YouSaid · the spoken record

Lieutenant General Dos Santos Cruz

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28
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2013-06-26
most recent
2014-10-09
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2
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un-security-council

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  1. The report was very sad, because it may lead to a decrease in the number of surrenders of ex-combatants, which we want, on the contrary, to encourage. The Special Representative of the Secretary- General visited MONUSCO before the problem arose. Now MONUSCO is there with a task force to support and help the Government, because, although the camp is not being administered by MONUSCO, we are committed to giving the maximum support in order not to have this kind of problem in future, because it is a problem that could endanger the entire process when we prompt the ex-combatants to surrender. That is the point we are at. The Special Representative of the Secretary- General is personally committed, along with the United Nations country team and the Mission, to supporting the Congolese Government.

    2014-10-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7275 (2014) · source

  2. Lieutenant General Dos Santos Cruz: I apologize for failing to have touched upon the points raised by the representative of Rwanda. I have profound personal and professional respect and consideration for him, and am sorry I overlooked his question. With regard to the question of Kota Koli, there are three camps for ex-combatants in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, one of which is Kota Koli. Human Rights Watch released a report on the camp, because more than 100 people died there during the time it was operating. The camp is not a military camp under the control of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). Rather, it is administered by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo as part of its disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme.

    2014-10-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7275 (2014) · source

  3. Why, then, is it not possible? Obviously, it is political; we will build one rapid-reaction force or a type of intervention force. That is my opinion. Then there is the mandate, which is not an obstacle to the actions we need to take. We have the means. Sometimes there may be improvements, but we have the means. Then, really, things depend on our attitudes on the ground.

    2014-10-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7275 (2014) · source

  4. It is safer for us. On the Intervention Brigade, I think it is a useful experience, exactly because of the behaviour based on the assumption that if one is stronger, one is better. It is very difficult and very sad, but that is the reality in which we live. I think that all troops should have the same obligations. From a practical perspective, it is not possible to say that "I am doing something to neutralize, or to protect civilians, or sometimes to protect myself". We need all troops to have the same conduct. In one intervention brigade of 20,000 troops, perhaps 17,000 will follow one interpretation while 3,000 follow another. If 20,000 take one step forward, it is a major event; it is not only 3,000 acting. I think all troops should have the same commitment and same obligations. Obviously, that is a much more political posture.

    2014-10-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7275 (2014) · source

  5. However, those means must be supported by the will and the commitment to take action, to report what we did yesterday, and not only what happened yesterday, because iftechnology is not used and the will is lacking, we will report what happened yesterday. With regard to troops, obviously a strong posture demands more risk for them. But the risks are not difficult to manage. There are combat procedures. The military combat procedures need improvement. We need to use more of the tactics we have for night combat and counter-ambush techniques and tactics. We have means to compensate for risks that may be assumed on the ground. It is unfortunate that we live in an environment where, for hundreds of years, neither French nor English was understood, but only force. We must therefore be strong. We need a strong image on the ground.

    2014-10-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7275 (2014) · source

  6. Maybe it is time for a more practical interpretation, when guidance does not provide freedom to the troops executing, in a practical way, the mandate to protect civilians, and when there is such a broad interpretation of the principle on the ground. On the ground we deal in real life, and we need to be focused on that. With regard to guidance, we need to state very clearly what effect we want on the ground. I think that according to the environment in which we live right now, guidance must be very clear. What attitude, what mindset, does the Council expect on the ground? That is very important. We need more technology and more means.

    2014-10-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7275 (2014) · source

  7. Lieutenant General Dos Santos Cruz: It is very difficult to offer suggestions to the highest level of decision-makers in the world. But even I have the opportunity to disagree or to freely provide some opinions on peacekeeping operations. I think that the mandates, the rules of engagement and international legislation have never forbidden the use of force for self-defence or the defence of a third party. It is a universal law. We need to refine certain mandates. But in my opinion, more than that is necessary. We need, in parallel, one interpretation from a practical point of View. Normally the mandates and principles have different interpretations - one is more classical, one is more academic and one is more philosophical.

    2014-10-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7275 (2014) · source

  8. The military components need to be coordinated with realistic, clear and effective political management. Hopes and expectations rise when a population sees a United Nations peacekeeping mission deploying on the ground, together with the presence of United Nations agencies, numerous non-governmental organizations and the international community. What they expect is action to stop the violence and the delivery of significant support. There are examples of failure to protect civilians due to low-intensity action or poor or inexistent initiative, but there are very few cases of problems due to effective action. To protect civilians, a military force should be robust and dynamic, supported by an operational administration and complemented by civilian components, with work that is visible to the population.

    2014-10-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7275 (2014) · source

  9. These include the requirement to have a mandate with the same obligations for all of the components on the ground; the use of a practical approach on how to protect civilians; and the need to consider that risk is inevitable in the armed services and can be effectively managed and mitigated by well- and appropriately trained, motivated and equipped soldiers. A robust posture is indeed safer for all. A mission should be proactive and responsive. Taking action to protect civilians does not undermine peacekeeping principles and is perfectly compatible with international law. The assumption that military action may create collateral damage should not prevent us from taking the necessary action. On the contrary, there are many examples that prove that action against armed groups brings huge benefits to the population.

    2014-10-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7275 (2014) · source

  10. Only an active force with a proactive, robust posture can neutralize and defeat threats to the civilian population. On the other hand, the simple presence of peacekeepers for prolonged periods without action while violence is being committed leads to a weakening of the reputation of the United Nations, the troop-contributing countries and the international community. In order to implement the mandate, troops on the ground must have the mindset, the will, the leadership and the initiative required to protect civilians in a robust and effective manner. As a contribution to the transformation required to better protect civilians, I would bring up the following points for the Council's consideration.

    2014-10-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7275 (2014) · source

  11. The United Nations should not wait for armed groups to come and terrorize communities; it should not give them freedom of movement; there should not be hundreds or thousands of panic-stricken civilians coming to crowd around or inside a United Nations base for safety. Conceptually, troops remain mindful of the United Nations principles of peacekeeping, namely, the consent of the parties, impartiality and the non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate. Those principles may not always apply against armed criminal groups in contemporary missions. Their application could be reviewed and adjusted to contemporary threats and to the context of violence that innocent civilians and peacekeeping personnel face in conflict areas. Deterrence by presence is not always effective.

    2014-10-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7275 (2014) · source

  12. The protection of civilians is the most important task of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It is far more than a task in a mandate: it is a moral obligation. The importance of protecting civilians is not in question. The question is, how to protect them in a more effective way. I am absolutely convinced that the best way to protect civilians is by being proactive rather than reactive. As an example, identifying and taking action against the threats represented by armed groups and militias, which are the main perpetrators of direct acts of violence such as pillage, rape, killings and other crimes, would be more effective than waiting for events to unfold. The protection of civilians is the effect required on the ground.

    2014-10-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7275 (2014) · source

  13. Lieutenant General Dos Santos Cruz: It is an honour to have the opportunity to address the Council today. It was in late 1999 that the protection of civilians from direct threats was specifically mentioned in the mandate for Sierra Leone. Peacekeeping missions' mandated tasks, based on Chapters VI and VII of the Charter of the United Nations, have been pragmatically reflected in Security Council resolutions. But even with the incorporation of details and specific tasks, there is room for interpretation. Furthermore, executing a protection-of-civilians mandate in a demanding and rapidly changing complex environment requires some necessary changes in structure, mindset and operational behaviour on the ground.

    2014-10-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7275 (2014) · source

  14. The FARDC is the national armed force. Everybody knows that we have a complex situation. It is not a national problem. It is more regional and has regional consequences because the groups operate very close to the border and sometimes interfere throughout the region. But, with regard to that question, we have four mechanisms in place now. We have the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, the Southern African Development Community, the African Union and the Peace and Security Council framework. With the guarantors, the Secretary-General and all of the countries around the lakes, we have very good prospects for being able to deal with any problem. From the military point of view, the protection of civilians is our primary concern, and we treat all threats against the population equally.

    2013-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6987 (2013) · source

  15. With regard to the Intervention Brigade, it is not a problem. We have the rules of engagement, we are very clear and it is not a problem. There was one more question concerning how the Security Council can obtain more up-to-date information from the field. If we have more technology, certainly the Department of Peacekeeping Operations has the structure and will provide all the information because we are connected in real time. In that regard, it is not a problem. We are available in the missions for video-teleconferences and to respond to questions, and we do that daily for our commanders in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. I would like to make one more point with regard to the reference to the Forces democratiques de liberation du Rwanda and the Forces armees de la Republique democratique du Congo (FARDC).

    2013-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6987 (2013) · source

  16. Therefore, it is not a problem to employ the Intervention Brigade because all the troops, even the Intervention Brigade, need to follow the same principles and we have very clear guidelines to justify the use of force. What may be of concern is artillery. Artillery is something new because normally we are not in an open field; rather we operate in very heavily populated areas. But we have the means to employ artillery. We have smoke grenades. We have ways to illuminate the battle field. We need to be very careful with explosive grenades. I have the staff and we follow the rules. I sometimes see some sectors very concerned about the protection of civilians. The protection of civilians is the main task for everybody, even for us. The main conditionality in our plans is the protection of civilians.

    2013-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6987 (2013) · source

  17. With regard to the question concerning the rules of engagement, in that environment it is not so easy to have a clear target because we have more than 50 armed groups. At this moment, we have only one in uniform and in a clear position, but we have some 56 groups in civilian dress within the population. With regard to the rules of engagement, we need to understand that peacekeeping operations follow the same principles. Even with the new mandate, the Force Intervention Brigade and more freedom to operate, we are operating under the same principles. The use of force follows the same rules and the same principles. We do not have many ways to justify the use of force.

    2013-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6987 (2013) · source

  18. I do not see unanimous understanding about it. But, with regard to the situation at this moment with the Force Intervention Brigade, in Sake we have one battalion from Tanzania, one battalion from South Africa that just arrived last week, one special force company from Tanzania as well, and we are waiting for the Malawians. We do not have exact information at the moment, but we hope they will be in place in late July. The problem with the Force Intervention Brigade is that it entails greater expectations, here and on the ground. On the ground, the common citizen thinks that we are going to solve all the problems, even public security, but that is not true because one brigade will not solve that problem. We need to protect civilians to accomplish our mission with the 20,000 we have on the ground.

    2013-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6987 (2013) · source

  19. It is not complicated. Sometimes from Headquarters it seems very complex, but it is not. It is simple. I am sure that we are going to have good results in favour of our mandates. We are going to protect more civilians and better protect our people, and we are going to have much more information, not only for us, but for the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Security Council and the United Nations as a whole. It will be very useful for everyone. With regard to the Force Intervention Brigade, I came to the Democratic Republic of the Congo three weeks - less than one month - ago and it is my personal opinion that the mandate of 2098 (2013) is something new. It is the first time a more open and stronger position has been taken with a Force Intervention Brigade. That has generated much speculations and many interpretations.

    2013-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6987 (2013) · source

  20. Lieutenant General Dos Santos Cruz: I have many questions which basically concern the Force Intervention Brigade and unmanned aerial vehicles. The first training is fundamental, and during the training we may have much more basic technology because, for instance - and I will mention some details - with regard to night vision, it is very difficult to find some rebel groups or gangs with the equipment we have. If we have the new technology, we will have more night combat and that is much better for us. It is a great advantage. There is a variety of technology, from basic to high tech. We need to know how to use it. At this moment, we are organizing our structure to receive the equipment. In New York, they are working on procurement and the final contract. I need to find specialized people to use the system in the best way.

    2013-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6987 (2013) · source

  21. Technology has its limitations and will not always be the answer to our challenges. In MONUSCO, we will soon have a chance to see for ourselves what UAVs can do for peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It promises to be a very interesting and instructive period for us, and we will be keen to share our experiences as we proceed forward.

    2013-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6987 (2013) · source

  22. If we do not link our structures to the new technology as it is adopted, the results are likely to be suboptimal. I would like to highlight the fact that the benefits of this technology relate not only to the results they bring to the mission. They are important at all levels, especially with regard to the political conclusions made because the political analysts have real evidence of what is going on the ground. In this brief address, I have pointed to some of the potential opportunities presented by advanced military technology for United Nations peacekeeping. No two United Nations peacekeeping missions are the same. While such technology might be good for one mission, it might not be as beneficial for another. Indeed, I have not discussed technologies that, while not suitable to MONUSCO, might suit other missions particularly well.

    2013-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6987 (2013) · source

  23. The use of surveillance devices could be regarded as overly intrusive by host nations if not adequately controlled, including the information that is generated. Only unarmed UAVs will be used in MONUSCO. Advanced technology also often requires skilled operators and analysis to support it. Such resources are often in scarce supply, particularly for the United Nations, which is heavily dependent on others for most of its military manpower. When we increase the technological resources in our mission, we need to adapt the structures we have. We need to have much more information. We need to have many more analysts. We need to have much more structure to deal with the intelligence. It is important to ensure that we can fully exploit the information and intelligence that are captured.

    2013-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6987 (2013) · source

  24. We have scanners and forward-looking infrared systems in our helicopters and aircraft. We have GPS trackers in our vehicles. Small and mini unmanned aircraft systems are extremely important for tactical operations. We should also note that the adoption of other basic technologies, such as night-sights for weapons, both thermal and image-intensifying, man- portable surveillance radar and laser range-finders would confer excellent benefits. The problem is that we need more than advanced technology. At the moment, we need much more basic technology. While pointing to the many potential benefits of the increased used of advanced military technology in United Nations peacekeeping, there are certain sensitivities and limitations that need to be recognized.

    2013-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6987 (2013) · source

  25. We have borders with many countries and more than 50 armed groups operating close to those borders, which they may cross, leading to broader disturbances. High-resolution imagery could be of significant use as material evidence. In a similar vein, the selective employment of signals intelligence could enable peacekeepers to stay one step ahead of those posing a threat to peace, which would undoubtedly help to mitigate the risks both to the population and to United Nations troops and personnel. Other advanced military technologies that could deliver benefits in the Democratic Republic of the Congo include weapon-locating systems, boats, radar and acoustic technology. These are important because the rebels may use the territory of foreign countries as a base for fighting. That is something we need to know.

    2013-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6987 (2013) · source

  26. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, there may be contingents from Portugal, Spain, Italy, France, the Netherlands, Germany, Austria and Poland in the same area - making it impossible to operate without very good information. I believe that information as key to the success of any mission. I should not limit myself to discussing UAVs alone. There are other advanced military technologies that also have the potential to offer major benefits for United Nations peacekeeping. We are already using ground-based radar in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to provide better knowledge and awareness of activity on the Great Lakes. There is also the potential to make much greater use of surveillance technology to bolster monitoring capacity, as in the context of cross- border activity.

    2013-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6987 (2013) · source

  27. This capability will certainly help us in addressing some of the major tasks set out in our most recent mandate under resolution 2098 (2013). How will we use these assets? We will use the UAVs to identify armed groups headquarters, logistics hubs, troop movements, convoys, clandestine air strips and roadblocks; to obtain early warning of armed groups' movements and intentions; and to monitor camps for internally displaced persons. The ability to fly over sensitive areas for extended periods of hours and days will provide timely information. Those UAVs will help to deter hostile action by the armed groups and to trigger the use of rapid reaction forces.

    2013-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6987 (2013) · source

  28. Lieutenant General dos Santos Cruz: It is a pleasure and a privilege for me to be here today. The subject I will focus on is the use of advanced technology in peacekeeping and the associated benefits, not only to the Mission but to the United Nations and the Security Council at all levels. This topic is of particular relevance to the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) at this time as we prepare for the arrival of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). A very extensive selection process is being run by the Secretariat for a contractor to field and operate the complete UAV system. We hope to see its arrival in the Democratic Republic of the Congo very soon.

    2013-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6987 (2013) · source