YouSaid · the spoken record

Lieutenant-General Prakash

lines on the record: 35
first: 2011-07-27
most recent: 2012-06-20
sittings or episodes: 2
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“First and foremost, I would say, are force protection measures. Various contingents come with varied types of equipment and varied perceptions concerning force protection. That is one issue that can be addressed. Even with a small tactical activity like patrolling, different nations have different ways and means of undertaking it; even that is an area that could be addressed. Some or most military contingents, having been trained to fight wars and not to keep peace, do not understand the implications ofjoint assessment teams and joint protection teams, or what kind of role the military has to play in them. That is another area where standardization can be undertaken. Another area is the gathering of analyses of information. That, I feel, is a major facet where the standardization of military contingents can be brought in.”
2012-06-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6789 (2012) · source
“As to the question that was raised regarding the flexibility or rigidity of standards, when one has real standards there is definitely a tendency for rigidity to creep in. But my request is that it not be considered in that light. It should be considered from the viewpoint that standards provide us with capability, and that flexibility is the state ofmind with which these standards should be used to one's own advantage. If there are no national caveats, there is an inbuilt flexibility in the memorandum of understandings. The standards that are laid down by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations can only help us to perform better. There was another question about the issues to which common military standards can apply. In fact, there is a wide range of facets to be addressed in that regard.”
2012-06-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6789 (2012) · source
“Lieutenant General Prakash: I shall first answer the question posed by the representative of Guatemala about what can be done with the feedback provided by the Force Commanders. I think that the Council can do a lot. There are a number of players who have a role to play in the feedback that is provided by the Force Commanders. Because there are a number of players to act on the feedback that is provided, the chain is long. In the military component, the frequency with which it changes is very high; it is somewhere between six and 12 months. Thus, unless that time gap is cut down, the feedback provided by the Force Commander is of no use. My request for the support that the Council can give is to reduce that time gap, which will help the Force Commander.”
2012-06-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6789 (2012) · source
“That said, it is the mark of any professional set-up that we constantly endeavour to improve. It is in that context that I have provided members with some ideas and suggestions.”
2012-06-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6789 (2012) · source
“Also on this requirement, troop-contributing countries could be encouraged to incorporate a specific United Nations peacekeeping module into the junior and senior staff college courses syllabuses. That would help military officers to pick the various nuances and intricacies of peacekeeping, such as the political and humanitarian aspects, which is currently a shortcoming noticed in military peacekeepers. In conclusion, while I have provided some suggestions for the adoption of a system to improve the performance of military components in United Nations peacekeeping, I request that this not be interpreted as the current system falling short of expectations. As a force commander, I am proud of what troops in MONUSCO are delivering today in a most challenging environment.”
2012-06-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6789 (2012) · source
“I may highlight here that that feedback will comment on the multidisciplinary facets of peacekeeping, even to include issues related to community liaison and dealing with civil populations and humanitarian actors under challenging circumstances. While I have made some suggestions for the collective improvement of the performance of units, I think there is also a need to have the very best leaders for the future missions, ideally with comprehensive and good grounding in United Nations peacekeeping missions. To support that, there needs to be a rigorous and honest personnel reporting system to inform national and United Nations authorities to facilitate the selection system, the aim being to have the right person for the right job.”
2012-06-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6789 (2012) · source
“In addition to the forum that already exists, there would be an advantage in facilitating greater interaction and communication between policy/decision-makers in national capitals and missions that are beneficiaries of troops provided by the capitals, so that both the contributor and the receiver are on the same page when it comes to understanding the requirements, constraints, limitations and performance of units. Moreover, for contingents deployed in the mission area, there is a need for a regular formal feedback system to be introduced tokeep the troop-contributing countries informed, of course through the permanent missions, about the operational performance of their troops. In MONUSCO, the chain of command in the Mission is conducting operational readiness inspections, the findings of which could well be formally shared with TCCs.”
2012-06-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6789 (2012) · source
“In my opinion, the preparation and predeployment phase is most critical. We need to place greater emphasis on issues that make United Nations peacekeeping under Chapter VII peacekeeping different from war fighting. Also, greater attention needs to be paid to preparing units under orders for deployment to a mission area on the mission-specific tasks. If the TCCs so desire, missions can provide teams to those units to brief and focus potential peacekeepers on their forthcoming tasks and duties.”
2012-06-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6789 (2012) · source
“To give members a practical example of standardization, in MONUSCO we have contingents holding varied types of armoured personnel carrier, in varied numbers. We have been pushing hard for the standardization of holdings based on operational needs. That has resulted in optimized use of holding of critical equipment and has generated much-needed financial savings, without jeopardizing operational efficiency. Going further, we need to have a system that covers the whole lifespan of activities - from preparation to deployment to de-induction - and that addresses the issues related to operational performance and the image projection of the United Nations in the field. While some of that already exists, as I previously explained, nevertheless there are some gaps that need to be plugged in order to have a fully effective system in place.”
2012-06-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6789 (2012) · source
“The traditional training of an officer and a soldier fielded to the missions does not equip them with all of the range of skills, techniques and sometimes even the mental attitude to operate in this wide band. At this point, I am reminded of a statement in a recent publication of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, which states that "United Nations peacekeeping is ostensibly a political endeavour". Therefore, having a system that conditions our young men and women peacekeepers to operate in such a challenging environment is a reality of the business of modern-day peacekeeping. As to what more can be done, I would like to make a few suggestions. First of all, the initiative of the Office of Military Affairs to base all contributions from TCCs on a generic infantry battalion is a welcome initiative in the right direction.”
2012-06-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6789 (2012) · source
“Not all contingents find themselves optimized to be able to effectively perform in that kind of scenario for reasons of training, equipment and sometimes even mental psyche. Some peacekeepers still arrive with a mindset and orientation of peacekeeping as a soft operational tour. In the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), we continue to find that contemporary peacekeeping, when it comes to the protection of civilians under imminent threat, is a fine balance between prompt and robust action required from a soldier in uniform and a person who cares and nurtures the vulnerable civilian community in his area of operational responsibility.”
2012-06-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6789 (2012) · source
“The Department ofPeacekeeping Operations and the troop-contributing countries (TCCs) already have a process of predeployment procedures, memorandums of understanding and laid-down training standards and concept of operations. This is supplemented by training material, standard operating procedures and manuals issued by the Office of Military Affairs, missions and even the troop-contributing countries. In spite of the fact that all this is happening, we still face some situations and challenges in the field missions that highlight the fact that more needs to be done. For instance, the protection of civilians requires the force component to be very agile and flexible, and to operate in difficult terrain and risky and demanding situations.”
2012-06-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6789 (2012) · source
“But it also needs to be highlighted here that, over time, the peacekeeping environment has become increasingly complex and challenging and come under increasing scrutiny. Thus, the ability to absorb the differences and shortcomings that I have just outlined is getting weaker and weaker. When one thinks of missions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan and Darfur, it is very evident that the business of military peacekeeping is now a specific and demanding affair in its own right, especially when it comes to the highest priority mandated task of protection of civilians. I now turn to the issue of what is being done in this regard.”
2012-06-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6789 (2012) · source
“Turning to the first part concerning why this is an issue that needs to be addressed, Council members are well aware that a force component in a Chapter VII mission is made up of troops from different regions of the world with different military orientations. They hold varied types of equipment and the troops back home are trained to adhere to their national doctrines and objectives. This is further complicated by issues of culture and language, and sometimes by the perceptions of their performance as per national expectations. Some may observe from what I have just said that there is nothing new here and that the United Nations forces have managed to get by not withstanding these challenges.”
2012-06-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6789 (2012) · source
“Lieutenant General Prakash: At the outset, I would like to take this opportunity to thank you, Sir, for the support that you provide to the men and women in uniform who proudly serve under the United Nations flag in the Democratic Republic of Congo. I also thank you for giving me an opportunity to talk to the Council about the need for a system to assess and support common military standards in peacekeeping operations and avoid underperformance of units. I will cover this subject in three parts: what this issue is about, what needs to be addressed and what is already being done in this regard, and what more can be done.”
2012-06-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6789 (2012) · source
“If such things are going to happen, we will need more enablers. The enablers need to come on time and to be in the right place at the right time. As long as the enablers are provided, I think there is no need to change strategy.”
2011-07-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6592 (2011) · source
“Lieutenant General Prakash: The question that I want to answer is whether a change of strategy is required with respect to the protection of civilians by the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) in the pre- and post-electoral periods. My view on the subject is that the present strategy in place is working well. We have recently taken a look at it. We have worked out modalities as to how we are going operate. We have arranged various contingencies to deal with various situations that may arise. What clearly emerges is not that the strategy is not in place, but that the enablers are not in place. For example, there is a likelihood of armed groups ramping up their activities and, as the elections approach, there is likely to be more civil unrest.”
2011-07-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6592 (2011) · source
“Since the elections are approaching, we also feel that future requirements for air assets are going to be much higher. There will be conflict between meeting the requirements for protecting civilians and for transporting electoral material. That is when we will be totally stretched, and I feel at this stage that our ability to do our basic task of protecting civilians will also be highly constrained.”
2011-07-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6592 (2011) · source
“The Council is well aware of the fact that there is no road infrastructure in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Today, of 93 bases that we have in the country, 31 are air-supported; that is, one-third of the temporary operating bases/company operating bases are in areas that can be logistically supplied only by air assets. If we do not get the right kind of air assets to support those bases, not only will we not be in a position to establish more bases that are required in inaccessible areas, but we will find it difficult to support even the existing 31 bases. The fact that since 4 July we have had no attack helicopters has greatly reduced our deterrence capability against the Forces democratiques de liberation du Rwanda in the Kivus. We have no capability for undertaking any proactive actions against the armed groups in the Kivus.”
2011-07-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6592 (2011) · source
“Also, in May, we had an inter-mission force commanders' conference in Entebbe where we shared information about the LRA. That said, this is not enough, and there is more scope for sharing information and conducting more effective operations against the LRA, provided we are given the right kind of resources to do it. The second question was about the existing capability gap in our aviation assets and how it affects the Mission. The non-availability of aviation assets - both utility and attack helicopters - is of great concern for the Mission. As the years have gone by, the negative activity has shifted west, away from the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and more towards the jungles, to areas that are accessible only by helicopter.”
2011-07-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6592 (2011) · source
“This reduction in the LRA's activity can, to a great extent, be attributed to a number of proactive operations that the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) has been undertaking in the area. That said, I would reiterate that the threat is real and cannot be wished away. The fact is that the terrain is rugged, the numbers they operate in are small, the areas where they operate are inaccessible, and the borders are porous. We have established a joint intelligence operations centre in Dungu that became operational this year and is a step towards sharing information between the partners: the Uganda People's Defence Force, the Forces arme'es de la Republique Democratique du Congo and our mission, MONUSCO.”
2011-07-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6592 (2011) · source
“Lieutenant General Prakash: Of the two questions asked of me, the first, from the representative of Gabon, concerned my assessment of the threat of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in the region, and what cooperation can happen between the interregional missions to neutralize it. The threat of the LRA in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is real. While its numbers are not large, the threat cannot be wished away. On average, we get reports of about 15 to 20 incidents of LRA activity every month. Over a period of time, the brutality of the attacks has lessened, the number of killings has fallen, and the number of civilians being abducted has also been greatly reduced.”
2011-07-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6592 (2011) · source
“While it would still be a vehicle for safeguarding the United Nations image and reputation, it could also create an opening for the host nation to influence and take informed decisions on what and who is supported.”
2011-07-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6592 (2011) · source
“We need to find a balance between what is desirable and what is feasible, in order for the policy not to become so invasive that it conflicts with the achievement of our overall mandate. Thirdly, where possible we should seek to introduce this policy at mission start-up rather than further downstream. It is easier to implement when everything else is new, and the impact could potentially be much greater. To conclude, conditionality policy has had both positive and negative impacts on operations. There are certain broader issues and human values at stake. To my mind, this policy is there to stay, but there is scope for further development and refinement. If the policy were seen as jointly owned by our national partners, this would be of great help.”
2011-07-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6592 (2011) · source
“Having sketched out some of the ways in which the conditionality policy can impact on operations, I would now like to make a few suggestions on how it might be enhanced for future missions. First and foremost, the conditionality policy cannot stand on its own for long- term gains; it must be simultaneously followed up and supported by broader military reforms, such as proper integration, and security sector reform. Secondly, while it is desirable to make the screening system broad and deep, apart from being resource-intensive, it tends to reduce the number of commanders and units available for operations that can be supported by MONUSCO. The extent to which the exercise is undertaken needs to be looked at again.”
2011-07-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6592 (2011) · source
“There have been stresses and strains along the way, including with our FARDC partners, who have complained about inadequate consultation and engagement, particularly in the early days when considering withdrawal of support to offending units. Requests for changes of commanders have aroused feelings of intrusion into areas of national sovereignty. Our own troops have also faced the dilemma of trying to work out where to place priority - monitoring supported FARDC or countering anti-Government forces? This has not been easy, particularly for junior field commanders, who are trained more to deal with clarity than ambiguity. Who is on which side? When should they act, and how? Conditionality has certainly added to the burden on such officers and made the operational landscape more blurred and challenging. Let me make some recommendations.”
2011-07-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6592 (2011) · source
“That having been said, even if we had sufficient resources we would still find ourselves in the situation where there is no longer a strong appetite within the FARDC for conducting joint operations, particularly in the Kivus. They argue, with some vindication, that operational surprise and security are lost due to the protracted preparations and wide consultation. The trend is therefore away from joint operations towards unilateral FARDC operations, over which the Mission has limited oversight or influence. It is a fact that we have been breaking new ground with the introduction of a conditionality policy. We had nothing to fall back on in terms of tried and tested guidance for implementing the policy. Only as time has passed have we become more confident about the best ways of operationalizing the policy.”
2011-07-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6592 (2011) · source
“Despite certain obvious benefits, the policy presents certain issues and challenges for the Mission. The limited resources available to the Mission to implement the conditionality policy, in addition to other commitments, means that there is a restriction on the number of FARDC units that it can support. At a certain point in time, we run out of military observers and contingents to carry out the monitoring functions. We also run out of civilian staff to conduct the necessary screening checks. In addition to this, experience has shown there are many commanders who do not meet the criteria. So, one of the consequences of our own conditionality policy is that our capacity to reach and influence all parts of the FARDC order of battle is not as great as we would want it to be.”
2011-07-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6592 (2011) · source
“The very existence of the conditionality policy, as well as President Kabila's "zero-tolerance" policy, has reminded Commanders of their personal responsibilities in exercising effective command and control over their own troops in operations. For their own sake, as well as for that of the unit, they have had to pay more attention to what is being done by the troops in their name. By and large, the recent behaviour of MONUSCO-supported FARDC units has been satisfactory, and the conduct of most joint operations has not been impacted by adverse publicity. In an army made up of professionals, ex-rebels and Mayi-Mayis, which has attracted criticism for preying off the local population, we now have started seeing encouraging signs of improvement in personal discipline and human values. There are certain issues.”
2011-07-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6592 (2011) · source
“Both sides have learned from each other, and, as a result, operations have become much more sophisticated in their design and implementation. Importantly, protection of civilians has been factored in at the start of the planning process, as inputs are sought from a large number of stakeholders, including the Joint Human Rights Office within the Mission. The Mission's efforts and those of the FARDC are now much better coordinated, with obvious benefits in terms of what can be achieved on the ground. The requirement for MONUSCO is to closely scrutinize the distribution of logistics support, which has its obvious operational benefits. It has helped to ensure that our support gets to the troops in the field as intended, to ensure that they are properly fed and sustained, thereby contributing to individual morale and motivation.”
2011-07-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6592 (2011) · source
“The standard operating procedure remains the subject of fine-tuning. The implementation of the conditionality policy is regularly reviewed by the senior management group, in consultation with representatives of the humanitarian community, including the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. The impact of the conditionality policy is now visible. There are, of course, some positives. In certain areas, the policy has had a positive impact on the conduct of operations by the FARDC. It has brought the MONUSCO Force and FARDC closer to jointly planning operations and developing operational concepts that are applicable to the unique conditions that prevail in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.”
2011-07-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6592 (2011) · source
“Support is limited to units and commanders with acceptable human rights records. Implicit is the requirement for adequate screening of key personnel and visibility of FARDC actions in the field. Support is denied at the planning stage to units or commanders believed to have committed grave human rights violations, including mass rapes and the employment of child soldiers. In this regard, a thorough screening process is in place. Even after the support is provided, if at some stage non-compliance with the conditionality policy comes to light, support can be withdrawn after due notification to the authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and if they then fail to take appropriate action, as was the case when serious human rights violations were committed by one of the battalions recently.”
2011-07-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6592 (2011) · source
“This caveat is what is now referred to as the conditionality policy, and it governs the way in which the Mission approaches the task of supporting the FARDC and other Congolese authorities. The policy has been translated into a detailed mission standing operating procedure, setting out very clear requirements that need to be met in order for support to the FARDC to be provided. The nature of the support includes primarily fuel, rations, transportation, fire support, expert advice and casualty evacuation. Certain ongoing FARDC actions against the armed groups, such as Operation Amani Leo and Operation Iron Stone, inter alia, are being carried out with considerable support from MONUSCO. That support is conditional on there being sufficient joint planning of operations, particularly with respect to protection of civilians.”
2011-07-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6592 (2011) · source
“Among the other tasks with which the Mission is charged, we are mandated to support the efforts of the Government in bringing ongoing military operations against the Forces Democratiques de Liberation du Rwanda (FDLR), the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and other armed groups to a completion, specifically by supporting the Forces armees de la Republique democratique du Congo (FARDC) through jointly planned operations. But, as stated in resolution 1925 (2010) and carried through its current mandate - resolution 1991 (2011) - MONUSCO support for the FARDC is strictly conditioned on compliance by the FARDC with international humanitarian and human rights law, and refugee law.”
2011-07-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6592 (2011) · source
“Lieutenant-General Prakash: It is an honour for me, as Force Commander of one of the largest United Nations peacekeeping missions - the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) - to be given an opportunity to address the Council this morning on the conditionality policy and its impact on operations. The policy has been in operation in MONUSCO for just over 18 months, and we now have a reasonably good feel for what it can do and the associated issues. These I will elaborate on a little later, but before doing so, it might be helpful if I started by talking about what the policy actually entails and how it is being implemented by MONUSCO. Protection of civilians in support of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo remains the primary focus of our work.”
2011-07-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6592 (2011) · source