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Lochhead

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21

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2021-10-06

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2021-10-06

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un-security-council

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1. “With that combination of innovations and improvements, peacekeeping operations would be well placed and have significant front-line assets to contribute to reaching SDG target 16.4, the Secretary- General’s disarmament agenda and Silencing the Guns. I believe that placing counter-proliferation back into a central role within peacekeeping operations would improve mandate implementation and protection outcomes and protect United Nations staff. Let the sacrifices of our fallen peacekeepers encourage our collective action on this issue.”

   2021-10-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8874 (2021) · source

2. “Missions could, first, conceptualize improved peacekeeping- operation counter-proliferation mandates and concepts of operations to actively prevent destabilizing inflows of lethal material; second, ensure that mission leadership is aware and supportive of arms control initiatives and that it integrates counter-proliferation-related analysis into mediation, SSR, DDR and peace processes; third, improve the weapons-intelligence capabilities of troop- contributors, UNPOL and other relevant sections and the collection of data and evidence across the mission; fourth, develop a workstream within DPO strategy on digital transformation, focusing on how emerging technology and big data can be harnessed for the good by peacekeeping operations to reduce arms flows; fifth, develop, field-test and adopt advanced collection tools for peacekeepers to identify and trace illicit materials and manage evidence; sixth, negotiate new data-sharing platforms and protocols among peacekeeping operations, panels of experts and Member States, as called for in resolution 2020 (2011), and interface with the operations of key international partners, such as UNODC, INTERPOL and the World Customs Organization; seventh, mainstream arms and ammunition analysis in human rights investigations and ensure information-sharing with international investigation and justice mechanisms, including those focused on the targeting and killing of peacekeepers; eighth, support baseline research within and outside the mission area in order to inform regional approaches and engagement with regional bodies and industry actors in order to create barriers to trafficking; and, ninth, conceptualize regional approaches and light-footprint support mandates that work with States on a regional basis to improve trafficking intelligence-sharing and inform national and regional responses to arms, ammunition and explosives proliferation.”

   2021-10-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8874 (2021) · source

3. “The Security Council could have an important role in conceptualizing both improved counter-proliferation mandates and future light- footprint regional counter-proliferation support operations that would be cost effective and support Stateswithadvancedtechnologyindisrupting destabilizing illicit crime and conflict-related flows. In summary, our research suggests that the following key elements could help peacekeeping operations to mitigate the dangers associated with arms, ammunition and explosives proliferation.”

   2021-10-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8874 (2021) · source

4. “The digital transformation of peacekeeping can directly support progress on Goal 16 and the Secretary-General’s disarmament agenda Securing Our Common Future: An Agenda for Disarmament, as well as the African Union’s Silencing the Guns initiative, by developing new, field-focused initiatives that identify and prevent dangerous inflows. Technology will paint a picture of trafficking dynamics over time only by acting as a sensor to detect diversion and related illicit flows. Analysis must inform actions, programming and operations if such flows are to be disrupted, both by peacekeepers and by national actors. What can therefore complement improved detection and understanding? As missions draw down, others are conceived in order to respond to emerging threats to international peace and security.”

   2021-10-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8874 (2021) · source

5. “New technology could amplify and simplify the collection, analysis and sharing of illicit arms- and ammunition-related data, empowering law enforcement and customs officials and providing a global picture of such flows. The United Nations could consider contributing to the development of that technology in partnership with the private sector and in support of Member States. Such tools and platforms could also be used in conjunction with new reporting mechanisms to inform the Security Council about global trends in illicit trafficking. Without such tools, platforms and reporting mechanisms, Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16, which calls for a reduction in arms flows and measures the tracing of illicit weapons, will be unreachable because there will be no baseline against which to measure trends in illicit proliferation.”

   2021-10-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8874 (2021) · source

6. “Peacekeeping operations should consider developing protocols to feed into global law enforcement and customs operations supported by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the World Customs Organization and INTERPOL, as well as the work of arms-embargo-monitoring expert panels, through the adoption of new data-sharing platforms. Precedents exist for cross-border arms monitoring mandates, and current good practice exists for peace operations to share arms-trafficking information on a regional basis, as called for in resolution 2020 (2011). Such initiatives all point to the way forward and are in line with the strategy on the digital transformation of peacekeeping.”

   2021-10-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8874 (2021) · source

7. “The Security Council has asked about regional or global mechanisms to strengthen arms control in conflict-related situations. Research shows us that we need to strengthen regional and global counter- trafficking approaches, informed by baseline research and data collection. Peacekeeping operations have struggled to respond to the multifaceted regional phenomenon of arms, ammunition and explosives proliferation, while implementing what is typically a national mandate. The lack of a regional mandate has put peace operations and local communities at risk of attack, failed to put up sufficient barriers to hostile actors’ access to illicit weapons and made stability elusive.”

   2021-10-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8874 (2021) · source

8. “By mainstreaming arms and ammunition analysis, peacekeeping human-rights-division missions can also collect important evidence supporting attributions for violence and violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law. Improved information-sharing on arms and ammunition among human rights investigations, commissions of inquiry and international criminal mechanisms can also enhance capabilities. Similarly, accountability for attacks against, and the killing of, peacekeepers requires robust evidence collection to the highest evidentiary standards. Since such incidents often occur in areas where the State has no presence, the State often cannot be relied upon to investigate such crimes, and it is often incumbent on the United Nations to do so.”

   2021-10-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8874 (2021) · source

9. “The creation of illicit arms monitoring mandates and cells within missions is also important, and the development of weapons intelligence capabilities within all contingents would help to provide a whole-of-mission report approach and develop a common operating picture, in line with the 2019 policy on peacekeeping-intelligence. DPO should also consider taking advantage of significant innovations in the available technology to conduct that work efficiently and effectively. Networked geoanalytics tools can now be applied to understand arms trafficking networks and inform operational planning by the force, United Nations Police (UNPOL) and national partners. That is in line with the Action for Peacekeeping Plus initiative by developing innovative, data-driven and technology-enabled peacekeeping.”

   2021-10-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8874 (2021) · source

10. “That is particularly acute where peace processes are stalled or implementation is delayed, highlighting the linkage among arms control, SSR, DDR and mediation. The Security Council has asked about weapons and ammunition management and existing tools and mechanisms. Gaps remain where the intention is not only to manage arms in the context of programmatic activities and caseloads but also to prevent trafficking and proliferation where civilians are being targeted or conflict is escalating. The lack of a regional remit is a significant blind spot within some peacekeeping operations that do not have a specific arms embargo or border monitoring mandates. Peacekeeping operations should consider developing mechanisms to reach out and collaborate with neighbouring States to prevent proliferation.”

    2021-10-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8874 (2021) · source

11. “Peacekeepers in the harshest and most dangerous duty stations are losing weapons only through combat losses, complex attacks and IED strikes, and that is only after responding in self-defence and sometimes losing personnel. It is critical that missions facing emerging IED threats — for example, such as in the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of Congo — take advantage of the hard-won mission adaptation experiences of a mission like MINUSMA. Additional programmatic safeguards are also required for security sector reform (SSR) and DDR programming, which can unintentionally stimulate illicit arms procurement and the proliferation of armed groups seeking to meet eligibility criteria in order to access payrolls and benefits through integration or DDR processes.”

    2021-10-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8874 (2021) · source

12. “Preventing illicit arms trafficking in conflict zones, including to terrorists, as called for in resolution 2370 (2017), requires specific mandates, support from mission leadership, a whole-of-mission approach, dedicated capabilities, sensors, analytical tools and human resources, in particular in areas where the State has no presence. Border security-related programming is also critical. The hardening of defences, improved predeployment training and more robust postures by peacekeepers operating in non-permissive environments mean that TCCs will now respond quite robustly to terrorists, bandits and non-State armed groups in ways for which peacekeepers in more permissive environments might not have historically been prepared, trained or equipped.”

    2021-10-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8874 (2021) · source

13. “The DPO weapons and ammunition management policy and the Effective Weapons and Ammunition Management in a Changing Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Context handbook, as well as mission-specific standard operating procedures, have gone a long way towards addressing the policy gaps identified by the Survey’s project on losses from peacekeeping operations resulting from the surrender, or capture, of weapons of troop-contributing countries (TCCs), negligence, poor storage and/or corrupt practices. I believe that the handling of recovered weapons requires special attention, and, if applied systematically down to the battalion level, the DPO weapons and ammunition management policy will help to address that.”

    2021-10-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8874 (2021) · source

14. “Lastly, missions could be clear about whose responsibility it is within a peacekeeping operation to identify and disrupt flows. That work requires a whole-of-mission effort, with clear benchmarks and reporting requirements. The Council has asked about preventing losses and connections with security sector reform (SSR), DDR and countering terrorism.”

    2021-10-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8874 (2021) · source

15. “Missions require strong mandates to monitor, identify and disrupt flows of illicit arms and ammunition into the areas in which they operate, and they require political support in their efforts to do that, which would allow missions to prevent armed violence from escalating and new armed actors from emerging, while creating space for the stabilization of fragile and conflict-affected States. Secondly, in States and regions where the illegal use of small arms and light weapons has reached chronic and destabilizing proportions, direct interventions and operations to reduce flows are important. That is particularly important in situations in which the peacekeeping operation itself is targeted with weapons, ammunition and IEDs.”

    2021-10-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8874 (2021) · source

16. “Small Arms Survey’s ongoing work on the diversion of IED components across the Sahel has highlighted how the diversion of commercial explosives fuels the artisanal mining sector, as well as provisions bomb- building networks across the subregion, requiring a coordinated regional approach. The Council seeks to understand how those trends and dynamics shape peacekeeping mandates. While mandates have frequently prioritized physical security, stockpile management and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and have supported national small arms commissions, they are necessary but not sufficient to address arms flows within active conflict contexts. In addition, not all peacekeeping operations are under United Nations arms embargoes. It is therefore important to identify solutions for both embargo and non-embargo contexts.”

    2021-10-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8874 (2021) · source

17. “Battlefield capture by non-State armed groups and terrorist groups also provisions the illicit market and enables attacks against United Nations peacekeepers and creates protection-of-civilians crises Force-multiplying technologies, including drones, armoured vehicles, night vision, encrypted communications and thermal optics, procured by States often make their way rapidly from the time of importation into the hands of terrorists and pose direct threats to United Nations forces, personnel and assets. The capture or looting of massive stockpiles in contexts, such as Libya or Afghanistan, can contribute to the destabilization of adjacent areas for decades to come. Craft-produced firearms, sporting firearms and their ammunition also allow for the easy emergence of vigilante and self-defence groups.”

    2021-10-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8874 (2021) · source

18. “Where the Department of Peace Operations (DPO) is deployed in asymmetrical conflict contexts, like Mali, the diversion of commercial explosives and legacy ordnance items has had a devastating effect, with improvised explosive devices (IEDs) accounting for almost 60 per cent of United Nations fatalities from malicious acts within MINUSMA — the balance of the killings having been carried out with small arms and light weapons.”

    2021-10-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8874 (2021) · source

19. “I will skip ahead quickly, as I do not have much time left. The Council seeks to understand trends in the proliferation of small arms and light weapons and their ammunition. I will try to summarize the main lessons based on research very briefly. First, the availability of arms to non-State armed groups, criminals and terrorists in peacekeeping contexts is often a product of historical regional conflict. Legacy weapons continue to circulate and fuel new types of violence. Where large-scale transfers of lethal material in violation of arms embargoes occur, weapons rarely remain within the confines of recipient States. In some peacekeeping operations, the inflow of arms, ammunition and explosives takes place largely through the ant trade from former and current conflict zones.”

    2021-10-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8874 (2021) · source

20. “Christophe was killed while responding to a complex terrorist attack against a United Nations base, as part of a quick-reaction force. He died valiantly leading troops from the front, leaving behind a wife and three children. In 2018, I chaired the Board of Inquiry into the circumstances surrounding Christoph’s death. Weapons and ammunition analysis showed us that the attack that killed him was linked materially to three other attacks, including against the MINUSMA base in Timbuktu and at a café in neighbouring Burkina Faso, which in total killed 28 people in a 24-hour period. Arms, ammunition and explosives constitute important evidence that can contribute to justice for such crimes in line with resolution 2589 (2021), thereby promoting accountability for the killing of, and acts of violence against, United Nations peacekeepers.”

    2021-10-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8874 (2021) · source

21. “Mr. Lochhead: It is a great honour to brief the Security Council today on behalf of the Small Arms Survey. My thanks go specifically to Kenya for inviting us to contribute to this important discussion. Having personally spent 15 years in United Nations peacekeeping operations, I can say that the unchecked proliferation of arms, ammunition and explosives poses one of the greatest challenges to peacekeeping today. I would like to dedicate this statement to the memory of a former colleague and friend, Captain Christophe Tangaou Massamaesso of the Togolese armed forces, who was killed in action by small arms fire in August 2017 while deployed in central Mali with the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).”

    2021-10-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8874 (2021) · source