YouSaid · the spoken record

Kirpichenko

lines on the record
12
first
2022-09-07
most recent
2022-10-25
sittings or episodes
3
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un-security-council

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  1. Our Syrian colleagues will once again have to fill in the blanks today and discuss the aspects of their interaction with the Technical Secretariat that are not mentioned in the report. We will refrain meanwhile from wasting our breath. It is clear that the timetable for discussing the implementation of resolution 2118 (2013) in the Security Council must be streamlined. Discussing the Syrian chemical weapons dossier every month will remain a pointless exercise until Mr. Arias deigns to address the Council as would befit a responsible international civil servant of his rank, especially given that the matter is discussed quarterly even at OPCW headquarters in The Hague.

    2022-10-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9164 (2022) · source

  2. Today’s meeting will be remembered only for the most recent refusal of OPCW Director-General Fernando Arias to brief the Council. He seems panicked about answering the inconvenient questions that the Technical Secretariat was asked about remedying its politicized approach to the Syrian chemical weapons dossier and the manipulation of the report of the Fact- Finding Mission on the Douma incident. We reiterate once again that the content of the reports of the OPCW Director-General are unbalanced, repeat the same accusations against the Syrians and are tailored for one purpose — to create the impression that the dialogue between OPCW and the Syrian Arab Republic is stalled solely as a result of the Syrian side’s alleged unwillingness to cooperate.

    2022-10-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9164 (2022) · source

  3. Mr. Kirpichenko (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We take note of Mrs. Nakamitsu’s briefing. Unfortunately, once again we heard nothing substantially new and were presented with the copy-and-paste report (see S/2022/727, annex) of the Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which was moreover issued on 30 September, almost one month ago. It is our understanding that the next meeting of the Security Council on the subject may be held as early as the beginning of November, and a new report will be issued in just a few days. What is therefore the point of discussing today a document that is already outdated? Such an approach undermines the credibility of the Security Council’s discussion of the implementation of resolution 2118 (2013).

    2022-10-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9164 (2022) · source

  4. The truce provisions have on the whole been complied with, with an insignificant number of violations, and this has improved the day-to-day lives of Yemeni people. Nonetheless, the humanitarian situation in the country remains dire. The residents of many regions, including those in Taiz, are suffering a shortage of the most basic necessities. We firmly believe that despite the clear backsliding on the political track, the provision of food and medicine to the Yemeni people should continue on a non-discriminatory basis. In this regard, we call for work to be continued with international financial organizations and for the relevant efforts of specialized United Nations bodies to be maintained. Any limitations on the provisions of humanitarian assistance or any obstacles for the work of humanitarian personnel are not acceptable.

    2022-10-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9152 (2022) · source

  5. That gives us reason to believe that the parties are not completely abandoning the idea of returning to the negotiating table and resolve mutual tensions through diplomatic channels. The Security Council should help them in this. We view the extension of the ceasefire in Yemen for a longer duration and its eventual expansion, including into security and economic areas, as the only way out for this country. We hope that the parties will be able to overcome their differences and that conditions conducive to further stabilization and transition to a full-fledged political process will be created. We wish to recall the numerous benefits for ordinary Yemenis of the six-month truce, including the establishment of fuel deliveries through the Al-Hudaydah ports and the maintenance of commercial flights from Sana’a airport.

    2022-10-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9152 (2022) · source

  6. We see no alternative to finding the necessary political solutions through broad intra-Yemeni dialogue with the participation of all parties to the conflict. Only direct negotiations between the official Yemeni authorities and the Ansar Allah movement on the issues that have accumulated will break the deadlock. We would note that even under current conditions, the leading Yemeni political forces clearly recognize the danger of sliding back into full-fledged military confrontation, and, for the moment, they have refrained from measures that would lead to further escalation. Hostilities that have resumed in a number of Yemeni provinces are sporadic in nature. In any event, at present, the situation on the ground is better than the circumstances that prevailed prior to the initial announcement of the ceasefire.

    2022-10-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9152 (2022) · source

  7. We believe that the members of the Security Council need to do their utmost to convince the sides in Yemen to pursue dialogue on the most urgent issues, even in the absence of a signed ceasefire agreement. At the same time, we emphasize that attempts to antagonize one of the parties to the conflict and make it solely responsible for the current situation will not help to bring about a settlement. We call on the Yemeni sides to show maximum restraint, refrain from provocations and continue to work constructively with the Special Envoy. For our part, we will continue to provide all possible assistance to the United Nations mediation. We maintain contacts with all leading political forces in Yemen and are actively encouraging them to make compromises. We call on all States that can influence the stakeholders in Yemen to take similar action.

    2022-10-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9152 (2022) · source

  8. Mr. Kirpichenko (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank Special Envoy Hans Grundberg and the Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Ms. Msuya, for their briefings on the political and humanitarian developments in Yemen. The renewed truce between the Yemeni authorities and the Ansar Allah movement that had been in effect since April expired on 2 October. Unfortunately, the sides failed to agree on the further renewal of the agreement. Nevertheless, we commend the efforts of Mr. Grundberg and his team, who continue to try and find some common ground between the Presidential Leadership Council and the Houthis, even in that hopeless situation. At this stage, our main task is to prevent a full- fledged military escalation. A resumption of hostilities would result in a political and humanitarian disaster.

    2022-10-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9152 (2022) · source

  9. Those include terrorist attacks on towns and cities and on positions and bases of ATMIS and the Somali National Army. Our main message today is for the Somali Government to focus its efforts on increasing the effectiveness of the security and law enforcement agencies, including the Somali National Army, so that the Government can effectively ensure independent control over the security situation throughout the country.

    2022-09-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9125 (2022) · source

  10. We consider the presence of the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) to be one of the most important factors in deterring extremist and other illegal activity, as well as a guarantee of steady movement towards strengthening statehood in the country. We believe it important for the Somalis themselves to take an active part in the discussion of issues relating to the strategic goals, mandate, size, composition and financing of ATMIS. Nonetheless, we are concerned about the significant uptick in the activities of the Al-Shabaab group, which controls vast areas in the south and centre of Somalia. Al-Shabaab militants periodically successfully carry out high-profile attacks that result in a large number of victims.

    2022-09-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9125 (2022) · source

  11. We commend the conclusion of the electoral process, including elections to both chambers of the Somali Parliament, the election of the President of the country and the appointment of the Prime Minister and the new Federal Government. We hope that all participants in the Somali political process, including the leaders of the states of Jubaland, Puntland and Somaliland, will continue to work together with Mogadishu in order to establish a sustainable model for federal governance in the country. Moreover, we firmly believe in the need to ensure the unity and territorial integrity of Somalia. We commend the work of the African peacekeepers who play a key role in counter-terrorism.

    2022-09-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9125 (2022) · source

  12. Mr. Kirpichenko (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We are grateful to Special Representative of the Secretary-General James Swan, as well as to Ms. Fiona Lortan, Deputy Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission for Somalia and Acting Head of the African Union Mission in Somalia, for their substantive briefings. We also listened to the briefing delivered by Ms. Annette Weber, Special Representative of the European Union for the Horn of Africa. Russia is closely following the developments in the situation in the Federal Republic of Somalia, which today faces serious challenges — a deep-rooted fragmentation of society, a terrorist threat and a country-wide large-scale drought. We have consistently supported the efforts of the Somali leadership to stabilize the domestic political situation.

    2022-09-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9125 (2022) · source