YouSaid · the spoken record

Kastrup

lines on the record: 88
first: 1999-02-22
most recent: 2001-11-13
sittings or episodes: 11
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“We support Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi and his team. "The first and most urgent task is securing the immediate survival of the people of Afghanistan. In order to combine and increase the humanitarian efforts made by the international community, we have, as Chairman of the Afghanistan Support Group, convened a meeting in Berlin, to take place in early December. If necessary, such a meeting could be organized at an earlier date. This meeting is intended to send a signal of international solidarity with Afghanistan, in response to the appeal of the Secretary-General made this morning. "We stand ready, together with our European partners, to meet with the G-21 group of friends on Friday to lay the ground for a lasting framework - a signal of hope and of a new beginning."”
2001-11-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4414Resumption1 (2001) · source
“"We are very concerned about reports of recent atrocities which might jeopardize ongoing efforts for a political solution. A new political order in Afghanistan can claim legitimacy only if it respects universal human rights and international humanitarian law. The new Afghanistan must be created step by step. Wherever the Taliban's grasp on power has been broken, new hope must be raised through concrete humanitarian relief and reconstruction measures. An appeal to demilitarize the capital, Kabul, seems necessary and reasonable. "The United Nations must be able to count on broad international support in its quest to support the creation of viable political structures. This requires cooperation from those States which are particularly affected or are playing a major role. Germany and the European Union are ready to do their part.”
2001-11-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4414Resumption1 (2001) · source
“This is the prerequisite for stabilizing the situation and organizing relief and reconstruction. Clear political, economic and humanitarian objectives must now be defined. The mandate necessary to this end must be provided by a Security Council resolution. "There are four prime tasks: a major international effort to provide, rapidly and comprehensively, humanitarian aid to the suffering people of Afghanistan; support for the formation of a representative transitional government and the development of local and regional self-administration; the opening of economic and social perspectives by means of a comprehensive reconstruction programme ~ a kind of Marshall plan for Afghanistan; and the buttressing of the first three tasks by contributing to security and stability. The Northern Alliance also bears responsibility for this.”
2001-11-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4414Resumption1 (2001) · source
“"Secondly, the legitimate interests and concerns of the States neighbouring Afghanistan must be taken into consideration in the efforts to reach a solution. This could help avoid a unilateral instrumentalization of internal Afghan developments and prevent further interaction of a tragic nature with neighbouring States. The neighbouring States bear a large share of the responsibility for the success of the peace efforts. We appeal to them to cast off old modes of thought and to contribute to regional stability by showing a willingness to compromise. "Thirdly, a political solution must be legitimized and comprehensively backed by the United Nations. The internal Afghan powers must take responsibility for the solution, yet they will still require the assistance of the United Nations and the international community.”
2001-11-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4414Resumption1 (2001) · source
“They bear the main responsibility for the failure of the previous United Nations peace efforts in that country. "Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi, who provided us this morning with a clear and principled blueprint for the next steps ahead, deserves our respect and unanimous support for his most difficult task. He envisaged the steps ahead, which we should not hesitate to take. These steps are the following. "First, a solution must be found by the Afghan population that must reflect the diversity of the Afghan people and must be accepted by Afghans in an act of free self-determination. The first pressing goal should be the convening of a representative body, with a View to forming a transitional government that will agree on a peace plan and on its implementation.”
2001-11-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4414Resumption1 (2001) · source
“Rau, attended the opening of the Security Council meeting. "One thing is certain: a purely repressive response to terrorism will fail. This is a lesson we must not forget with regard to Afghanistan in particular. For more than 20 years, a murderous war, human rights violations and misery inflicted on millions of refugees have provided the nourishing ground for an unprecedented symbiosis between the Al Qaeda terrorist group and the Taliban regime. From there the trail leads directly to the monstrous attacks in the United States. "As hard as the decision may be, without military means we will not be able to destroy this hotbed of terror. We must not forget that the humanitarian catastrophe in Afghanistan is first and foremost the work of the Taliban.”
2001-11-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4414Resumption1 (2001) · source
“The German Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer, who had to return to Berlin last night, has asked me to read a statement that he had intended to make. "My country fully associates itself with the remarks made by the Belgian Foreign Minister, Mr. Michel, on behalf of the European Union. It is in view of my country's special commitments with regard to Afghanistan - the first being our chairmanship of the Afghanistan Support Group, and the second our traditional sponsorship of the annual draft resolution of the General Assembly on Afghanistan - that we would like to add some thoughts. Our interest in and political commitment to contributing to the multilateral effort aimed at designing a new political framework for the political future of Afghanistan was again highlighted this morning when our Federal President, Mr.”
2001-11-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4414Resumption1 (2001) · source
“But it remains a question of commitment and willingness on the part of every single Member State to lead coercive measures to success: to compliance with the United Nations Charter by the State concerned. Let me express my thanks to the Secretariat for its helpful role and its active participation. I would like also to thank the numerous Members of the United Nations that have participated in the process and enriched it. Finally, let me thank you again, Mr. President, for this opportunity to share the results of the Bonn-Berlin process with the Security Council.”
2001-10-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4394 (2001) · source
“My country is of the opinion that only targeted sanctions can achieve their goals. "Targeted" means concentrated on crucial issues, such as finances or arms, and focused on a specific group; it also means regular reconsideration of the sanctions regime and its consequences. The model resolutions included in the handbook that is before members should be regarded as a valuable point of reference that merits close consideration by the Council. We would hope that those texts will help Council members to draft or re- draft targeted sanctions to improve their efficiency. I cannot conclude without mentioning that even the most precise sanctions resolutions can fail if some Member States lack the political will to implement them. The recommendations set out in our documentation are aimed at achieving a better level of national implementation.”
2001-10-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4394 (2001) · source
“I hope that members of the Council will agree that, in the past, not every sanctions regime has been successful in this regard. The only measure for success is a halt to unacceptable behaviour. Some sanctions have not led to compliance with the United Nations Charter; others have had disproportionately negative side effects on civilian populations and/or on third States and, in the worst cases, a combination of both. Even the most equilibrated and fine-tuned sanctions still depend on a prognosis of the aggressor's behaviour. If a tool proves ineffective, it should be our obligation to reconsider and re-evaluate whether a change would serve better. A flexible response to continued outrageous misbehaviour is a sign not of resignation, but ofa smarter use of the legal tools.”
2001-10-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4394 (2001) · source
“When the Council members decide to apply sanctions, they speak on behalf of the whole membership of the United Nations. Generally speaking, sanctions should not be a punishment; rather, they should lead to compliance with the United Nations Charter. Amongst the States Members of the United Nations, there is consensus that a sanctions regime should neither hit the innocent civilian population nor affect non-target nations. It should focus on those responsible for the threat to international peace and security. Through sanctions, these people should become aware that the community of nations does not tolerate behaviour hostile to international peace and security, acting across borders or at home. In order to achieve this aim, thorough deliberations and careful drafting of resolutions are of the utmost importance.”
2001-10-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4394 (2001) · source
“We are convinced that the documentation before the Council can be very helpful in conceiving efficient sanctions regimes and in minimizing unintended negative impacts on civilian populations and third States. The primary aim of the United Nations is to maintain peace and security in the world. In order to maintain this goal, the Charter, in its Chapter VII, mandates the Security Council to impose certain coercive measures. The experience of recent years and months has shown that sanctions are and will remain an important tool of the Council in this context. All Member States are aware of the fact that imposing sanctions is a difficult step to take. All Council members, elected or non-elected, carry heavy responsibility in this regard.”
2001-10-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4394 (2001) · source
“It will be sent to all United Nations Member States and sets out model Security Council resolutions on arms embargoes and travel-related sanctions, accompanied by an extensive commentary. It also reflects, in two other documents, national implementation of those types of sanctions. Finally, a last report makes suggestions for the monitoring and enforcement of arms embargoes. Let me stress here that the Bonn-Berlin process and the handbook before the Council were construed not as representing the official view of the German federal Government, but rather as the result of the careful deliberations and discussions of various experts from different backgrounds. At the same time, however, my Government widely agrees with the outcome of the process.”
2001-10-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4394 (2001) · source
“In hindsight, this proved to be the right mix to tackle a difficult task, namely, to support the sanctions makers in the Security Council with model drafting language for resolutions and checklists for their better implementation. The two types of sanctions - arms embargoes and travel restrictions 4 were obviously not selected at random. Rather, they were identified because they help to focus the unavoidable coercive element of any sanctions regime on those most responsible for a threat to peace and security. Dealing with both issues at the same time seemed sufficiently concrete and politically desirable. I would like to submit today a handbook containing the practical results of the Bonn-Berlin process.”
2001-10-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4394 (2001) · source
“In 1998, Germany declared its preparedness, in close coordination with the United Nations Secretariat, to continue the process initiated successfully by Switzerland. Building on the experience gained by our Swiss colleagues on financial sanctions, we decided to involve civil society from the outset. Thus, we asked the Bonn International Center for Conversion, an independent organization with considerable expertise in the field of sanctions, to organize a series of conferences, seminars and workshops on the issues of arms embargoes and travel bans. The participants were diplomats and United Nations personnel, as well as experts from academia, non-governmental organizations and the private sector.”
2001-10-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4394 (2001) · source
“I thank you, Sir, for convening this meeting. Like the previous speaker, the Permanent Observer of Switzerland, I am grateful for the opportunity to present the results of the so-called Bonn-Berlin process. Today's session is another proof of the high importance attached to the question of sanctions by the Security Council. I am sure that we all share the same goals in this respect: minimizing the unintended effects of sanctions on the civilian population of the targeted country and on third countries. The results of both the Interlaken and the Bonn-Berlin processes are designed to help achieving these goals by introducing targeted or smart sanctions - in our case with respect to arms embargoes and travel bans. Let me briefly recall the history.”
2001-10-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4394 (2001) · source
“This solution should also take into account the admittedly extremely difficult situation of neighbouring States. We recall, in that context, Security Council resolution 1352 (2001), which confirmed the agreement among the members of the Security Council to work on new arrangements for Iraq, allowing 30 days to conclude these measures. We all know that the 30 days are about to expire in just a couple of days, but it seems much work still has to be done. In the interest of the Iraqi people and in the interest of the international community, the Security Council should meet this target.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“Furthermore, we expect that these new arrangements will, by clearly defining the goods and items on the Goods Review List, alleviate the problems that have led to the large number of applications being put on hold by the sanctions committee. The Security Council has a responsibility to develop a new strategy in a coherent and transparent manner. We welcome the fact that, after long-standing debate on civilian passage and cargo flights, the opportunity for a solution exists. These flights should be made possible through an easily implementable system that would allow for practical solutions, including the necessary inspections. We encourage the Security Council to work towards a concrete solution that will benefit the Iraqi people, while ensuring the compliance and cooperation of the Iraqi Government.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“We believe that a more transparent, practicable and targeted system could be created by improving the flow of commodities and products to Iraq, and at the same time, by creating more effective controls to prevent circumvention. This would lead to an environment that is conducive to the improvement of the humanitarian situation of the people. Such a new approach should allow for potentially growing civilian trade, including projects for infrastructure. In this context, the so-called Goods Review List is of paramount importance. Those goods and items have to be defined that will prevent the re- building of the military capabilities and capacities of Iraq and prevent the import of dual-use goods. In shaping this list, work should be undertaken in a target- oriented approach, making the list transparent, concise and, thus, implementable.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“We would like to recall the repeated concern raised by the Secretary- General that Iraq is not using the already existing mechanisms to their full potential. As this responsibility lies solely with the Iraqi Government, the international community has only limited influence. Nobody in Germany wants to see the Iraqi population suffer unnecessarily, but as long as the Government of Iraq does not comply with its international obligations, the question will not be whether to lift sanctions or not. The question will be how to improve the sanctions regime by making sanctions more targeted towards achievement of the objectives, by making them more efficient and by limiting their negative effects on the population of Iraq. We therefore welcome the ongoing discussions.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“The failure of the Government of Iraq to fulfil its obligations, most significantly visible through the continued denial of cooperation with the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency, prevents until this day, unfortunately, the lifting of sanctions. The difficult humanitarian situation in Iraq has been giving the international community reasons for concern practically throughout the existing sanctions regime against Iraq. The Security Council has repeatedly reacted to this situation, particularly through the inception of the oil-for-food programme and its subsequent changes and additions. It should be recalled that this programme was never intended to meet all the needs of the Iraqi population, but it is supposed to provide sufficient basic requirements.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“For Germany, it goes without saying that the best solution would be the lifting of sanctions, but, of course, only after full compliance by the Government of Iraq with all relevant Security Council resolutions, in particular the obligations contained in resolutions 687 (1991) and 1284 (1999). Unfortunately, we are still far away from this best solution. In this context, we have taken note of the new Russian draft resolution. We have strong doubts that it will contribute to the urgently needed consensus. The call for the implementation of Security Council resolutions 687 (1991) and 1284 (1999) remains valid. These resolutions define the obligations of Iraq in the areas of weapons of mass destruction and describe, at the same time, the way to the suspension and lifting of the sanctions.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“The Swedish Ambassador has spoken on behalf of the European Union. My country fully supports that statement, but we would like to offer some additional remarks. It is regrettable that the Security Council still has to discuss the sanctions regime on Iraq more than 10 years after the end of the Gulf War. My country is concerned about the humanitarian situation in Iraq, and we are, like many other Member States, determined to improve that situation. We want to emphasize, however - and I say this in the presence of the representative of the Iraqi Government -that it remains the responsibility of the Government of Iraq alone to improve the situation of its population.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“This morning the United States representative said that he would pray to continue this discussion in private meetings. Please, dear colleague, include us in your prayer.”
2000-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4223Resumption1 (2000) · source
“We are looking forward to a speedy implementation of those recommendations. We also welcome the Security Council's resolution (resolution 1327 (2000)) on the implementation of those recommendations adopted last Monday. Germany has already, at the national level, started to implement a number of the Panel's recommendations: conclusion of a stand-by agreement, international training facilities for civilian peacekeepers, financial contribution to the trust fund on crisis prevention, strengthening of the Lessons Learned Unit and active contributions to peace-building. We are strongly committed to using the Brahimi Report (8/2000/809) to bring about major and much-needed changes in the way the United Nations carries out its responsibility for maintaining international peace and stability.”
2000-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4223Resumption1 (2000) · source
“In preventing violent conflicts from re-emerging and in rebuilding the capabilities of a society to resolve conflicts without fighting, peace-building measures apply to situations where the worst has already happened, leaving behind traumas to heal, minefields to clear, infrastructure to rebuild, former combatants to disarm and refugees to repatriate. Other elements might include post-conflict governance, emergency assistance, first steps towards economic stabilization, health care and the coordination of international and local actors. In concluding I would like to underline what I have said at the beginning. It is very encouraging that the Brahimi Panel and its implementation plan presented by Deputy Secretary-General Louise Frechette have addressed many of the above-mentioned elements.”
2000-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4223Resumption1 (2000) · source
“It is clear that in practice such clear distinctions do not occur. Overlapping tasks and multi-functional operations are the norm. The need for effective coordination of all potential actors and for integrated actions is therefore evident. Tenth, specific components of post-conflict peace-building should therefore be included early on in peace agreements, when setting up new peace missions, but especially when concluding mandates. Without those elements the lasting success of peace missions cannot be expected.”
2000-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4223Resumption1 (2000) · source
“The fact that the first elections have been held can seldom be the concluding point for peace operations. Elections can be held too soon in conflict- ridden societies or can result in even increased fragmentation of the societies. International monitoring must therefore often continue throughout the electoral process and even beyond in order to enable a smooth transition. Criteria for the achievement of a lasting, self-sustained peace are vague. However, they should include the rule of law and functioning of civil institutions. Ninth, peace missions must be seen as a multifold continuum of tasks. Complex peace processes are getting more and more multidimensional. It is important to address the integrated tasks that stretch from conflict prevention all the way to peace-building.”
2000-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4223Resumption1 (2000) · source
“Sixth, heads of any mission and their staff should remain focused and concentrated on achieving the defined goals and objectives of their mandate, resisting any temptations to gradually extend their authority and jurisdiction into areas that are not explicitly covered by the mandate. The experience of the United Nations- mandated operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina is a good case to study to this end. Seventh, mandates must include enough built-in flexibility so that corrections, adaptations to changing situations and fine tuning during the mission implementation is possible. Close cooperation and coordination between "ground zero" forces and headquarters is indispensable. Eighth, while understanding the reasons for quick pull-outs, it is important to set high threshold criteria for withdrawals.”
2000-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4223Resumption1 (2000) · source
“In this context, I should like to remind the Council of the impact that the Security Council's mandates for Kosovo, Bosnia and Sierra Leone had on neighbouring countries in the respective regions. Third, when altering or ending a mandate, a clear scenario and analysis of options must be put together to evaluate the consequences of the intended action. Fourth, the provisions of the mandates have to be clear, credible and achievable, and they must provide for adequate resources. Fifth, when a mission is to be reduced, withdrawn or terminated, a transparent and proper assessment of the achievement of the mission's goals must be undertaken.”
2000-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4223Resumption1 (2000) · source
“The tools to achieve this objective include a special representative of the Secretary-General; close consultations with the affected Member States and potential or actual troop contributors; a strengthened capability on the part of the Secretariat - as pointed out by the representative of France this morning - to gather information, analyse and plan strategically; and close contacts with civil organizations on the ground. This requires a better linkage between the Security Council, troop contributors and countries contributing to policing and civilian operations. Second, an integrated approach also means taking into account the repercussions for neighbouring countries of a mandate that is new, altered or has ended. This is a point that has not yet been touched on.”
2000-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4223Resumption1 (2000) · source
“It is clear that there are no standard models and that each actual or potential conflict requires its own analysis and response, as was rightly pointed out by our colleague, the representative of Bangladesh, this morning. Nevertheless, lessons learned have led to the following preliminary conclusions, which I should like to sum up in 10 points. Of course, as I am the 15th speaker, certain repetitions cannot be avoided. First, before setting up, altering or ending a mandate, it is essential to have a clear, reliable assessment of the situation on the ground which is agreed upon by all important actors.”
2000-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4223Resumption1 (2000) · source
“In talking about an exit strategy, one should first define and agree on the term itself. What does it mean? The Withdrawal of a mission in case of emergency? The transition from one type of peace operation to another? The gradual handover from United Nations to national or local responsibility? Or the assessment of the successful fulfilment of a mission's mandate? Other multinational organizations or national bodies may have their own definition of "exit strategy", but the Security Council must have a clear one of its own. Workable mandates are not possible otherwise. There is no magic formula to ensure a perfect Security Council mandate, but there are elements which should be taken into account when drafting, changing or ending a Security Council mandate.”
2000-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4223Resumption1 (2000) · source
“Mr. President, I should like to commend you and the Dutch delegation for having convened this thematic debate and for resuming our discussion punctually. This debate is indeed timely. The recommendations of the Brahimi Panel on the reform of UN peacekeeping are on everybody's mind these days. The Security Council has just completed its work on its implementation document, and the General Assembly is still deliberating on the recommendations and will - hopefully - soon come up with a substantive document. Many of the report's recommendations are related to today's brainstorming- the quality of Security Council mandates, the comprehensive definition of peace operations, the timely deployment of adequately equipped troops, the efficient coordination of all actors, and a better flow of information.”
2000-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4223Resumption1 (2000) · source
“As the Canadian Foreign Minister said a couple of minutes ago, it should be recognized that targeted sanctions are not an end in themselves, but rather elements of a comprehensive political strategy designed to achieve the peaceful resolution of conflicts.”
2000-04-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4128 (2000) · source
“We are working towards the holding of a second seminar to present the findings of the working groups in Berlin in November this year. We will be happy to provide the results to the working group of the Security Council, in the hope that the results will help to provide the Council with an improved set of tools if and when there is the need to impose sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter. Germany is strongly committed to the process of targeting sanctions in order to minimize the impact on civilian populations and third countries. When this goal is achieved, sanctions imposed under the Charter will find wider acceptance among Member States of the Organization, which in our view is a very important aspect. We hope that our initiative will be a valuable contribution towards improving sanctions.”
2000-04-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4128 (2000) · source
“Among the participants invited by my Government were representatives from a number of countries currently serving on the Security Council, officials from other United Nations Member States, representatives of regional and non-governmental organizations - which, in our view, are very important - scholars, experts from the private sector and, last but not least, officials from the Secretariat. That first conference provided an excellent opportunity for the participants to review the current successes, but also the shortcomings, of arms embargoes and travel sanctions. This year, four working groups are going to meet in order to develop concrete recommendations on how to improve the implementation and monitoring of these sanctions.”
2000-04-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4128 (2000) · source
“He has therefore encouraged the Security Council, the General Assembly and Member States to consider possible ways to render sanctions a less blunt and more effective instrument. He has specifically welcomed the fact that the concept of "smart" sanctions seeks to exert pressure on regimes rather than on people, thus reducing humanitarian costs. He has also welcomed the fact that this concept has been gaining support among Member States. Encouraged by the remarks of the Secretary-General, the German Government accepted the challenge to assist in exploring ways to make arms embargoes and travel sanctions "smarter" by targeting them. A first experts seminar was held in Bonn in November of last year, with more than 60 participants from 21 countries.”
2000-04-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4128 (2000) · source
“I of course associate myself fully with the statement made by our Portuguese colleague on behalf of the European Union. I have asked for the floor to make some additional remarks because the German Government has initiated a process that should lead to concrete suggestions on how to enhance the role of arms embargoes and travel sanctions. If that is called the Bonn- Berlin process, as was done this morning by the Permanent Representative of Russia, we would certainly not object. What are our terms of reference? The Secretary- General has often stressed the value of sanctions under the Charter as a tool in exerting pressure on offenders without the use of force. He has, however, also expressed concern about their negative effects on the civilian population, as well as on third States.”
2000-04-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4128 (2000) · source
“With regard to the options to be explored in connection with the security needs of the Mission, as mentioned in the Secretary-General's report, Germany would like to draw the attention of the Council to the experience of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia, which could be taken into consideration for UNMIBH as well. I thank you, Sir, for the Council's attention and, once again, for the opportunity to take the floor on this occasion.”
2000-03-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4117 (2000) · source
“Given the fact that the implementation of the reform of the judicial system has just started, and that it is highly likely that there will be attempts to obstruct this process, Germany would like to know how this reform will be furthered and which body will be responsible for the supervision of the judicial reform process. This question has already been asked by other participants in this meeting. My country welcomes the measures undertaken by UNMIBH to raise the qualification standards for the personnel of the International Police Task Force. In View of the focus on co-location and consultancy tasks, those higher standards will be essential if these tasks are to be successfully carried out.”
2000-03-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4117 (2000) · source
“We share the Secretary-General's concerns about the continuing obstruction by Bosnian-Herzegovinan Croat politicians in Mostar. Successful integration of the police force and of the administration in general in Mostar would set a precedent and allow for a breakthrough elsewhere in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Germany is ready to cooperate with UNMIBH and with the High Representative in pursuing this goal. To this end, we would be grateful to learn what steps UNMIBH and the High Representative plan for the near future. The Secretary-General's report states that the judicial assessment programme will have concluded its task by the end of this year.”
2000-03-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4117 (2000) · source
“The early adoption of an electoral law and the provision of sufficient budgetary resources to implement it would be visible proof of the maturity of the political leadership of Bosnia and Herzegovina and of their capability to take ownership of their affairs. I would like to associate myself with the remarks of my French colleague, who spoke of the need for the leaders of Bosnia and Herzegovina to take hold of their country's destiny. In this context, we would like to learn more about the experience so far with the implementation of the State Border Service Law, in particular with the responsible authority for the Border Service. It would also be of interest to know whether Bosnia and Herzegovina will provide adequate funds in its budget for the implementation of the Law. What are the planned next steps?”
2000-03-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4117 (2000) · source
“My country welcomes the report of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the progress in implementing their New York Declaration of 15 November 1999, and I listened carefully and with the greatest interest to what our colleague from Bosnia and Herzegovina told us today. The commitments made in this Declaration are well on their way towards being translated into concrete measures. Germany, however, cannot but express disappointment that, once again, progress was possible only after the intervention of the High Representative. We hope that in the future the political leadership of Bosnia and Herzegovina will be able to live up to their responsibilities.”
2000-03-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4117 (2000) · source
“But please allow me to make a few remarks as the representative of a country that is heavily involved in the peace process. We share the view expressed by the Secretary-General and repeated by Mr. Annabi today that there is slow progress in the implementation of the Dayton/Paris Agreement as well as in that of the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH). Germany is therefore of the opinion that - despite other crises in the region which are requiring the full attention and commitment of large resources - the mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina is far from being finished. We therefore call on Member States to maintain their involvement at a high level so as not to lose the momentum created over the past four years.”
2000-03-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4117 (2000) · source
“I appreciate that Member States that are not members of the Council but are highly involved in the implementation of the Dayton/Paris Peace Agreement are being given an opportunity to express their Views on the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. My Government very much welcomes this step towards more transparent and, therefore, credible work by the Council. I would like to thank all those who have supported us and ask for the understanding of those who have been reluctant so far. We have suggested, as Council members know, that the speaking time of non-members be limited to not more than five minutes. I will try to live up to that self- imposed restriction. First of all, I would like to associate myself with the statement made on behalf of the European Union by the Portuguese presidency.”
2000-03-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4117 (2000) · source
“We highly appreciate their hard work and their commitment, in particular their readiness to risk their personal safety. These men and women risk their lives to keep the United Nations presence in East Timor and to help the East Timorese who fled to the UNAMET compound in Dili.”
1999-09-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4043Resumption1 (1999) · source
“Germany strongly calls upon the Government of Indonesia to assist the deployment of international humanitarian staff to Indonesia and to provide all the necessary security for their work. We are ready to provide, as a first step, DMl million for humanitarian assistance. We expect the Indonesian Government to take immediate and efficient measures in line with the commitments agreed upon on 5 May 1999. A breach of these commitments cannot be without consequences. In its capacity as presidency of the G-8, Germany will attach particular importance to the developments in East Timor at the forthcoming G-8 Foreign Ministers' meeting to be held during the forthcoming session of the General Assembly here in New York. Let me conclude by expressing our greatest gratitude to the staff of the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET).”
1999-09-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4043Resumption1 (1999) · source
“The German Government has also been in constant close contact with other Governments to increase the common pressure on the Indonesian Government. We are not willing to tolerate any longer the atrocities in East Timor. The killings and the suffering of the East Timorese people must be stopped immediately. We therefore wholeheartedly support the Secretary-General in his assertion that the time has come for Indonesia to seek help from the international community in fulfilling its responsibility. We are encouraged by signs of flexibility on the part of the Indonesian authorities, but they have to deliver. The international community must also start to concentrate its efforts on the need for urgent humanitarian assistance to be provided to the East Timorese people.”
1999-09-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4043Resumption1 (1999) · source
“It is evident that parts of the Indonesian military forces are aiding and supporting the militia Violence, either by direct collaboration or by tolerating the atrocities. Action has to be taken now. The militias must be disarmed. The use of force and violence must be stopped immediately. In the last few days Germany, like others, has pressed the Indonesian authorities to act as quickly as possible to stop the unacceptable chaos in East Timor and, should this not be possible, to accept international assistance. Up to now, Indonesia has not accepted this international offer. Federal Chancellor Schroder has had direct contact with President Habibie, as has Foreign Minister Fischer with his Indonesian colleague Mr. Alatas.”
1999-09-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4043Resumption1 (1999) · source