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Kuburovie

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2017-05-16
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2018-12-11
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un-security-council

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  1. The Mechanism's position of asserting pressure on Serbia as we undergo European Union accession negotiations goes against the theme of cooperation with my country. That position has always illustrated that the Mechanism is of a political nature, not a legal one. That has been the Mechanism's principal shortfall from the time it was established. In conclusion, let me point out that, notwithstanding that shortfall, the cooperation between Serbia and the Mechanism has been successful. There are no outstanding issues in our cooperation, and I trust and believe that the efforts invested by my country will be acknowledged and presented in the coming reports.

    2018-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8416 (2018) · source

  2. The publication of memoirs of one participant in the war - and not the only participant - cannot by itself be construed as a glorification of the position of one side. Memoirs are personal views of the events, and, under article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, everyone has the right to freely express his or her opinions. It is not clear how the memoirs of Serbian convicts are the only ones to have found their way into the progress report of the Mechanism presented to the United Nations, whereas the memoirs of others of different nationalities have not. The progress report states that a key tool for ensuring continued cooperation with the Mechanism is the policy of conditionality of the European Union, which links membership progress to full cooperation with the Mechanism.

    2018-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8416 (2018) · source

  3. The declaration, which was signed by the Prime Ministers of Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Germany, Italy, Poland, Slovenia and the United Kingdom, and the professed Prime Minister of Kosovo, expresses support for the efforts to find the 12,000 persons still listed as missing in conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. Of particular significance in the context of regional cooperation is the fact that, on 6 November, the Commission on Missing Persons of the Republic of Serbia signed the Framework Plan to Address the Issue of Persons Missing From Conflicts on the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, at the headquarters of International Commission for Missing Persons in The Hague. It is particularly worrisome that the progress report points to the publication of the memoirs of General Pavkovic'.

    2018-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8416 (2018) · source

  4. Yet still more serious consequences for the Serbian people in Kosovo and Metohija could result from recent irrational decisions taken by Pristina, and a humanitarian catastrophe of unprecedented proportions is possible. I hope that the international community will not remain silent and tolerate these blatant Violations of basic human rights. At the Western Balkans Summit in London on 10 July, the countries of the European Union and summit participants from the Western Balkans signed a joint declaration on missing persons, the key document upholding the rights of all families of the missing persons to truth, justice and compensation.

    2018-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8416 (2018) · source

  5. UNMIK's competencies in the judicial field were set forth in the joint document signed by UNMIK and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in November 2001. All along, however, the judicial authorities of Serbia have been prevented from undertaking proceedings in cases of war crimes committed in the territory of Kosovo and Metohija. In addition to the refusal by Pristina to respond to cooperation requests by the Office of the War Crimes Prosecutor of the Republic of Serbia, UNMIK now makes INTERPOL notices related to Albanian terrorists from Kosovo and Metohija invisible for no apparent reason. UNMIK has not been mandated by the Security Council to act in this way.

    2018-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8416 (2018) · source

  6. That is eloquent proof that Serbia is ready to try all war crimes, irrespective of the citizenship of the perpetrator, which is not, I regret to say, the practice in the other countries of the region. Unlike in a number of previous years, bilateral meetings of the Ministers of Justice of the Republic of Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia were held this year. I therefore see no reason why the efforts of the countries of the region, aimed at reconciliation, should not be given their due. The progress report notes that judicial cooperation between Serbia and the self-declared State of Kosovo in war crimes matters had broken down. However, I would like to point out that cooperation is taking place through the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).

    2018-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8416 (2018) · source

  7. Six of the indictments were transferred from the Prosecutor's Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina and one, against two persons, from the Prosecutor's Office of the Republic of Croatia. In 24 cases, the Office of the War Crimes Prosecutor of the Republic of Serbia received no response from the Prosecutor's Office of the Republic of Croatia on requests for evidence and information, despite the terms of the cooperation agreement. Some 103 persons, most of them of Serbian nationality, have been tried in 23 cases in the War Crimes Department of the Higher Court in Belgrade; judgments in two cases were handed down right before the convening oftoday's meeting.

    2018-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8416 (2018) · source

  8. The first commission has completed its task, while the second has been continually working on its assignment; a meeting of the latter commission's members is expected to be convened this month. We firmly believe that this is an important step forward in addressing outstanding bilateral issues, even though Croatia continues to try Serbs in absentia and without facts or sufficient evidence and, in the opinion of many, passes judgments lightly, thereby deliberately preventing Serbs expelled from Croatia from being able to return home. Serbia does not try cases in absentia; indeed, dozens of cases have simply been suspended. From 1 January to 30 November, eight new indictments were confirmed by the Office of the War Crimes Prosecutor of the Republic of Serbia against 12 persons.

    2018-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8416 (2018) · source

  9. We are fully committed to the full implementation of the agreements and relevant protocols. Unfortunately, not all of the countries in the region share this position. Let me point out in this context that my country's cooperation with Bosnia and Herzegovina in the provision of legal assistance is at a very high level. It is our hope that we will achieve this level of cooperation with Croatia. Last March, a meeting between the Ministers of Justice of the Republic of Serbia and the Republic of Croatia was held in Belgrade. As a result, two commissions were established, one to exchange lists of persons indicted or sentenced for war crimes, and the other to draft a bilateral agreement relative to the processing of war crimes.

    2018-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8416 (2018) · source

  10. Does that mean that no crimes have been committed against the Serbian population and that no one is responsible for the killing, torture and persecution of Serbs? Notwithstanding the selective approach by the Tribunal, we can hardly agree with the assessment in the Mechanism's report that cooperation among countries of the region has been inadequate and that there has been equal refusal to cooperate. My country has made every effort to cooperate with the Mechanism and expects inter-State cooperation in the region to be at an appropriate level. Serbia has concluded bilateral agreements with Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, while cooperation among regional judiciaries is based on the agreements concluded among the relevant Offices of the countries of the region and the Office of the War Crimes Prosecutor of the Republic of Serbia.

    2018-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8416 (2018) · source

  11. It is important to note that, ever since the Tribunal was established, it adopted a selective, ethnically- tainted approach when it came to the number of both indictments in and case referrals to the judiciaries of the successor States of the former Yugoslavia. It turns out that, in the past, the Tribunal had the greatest confidence in the judicial institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In more literary parlance, those courts used to be ifavort'tt della regina. This conclusion is borne out of the following data. The largest number of cases have been referred to courts in Bosnia and Herzegovina for trial: 6 out of 10 persons indicted by the ICTY. Most of them were Serbs. In contrast, Serbia and Croatia have received one case each, and none of those referrals concerns persons indicted for crimes against Serbs.

    2018-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8416 (2018) · source

  12. During the visit of Prosecutor Brammertz in October, agreement was reached on organizing a prosecutors' training course in March 2019, in cooperation with the Belgrade's Judicial Academy and as part of the Prosecutor of the Mechanism's support for Serbia. Mr. Brammertz will be one of the lecturers. The progress report of the Prosecutor of the Mechanism notes that regional judicial cooperation in war crimes matters between the countries of the former Yugoslavia is at its lowest level in years and faces increasingly immense challenges. The report goes on to say that decisive action is needed to reverse the current negative trends and ensure that war criminals do not find safe haven in neighbouring countries.

    2018-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8416 (2018) · source

  13. The adoption of the Prosecutorial Strategy for the Investigation and Prosecution of War Crimes in the Republic of Serbia in the period 2018 to 2023, in accordance with the Action Plan for Chapter 23 and the National War Crimes Prosecution Strategy, accentuated the importance of greater efficiency in processing war crimes. The funds to enhance the capacities of the Prosecutor's Office have been provided by the Government, while the number of the employees of the Office, in particular of Deputy Prosecutors, has been increased. Five new Deputies have been appointed since the last meeting of the Security Council on this agenda item, in June (S/PV.8278). The Prosecutorial Strategy has also been commended by the Prosecutor's Office of the Mechanism.

    2018-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8416 (2018) · source

  14. Let me reiterate that my country will continue to advance the initiative, all the more so as the sentenced persons are advanced in age and the majority of them are not in the best of health. In February 2016, Serbia adopted a national strategy for the prosecution of war crimes for the period 2016-2020, thereby demonstrating its commitment to building up its national judiciary and supporting all judicial and administrative investigative agencies, as well as other independent monitoring and reporting organizations. Since the decision of the Government to establish a working body to monitor the implementation of the strategy in August 2017, four reports have been submitted on the progress made so far, the most recent of which was submitted on 21 November.

    2018-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8416 (2018) · source

  15. I therefore take this opportunity to call on the Secretary-General to instruct the Mechanism to assess the initiative and make it possible for the Security Council to consider the current practice relative to the enforcement of sentences and decide on how to approach change. Serbia is ready to accept strict international monitoring and provide guarantees that sentenced persons will not be released without a decision by the Mechanism. We invite its representatives, as well as representatives of other relevant institutions appointed by the Secretary-General, to visit Serbia and tour its prisons to assess the capacities and conditions of the facilities themselves.

    2018-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8416 (2018) · source

  16. The position taken by the Secretary-General in his report to the Security Council on 3 May 1993, namely, that, given the nature of the crimes in question and the international character of the Tribunal, the enforcement of sentences should take place outside the territory of the former Yugoslavia, can hardly continue to be taken as valid. It made some sense while the war went on in the country. However, the situation today is altogether different, and my country insists that the question be reconsidered. During his Visit to Belgrade in November, President Meron gave his assurances that there were no obstacles to realizing this initiative. He advised that it be brought to the attention of the Security Council, under whose resolutions the Tribunal and the Mechanism have been established.

    2018-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8416 (2018) · source

  17. I believe that we can hardly expect this purpose to be fulfilled if sentenced persons serve their sentences in faraway countries where they do not understand the language, where the possibility of enlisting the help of a translator or receiving visits from and maintaining contact with friends and relatives are limited, and where medical treatment is inadequate. After all, nine persons of Serbian nationality have died during trials or while incarcerated. Let me highlight the particularly difficult situation of Serbian nationals Milan Martic' and Dragomir Milosevic, who are serving their sentences in Estonia. I have already spoken of them on a number of occasions in this Chamber and with Judge Meron, President of the Mechanism. The International Committee of the Red Cross has also reported on their case.

    2018-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8416 (2018) · source

  18. Considering that a small number of cases are before the Mechanism, we might conclude that not much work remains for the Mechanism to carry out. However, the legacy of the ICTY includes important questions that still should be addressed, lest they remain unresolved. Ten years ago, Serbia launched an initiative to have its citizens who had been sentenced by the Tribunal serve their sentences in Serbia. When the initiative was launched, my country was motivated by a firm commitment to assuming the responsibility for enforcement of sentences. The purpose of punishment includes, inter alia, the social reintegration of sentenced persons.

    2018-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8416 (2018) · source

  19. As early as last June, a single Judge of the Mechanism ruled that the contempt-of-court case Prosecutor v. Petar Jojic and Vjert'ca Radeta be referred to Serbia, and the decision on the appeal of the Amicus Curiae Prosecutor is still pending. Ifthe case is referred to the Serbian judiciary, it will be a step forward in my country's relationship with the Mechanism. As a State with an independent judiciary, Serbia can - and is willing to - comply with the obligation to try the case in accordance with the highest standards of judicial independence and the rule of law. In this context, let me point out that, during the case-referral process, the Amicus Curiae made comments in its submissions that were inappropriate and not founded on the legal facts or evidence, which accounted for the delays in the procedure.

    2018-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8416 (2018) · source

  20. 30) Regrettably, the Tribunal has not realized the purpose for which it was established, nor has it provided answers to many important questions. Serbia's cooperation with the Mechanism has been successful, and my country has fulfilled all its obligations. The results are also noticeable within its national legislative system, and its cooperation with the Mechanism has run unimpeded. The Office of the Prosecutor of the Mechanism has been given free access to all evidence, archives and witnesses. Requests have been attended to, and responses are being provided to the Office, Chambers and Secretariat of the Mechanism, including those related to classified Government and military documents. Witnesses have been cleared of the obligation to keep Government, official and/or military secrets.

    2018-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8416 (2018) · source

  21. I thank the Security Council for this opportunity to address it today on behalf of the Republic of Serbia. Since the establishment of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), in 1993, and the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals after the ICTY completed its work, Serbia has, for the last quarter century, been travelling on a path of cooperation with the institution. Much has been done in this time. Speaking in this very Chamber in December 2017, I said that "[f]ighting impunity for the most serious international crimes and efficiently prosecuting war crimes were the key reasons for the establishment of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia." (S/PV8120, p.

    2018-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8416 (2018) · source

  22. After all, for peace and stability in the region it is necessary that efforts be invested by all its countries, and that active, open and constructive dialogue and cooperation be engaged in to bring about a better future, economic development and the normalization of relations. The meeting rose at] p.m.

    2017-12-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8120 (2017) · source

  23. In disregard of those and other facts, and motivated by extra-legal considerations, the Tribunal, which we all believe was established to render justice impartially, has often fallen short of making a contribution to regional reconciliation and achieving fairness and equality - the fundamental principles of each and every legal order. To conclude my statement, I express the greatest respect for all the Victims of the armed conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, irrespective of nationality, religion or any other affiliation. The need to work jointly on mutual understanding, regional cooperation and reconciliation is indispensable.

    2017-12-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8120 (2017) · source

  24. For over two decades the Tribunal failed to note two important and relevant facts: first, during the celebration of the first anniversary of Croatian independence, in 1992, Franjo Tudjman, the President of Croatia at the time, said in front of more than 100,000 people that the war could have been avoided, but he did not want that; and, secondly, in 1992, Alija Izetbegovic', the President of Bosnia and Herzegovina at the time, withdrew his signature from the Cutileiro plan, which was signed by all three sides in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The plan could have preserved peace and saved the victims of the civil war.

    2017-12-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8120 (2017) · source

  25. The ethnic disparity of accused persons in ICTY judgements and sentences, the Violations of the right to trial within reasonable time and the lack of respect for procedural guarantees will also be the legacy of the Tribunal. In the eyes of Serbia and many other countries that believe the law is an irreplaceable vehicle to ensure respect for, and the protection of, basic human rights, the 13-year case involving Vojislav Seselj, who surrendered voluntarily, which ended in a first-instance acquittal, is surely a stain on the proceedings of the Tribunal.

    2017-12-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8120 (2017) · source

  26. Improving its national judicial system along the guidelines defined, among others, by the national strategy to process war crimes, which were adopted in 2016, continues to be one of Serbia's priorities. To that end, a monitoring mechanism, directed by the Minister of Justice and the War Crimes Prosecutor, has been established to monitor the implementation of the strategy. It is hoped that it will contribute to the effective prosecution of all those responsible for war crimes. The Tribunal is receding into history, but its legacy is here to stay. The question, however, continues to linger as to whether it has accomplished its purpose. From our perspective, the statistical account of its decisions strengthens our impression that its has delivered justice selectively.

    2017-12-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8120 (2017) · source

  27. We believe that it is hard to achieve the goal of punishment and resocialization in cases where sentenced persons serve their sentences in faraway countries. In those countries, they are unable to communicate in their maternal language and have no possibility of receiving family Visits or maintaining contact with relatives. Moreover, some of them are kept in inadequate conditions and provided inadequate health care. In launching the initiative, Serbia is committed to providing guarantees that ensure, in cases of sentence-enforcement transfers, all security measures are taken. In that regard, it is ready to accept international monitoring. Serbia will continue to try war crimes and expects other countries to follow suit.

    2017-12-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8120 (2017) · source

  28. Those numbers make it difficult for us to understand why such a small number of persons have been found responsible for the killing or expulsion of hundreds of thousands of Serbs. Is it that Serbian victims count for less? Only Serbs have been handed life sentences, in five cases before the Tribunal. Such selective prosecution is a legitimate cause for legal concern and, in some legal systems, provides the basis for the pursuit of selective prosecution claims. In any case, it remains an issue that should be considered in the ICTY records in the future. The initiative of my country related to the enforcement of sentences in the countries of origin of the sentenced persons is another matter to which I want to draw the attention of the Council.

    2017-12-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8120 (2017) · source

  29. Of the total number of those sentenced, 70 per cent are Serbs, 19 per cent are Croats, 6 per cent are Bosniaks and only 2 per cent are Albanians. Those numbers speak tellingly about the selective justice of the Tribunal, especially in the context of its mandate to establish the truth about the armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia and to bring about reconciliation. In a report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, it is stated that 333,000 refugee Serbs from Croatia and 266,000 from Bosnia and Herzegovina ended up in Serbia in the wake of the armed conflict, as well as 287,000 internally displaced persons from Kosovo and Metohija after the bombing of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999.

    2017-12-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8120 (2017) · source

  30. That failure to cooperate with the ICTY is characterized by a lack of political will - such a contention is erroneous, and therefore unacceptable. It has been clarified several times by Serbian representatives that the competent, independent Serbian court has rejected the request under relevant legislation, in line with the ICTY statute. Under the provisions of the law and the statute, Mr. Jojie and Mr. Radeta committed no criminal offence. The following data, however, is much more illustrative of the deliverance of justice by the ICTY. One hundred and sixty-one persons were indicted: 109 Serbs, 33 Croats, 10 Bosniaks, sevan Albanians and two Macedonians. Proceedings against 156 individuals were finalized.

    2017-12-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8120 (2017) · source

  31. Serbia enabled the ICTY Prosecutor free access to evidence, documents, archives and witnesses; 2,183 requests for assistance were submitted by the Office of the ICTY Prosecutor and the Office of the Prosecutor of the Residual Mechanism, all of which were complied with. Serbia allowed 759 witnesses to testify freely, relinquishing their right not to on account of State, military or official secrets, and 1,341 requests were submitted by various defence teams, all of which were complied with. In the ICTY final report (see S/2017/662), it is said that Serbia is not cooperating with the Tribunal, as it has failed to secure the arrest and transfer of two persons in the case Prosecutor v. Petar Jojie and Vjerica Radeta.

    2017-12-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8120 (2017) · source

  32. Serbia has aligned its legislation with relevant standards, facilitating cooperation with the ICTY without exception, and bearing in mind all acts that the Security Council recognized in the ICTY statute as serious international crimes. Its commitment to fighting impunity has also been reflected by the number and rank of the accused persons it handed over to the Tribunal. Out of 46 persons whose extradition was requested by the Tribunal, Serbia extradited 45; one person committed suicide before he could be extradited. Some of those people were in very high positions, including high-ranking officers in Serbia's military and high officials in the executive branch of its Government, which is a convincing illustration of my country's non-selective cooperation - one that is hardly matched by any other State.

    2017-12-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8120 (2017) · source

  33. By and large, the controversies revolve around the efforts made by the States of the former Yugoslavia to cooperate with the ICTY efficiently. While the efforts of some countries have been assessed as sufficient, the much greater efforts of Serbia have not been adequately recognized. Serbia's record in that regard has been exemplary, both in terms of compliance with its obligation to cooperate with the ICTY and the results achieved within its national judicial system. Moreover, its compliance has been efficient and non-selective. The judgements rendered before Serbian courts are eloquent proof of Serbia's readiness to punish the perpetrators of the most serious crimes committed in violation of international humanitarian law, irrespective of their nationality.

    2017-12-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8120 (2017) · source

  34. I thank you, Mr. President, for this opportunity to address the Security Council today on behalf of the Republic of Serbia. Allow me to welcome the President of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), Judge Carmel Agius, the President of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, Judge Theodor Meron, and the Prosecutor of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, Mr. Serge Brammertz. Fighting impunity for the most serious international crimes and efficiently prosecuting war crimes were the key reasons for the establishment of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. Since its establishment, it has been the subject of frequent criticism by the expert community, and with its mandate completed some important questions remain unresolved.

    2017-12-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8120 (2017) · source

  35. I will conclude my statement with a call to those countries that have not recognized the unilaterally declared independence of Kosovo to remain consistent in their principled respect of international law and the Charter of the United Nations. At the same time, I call on those countries that have recognized Kosovo to reconsider their decision and contribute accordingly to efforts to finding a mutually acceptable solution to this question, proceeding from the unacceptability of unilateralism as a way of solving any issue.

    2017-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7940 (2017) · source

  36. We hope that Pristina will realize that it should and must find mutually acceptable solutions with Belgrade for all outstanding issues, which cannot be based on diktat and fait accompli. In the quest for such solutions, it is necessary to avoid unilateral acts - which are, in many ways, harmful - such as attempts to admit Pristina to various international organizations and the unlawful decisions, which are null and void for the Republic of Serbia, such as that of 1 March to appropriate the property of the Republic of Serbia. Such decisions needlessly pollute the atmosphere of the dialogue. To give the dialogue a chance, it will certainly be necessary that the facilitator demonstrate stronger leadership, primarily in the area of the implementation of reached agreements.

    2017-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7940 (2017) · source

  37. Yet it is hard to push aside the impression that the dialogue is not yielding results at the moment, which could be due to the non-constructive position of Pristina to implement the agreements. For the dialogue to be genuinely meaningful, it must not be abused as a platform for the imposition of the interests of one side, based on unrealistic expectations that normalization should amount to nothing other than the recognition of Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence by Serbia. The positive results achieved thus far in areas such as telecommunications and the freedom of movement are eloquent proof that there is no alternative to the dialogue and that it should be continued with more responsibility and a genuine commitment to compromise.

    2017-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7940 (2017) · source

  38. Guided by the interests of regional stability, Serbia is firmly committed to the continuation of the dialogue, aimed primarily at resolving the everyday problems of the people living in Kosovo and Metohija without prejudice to the future status of the province and with full respect for resolution 1244 (1999). This resolution continues to be the basis and framework for the solution to the question of Kosovo and Metohija with guarantees for the territorial integrity of the Republic of Serbia. We consider that the dialogue, with the facilitation of the European Union, is the most appropriate vehicle to build confidence between the Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo and Metohija, and an important mechanism for supporting the efforts of the European Union to solidify peace and stability and further the process of European integration in our region.

    2017-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7940 (2017) · source

  39. A special threat to the security of the southern Serbian province recently has been the trend of the continuation of the process of the return of foreign terrorist fighters from Middle East battlefields and the escalation of political and religious extremism. Serbia is strongly opposed to the establishment of the so-called Kosovo Army, contrary to resolution 1244 (1999) and the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia. Efforts to establish the so-called Kosovo Army are but an attempt to create new tensions at an extremely sensitive moment, marked by dangerous statements on redrawing internationally recognized borders and creating a greater Albania, an idea that we had believed belonged to the dark past of this part of the Western Balkans during the Second World War.

    2017-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7940 (2017) · source

  40. In a memorandum issued following his mission to Kosovo and Metohija, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights "notes with concern the existence in Kosovo of many obstacles to the voluntary return of displaced persons." He goes on to say that "[a]lthough the Stabilization Association Agreement", signed by the European Union and Pristina in October 2015, "reaffirms refugees' and displaced persons' right to return and the protection of their human rights, [...] progress in this field has been very modest." The Commissioner expresses his particular concern "about the reported negative impact on voluntary returns of acts of hostility or flagrantly ethnically motivated violence" and the lack of classification by the police of "ethnically motivated crimes as such and [...] systematic monitoring of the situation in this field".

    2017-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7940 (2017) · source

  41. The key obstacles to their return include continuous attacks on Serbian and other non-Albanian returnees, looting, the desecration of cultural and religious heritage, and politically motivated criminal proceedings against IDPs, as well as their inability to exercise the right to property restitution. In this context, it is necessary that all actors involved in the resolution of the question of IDPs work together to create conditions conducive to unimpeded and long-term sustainable returns, a key element of the UNMIK mandate.

    2017-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7940 (2017) · source

  42. Let me mention only the protest by a group of Albanians in the village of Ljubozda, near Istok, to which 13 Serbian families returned recently, as proof that Kosovo and Metohija still has a long way to go before it becomes a multi-ethnic society in which all its residents are treated equally. The lack of proper institutional response represents tacit approval of, and even support for, the continuation of such practices. There can be no harmonious coexistence where the rate of IDP returns, only 1.9 per cent, is lower than in the most traumatized post-conflict areas. Let me remind the Council that there are still more than 200,000 IDPs living in central Serbia.

    2017-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7940 (2017) · source

  43. It is evident that the human rights of non-Albanians continue to be systematically threatened all across Kosovo and Metohija. Numerous incidents provide ample evidence of the fact that security in Kosovo and Metohija remains unstable and subject to an escalation of violence. As a rule, returnees in ethnically mixed communities are the most vulnerable. This issue should be accorded greater attention in the reports of the Secretary-General. On average, 10 to 15 ethnically motivated attacks are recorded every month, followed by an ever-present intimidation campaign against Serbs. None of the perpetrators has yet been punished.

    2017-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7940 (2017) · source

  44. The facts provide ample evidence today that the action against Serbia was planned and that it was calculated and not aimed at satisfying international justice. Resolution 1244 (1999) does not constitute, nor can it constitute, a post factum approval of the use of armed force against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, nor can it change the legal qualification of the NATO intervention as an aggression. That resolution, as stated by the International Court of Justice in its advisory opinion on the accordance with international law of the unilateral declaration of independence in respect of Kosovo (see A/64/88l), forms part of international law, as does UNMIK regulation No. 2009/1, which defines Kosovo and Metohija as a territory within the Republic of Serbia under international administration.

    2017-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7940 (2017) · source

  45. That the so- called humanitarian intervention has never become part of international law was made clear by, inter alia, the 2005 World Summit Outcome (resolution 60/1), which confirmed in its paragraph 79 that "the relevant provisions of the [United Nations] Charter are sufficient to address the full range of threats to international peace and security", and further reaffirmed "the authority of the Security Council to mandate coercive action to maintain and restore international peace and security", emphasizing "the importance of acting in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter". The aggression against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia resulted in large-scale destruction and loss of life and the expulsion of a huge number of Serbs and other non-Albanians from the territory of Kosovo and Metohija.

    2017-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7940 (2017) · source

  46. Invoking a humanitarian intervention as the basis for the use of armed force is in sharp contrast with the practice of the International Court of Justice - for example, the case of Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua - and other documents developed under United Nations auspices.

    2017-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7940 (2017) · source

  47. For instance, at the time when William Walker was heading the Verification Mission, a communication from the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs dated 12 January 1999 to a court in Trier stated that the operations of the Yugoslav and Serbian security forces were not directed against Kosovo Albanians as an ethnic group but against the militant opponents and their alleged followers. The position on the alleged humanitarian intervention in Kosovo and Metohija was not that of the Security Council or any other credible body. The facts underlying the assessment that a military intervention was required at the time were contradictory and tailored to suit the needs of NATO, with the goal of launching an armed aggression against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

    2017-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7940 (2017) · source

  48. The decision to use force against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was taken and carried out without the authorization of the Security Council by those same countries that continue to this day to advocate recognition of the independence of Kosovo. The sovereign rights of Serbia are thus being violated, and the authority of the Council in the performance of its main duty of the maintenance of peace and security is being undermined. The illegal decision on the aggression against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia resulted primarily from the report of William Walker, although there was neither a humanitarian disaster nor any persecution of Kosovo and Metohija Albanians in the province in 1998-1999.

    2017-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7940 (2017) · source

  49. The actions of William Walker and the use of armed force against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia are nothing other than a flagrant violation of the principles on which the United Nations is based, in particular the principle on refraining from the threat of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of any State, and a violation of the imperative clause of Article 53 of the United Nations Charter to the effect that no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies, which includes the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, without the authorization of the Security Council.

    2017-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7940 (2017) · source

  50. In this context, the role played by William Walker can be characterized only as an abuse of his position in a respectable international organization such as the OSCE to create the political conditions for the adoption of a decision on the aggression against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. This is also corroborated by the recent statement of Victoria Nuland to the effect that the United States has invested in the independence of Kosovo for 20 years.

    2017-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7940 (2017) · source