YouSaid · the spoken record

Lee

lines on the record: 254
first: 1998-06-06
most recent: 2013-02-12
sittings or episodes: 34
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“We thank the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) for giving us the figures on the 2000 Consolidated Appeal in relation to Liberia, which reveal that only 5 per cent of the required $7.2 million, or only about $360,000, was received. This highlights the point we made earlier on donor fatigue in respect of Liberia. We should therefore be honest in our assessment of whether the people of Liberia are suffering because of the unintended effects of the United Nations sanctions. We should also question why the humanitarian agencies are pulling out from Liberia and if there is something we can do to arrest this trend. We hope that either the Panel members or OCHA could provide some information on this.”
2001-11-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4405 (2001) · source
“One possible follow-up to the Panel's findings and those of the OCHA report on the humanitarian situation in Liberia is for Members of the United Nations to send suggestions to the Chairman of the sanctions Committee for its consideration. This is because the sanctions Committee is mandated under paragraph 14 (g) of Security Council resolution 1343 (2001) to make recommendations to the Council to make recommendations to the Council on ways to limit unintended effects, if any, of the measures on the Liberian population. As such, any suggestions by the United Nations membership would be useful to the discussions of the sanctions Committee on the necessary follow-up to the reports.”
2001-11-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4405 (2001) · source
“Sanctions are one of the most important tools of the Council, and the Council needs to ensure that its objectives are achieved without disproportionate humanitarian effects. We should be careful not to allow the United Nations sanctions on Liberia to suffer the same fate as the Iraqi sanctions regime. Both from the humanitarian perspective and for the credibility of the United Nations and its sanctions, while the Security Council must maintain the rigour and aims of its sanctions regimes, it cannot ignore the news of the rapidly deteriorating humanitarian situation in Liberia, especially when the Government of Liberia has laid the blame for it at the Council's doorstep.”
2001-11-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4405 (2001) · source
“Of course, strictly speaking, the humanitarian situation in Liberia and the United Nations sanctions that were imposed on Liberia are separate issues and should be treated as such. Furthermore, indications are that the Government of Liberia's own corrupt practices have strongly discouraged international aid donors. Many donors are also suffering from donor fatigue, and the situation in Liberia does not seem to have improved after close to a decade. Yet, clearly, the Council cannot ignore the growing humanitarian crisis in Liberia, not least because OCHA has also highlighted that the Government of Liberia has mounted a successful information campaign to blame the economic and social woes of the country on the United Nations sanctions.”
2001-11-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4405 (2001) · source
“Although the sanctions were designed to specifically target the illegal activities of Liberia's elite, and not intended to harm the lives of ordinary Liberians, the report of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has confirmed the bleak humanitarian situation of the population in Liberia. The OCHA report has also highlighted that international aid to Liberia has been drastically reduced, falling from $138 million in 1998 to less than $30 million this year. By December many aid agencies will be pulling out of Liberia due to lack of funds. At an Arria-formula meeting with some non-governmental organizations (NGOs) on Liberia on 17 October 2001, one NGO highlighted that Liberia is "starved of aid".”
2001-11-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4405 (2001) · source
“While we do not intend to compromise its eventual issuance, we would like to state that the report would be very relevant to the issues we have raised today, particularly on the issue of consistency in the implementation of United Nations sanctions, and for ensuring that we make full use of the work of such panels. The report would also be relevant for addressing the next issue that we will be raising: what we can and should do to limit the unintended effects of sanctions when they have a negative - whether direct or indirect - impact on the humanitarian situation of the targeted country.”
2001-11-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4405 (2001) · source
“A permanent monitoring mechanism in the Secretariat could also assist States in their implementation and ensure a more professional and thorough approach to the implementation of the sanctions, rather than ad hoc panels. It could also assist the Council's work by being the link with sanctions committees and other United Nations agencies. Clearly, there should be better coordination within the United Nations system, not only to avoid duplication and save on costs, but also to ensure that there is consistency and follow-up. Here we would like to express our regret that the report of the Council's Working Group on sanctions - which, under the note by the President issued on 17 April 2000 in document S/2000/319, was due on 30 November 2000 - has yet to be issued.”
2001-11-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4405 (2001) · source
“Little has been done to address it. Another negative consequence of this lack of follow-up on the information obtained is that it further damages the credibility of the United Nations sanctions themselves. Our perception is that there appears to be only a one-off impact to the work of such panels. The countries investigated need only show compliance for the duration of a panel's mandate because there is no one to monitor them after the panel leaves. Even when the panel documents evidence of sanctions-busting, the lack of follow-up means that any attempt to show respect for the sanctions disappears as soon as the spotlight is off these countries. While the implementation of sanctions is the responsibility of each Member State, their effectiveness could be increased if there were some monitoring of the sanctions.”
2001-11-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4405 (2001) · source
“But our question is, what next? What happens to the information and evidence obtained by such panels? Is there a database in the United Nations that stores this? And what is the point of having such a database if it is only stored and not acted on? We ask these questions because it seems to us that the same criminal networks are referred to time and again, beginning with the Fowler report and cited in both the Sierra Leone Panel report, as well as in the report of the Panel before us today. In fact, in the Sierra Leone Panel report it was noted that "Where diamonds are concerned, there have been three Expert Panels examining many of the same issues concurrently. There has been useful collaboration, but there has also been overlap and duplication." (S/2000/1195, para. 17) That point was made in December 2000.”
2001-11-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4405 (2001) · source
“Thus, in our statement today we will not go into these details, but we would like to raise the larger question of how we assess the work of such panels. It is not so much a question of costs, although we note that this report cost the United Nations $890,900, which makes it the second most expensive report, after the Angola Monitoring Mechanism report, which cost the United Nations about $1.6 million. The third most expensive was the Sierra Leone Panel report, which cost about $717,300. Our assessment should involve a greater dimension, relating to the usefulness of the information that is contained in the Panel's report. For example, what happened to the information obtained in the Fowler report? We note that the Angola Monitoring Mechanism that has been set up has collected even more information on sanctions violations.”
2001-11-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4405 (2001) · source
“This report was written pursuant to the Council's request for "a preliminary assessment of the potential economic, humanitarian and social impact on the Liberian population of possible follow-up action by the Security Council in the areas of investigation indicated in paragraph 19 (c) of the resolution." (S/2001/939,para.1) Those areas are basically the other areas of economic activity that the Panel was investigating as possible links to the fuelling of conflict in Sierra Leone and neighbouring countries. We note that this is the first time that a pre-assessment report has been requested, and we hope that this practice will continue. We would like to commend the Panel for its very comprehensive report and extensive use of case studies. Several speakers have already commented on the specific contents and recommendations of the report.”
2001-11-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4405 (2001) · source
“Under its mandate, the key goals of the Panel were to collect information on illegal activities, investigate violations of the current sanctions imposed on Liberia, collect information on the compliance by the Government of Liberia with the demands of the resolution, and investigate possible links between the exploitation of natural resources and other forms of economic activity in Liberia and the fuelling of conflict in Sierra Leone and neighbouring countries. Today's consideration of the Panel's report is therefore a timely juncture for all of us to reflect on and consider the full impact of the sanctions on Liberia, including the unintended effect of these sanctions on the ordinary people of Liberia. In this respect, we also have before us today the Secretary- General's report requested under paragraph 13 (a) of resolution 1343 (2001).”
2001-11-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4405 (2001) · source
“The evidence of the Government of Liberia's activities and the recommendations for the measures that were imposed on Liberia under resolution 1343 (2001) were mostly derived from the report (S/2000/ll95) of the Panel of Experts on Sierra Leone, whose membership is very similar to that of the Panel before us today. We are highlighting this to show that, given the possible consequences of such reports, we have to take them very seriously.”
2001-11-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4405 (2001) · source
“We need name only two panels to show the impact which such panels have had on the work of the Council: the Mollander Panel, which issued the first of the name- and-shame panel reports and paved the way for the setting up of the Angola Monitoring Mechanism, and the Sierra Leone Panel report, which paved the way for Security Council resolution 1343 (2001), on Liberia. The report that we are discussing today also fits that category. It has been almost exactly eight months since resolution 1343 (2001) was adopted. The resolution imposed targeted sanctions on Liberia, with the main objective of dissuading the Government of Liberia from supporting non-State actors, particularly the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), from activities which were destabilizing the situation in neighbouring Sierra Leone and the West African region as a whole.”
2001-11-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4405 (2001) · source
“We would like to begin by welcoming the Foreign Minister of Liberia to today's debate, as well as the members of the Panel of Experts and representatives of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). Madam President, we thank you for arranging this public debate on the Panel of Experts' report on Liberia. The importance of such public debates lies in the fact that they allow non-Security Council members to help the Council in its assessment of the value of such reports. Such panels have become a very important tool of the Security Council in relation to the follow-up to the sanctions imposed by the Council.”
2001-11-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4405 (2001) · source
“Thirdly, as sanctions are one of the most important tools of the Security Council, the Council needs to ensure that its objectives are achieved without disproportionate humanitarian effects. As the United States has noted, this is to ensure that sanctions remain a viable policy tool. As such, we were pleased to learn that the Stockholm process, will focus on the implementation and monitoring of targeted sanctions. We would like to express our support in advance for the Stockholm process, in the hope that its work will result in more effective implementation of United Nations sanctions.”
2001-10-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4394Resumption1 (2001) · source
“However, as Mali, Colombia, Jamaica, Mauritius and other delegations have highlighted, the image of United Nations sanctions has not been good. The United Nations and United Nations sanctions are often blamed for the economic woes of the targeted country. This may be due in part to the unintended side effects of the sanctions. However, in our view, much of the problem can be attributed to the less than effective implementation of United Nations sanctions to date. As such, while the United Nations may have won the Nobel Peace Prize jointly with the Secretary-General this year, the credibility of the United Nations in relation to the implementation of sanctions has eroded badly in the last 10 years. We must arrest this slide.”
2001-10-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4394Resumption1 (2001) · source
“For example, as the Chair, we have had to facilitate the implementation of a travel ban list. Since this list was promulgated in June, we have experienced many of the difficulties discussed in the seminars and workshops organized under the two processes, in particular for the removal of targets from such lists. While we have noted the suggestion from the Bonn- Berlin process that this could be dealt with by empowering the sanctions Committees to keep such lists up to date, the reality is that United Nations sanctions Committees do not have the resources to do this, nor is there any institutional follow-up within the United Nations system to monitor the implementation of sanctions. Secondly, United Nations sanctions, if designed and implemented properly, can do much good.”
2001-10-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4394Resumption1 (2001) · source
“We join our colleagues in thanking the representatives of Switzerland and Germany for their presentations and for their very useful manuals on the Interlaken and Bonn-Berlin processes, which they distributed at our meeting on Monday. We applaud the laudable efforts of the Governments towards the improvement of financial sanctions, along with arms embargoes and travel bans. As time is short, Mr. President, we hope that you will let us make a targeted statement of three key points. First, in relation to the presentation by State Secretary Dahlgren of Sweden, we would like to express our sympathy for the frustration that he endured as Chairman of the sanctions Committee on Sierra Leone. As the Chair of the sanctions Committee on Liberia, we have experienced similar highs and lows.”
2001-10-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4394Resumption1 (2001) · source
“Perhaps MONUC can consider setting up a coordination committee with the participation of these countries to ensure such close coordination, as well as the transparency of the DDRRR exercise.”
2001-10-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4395 (2001) · source
“Success in these areas will provide tangible and persuasive evidence of the benefits of MONUC's presence and will help MONUC's confidence-building efforts and dialogue with the armed groups in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. Should MONUC be seen as making little or no difference by its presence in existing areas, we think it would be difficult for MONUC to win the confidence of the population in new areas, let alone that of the combatants it hopes to disarm. Finally, we call on countries in the region to cooperate fully with MONUC on the repatriation of ex- combatants who are their nationals. It is already very apparent to all of us that the security problems of these countries are closely interlinked. For the DDRRR effort to succeed, there must close cooperation and coordination among these countries and MONUC.”
2001-10-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4395 (2001) · source
“As such, we support the Secretary-General's recommendation that MONUC move to establish a presence in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo under phase III. However, before doing so, MONUC must be given the means and be ensured as far as possible that the conditions are conducive for it to achieve its objectives there. Failure would undermine MONUC's credibility and would make MONUC's work more difficult. On the human rights situation, we feel that, even as MONUC moves forward with its deployment plans, it must not neglect its humanitarian and human rights responsibilities in areas where it has already established a presence.”
2001-10-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4395 (2001) · source
“We thank the Foreign Minister of the Democratic Republic of the Congo for briefing us on the latest situation in his country, and we also thank the Secretary-General for his ninth report on the Democratic Republic of the Congo. We view the completion of phase II of MONUC's operations as a job well done under difficult conditions and we also extend congratulations to the MONUC team. However, we are concerned - and this point has also been expressed by other colleagues around this table - over the continued instability in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. Therefore, the main point that we would like to stress today is that it is important to establish a United Nations presence in the trouble areas in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.”
2001-10-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4395 (2001) · source
“We look forward to UNMIK's facilitating a political process designed to determine Kosovo's future status, taking into account the Rambouillet accords, as mandated by the Security Council under resolution 1244 (1999). Continuing dialogue with Belgrade on this is important.”
2001-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4387 (2001) · source
“At the public meeting on Kosovo this July, we stated that "The United Nations responsibility to Kosovo does not end with the elections and the establishment of the structures of provisional self-government Resolution 1244 (1999) must be strictly implemented until an agreement on the final status of Kosovo is reached. The need for a continued and substantive United Nations presence in post-election Kosovo, supported by other international agencies and interested parties, is obvious [T]he eventual termination of the United Nations presence must be gradual and carefully structured to bolster, not undermine, the painstaking progress achieved." (S/PV4350, p.]6) We stand by this.”
2001-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4387 (2001) · source
“Also significant is the fact that, in the election campaigning that started this Wednesday, the ethnic Albanian parties are using the platform of independence for Kosovo. We would therefore appreciate Mr. Haekkerup's assessment of the extent of ethnic minority, especially Serb, participation in the upcoming elections and the provisional self-government institutions thereafter, and of what this portends for Kosovo's stability. While not wanting to sound pessimistic, we would like to ask Mr. Haekkerup about the contingencies that are being considered by UNMIK to ensure that things do not get out of hand. Should Kosovo's transition to substantial autonomy be carried out smoothly, UNMIK will have accomplished an important mandate under resolution 1244 (1999).”
2001-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4387 (2001) · source
“Specifically, we support the goals of securing the engagement and participation of Kosovo Serbs and other minorities, the return of refugees and displaced persons, the development of a safe and secure environment and the building of public administration and economic capacities. These are essential for the handing-over of authority leading to substantial autonomy in Kosovo, as mandated in resolution 1244 (1999). We note the good progress made by UNMIK. At the same time, however, we note that a number of problems in achieving those goals remain. Significantly, Kosovo's security situation remains precarious, with violence against minorities and criminal activity continuing unabated, despite the reinforcement of law and order.”
2001-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4387 (2001) · source
“At the outset, we would like to welcome the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Hans Haekkerup, and to thank him for his detailed briefing. It was a useful update of the Secretary-General's comprehensive report, which we would like to thank the Secretary-General for. We reiterate our support for the tireless efforts of Special Representative Haekkerup and the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) in fully implementing resolution 1244 (1999) and primarily at this time in building the necessary conditions for free and fair general elections and an all-inclusive provisional self-government in Kosovo.”
2001-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4387 (2001) · source
“That it should also bear the burden of hosting refugees from its neighbours in the region only adds to this precarious situation. In fact, the Secretary-General has pointed out that there is a sort of inter-refugee problem faced by the region as a whole, and this is a threat to the security of the subregion. We urge that efforts to address this problem also be treated as a matter of high priority.”
2001-09-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4380 (2001) · source
“Otherwise, we run the risk of damaging its credibility should it fail to meet the expectations on the ground. Secondly, even as we work toward political reconciliation, we must also focus on the root causes of the problem. The Council addressed these areas in its presidential statement of 17 July 2001. I need not repeat them, but we would like to encourage the international community to include, in its assistance packages to the Central African Republic, training in the form of technical and management expertise. In our View, this would lay the foundation for the long-term economic viability of the country. Finally, we need to consider the consequential effects of the presence of refugees in the Central African Republic over the long term. It is already in a precarious economic situation.”
2001-09-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4380 (2001) · source
“Ijoin others in thanking the Representative of the Secretary-General, General Cisse, and Mr. Calderisi for their excellent briefings. I wish to make only three brief points. First, in paragraph 29 of his report, the Secretary-General has made specific proposals on the areas where the mandate of the United Nations Peace-building Support Office in the Central African Republic (BONUCA) could be strengthened, and for the extension of its mandate for another year. While we are fully supportive of these proposals, we would like to caution that any decision to strengthen BONUCA should be commensurate with its ability to achieve tangible results. In other words, BONUCA must be given the capacity to carry out a strengthened mandate effectively.”
2001-09-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4380 (2001) · source
“We urge aid agencies to intensify their efforts to help those people and again call on the parties to the conflict to allow aid workers safe access in order to carry out their work. Finally, we would like to assure the Secretary- General's new Special Representative to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mr. Amos Namanga Ngongi, of our support as he takes on his functions this month.”
2001-08-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4361 (2001) · source
“Furthermore, the parties to the conflict must be made responsible for ensuring that the areas under their control are accessible and safe for MONUC to proceed with its work. The news that another United Nations helicopter was recently shot at is not encouraging. The Council should also continue to follow the peace process closely and discourage any backsliding. All parties must be made to realize that they are under the close scrutiny of the international community. We note with concern the humanitarian situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and urge that immediate attention be given to alleviating the plight of civilian victims. The facts show that more than 2 million Congolese have died since the start of the current conflict in 1998 and that many more are in critical need of food and medical attention.”
2001-08-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4361 (2001) · source
“Every step forward fosters confidence and generates its own momentum for the peace process as a whole. However, we note from Mr. Annabi's briefing that military disengagement has not been proceeding well. Although countries in the conflict have officially disengaged their forces, there are reports that indicate that they continue to operate through rebel and militia proxies. We should continue to put pressure on those found to be undermining the disengagement process. We would also like to emphasize that the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) needs to be given the means to carry out its duties as mandated under resolution 1291 (2000).”
2001-08-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4361 (2001) · source
“We too would like to thank the Assistant Secretary-General, Mr. Annabi, for his useful update on the situation. We congratulate the facilitator, Sir Ketumile Masire, and his team on the success of the preparative meeting and express the hope that all parties will continue their constructive approach when the inter-Congolese dialogue begins in Addis Ababa in October. Addis Ababa, as a venue, of course, has its own significance because it is the site of the headquarters of the Organization of African Unity and of its successor body, the African Union. We would like to reiterate the importance of an open, representative and inclusive dialogue by the parties in such an important setting. The withdrawal of troops by Uganda and Namibia is a step forward.”
2001-08-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4361 (2001) · source
“At the end of the day, it is the parties involved that must make their own strategic decision to eschew violence and return to the peace track. There is clearly no alternative to discussing issues of security, borders and statehood except through negotiations on the basis of the principles of non-acquisition of territory by the use of force and of the right of States to live within secure and recognized borders. The further the parties stray, the more these principles would be undermined. The faster we help the two sides implement the Mitchell report, the sooner we can stop the violence and end the senseless loss of life.”
2001-08-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4357 (2001) · source
“Singapore believes that the Security Council should examine what it could do to help implement the Mitchell report. There are already intensive ongoing efforts by key parties, including the United States and regional countries, and the Security Council should support and bolster these efforts. The Council should consider asking the Secretary-General, who was instrumental in convening the Sharm el-Sheikh meeting, to assist in the implementation of the Mitchell report. For the Security Council to make a real and constructive impact on this volatile situation, we strongly believe that it is important for it to act in a unified manner on this critical issue. The credibility of the Council is at stake. An unequivocal and unified message from the Council would exert the strongest possible influence on the parties involved.”
2001-08-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4357 (2001) · source
“Singapore is prepared to listen to any proposals that help to ease tensions, lead to the cessation of violence and hostilities, bring both parties back to the negotiating table, and ultimately advance the prospects of a just, lasting and comprehensive peace in the Middle East. We believe that the report of the Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-finding Committee, the Mitchell report, represents the best hope in providing the parties with a common framework to take reciprocal steps to ease tensions and cease hostilities. It is comprehensive, fair and objective. More importantly, both parties have embraced its recommendations. Unfortunately, the glimmer of hope provided by the Mitchell report has waned as violence becomes more entrenched. What is needed is an urgent and renewed effort to kick-start its full and immediate implementation.”
2001-08-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4357 (2001) · source
“The conflict in the Middle East has entered a dangerous new phase. The cycle of violence has reached alarming levels and appears poised to spiral out of control. The grave situation is a matter of concern to the entire international community and demands the urgent attention of the Security Council. Singapore deplores in the strongest terms all acts of terror. We are deeply disappointed that the violence and provocative acts have continued unabated and indeed escalated, despite the various mediation efforts, including that of the Secretary-General. Now more than ever, the parties need outside help to climb down from the cycle of violence.”
2001-08-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4357 (2001) · source
“For these reasons, we feel that it is vitally important to factor the DDR dimension into our peacekeeping considerations, to try to put a stop to the circulation of illicit small arms in affected States. In conclusion, we think that the Security Council has a duty to work in partnership with the international community, including, where appropriate, civil society, to deal with the intractable problem of illicit small arms. By focusing on key priorities, we can make significant headway in resolving this problem.”
2001-08-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4355 (2001) · source
“It is therefore not surprising that many ex-combatants and dispossessed young men in post-conflict situations are reluctant to give up their arms. But the Council must address this as a priority issue, as the persistence of such arms impedes post-conflict peace-building and redevelopment. In addition, the easy availability of small arms also threatens the security of United Nations personnel and peacekeepers. According to the 2001 Small Arms Survey, 456 international peacekeepers and United Nations staff were killed by small arms between January 1992 and March 1997. Perhaps some of these 456 lives could have been saved had there been more effective DDR.”
2001-08-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4355 (2001) · source
“This database will go a long way in addressing the problem of illicit arms proliferation, not just in Africa but throughout the world. The second area I wish to highlight is the reference in the Programme of Action for the inclusion, where applicable, of provisions for DDR in the mandates and budgets of peacekeeping operations. My delegation welcomes this emphasis on DDR, as it will lead to a more holistic and effective approach. Put bluntly, stopping the supply of illicit small arms will be ineffective if we do not also mop up the excess arms still in circulation. No one will dispute that disarmament in a post- conflict situation is inherently a dangerous and difficult affair. In many countries engaged in, or emerging from, armed conflict, the possession of a weapon is closely linked to power, identity and status.”
2001-08-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4355 (2001) · source
“As the Singapore delegation proposed during last month's Conference, a related initiative that could improve monitoring would be the establishment of an international database of authorized arms traders as well as a blacklist of traders convicted of illicit arms trafficking. As stated in paragraph 28 of the Secretary- General's 1998 report on dealing with the proliferation of arms in Africa, "The goal of public identification of international arms merchants and their activities has proved elusive, but perhaps no other single initiative would do more to help combat the flow of illicit arms to Africa". (S/1998/318, para. 28) It is time to set up such an international database to properly identify legal traders and, perhaps more importantly, to make known the convicted illicit arms traders.”
2001-08-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4355 (2001) · source
“In order to complement national and regional efforts, we believe that the Security Council should place special emphasis on countries that are most affected by the problem of illicit small arms and light weapons - in other words, those conflict and post- conflict situations where such weapons continue to wreak havoc. With that in mind, we would like to briefly highlight two key areas where we think the Security Council can play a vital role. First, we must find better ways of implementing arms embargoes mandated by the Security Council. In this regard, we welcome the recent establishment of a monitoring and assistance mechanism for the sanctions on the Taliban in Afghanistan. This is a step in the right direction.”
2001-08-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4355 (2001) · source
“Although some countries have expressed disappointment that the Programme of Action does not go far enough, we believe that it is nevertheless the beginning of a process and a good foundation to build upon. Today's debate is timely in focusing on the Council's role regarding the small arms issue. In this regard, we thank the Colombian delegation for its very comprehensive background paper in document S/2001/732. As previous speakers have also pointed out, the problem of illicit small arms is multifaceted and overlays many other issues, including conflict prevention, peace-building, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, sanctions enforcement and sustainable development, just to name a few. That is why the Security Council needs to act in tandem with the General Assembly to address the small arms problem on all these fronts.”
2001-08-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4355 (2001) · source
“We would first like to express our appreciation to the Chinese presidency of the Council last month, and we join others in welcoming your presence, Sir, as you preside over our debate today. We appreciate the significant and constructive role Colombia has played in the small arms debate, most recently through the sterling work of Ambassador Camilo Reyes during last month's Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects. Thanks to his able leadership and that of Ambassador Carlos dos Santos of Mozambique, who chaired the Preparatory Committee process, we have today a watershed Programme of Action to guide our national, regional and global efforts to tackle the problem of illicit small arms.”
2001-08-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4355 (2001) · source
“However, if exit strategies for operations that the United Nations has already committed to are not carefully calibrated and executed, we run the real risk of unravelling all of the achievements made. This would render the substantial investments made by the international community a total waste and seriously undermine the credibility of the United Nations. Worse, it might render necessary the expenditure of even more resources to put the pieces back together again.”
2001-07-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4350 (2001) · source
“The peaceful resolution of the Kosovo question is integral to the security and stability of the entire Balkan region. We are of the View that the eventual termination of the United Nations presence, as in other troubled parts of the world, must be gradual and carefully structured to bolster, not undermine, the painstaking progress achieved. It is imperative that the United Nations, having begun such a major undertaking, does not terminate or draw down one mission prematurely on the simple-minded proposition that another, elsewhere, can be supported. The fact is that demand for resources to restore international peace will always exceed supply.”
2001-07-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4350 (2001) · source
“Clearly, the effective implementation of resolution 1244 (1999) requires continued communication with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Government. The United Nations responsibility to Kosovo does not end with the elections and the establishment of the structures of provisional self-government. These are indeed significant milestones, but Kosovo's return to normalcy is likely to take more time. Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) must be strictly implemented until an agreement on the final status of Kosovo is reached. The need for a continued and substantive United Nations presence in post- election Kosovo, supported by other international agencies and interested parties, is obvious. The duration and nature of that presence must take into account the larger political context and environment.”
2001-07-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4350 (2001) · source
“The positive spiral effect of economic progress on Kosovo should not be underestimated. Economic growth even has an affirmative effect on the security environment in the province. But just as for reconciliation, economic development depends on the readiness of the Kosovo leadership itself to build economic sustainability in the province. In this respect, we urge the Kosovo leadership to support the work of UNMIK in relation to the strategies developed under the economic pillar. Fourthly, it is even more important, in this crucial period, for UNMIK to have regular, direct dialogue with Belgrade. Dialogue between the Kosovo political leaders and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Government should also be encouraged.”
2001-07-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4350 (2001) · source