YouSaid · the spoken record

Lieutenant General Gaye

lines on the record
22
first
2010-08-06
most recent
2010-12-16
sittings or episodes
2
sources
un-security-council

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  1. “In addition, I am considering issuing specific guidelines for heads of military components on the protection of civilians, including against sexual violence, as a priority in the Office of Military Affairs. Last but not least, I will also continue to engage Member States to deploy female military personnel, as Mr. Le Roy urged. The success and sustainability of our efforts to prevent sexual violence in conflict situations require the engagement of all partners and an integrated approach to promoting women's rights and security.”

    2010-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6453 (2010) · source

  2. “In this connection, and as Mr. Le Roy stated, the Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support have developed a number of guidelines, including the operational concept, the strategic framework for drafting protection of Civilian strategies in peacekeeping operations, and the inventory of peacekeeping practices, intended to address conflict- related sexual violence. In my current capacity as Military Adviser in Peacekeeping Operations, I will endeavour to ensure that military planning processes integrate protection priorities and that our force generation efforts respond to the skill set and capabilities required to carry out protection of civilians tasks.”

    2010-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6453 (2010) · source

  3. “Some of those operations and key considerations included identifying high-risk areas and vulnerabilities; improving military liaison with local populations through community liaison interpreters; taking mitigation measures and employing crisis response; and coordinating with humanitarian partners, United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations. Lastly, strategies to counter sexual violence should take account of lessons learned to identify weaknesses within the system and to assess the efficiency of the mechanisms in place in order to make necessary adjustments. In view of this, experience and lessons learned reaffirm that responding to sexual violence inflicted on women and children by armed elements in our areas of operation is an integral part of peacekeepers' responsibility to deliver better protection of civilians.”

    2010-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6453 (2010) · source

  4. “Secondly, the strategy elaborated by the leadership must be implemented on the ground. As a Force Commander and a member of the senior management of the integrated peacekeeping mission, I ensured that my force directives, concept of operations, rules of engagement - approved by the Under- Secretary-General - and standard operating procedures reflected the task of protecting civilians, including women and children, from sexual violence. Our military leaders, from my Deputy Force Commander to battalion and company commanders, understood this mandated responsibility, which they translated into practical operations aimed at protecting civilians from physical violence and facilitating the establishment of a protective environment.”

    2010-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6453 (2010) · source

  5. “From my experience in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, addressing sexual violence requires the following: first of all, clear commitment from the leadership all the way from the top down; translating that commitment into operational orders and directives for the Mission; awareness of what constitutes a security threat, taking into account the perspectives of the local community, including women's organizations, with adequate flexibility and capacity to adapt military operations, including deployment tactics, patterns and frequency of patrols, information analysis, and response and adaptation to protection needs; strengthening civilian-military relationships, including specific outreach to community women so they can give information about patterns of attack and so that peacekeepers can also build confidence; improving understanding of local, political, social and protection dynamics; enhancing the capacity to address emergency situations; and acting as a catalyst to build confidence at all levels within the local community.”

    2010-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6453 (2010) · source

  6. “It was therefore an integral and specific component of the Mission's implementation strategy for the protection of civilians and in support of the national authorities, with a view to ensuring the sustainability of efforts to build local ownership in addressing protection priorities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. MONUC worked diligently in coordination with protection partners to develop a Mission strategy to address protection issues in a coherent and holistic conceptual framework. Furthermore, we issued a practical set of specific guidelines on sexual and gender-based violence for tactical-level military and field-level troops to improve preventive and responsive actions by offering a checklist of activities to be undertaken by military components in response to sexual violence against civilians.”

    2010-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6453 (2010) · source

  7. “It was in this way that, within a few days of stepping onto Congolese soil, I was made aware of the gravity and magnitude of the sexual violence that was prevalent in that country. It is with that in mind that I wish to pay tribute to Ms. Wallstrom and to you, Madame President, for your contributions to the fight against sexual violence and for the protection of civilians. As a former Force Commander in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, I would like to emphasize that commitment to preventing sexual violence is a key part of the broader effort to protect civilians.”

    2010-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6453 (2010) · source

  8. “Lieutenant General Gaye: It is an honour to stand before the Council and to share my experience in addressing conflict-related sexual violence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. On 4 April 2005, I took up my functions as Force Commander of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), and on 8 April I travelled to Walungu in South Kivu on an initial visit to the company deployed there. During the Commander's briefing, I was informed of raids by the Forces democratiques de liberation du Rwanda on villages where women were kidnapped, turned into sex slaves and released only when they became pregnant. That was later confirmed to me in a letter from the Ninja group chief, which I have kept religiously.”

    2010-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6453 (2010) · source

  9. “But definitely, at the Force Commander level and also at the level of Head of Mission, there is a framework for regional coordination. At the tactical level, MONUSCO's intent is to set up a joint operations centre in Dungu among the FARDC - that is the Congolese military - MONUSCO and the Uganda People's Defence Forces (UPDF), because UPDF is currently operating in the four countries I have just named - Uganda, Southern Sudan, Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo - so their participation will be part of the coordination.”

    2010-08-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6370 (2010) · source

  10. “But there is definitely a need, particularly when operating under Chapter VII, to provide the force with intelligence assets. That will definitely help improve the protection of the population. Concerning cooperation among neighbouring missions, that has already been done. There is a framework for meetings among MONUC, the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT), the United Nations Mission in the Sudan, the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur and the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA). Several meetings have already been held in Entebbe and in the various missions. Unfortunately, because of visa issues, we did not succeed in holding a meeting in the Sudan or one in MINURCAT.”

    2010-08-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6370 (2010) · source

  11. “There has been a growing awareness of human rights issues and respect for international humanitarian law, but a reduction in the number of battalions supported and thus an increased risk that FARDC forces will seek to live off the population. (spoke in English) Concerning technology assets for providing additional intelligence to the force commanders, I think that all of the force commanders will welcome this important step. The issue will be to examine its cost- effectiveness and political implications, notably as concerns the relations between the force and the host country, and, last but not least, to look at this from a military perspective. Will we focus on tactical intelligence, operational intelligence or strategic intelligence?”

    2010-08-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6370 (2010) · source

  12. “The impact of the conditional support policy on the security and protection of civilians is positive, first in terms of the Congolese military authorities' awareness of protection issues. Secondly, that policy has obliged us in the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), now the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), to develop procedures - primarily to monitor activities of the Forces armees de la Republique democratique du Congo (FARDC) within the dictates of conditional support policy. But it is clear that by reducing our support to the FARDC, as required by the conditional support policy, we have thus created conditions where more FARDC forces may live off of the population.”

    2010-08-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6370 (2010) · source

  13. “I am enormously proud of what our young soldiers, their officers and civilian colleagues in the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and MONUSCO have managed to achieve in this regard, and I have every confidence they will continue to do so in the future.”

    2010-08-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6370 (2010) · source

  14. “The greater use of interpreters is also vital to overcoming some of the language and cultural issues, and operational reach and responsiveness hinge on the United Nations ability to muster sufficient and capable transport - particularly aviation - assets. Even then, try as we might, we will never be able to offer a complete guarantee of security. There will always be risks, and the Mission will always be vulnerable to some form of criticism. But by adopting this proactive, high-profile and - where necessary - robust stance, the United Nations is able to show a strong and effective commitment to the very important task of championing the most vulnerable.”

    2010-08-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6370 (2010) · source

  15. “We have not shied away from the challenge and have sought out humanitarian and civil society actors, both Congolese and international, to help us do a better job. Ultimately, the protection of the population in the Democratic Republic of the Congo will depend upon expansion of State authority and the rule of law across the country. This is still a work in progress, and the force has lent its support to this effort through the work of engineering units and other specialists. The protection of civilians is new ground for many of the troops, and there is a need for in-depth United Nations military doctrine and more comprehensive individual and collective training on the protection of civilians.”

    2010-08-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6370 (2010) · source

  16. “In the very remote areas of Bas-Uele, in northern Orientale province, where the Lord's Resistance Army continues to prey on small village communities, MONUSCO is also conducting farming patrols, allowing villagers to work in safety in their fields. And in parts of the volatile Kivus, we are providing security escorts so that groups of up to 1,000 civilians can go to their weekly markets. Thus, we have certainly made some advances and have become more adept at tackling this task. Managing expectations has been a major challenge. Congolese see a relatively well-equipped and well-organized team of Blue Helmets and cannot understand why we cannot protect everyone, everywhere. Well-motivated and concerned actors in the international community often have high and, I dare say, unrealistic expectations of the force.”

    2010-08-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6370 (2010) · source

  17. “The Mission's military and civilian components have increasingly concentrated on improving our communication with the population and with key actors, both to understand the situation better and to make ourselves better understood. 5 For instance, community liaison interpreters are now deployed to many of the troop sites to improve liaison and interaction with locals. A network of high- frequency radios and mobile phones is being rolled out to bolster the already established unit surveillance centres. And multidisciplinary Joint Protection Teams are now quickly dispatched to areas where there are reports of problems, to advise on the best course of action. The Mission's Joint Military Analysis Centre has also been a great help in pointing the Force towards emerging areas of concern.”

    2010-08-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6370 (2010) · source

  18. “Each battalion has been required to deploy to around six to eight separate sites and to maintain a high profile and a robust presence both day and night. We cannot pretend to provide blanket protection. We have attempted to overcome gaps by conducting regular long-range patrols and temporary two-to-three- day standing deployments. In parallel, there have been deployments by the Congolese army. Admittedly, however, not all units have a positive benefit, for the reasons I have mentioned. In essence, that has been the framework around which our approach has been built, and, over time, improvements and enhancements have been made. I have mentioned presence and mobility; but there is a third essential ingredient of our protection effort: communication.”

    2010-08-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6370 (2010) · source

  19. “We must recognize that, without proper military training, equipment and communications, and operating in a highly volatile political environment, many of the members of the FARDC themselves constitute a threat to the population. Our work with the country's senior military command to help with planning, military justice and logistical support must be seen in the context of our protection mandate. Our approach to this problem has been very much an integrated one with our civilian colleagues in the Mission. Together, we have identified the areas of greatest risk, and have then set about deploying peacekeepers to the most vulnerable sites. Our approach is based on the premise that presence equals protection. And in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, presence equals mobility.”

    2010-08-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6370 (2010) · source

  20. “Adding to those problems was the lack of roads and infrastructure, which made it extremely slow and difficult to get from one place to another. It is undoubtedly a beautiful part of the world, but the climate and terrain can be arduous, rendering many places remote and inaccessible. The threats to the population have also been numerous and varied. They have faced the physical threat posed by countless armed groups, as well as the broader human security threats stemming from years of poverty and underdevelopment. At the same time, our partner on the ground - the Forces armees de la Republique democratique du Congo (FARDC) - is struggling to integrate and exercise command and control over tens of thousands of former militia combatants.”

    2010-08-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6370 (2010) · source

  21. “Quite clearly, that statement in no way detracted from the primary role of States in protecting their people, as was reiterated at the 2005 World Summit. For the United Nations, this is about helping countries to help themselves by providing tailored support to meet individual circumstances. (spoke in English) In MONUC, now MONUSCO, the protection of civilians is the Mission's priority task. Although the military was nearly at 20,000 in strength and possessed some useful capabilities, including eight attack helicopters, we had an operational area equivalent to the size of Western Europe before expansion to the east, as well as a population nearing 65 million people and limited intelligence assets. In the eastern provinces of the Kivus alone, the entire force could be spread out to just one peacekeeper per 20 square kilometres.”

    2010-08-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6370 (2010) · source

  22. “As the outgoing Force Commander of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), I would like to say a few words on the challenges faced by the Mission and the progress it has made in the area of protecting civilians. As the Council is aware, it was in 2000 that the task of protecting civilians first figured in the mandate of what was then the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). Of course, that undertaking was entirely in line with the Secretary-General's statement during the sixty-third session of the General Assembly in which he recalled that the United Nations was the champion of the most vulnerable (see A/63/PV.5).”

    2010-08-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6370 (2010) · source