YouSaid · the spoken record

Kim Won-Soo

lines on the record

24

first

2016-08-23

most recent

2017-04-05

sittings or episodes

3

sources

un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

1. “On our part, we would like to reassure the members of the Security Council that the OPCW and United Nations secretariats will provide every possible support to the work ofboth the Fact-finding Mission and the JIM so that these missions will discharge their mandates in an independent, impartial and professional manner. We look forward to the deliberations of and continuing guidance from the Security Council.”

   2017-04-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7915 (2017) · source

2. “With this determination, the international community has made tremendous efforts, symbolized by three consecutive joint missions of the OPCW and the United Nations over the past four years, to stop the impunity for chemical-weapons use from growing any further. Despite these efforts, however, it is profoundly disturbing to witness the tragic consequences of the continued use of chemical weapons on innocent civilians. We are grateful to the Security Council for addressing this issue with unity, including through the creation and renewal of the JIM.”

   2017-04-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7915 (2017) · source

3. “As has been done in the past, I expect that all members of the Security Council, and all Member States in a position to do so, will provide information and access to both the Mission and the JIM. in order to facilitate the collection ofevidence for the establishment of facts. The Secretary-General is deeply disturbed by the continuing reports of the alleged use of chemical weapons in Khan Shaykhun and elsewhere in Syria. The Secretary-General recalls that the Security Council has repeatedly determined that the use of chemical weapons anywhere constitutes a threat to international peace and security as well as a serious violation of international law.”

   2017-04-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7915 (2017) · source

4. “Should any Fact Finding Mission report conclude that an incident involved or likely involved the use of toxic chemicals as weapons, it will provide the basis for the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) to begin its work to attribute responsibility for their use. The investigative capacity of the JIM. is now operational. It is based in The Hague owing to the obvious need for it to work closely with the OPCW teams. It will be fully ready to begin its work as soon as the Mission reaches its conclusions. The political and other support structures of the JIM. in New York are likewise operational, with a liaison presence in Damascus soon to be established.”

   2017-04-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7915 (2017) · source

5. “A number of outstanding issues related to Syria's declaration still remain open. The high-level consultations between the OPCW and the Government of Syria to address these unresolved issues will resume in The Hague in early May. The first OPCW inspection at the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC) took place starting last February. During this inspection, OPCW inspectors took samples, which are now being analysed by OPCW-designated laboratories. Thirdly, on investigations into alleged chemical attacks, the OPCW Fact Finding Mission is looking at a number of incidents that have taken place over the past several months. It is in the process of finalizing its reporting, and this should be done in some weeks' time.”

   2017-04-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7915 (2017) · source

6. “I would like now to turn to my monthly briefing on work regarding the Syrian chemical file. First, on destruction, for the last three years following Syria's initial declaration, all declared chemical materials and equipment have been removed or destroyed. Four hangars and seven tunnels have been disabled. One hangar and two above-ground stationary facilities remain subject to verification of their disablement. This work is still pending, mainly due to the prevailing security situation around these facilities. For this work to be complete, the OPCW, the Syrian Arab Republic and the United Nations Office for Project Services extended the tripartite agreement until the end of this year. Secondly, on the declaration assessment, for the past three years the OPCW has worked with the Syrian Arab Republic to assess and verify the declaration.”

   2017-04-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7915 (2017) · source

7. “If confirmed, this would constitute the single largest chemical-weapons attack in the Syrian Arab Republic since the attack on eastern Ghouta, in August 2013. Reports have stated that the attack was carried out through an airstrike on a residential area. However, the means of delivery of the alleged attack cannot be definitively confirmed at this stage. Reports have also indicated that the presentation of symptoms after the attack included respiratory problems, vomiting, fainting and foaming at the mouth, as well as miosis, or pupillary constriction. This was visible in videos on social media said to have been taken at the scene of the attack. During my discussions yesterday with the charge' d'affaires of the Syrian Arab Republic, he stated that his Government denied having used chemical weapons in this attack or any other attack.”

   2017-04-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7915 (2017) · source

8. “Currently, details about the attack are not fully known, but, according to the most recent media reports, a chemical attack may have caused the deaths of at least 70 civilians, with perhaps more than 200 injured. Both the Secretary-General and the OPCW Director General issued statements expressing grave concern about these reports and reiterating their condemnation of any chemical-weapons use. I have been in close contact with the Director- General since the first reports came in yesterday. He informed me that the OPCW Fact Finding Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic is actively engaged in gathering and analysing information from all available sources and will be prepared to deploy a team at the earliest opportunity.”

   2017-04-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7915 (2017) · source

9. “Mr. Kim Won-soo: I would like to thank you, Madam President, for the opportunity to brief the Council on the Syrian chemical file, undertaken in furtherance of Security Council resolutions 2118 (2013), 2235 (2015) and 2319 (2016). But I will do so with a heavy heart. Since yesterday morning, I have been in close contact with the Director General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). I also met with the charge' d'affaires of the Syrian Arab Republic in New York. I will first brief the Security Council on the most recent reported use of chemical weapons, in Khan Shaykhun, in Idlib, Syria. At this point, information is still coming in.”

   2017-04-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7915 (2017) · source

10. “I would like to close by repeating the Secretary- General's many calls, and the Deputy Secretary- General's call made this morning before my statement, that the ultimate guarantee against any use of a weapon of mass destruction is through their total and irreversible elimination.”

    2016-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7837 (2016) · source

11. “For that purpose, our Office will do our best to support the Chair and the members of the Committee in their assessment of how to make the best use of the available resources, including streamlining support structures. Today's debate is a welcome reaffirmation of the gravity with which the Security Council treats the threats and risks posed by weapons of mass destruction. We count on Council members to continue to safeguard international peace and security, not only by announcing preventative measures through resolution 1540 (2004), but also by looking ahead at response challenges in the eventuality that prevention fails. The consequences of an attack would be disastrous and we must be prepared.”

    2016-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7837 (2016) · source

12. “We commend the call of resolution 2325 (2016) on all States to voluntarily contribute to the United Nations Trust Fund for Global and Regional Disarmament Activities. We want to reiterate our readiness to better match donors with recipients. We intend to raise the quality of assistance alongside the quantity. Last, but not least, are the institutional issues. As recognized by the Council, the 1540 Committee needs institutional support that is fit for purpose in our fast-changing security environment. We must ensure that the resources at the disposal of the Committee, the Office for Disarmament Affairs and the Expert Group - through both a regular budget and voluntary funding - are being used in the most efficient and effective way possible.”

    2016-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7837 (2016) · source

13. “That might include the development of industry codes of conduct and ethical standards on dual-use technologies with proliferation risks for weapons of mass destruction. The third priority is capability. Since the last comprehensive review, the 1540 Committee and its Expert Group, in partnership with the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, our Office, have substantially expanded their outreach. In the last five years, 188 States have participated in those outreach activities. That is a significant achievement but it is not enough, given the growing threats and risks, as well the needs of Member States. Unfortunately, our capacity to respond to requests for help from Member States is declining. Donors have been generous, but the gap between the needs and the available resources is growing.”

    2016-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7837 (2016) · source

14. “The international community cannot afford to lag behind a technological curve. The 1540 Committee could build on the request made in resolution 2325 (2016) and hold an open meeting next year on technological and scientific issues. Such a meeting could address the following two issues. First, emerging technologies and scientific development could have potential weapons of mass destruction capabilities or can be adapted as a means of delivery must be assessed; and secondly, we must consider how to prevent their misuse while safeguarding peaceful applications. The 1540 Committee could also utilize its interaction with the industry through the Wiesbaden process, in order to further elaborate how the private sector can self- regulate to prevent the misuse of technology.”

    2016-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7837 (2016) · source

15. “One near-term step, as reflected in the new resolution, could be to enhance the information sharing mechanism on biological threats and risks between States, international organizations and regional organizations. For our part, the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs will continue to strengthen the Secretary-General's Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, in line with the recommendation of the 2013 lessons- learned exercise. The Mechanism is the only instrument at our disposal to investigate if a biological instrument occurs. The second is disruptive technology. I welcome the resolution's call for Member States to take into account the rapid advances in science and technology and to control intangible transfers of technology and information.”

    2016-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7837 (2016) · source

16. “Bolivia has big shoes to fill, but we also hope that it will take the work of the 1540 Committee to a much higher level. The Deputy Secretary-General has just given us a sharp reminder that the threats and risks of a non-State actor acquiring a weapon of mass destruction are not receding. How to tackle these threats and risks is a decision for Member States to make, but I would like to highlight three priorities. The first is biological weapons. The resolution just adopted recognizes the growing threats and risks associated with biological weapons. The need to address these threats and risks is all the more important given that the recent Review Conference of the Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention fell short of expectations. There is much more work to be done in implementing preventative measures for biological weapons.”

    2016-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7837 (2016) · source

17. “Mr. Kim Won-soo: At the outset, I too would like to thank the Spanish presidency ofthe Security Council for organizing this open debate and allowing me to brief the Council. I congratulate the Security Council on its adoption of resolution 2325 (2016), endorsing the comprehensive review of resolution 1540 (2004). My deep appreciation also goes to the Government of Spain, and in particular Ambassador Oyarzun Marchesi, for their tireless work in chairing the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) for the past two years. Under Spain's stewardship, resolution 1540 (2004) has been enhanced as a bulwark against the possible proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to non-State actors. I also congratulate the Plurinational State of Bolivia for taking up the chairmanship of the 1540 Committee in anticipation.”

    2016-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7837 (2016) · source

18. “The United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs is at the disposal of Council members to provide whatever assistance is required.”

    2016-08-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7758 (2016) · source

19. “In conclusion, I want to reiterate the Secretary- General's key point, namely, the need for accelerated action in disarmament and non-proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction. The ultimate way to reduce the risk of a non-State actor using a WMD is through their complete and irreversible elimination. Achieving a world free of weapons of mass destruction is the collective responsibility of all States. Overcoming divisions in approaches requires inclusive dialogue, commitment, flexibility and creativity by all States. Today's debate is a demonstration of Security Council members' commitment to pursuing the crucial challenge of preventing WMD proliferation. We hope that Council members will continue to show such leadership until we have achieved our shared goal of a world free of weapons of mass destruction.”

    2016-08-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7758 (2016) · source

20. “Koblentz indicated, the repercussions of such an attack would be multiplied by exploiting new technological advances, such as genetic engineering and unmanned aerial vehicles, just to name two. Subsequently, it would almost certainly become a complex international health and humanitarian emergency, disrupting law and order. It would require the coordination and deployment of a wide array of agencies at the national, regional and multilateral levels. In such an event, the international community would likely turn to the United Nations, as was the case in the recent response to the Ebola virus. We have made some progress in developing investigative mechanisms, but any international response will go beyond an investigation. The international community needs to think hard about what to do in advance of such an eventuality.”

    2016-08-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7758 (2016) · source

21. “Both the comprehensive review of resolution 1540 (2004) and the Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction to be held in November are opportunities to consider how those instruments can be strengthened and enhanced to provide crucial prevention and preparedness. The second issue is how the international community should respond if prevention fails. Despite our concerted prevention efforts, a CBRN attack may happen - with repercussions that are likely to go beyond the remit of a concerned international agency. or the capacity of the attacked country. As Mr.”

    2016-08-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7758 (2016) · source

22. “In this journey, today's debate and the ongoing comprehensive review of resolution 1540 (2014) are important landmarks. If we ask ourselves whether the international community is prepared to address the full scope of CBRN threats and risks, unfortunately the answer is not yet. We have significant gaps in a number of areas. The Joint Investigative Mechanism is one example ofa body that needs to fill the gap in identifying the perpetrators of chemical-weapon attacks. I want to highlight two points that the international community must examine in the international architecture. The first point relates to biological threats and risks. With the increasing reports of terrorist groups seeking to acquire biological materials, we need to ensure that the investment in preventing biological incidents is commensurate to the threat and risk.”

    2016-08-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7758 (2016) · source

23. “That includes through better reporting, adding or reinforcing legislation, assistance benefits, regional cooperation and national action plans. Similarly, the Secretary-General's mechanism for investigation of alleged use of chemical and biological weapons has demonstrated its utility in responding to allegations of chemical-weapon use. I hope that when the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Joint Investigative Mechanism submits its report to the Council tomorrow it will fulfil its mandate to identify the perpetrators of such horrific acts. The Nuclear Security Summit process has contributed to raising awareness of, and preparedness against. the dangers posed by nuclear and radiological terrorism. But much more still needs to be done. This is a long journey.”

    2016-08-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7758 (2016) · source

24. “Mr. Kim Won-soo: At the outset, I would like to thank you, Mr. President, for this opportunity to address the Security Council today and to congratulate Malaysia for hosting this timely debate. Secretary- General Ban Ki-moon just provided us with a strategic overview of the global challenges posed by weapons of mass destruction (WMD). I would like to add a few words about the challenges posed by chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) materials and on Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). The international community has made sound progress in trying to prevent, investigate and respond to CBRN threats and risks. Resolution 1540 (2004) has enabled the international community to make advances in addressing the proliferation of WMDs to non-State actors.”

    2016-08-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7758 (2016) · source