YouSaid · the spoken record

Klein

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2000-06-13
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2017-06-06
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un-security-council

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  1. One element is a comprehensive 2002-2005 Dayton Implementation Plan, with benchmarks and timelines, endorsed by key international bodies - the United Nations, the Peace Implementation Council, the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization a and including guaranteed multi- year funding of the agreed programmes. The implementation of the agreed plan should prepare the country for the commencement of European integration, which ultimately is the only long-term basis for stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the wider region.

    2001-09-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4379 (2001) · source

  2. With respect to the specific goals and directions of streamlining, I emphasized that the establishment of the rule of law has to be a core task of the international peace implementation effort and that without it the other three core goals - refugee return, institution building and economic development - cannot be achieved. Council members may ask what is the optimum manner in which to carry out the core tasks. On the basis of extensive United Nations and personal experience in the region, I believe that streamlining should be based on the following key elements.

    2001-09-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4379 (2001) · source

  3. Also, decisions must be made in the coming months about the future of United Nations peace operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Next month, UNMIBH must present its budget for the period July 2002 to June 2003. Bearing in mind that the UNMIBH core mandate is scheduled for completion in December 2002, I seek your guidance on what should remain in 2003, other than an administrative liquidation presence. Last week, at Ambassador Petritsch's invitation, I addressed the Peace Implementation Council Steering Board in Brussels. I noted that any decision regarding a continued United Nations peacekeeping presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina after 2002 is the sole prerogative of the Security Council.

    2001-09-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4379 (2001) · source

  4. Turning now to streamlining, I have consistently maintained that as long as the international community continues to pursue a piecemeal approach to the Balkans, in which loose coordination among a multitude of actors is an unsatisfactory substitute for purposeful planning, the real opportunities to close a tragic decade of war and instability will go begging. Streamlining presents a unique and long-overdue opportunity to correct the deficiencies in the structure and activities of the current international presence. But this opportunity can be realized only if streamlining moves beyond mere ad hoc downsizing of existing international operations and organizations and is instead based on an agreed international strategic vision and plan that has the authority and support of the Security Council.

    2001-09-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4379 (2001) · source

  5. From recent discussions in Brussels and in Sarajevo, I believe that the will is there, but additional funding is required for accommodation and equipment to enable these units to operate in company-size formations. This week, UNMIBH began training the second group of 26 military observers for deployment to Ethiopia and Eritrea. The second contingent of civilian police has been deployed to East Timor. By the end of this year, I expect that a multi-ethnic composite logistics unit of over 120 military personnel will be ready for deployment to other United Nations peace operations.

    2001-09-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4379 (2001) · source

  6. In Sarajevo, the Ministry of the Interior, apparently under instructions from members of the Alliance parties, has completely failed to nominate even one candidate, out of 1,800 local police, who meets the simple criteria we have set out - namely, eight years of police experience, not a political office holder and a clean wartime criminal and housing record. I find this to be extraordinary and unacceptable behaviour from political parties who claim to be serious partners with us and the rest of the international community. UNMIBH is also engaged in constructive dialogue with the Stabilization Force (SFOR) on how to bridge the public order security gap through advanced training of local police riot control support units by the IPTF and the SFOR Multinational Support Units.

    2001-09-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4379 (2001) · source

  7. In the Republika Srpska entity and in 6 out of 10 cantons, interim police commissioners have been appointed, pending the amendment of legislation to enable the posts to be formally established and filled permanently through open competition. But, particularly in the Sarajevo canton and in areas dominated by Croat hardliners, we are meeting political obstruction. In the Croat areas, suitable candidates have been identified, but local authorities are attempting to put conditions on their appointment.

    2001-09-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4379 (2001) · source

  8. The State Information and Protection Agency (SIPA) that we are creating will be an essential complement to our efforts to improve the efficiency of police cooperation between the 23 different police administrations in the fight against organized crime. However, we are concerned about possible competing and uncoordinated initiatives. Next week we will chair the first coordination meeting between major regional and bilateral parties working on these issues. The Police Commissioner Project is fundamental to ensuring an independent and apolitical police force. It is also the first step in the formation of a professional non-partisan civil service.

    2001-09-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4379 (2001) · source

  9. In the past six months, all 290 known brothels have been raided, some several times. With the assistance of the International Organization for Migration, over 150 women have been repatriated this year alone. We are now focusing on prosecuting traffickers and brothel owners, and on assisting international efforts to identify the gangs behind trafficking. In this regard, more protection needs to be given in their home countries for trafficked women who agree to testify in court. Through the regular ministerial-level meeting on police and the trilateral Regional Law Enforcement Agreement, we are building patterns and institutions for regional cooperation against organized crime and illegal migration.

    2001-09-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4379 (2001) · source

  10. The State Border Service has also confiscated 1.2 million convertible marka of contraband goods, thus demonstrating that it will contribute to increased customs and excise revenues. It should be borne in mind that effective border controls are a major weapon in the fight against international terrorism. However, to complete this vital project by November 2002, additional funds are urgently required. Assuming that the 2001 State budget is implemented, and a similar allocation is made for 2002, the remaining shortfall is approximately $12 million. UNMIBH has taken stringent measures against human trafficking. Under the UNMIBH Special Trafficking Operational Programme (STOP), conceptualized by Mme. Celhia de Lavarene, special teams of international and local police are aggressively pursuing traffickers.

    2001-09-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4379 (2001) · source

  11. The State Border Service (SBS), which Ambassador Petritsch mentioned, now covers about 75 per cent of the border and is already proving its worth. Illegal migration through the Sarajevo airport has decreased from 25,000 last year to about 9,000 as of 15 September this year. Attempts to bypass the Sarajevo airport controls by using the Tuzla airport have been thwarted, and the director of the offending airline company, Air Bosna, has resigned. We are delighted to have concluded a memorandum of understanding this week with the United Kingdom for the co-location of migration experts with our Border Service Department as part of the European Union Illegal Migration Initiative. There is no alternative to a regional approach to this growing problem.

    2001-09-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4379 (2001) · source

  12. For this reason, we have constantly advocated that priority should be given to police salaries and housing allocation. Judges' salaries were substantially raised a year ago, but police in the Republika Srpska entity have received only nine inadequate salaries in the past 12 months. Consequently, even some of our minority police recruitment projects are suffering. Despite the most intensive efforts, the pool of displaced police officers willing to return to an uncertain and inadequate income is ever diminishing. Notwithstanding these difficulties, which are beyond the authority of UNMIBH to address, we are making good progress on our core mandate. Our latest review showed that 30 of our 64 projects are completed; 28 are ongoing; and eight are in the planning stage.

    2001-09-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4379 (2001) · source

  13. His reason was simple: twice before he had put his life at risk arresting this man, but both times the perpetrator had been immediately released by local courts. In such circumstances, police forces cannot be effective. Police reform and judicial reform must proceed hand in hand. Equally important to the goal of establishing professional police forces is the unresolved salary issue. As long as police do not regularly receive wages sufficient to feed their families, their performance will always be open to compromise and corruption. No amount of restructuring and retraining can overcome economic necessity. I am prepared to aggressively weed out corrupt and non-performing police officers, but this is ultimately an impossible task if honest policemen cannot make an honest living.

    2001-09-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4379 (2001) · source

  14. I wish to update the Council simply on the major achievements of UNMIBH since my last briefing in June and to seek its engagement in and guidance on the process of streamlining in the context of imminent decisions about the future of UNMIBH and the United Nations role in Bosnia and Herzegovina. With respect to the progress of UNMIBH, I must admit to some frustration. Through our Mandate Implementation Plan, UNMIBH is robustly undertaking one of the largest police reform and restructuring missions in history, but, as we have repeatedly noted, the judicial system remains largely dysfunctional. Two weeks ago, a policeman in Trebinje chose not to carry out a potentially dangerous arrest of a known smuggler.

    2001-09-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4379 (2001) · source

  15. Specifically, our role is to reform and restructure the local police forces, but, as we look at the major domestic and international problem areas - terrorism, corruption, discrimination - the establishment of a professional, non-political and honest police force is the key to resolving each of them. And as we look at the future priorities - economic reform to encourage investment, sustainable minority returns and institution-building - none of these will be achieved without rule of law based on effective policing and an impartial judiciary. Ambassador Petritsch has reported eloquently on the overall progress of the peace implementation process in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

    2001-09-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4379 (2001) · source

  16. War and conflict have domestic and international consequences long after the fighting has stopped. We have begun to understand a new reality. Without reconciliation, tolerance and the rule of law, we are all potential victims of violence and terrorism. We must respond on two fronts: to find and punish those who committed these abominable acts and to establish the social, political and economic conditions in which democracy, peaceful resolution of disputes and the rule of law can govern national and international society. This is precisely what the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina is striving to achieve. UNMIBH has, admittedly, a thin slice of the international mandate, even less than that envisaged in annex ll of the Dayton Accords.

    2001-09-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4379 (2001) · source

  17. Mr. Klein: At this time of wrenching anguish and tragedy for the people and city of New York, the empathy of the men and women of the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) for them is real. Many of my staff come from this city; a large part of the United States of America contingent of the International Police Task Force (IPTF) is from the New York City Police Department. They have lost close friends and colleagues. Their ability to console the survivors and their families is limited to the telephone. This is one of the unwritten human dimensions of the job of peacekeeping: the distance from family and friends when tragedy strikes at home. But our work must go on with new urgency and determination. Weak and failed States are a target of opportunity for extremism.

    2001-09-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4379 (2001) · source

  18. So we have to look at how we develop a formulation where we finish Dayton and we say, "That is done; now it is time for integration into Europe" - to put it candidly, you go from Yugo to Euro. That is the way we have to proceed. I forgot to mention that we also included in the folder a document entitled "Balkans 2001: Opportunities in search of a strategic Vision", which lays out what we see as possible options - the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, et cetera. Since the Council was so extremely generous in its comments, we have also brought along a little gift for the members, which we were holding in abeyance pending the outcome of the actual meeting.

    2001-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4330 (2001) · source

  19. This is one approach we are trying to take. But we must also move away from what, I think, is perhaps a too excessive international presence. I think it is time for us to look very seriously at when we finish implementing Dayton and begin integration into Europe. That should really be our thinking over the next two or three years. In my estimation, refugee returns is a function of this year and next year. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees formula for the rate of refugee return is that for every year one is abroad there is a 12 per cent lower chance of return. That means that in five years 60 per cent of those people will not return.

    2001-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4330 (2001) · source

  20. How, then, do I persuade a Bosniac Muslim policeman from the Federation, who wants to return to the Republika Srpska, to go back, knowing that he will receive only nine months' salary instead of 12 and that he will have to find a way to provide housing and education for his wife and children? We are trying to address those issues. One proposal we are exploring is the one many nations employ, that is, a construct under which the customs officials or police authorities confiscate contraband and then auction it off. The proceeds are then put into a central account through which police are paid salaries and provided with the health and life insurance they need. Having that money would also allow us to actually say to the Republika Srpska and to the Federation, "Let us now look at and rationalize police structures and salaries".

    2001-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4330 (2001) · source

  21. To be very candid, Dayton was a less than perfect peace to end a horrible war. We know that. But Dayton created a construct where post, telephone, telegraph, commerce, taxation, regulation, police and military are under two entities. Therefore, what is the State? In the Republika Srpska I deal with a Minister of the Interior and a police department that is paid nine months out of the year, with relatively centralized control. In the Federation I deal with a police department that is paid 12 months out of the year, with 10 ministers of the interior to deal with. The salary scales are also different.

    2001-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4330 (2001) · source

  22. I think this demonstrates, as Ambassador Zivalj has said, that Bosnia and Herzegovina has not only profited from the participation and interest of the Council, but also that it is now prepared to return something as well. There are 95 nationalities represented in the Mission itself, and 47 in the IPTF. We are of different ethnicities, nationalities, races, religions and ideologies. I think we still remain the best example for the local population. If we under the mandate and universal umbrella of the United Nations can actually work together constructively in carrying out the directives and mandate of the Security Council, we would certainly be providing an example to the local population. There is a real problem concerning the dilemma we are facing with regard to resources.

    2001-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4330 (2001) · source

  23. They have demonstrated that they can work collectively together in the right circumstances. Additionally, we have nine military officers already serving in Ethiopia and Eritrea, again, in a United Nations role as military observers. Two weeks ago, I was in the Republika Srpska at Banja Luka. The Republika Srpska has now agreed with us to form a composite military group of about 160 personnel. The Government of Switzerland has very kindly offered us motor vehicles. This group would be a light transportation and logistics company equipped with non-combat arms that, hopefully, would be able to take up a role in the United Nations Mission by September or October.

    2001-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4330 (2001) · source

  24. What we need to do in Bosnia and Herzegovina is to train a multi-ethnic national police structure that can take on the role of dealing with civilian riots, where we and the nations do not want SFOR involved in those kinds of civilian activities. An armed police support group of some kind - and I may come back to the Council with something along those lines - where we could train a battalion or so, 500 to 700 local personnel to take on that role, is especially important as SFOR draws down and we complete the termination of the mission of the International Police Task Force (IPTF). I think that it is worth noting what Ambassador Zivalj said. As we speak we have 25 police officers - Bosniacs, Croats and Serbs, including one woman - serving in East Timor under the United Nations rubric.

    2001-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4330 (2001) · source

  25. I think we pointed out to him that the United Nations is a paramount organization that is not subsumed under any regional construct and that, indeed, the authority of the Council is ultimately the one that drives the agenda. But this is a serious issue that has to be looked at because we have to see how we take five organizations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and bring them logically down to two so that there is, in a sense, a civilian pillar and a military pillar. I think this is very important. With regard to the issue of crowd control, we do have a dilemma, because the Stabilization Force (SFOR) and the Multinational Specialized Unit (MSU), which is the police element of SFOR, have exactly the same rules of engagement - the same ROE, as we say. So there is no one out there who can really engage on the civilian side.

    2001-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4330 (2001) · source

  26. With regard to restructuring and transition, if we indeed look towards December of 2002, what I hope to do by next July is to be able to tell you exactly where we are and how close we are to the termination of the Mission. But we need now, already, to think seriously about what it transitions to. In my last United Nations mission, as Transitional Administrator in Eastern Slavonia, we transitioned into a police mission, which was then mandated over to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). We have an OSCE option; we have a European Union option. These all have to be looked at in terms of which way you want to go. Recently, the High Representative put a plan on the table that basically subsumed UNMIBH and other international organizations under his purview.

    2001-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4330 (2001) · source

  27. In it are the mandate implementation plan, which lays out very logically and very chronologically the 57 different targets that have to be met by us in order to complete our mandate by the end of the year 2002, green being "done", yellow "in progress" and red "still needing to be done". We also have in the folder a brochure which covers the State Border Service and gives you some feel for the data on the illegal migration that is taking place through Bosnia and Herzegovina into Europe itself. We estimate some 10 per cent. Thirdly, we are a United Nations family in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and we have just produced this folder which lays out data for all the organizations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, from UNMIBH to the World Food Programme 4 again, staffed by representatives of your countries - that I think are doing such good work.

    2001-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4330 (2001) · source

  28. Mr. Klein: First, an administrative matter. A corrigendum is being issued regarding paragraph 9 of the Secretary-General's report, document S/2001/571. Paragraph 9 should read, "The Croat Minister of Interior"- not the "Minister of the Interior of Croatia". I wish to thank all members of the Security Council for your collective, warm and supportive comments. I am blessed to have a mission of unusually talented people who are outstanding representatives of your countries, and I will pass on your messages of support to them, because they are ultimately responsible for whatever success we have had. With regard to your questions, I will try to answer them in seriatim fashion. Each of you has a folder which we have given you.

    2001-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4330 (2001) · source

  29. (spoke in French) In conclusion, I wish to pay tribute to the women and men who are dedicated to the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. I also wish to thank all the States that have placed their nationals under the United Nations flag in Bosnia. Ninety-five nations are represented in UNMIBH, including 13 members of the Security Council. These personnel are examples par excellence of what can be accomplished in the cause of peace by women and men of good will from various nations and ethnic groups. I thank the Security Council for its support.

    2001-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4330 (2001) · source

  30. Only when we agree on a common vision can there be coherence and efficiency in the respective roles of the many current international actors, including the United Nations, the European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Stability Pact and the Peace Implementation Conference. Thirdly, I cannot overemphasize the importance of the active involvement of this Council in any review of long-term international planning, presence and operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina. If there is to be a new international debate on the Balkans, as some have suggested, it should not be on how to redraw maps; it should be on what is required to finish the job and on how to streamline and make our efforts more efficient to that end.

    2001-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4330 (2001) · source

  31. We did not come to Bosnia and Herzegovina to do what was easy; we came to do what was right. Secondly, as this Council has previously noted, there is no exit without strategy. UNMIBH has an achievable strategy. We believe that we can complete our core mandate by the end of next year, provided that we keep a full team of the 1,850 international police officers until at least July 2002 and that we find the relatively modest additional funding for the State Border Service and basic police equipment. We cannot get out, in a sense, without getting in, but I see no other organization with a similar strategy or Vision. Crisis- management must go hand in hand with strategic planning and operations.

    2001-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4330 (2001) · source

  32. However, I am concerned that signs of increasing religious polarization may prejudice the success of this and other events. A more active promotion of dialogue between religious and cultural organizations is desperately required. In the United Nations Year of Dialogue among Civilizations, when the Pope can enter a historic mosque in Syria, it should not be beyond the ability of Bosnian religious leaders to make additional efforts at promoting tolerance and reconciliation in their own country. Permit me to conclude my briefing by addressing three issues that I believe are seminal. First, the success of multi-ethnicity in Bosnia and Herzegovina is key to the prospects of multi-ethnic States throughout the Balkans. We must see the process through to a successful conclusion.

    2001-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4330 (2001) · source

  33. The Srebrenica Action Plan was adopted in March to address the problems of the living, thus complementing the work of the International Commission on Missing Persons and the Office of the High Representative to assist the Victims' associations and establish the Potocari burial site and memorial. UNMIBH's role is focused on return security and multi-ethnic policing. Our immediate priorities are the voluntary redeployment of about 10 Bosniac police officers to work in Srebrenica, the construction of a model police station in the town and several infrastructure projects, beginning with the schools and hospital. Working closely with SFOR and local police, we are making every effort to ensure that the forthcoming commemoration on ll July will be a secure and orderly one.

    2001-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4330 (2001) · source

  34. It undermines the authority of the International Tribunal as well as the credibility of SFOR and, through that, it throws into question the resolve of participating Governments to lead the peace process to a successful conclusion. I am pleased to report some progress on Srebrenica, which has been a desolate blight on the conscience of the international community. Last December, UNMIBH proposed to the five principal international organizations that we establish a comprehensive plan to address the return, reconstruction and revitalization needs of that tragic area.

    2001-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4330 (2001) · source

  35. Widening the rules of engagement of the multinational specialized units is an option that deserves serious consideration. But some very significant actions can be taken even within SFOR's current rules of engagement. The arrest and trial of notorious war criminals remains the most important action to undercut extremists and consolidate peace implementation. Their continued presence undermines the establishment of the rule of law, inhibits inter-ethnic reconciliation and holds back the political future of the country. The lack of progress in arresting Karadzic and Mladic for nearly six years is a testament to the weakness of the international community in the face of evil.

    2001-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4330 (2001) · source

  36. As a recent report from the International Crisis Group warned, "Any significant cuts in SFOR levels now would strengthen Bosnia's hardliners and encourage extremists throughout the Balkans. Their long-time belief that they can wait out the international community would seem justified." This is not a matter solely of troop numbers. The mobility and rules of engagement of SFOR, particularly the multinational specialized units, are critical. We cannot afford a security gap between unarmed UNMIBH police monitors and SFOR combat troops working under military rules of engagement. The Violence of the past two months has sounded a warning bell. If we are serious about protecting international personnel and property, the security gap must be closed.

    2001-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4330 (2001) · source

  37. Senior officers resigned or were dismissed in Banja Luka and Trebinje; in Mostar, seven police officers were de-authorized and the High Representative eventually removed the Minister of the Interior, who was one of the leaders of the riot. However, dismissal from a very low- and irregularly paying job in the police force is an imperfect sanction. Consequently, at a time of increasingly violent resistance from extremists, whose interests are directly threatened by more intrusive measures of peace implementation, the international community is more reliant than ever on the security support of SFOR. In this context, I must express some concern about the possible further SFOR reductions.

    2001-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4330 (2001) · source

  38. Unfortunately, difficult economic conditions, including over 40 per cent unemployment among young people, many of whom are children of displaced persons, are creating a disillusioned underclass that is easily manipulated and mobilized. At the aborted Ferhadija mosque ceremony in Banja Luka, a small group of extremists was quickly swelled by young people and schoolchildren throwing rocks. The police, whose planning did not anticipate the number and violence of the demonstrators, were quickly overwhelmed. In Mostar, the speed and viciousness of the ultra-nationalist's counterattack on the Stabilization Force (SFOR) and international civilian personnel was underestimated. In Trebinje, local police were passive against their fellow Serbs. In all cases, UNMIBH has taken swift and effective action against non-performing policemen.

    2001-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4330 (2001) · source

  39. The strength of that intimidation and manipulation is proof of the need for professional and non-political appointments staffed through transparent measures. I would ask for the Council's support in sending a clear message that independent commissioners of police must be appointed in all police administrations by the end of this year. Looking ahead, we expect that it will be a politically hot summer in which police performance will be under the microscope. The violent events we have witnessed recently are the result of premeditated incitement by fringe groups of extreme nationalists intent on preserving their criminal gains and on derailing the establishment of the rule of law and normal civil society.

    2001-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4330 (2001) · source

  40. Today, through the two police academies and the voluntary redeployment programme, there are almost 1,000 minority police. There is no shortage of potential candidates; but the full potential of our minority recruitment programmes will not be reached until action is taken to improve police salaries, especially in the Republika Srpska, and until the police are given priority for housing assistance and provision of alternate accommodation. An area where we are meeting political obstruction is in establishing the post of a professional and non-political commissioner of police in every police administration. Recently, Bosniac politicians have tried to intimidate UNMIBH personnel to ensure that their own Bosniac candidates are appointed to the Federation Ministry of the Interior and to senior posts in other common institutions.

    2001-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4330 (2001) · source

  41. The fact that minority returns have doubled and that most returnees experience no security problems is evidence of improved police performance and public acceptance. However, the number of return-related incidents is still unacceptably high in certain areas, particularly in the eastern part of the Republika Srpska and in parts of Herzegovina. Also, only a handful of perpetrators have been convicted and sentenced. We hope that the Independent Judicial Commission, now established in the Office of the High Representative, will robustly address the problem of lack of judicial follow-up. Multi-ethnic police forces are an essential confidence-building measure for returnees and an important test for minority rights. Two and a half years ago the police forces were mono-ethnic.

    2001-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4330 (2001) · source

  42. One hundred and seventy-seven women were given the option to freely choose whether they wished to remain in those bars or to be repatriated. To further assist in fighting international organized crime, I am pleased to inform the Council that the official inauguration of the Sarajevo national Interpol office, established with considerable UNMIBH assistance, will take place next week. Training and monitoring police performance and minority returns is at the core of our mandate. We seek to ensure that return security plans are prepared, incidents are professionally investigated and police reports to judicial authorities are of a quality and thoroughness sufficient to commence criminal prosecutions. The small Criminal Justice Advisory Unit is already playing a central role in that regard.

    2001-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4330 (2001) · source

  43. Completion of full deployment and equipment next year depend on a new contribution of about $17 million. In the following years the State Border Service is expected to be more than self-financing through its contribution to improved State revenue collection. Trafficking in human beings is one of the most insidious and lucrative of crimes. In the past 18 months UNMIBH and the International Organization for Migration have assisted nearly 400 trafficked women, of whom 304 have been repatriated. We have intensified our efforts on illegal migration and organized crime through the Joint Entity Task Force; and in March this year police officers from five different police structures, working together, simultaneously raided 38 nightclubs, in every canton of Bosnia and Herzegovina except one.

    2001-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4330 (2001) · source

  44. When fully deployed and equipped, together with the reformed customs service it will play a major role in increasing desperately needed State revenues and cracking down on organized crime. The State Border Service is also a major instrument to reduce unregulated migration to Western Europe, as well as human trafficking. Some 10 per cent of all legal entrants to Western Europe pass through Bosnia and Herzegovina. Last year over 25,000 such migrants entered through Sarajevo airport alone. This year more effective border controls and the introduction of a Visa regime for Iranian passport holders has so far halved the number of such migrants. Several donors have contributed generously to the deployment of the State Border Service. However, we remain about $5 million short of our requirements this year, especially for salaries.

    2001-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4330 (2001) · source

  45. We must depend on the timely and effective support, actions and political policy-setting of the High Representative. Allow me to briefly draw the Council's attention to some highlights in our mandate implementation, as well as some challenges where additional assistance is required. The deployment of the State Border Service is making exceptional progress. Since its inauguration, one year ago, the State Border Service now covers some 62 per cent of the border, as well as the major international airport in Sarajevo. It is the first multi- ethnic State-level agency. It has begun to make frequent seizures of contraband, including drugs and other smuggled goods.

    2001-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4330 (2001) · source

  46. When the Plan is completed, which I expect will be at the end of 2002, each of the approximately 20,000 local police officers will have been vetted, trained and basically equipped, and will be working in professional and accountable police structures. It is possibly the largest programme of police reform and restructuring that has ever been undertaken. However, I must emphasize that as long as the majority of the police receive less than a living wage and there is no effective judicial follow-through, and as long as political parties interfere directly in police work and appointments, the establishment of the rule of law will be incomplete. These key areas - salaries, judicial follow-through and political interference - fall outside our mandate.

    2001-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4330 (2001) · source

  47. This cycle will be finally broken only when the leaders and the people themselves engage constructively to agree on the constitutional rules that will govern their State. Without this we will continue to face the problems of parallel institutions and non-accountable political structures. Turning now to the specific work of UNMIBH, the report of the Secretary-General shows a Mission that, I think, is dynamic, focused and results-oriented. Our internal Mandate Implementation Plan is a comprehensive blueprint of some 57 specific projects that address individual police officers, police organizational structures and rules and the relationship between police and society at large. About one third of the projects have been completed, one third are ongoing and the remainder will be launched in the next six months.

    2001-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4330 (2001) · source

  48. Their failure to exercise real leadership is directly contributing to the turbulent political climate. Thus, despite the shady personal interests of its leaders, the Croat self-rule movement has tapped into the fears of many Croats that they will become marginalized. And the Serb unwillingness to implement the decisions of the Constitutional Court and to participate constructively in State institutions is drawing a stronger Bosnian counter-reaction that is being manifested, inter alia, in the politicization of religious events. The result, political ferment and increased incidents of public disorder, has a direct impact on our mandate and on implementation, as well as on the security and safety of international personnel and property.

    2001-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4330 (2001) · source

  49. A quasi-protectorate has been established in which democratic form has taken the place of democratic substance. Parts of the Dayton Constitution are now starting to creak. Constitutional evolution - which can and must be achieved without reopening other aspects of Dayton - is becoming necessary, and probably inevitable. Dayton is the floor, not the ceiling. It was never intended to constrain such an evolution or to substitute for local formulation of the common political will and aspirations of the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, agreement on the fundamental rules of the game, the constitutional equality of all citizens and a permanent election law languishes. The new leaders have shown little will to move away from their personal and sectarian positions in the interests of the citizens and the country as a whole.

    2001-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4330 (2001) · source

  50. This was recognized in the original concept of the Stability Pact, which, regrettably, has diffused some of its political dimension. A reconsideration of the respective roles of the Stability Pact and the European Union would be timely. If either of those bodies cold become the engine of regional cooperation and integration, the role of other organizations would be much clearer and more effective. Another important aspect is that the people of the region themselves must articulate their will to live peacefully together as part of Europe and undertake the domestic measures and accommodations necessary to do so. In Bosnia and Herzegovina the international community has, for nearly six years, been practically the sole driving force of Dayton implementation.

    2001-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4330 (2001) · source