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Lieutenant General Mgwebi

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18
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2017-05-23
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2017-05-23
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1
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un-security-council

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  1. According to Headquarters, the Mission's strategic review speaks to the notion of force optimization, which means that we are looking at a number of capabilities that would give us the flexibility and versatility to be able to respond to possible challenges. We are also revisiting the contract we have regarding unmanned aircraft systems. We would like to increase our range of coverage and payloads, so that we can have greater situational awareness. In that way, small versatile companies can improve our ability to respond. The challenge, however, is to secure the necessary assets.

    2017-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7947 (2017) · source

  2. As for the question from the representative of Japan about the enhancement of the force in the Kasai region, I note that, previously, there was no force stationed there. Recently, with the assistance of the Office of Military Affairs, we have been able to move two companies from Pakistan who were in stationed in South Kivu to the Kasai region. Now, we are only waiting for their vehicles, so they are ready to move. Even the boundaries of Pakistan's South Kivu brigade have been adjusted pursuant to consultations between the Office of Military Affairs and Islamabad, which makes life a bit easier. All those efforts are aimed at being able to cover the Kasai region. The last question came from the representative of Uruguay, who inquired about the implications of MONUSCO's troop reduction.

    2017-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7947 (2017) · source

  3. With the use of technology, the various contingents can speak to each other using their own equipment, which bridges the gap. In response to the question from the representative of the United States about assistance in moving troops, the Office of Military Affairs has helped by readjusting and revisiting the areas of responsibility as they relate to the boundaries of the various contingencies. Headquarters has granted our request to be able to move the rapid deployment forces within an area of responsibility without first seeking Headquarters' permission, which makes our life easier. We are also working with the Office of Military Affairs to revisit the statement of unit requirements so that we can respond as required.

    2017-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7947 (2017) · source

  4. That situation is challenging, because when it comes to an armed group that has a base probably not too far from the mission's base, what does the mission do if that armed group is threatening the population, but has not done anything yet? Does the mission proactively attack the group or does it coexist with them? At present, the question of co-location and co-existence with armed groups is challenging. Even if the Intervention Brigade can overcome that challenge, it cannot be present all over the country at the same time. With regard to intelligence, it is encouraging that the United Nations has at least accepted the term "intelligence" and has accepted to bring in technology in the form of unmanned aircraft, which do help when it comes to contentious issues. Some of the military radios at our disposal are not interoperable.

    2017-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7947 (2017) · source

  5. Lieutenant General Mgwebi: In responding to the question posed by the representative of the United Kingdom on the principles of peacekeeping, I would say that the commanders understand those principles as they relate to consent, impartiality and the use of force, and even more so the use of force for self-defence. The critical challenge is to understand the use of force when it comes to defending the mandate. Additionally, the language of the mandate of United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) uses terms like "terrorist operations", which then creates a special responsibility for the Intervention Brigade to act in accordance with the mandate.

    2017-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7947 (2017) · source

  6. The credibility of the United Nations is at stake if it is seen to be working with them. In our experience, when we are present and work closely with them, their behaviour tends to change; they become more positive, but in areas in which we are not present, violations are committed and the environment then becomes very politically charged. I thank you, Sir, for giving me the opportunity to speak. I have tried to very briefly highlight some of the challenges that my colleagues in other areas might be experiencing.

    2017-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7947 (2017) · source

  7. If we speak of the use of force, where do we stand with them? Impartiality and all of the principles are valid, more so perhaps in peacekeeping. In peace enforcement, however, where no agreement has been signed, how do we address the principles of peacekeeping in today's conflict situation, in which we find ourselves dealing with criminal groups, as opposed to political groups trying to fight for freedom or independence from the host country? It is a challenge for us to work with the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, especially in politically charged areas such as the Kasais. Cooperating with them becomes difficult when they are also found to be committing human rights violations, but we are expected to support them. How then do we approach the situation when they are participating in such abuses?

    2017-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7947 (2017) · source

  8. At times, forces are not eager to move forward and do what is expected of them, wishing to consider whether it is within their mandate or not, which is a challenge for MONUSCO. With regard to the issue of targeted operations by the Intervention Brigade, the Brigade becomes an escape clause for some of the framework brigades, which claim that a specific operation is not their job; it is the job of the Intervention Brigade. That is one of the areas that we need to look at. I would like to point out that the principles of peacekeeping are still valid, but with regard to what happens on the ground, some of the armed groups are foreign, criminal and without any political agenda. In my view, if we speak of consent, that does not apply to them. If we speak of impartiality, that does not apply to them.

    2017-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7947 (2017) · source

  9. The question ofthe use of force as mentioned by the report must be looked at by the United Nations because interpretations by some contingents on the ground are not necessarily the same. They tend to be eager to use force when it comes to self-defence, but the part of the report that speaks to the use of force for the defence of the mandate leads to different interpretations, which we need to look at. In addition, command-and-control is a challenge because, once again, according to the same report, there is a "a de facto dual line of command involving mission leadership and troop-contributing countries that regulates the use of force by missions" (ibid) That means that, although they are not expressly stipulated, there are caveats that are not visible and come from the capitals.

    2017-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7947 (2017) · source

  10. The challenge within the mission itself is to achieve a comprehensive integrated approach. Mission leadership must look at that and ensure that all components begin to play their role, so as to avoid a situation where, when we reach the physical stage, it is already a bit too late. At the political level, we must ensure that we are able to, at least, prevent and anticipate events occurring. According to a report published by the Office of Internal Oversight Services, which is tasked with evaluating the implementation and results of the protection of civilians mandates, "the chain linking the intent of the Security Council to the actions of the Secretariat, troop- and police-contributing countries and peacekeeping missions themselves remains broken when it comes to the use of force" (A/68/787, summary).

    2017-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7947 (2017) · source

  11. The soldiers have been on the ground now for the past three weeks, still awaiting the heavy-lift aircraft to move the vehicles. The Ilyushin 76, which is expected, is not yet on the ground, and it has been almost three weeks. That leaves the troops vulnerable on the ground. How then do we ensure that the forces and the support element, which falls under the civilian side of the operation, are responsive to the requirements of operations? That becomes a challenge when it comes to moving the forces to where they are expected to be. Missions are expected to protect civilians and rightly so. A very good paper has been written on the three tiers of protection-of-civilians mandates: political strategy, physical protection and a conducive environment. The Mission is made up of civilian, police and military or force components.

    2017-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7947 (2017) · source

  12. With regard to the assets and capabilities that are available, the absence of infrastructure such as roads in the Democratic Republic of the Congo makes moving forces from one area to another very difficult. The way in which the mandate is written expects the force to be agile, flexible, versatile and mobile. In order to achieve that, the assets must be available in order for the mandate to be implemented. Unfortunately, such assets are often not available on the ground. In the Kasais, for example, I had to move a force from South Kivu to the Kasais. Because of the limited Mission support available, including the people required to provide the assets that were are not available on the ground, I was able to move only soldiers and their personal equipment; no main equipment could be moved.

    2017-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7947 (2017) · source

  13. That represents a challenge in terms of command- and-control, policy-writing and giving direction to the Force Commander to use the forces at his disposal. Aware that we are expected to deal with armed groups, especially the foreign armed groups within the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the way in which the MONUSCO mandates are written tends to provide for two forces. One is the Intervention Brigade, which is mandated to conduct targeted operations, whereas the rest of the Force, commonly known as the framework brigades, is expected to conduct only normal, and not targeted, operations. In terms of the cohesion of the force, that then becomes a challenge to command-and- control, which then makes the Force Commander's task a bit ofa challenge to achieve what needs to be achieved.

    2017-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7947 (2017) · source

  14. Moving the force is becoming difficult, as the statement of unit requirements issued by the Office of Military Affairs and the memorandums of understanding (MOU) signed by Member States tend to confine the troops at my disposal to a greater degree in the east. Therefore, ifI must move forces from the east to where there is a challenge, it means having to speak to the Office of Military Affairs and the Permanent Missions that must communicate with their capitals so as to obtain agreement allowing the forces to move. In terms of reaction-and-response time, that process takes time and causes delays. It becomes critical for the language of the statement of unit requirements and the MOUs to allow the Force Commander to use forces available to him in the part of the country in need and not in specified areas.

    2017-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7947 (2017) · source

  15. That is happening at a very interesting time in the sense that, as a mission and a force, we are expected to deal with the issue of the protection of civilians in a country approximately the size of Western Europe, added to which we are tasked with the objective of supporting the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the holding of elections - which was not included in the previous mandate. If that is what is expected of us while we are called on to reduce the force, that becomes challenging. With regard to current developments, the force was initially deployed to a greater degree in the east, whereas there are currently more problems in the southern sector.

    2017-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7947 (2017) · source

  16. Once the mandate has been issued, the Secretariat, the mission and the force's formulation and interpretation of the mandate become critical, because if there is a failure to understand the mission's concept of operation, which underlies campaign planning by the force, challenges and differences of opinion might result in connection with how to move the mission forward. The MONUSCO mandate has just been extended pursuant to resolution 2348 (2017), which calls for the reduction of the force to a troop ceiling of 16,215.

    2017-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7947 (2017) · source

  17. When it comes to the actual drafting of the mandate, it is also critical that its authors take into account that its implementation will be critical for its success and that any possible exit strategy should be understood at the earliest stages, while taking into account the complexities of the conflict and specific factors, such as the country's size, the fault lines leading to and defining the conflict in its present state and the allocation of resources needed so as to be able to conduct the mission itself. That speaks to the nature of the mandate itself.

    2017-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7947 (2017) · source

  18. Lieutenant General Mgwebi: It is an honour and privilege for me to have been asked to brief the Security Council today. I have been with the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) for the past 15 months. MONUSCO is a very complex and politically charged mission. I am going to attempt to cover the challenges that have faced us over the past 15 months. I trust that the challenges of which we will be speaking will be similar to those facing my colleagues who are Force Commanders elsewhere. One of the most important aspects is the mandate itself.

    2017-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7947 (2017) · source