YouSaid · the spoken record

Lowcock

lines on the record: 570
first: 2017-09-27
most recent: 2021-06-15
sittings or episodes: 46
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“There therefore remains an essential, indeed growing, requirement for a predictable and regular flow of foreign exchange into Yemen at a scale that allows the Government to continue to pay salaries and to keep the exchange rate stable. The fifth priority is the most important: meaningful progress towards peace. The Stockholm Agreement is a crucial step in the right direction. But as Council members just heard from Martin Griffiths, we are in danger of losing that momentum. I hope that everyone will do everything they can to work with Martin and his team to keep moving towards peace. I have already again today explained the consequences of failing to do so. After almost endless repetition, there is a happy ending to Groundhog Day. The main character eventually breaks out of his time loop but only by completely changing his behaviour.”
2019-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8551 (2019) · source
“Any extra money in Yemeni pockets is therefore now worth much less, especially since nearly all goods must be imported. A growing number of families are also getting less help from friends and family overseas. According to the World Bank, Yemenis working abroad, almost entirely in Gulf countries, send home more than $3.3 billion a year. Remittances are a lifeline for their families. Some experts estimate that those payments make up nearly a quarter of Yemen's gross domestic product and pay for more than half of commercial imports. But stricter labour policies are sending thousands of Yemeni workers home every month, effectively cutting off family incomes.”
2019-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8551 (2019) · source
“Since the conflict began, food imports have declined by more than 40 per cent, fuel imports by 70 per cent and the import of medicines by 50 per cent. Almost no containerized commercial cargo has entered Al-Hudaydah or Saleef since late 2017. That means that everything that is not food or fuel, such as medicine, clothing or shelter materials, must go elsewhere. Food, fuel and other goods are able enter Aden and other ports, but moving them north, where most people live, is increasingly difficult and pushes prices even further out of reach for many people. And while it is true that civil servant salaries are being paid more often, the currency is also losing value again. One United States dollar now costs about 560 Yemeni rial as compared to 400 rial at the end of last year and 215 rial before the crisis.”
2019-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8551 (2019) · source
“In May, commercial food imports through Al-Hudaydah and Saleef were the highest in three years, and fuel imports have largely recovered from the fuel crisis in the previous month. With salary payments rising and increasing imports, many Yemenis should have more money in their pockets and find more goods to purchase in the market. But - and this is the point to focus on - like the war itself, progress on one issue can obscure the bigger picture. Commercial imports through Al-Hudaydah and Saleef rose in May but they also fluctuate greatly from month to month. As I have said before, we frequently see that in months in which food imports increase, fuel imports drop, and vice versa. And the trend line, which is what really matters, points sharply downwards.”
2019-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8551 (2019) · source
“Other critical programmes, including malnutrition treatment, cholera prevention and support for displaced people, could start closing in the next few weeks. Fourthly, in October, I emphasized the need for sustainable measures to strengthen the Yemeni economy. We have seen some important progress on economic issues over the past six months. The Government recently published its first budget since 2015, and I strongly support its efforts to get it fully financed. I hope donors will do the same. The Government has paid salaries across the country for health workers and some other civil servants for several successive months, and the Ansar Allah authorities have also made salary payments in some areas.”
2019-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8551 (2019) · source
“The third priority that I outlined in October (see S/PV.8379) is full funding for the humanitarian operation. This year, as I said, we require $4.2 billion. We have so far received only $1.15 billion, or 27 per cent. In February, we heard very generous pledges in Geneva, amounting to $2.6 billion. We thank all our donors for their generosity, and we understand that this money comes from voluntary contributions. But when pledges are made, they must be fulfilled. It has now been four months since the Geneva conference. The World Health Organization has already had to suspend payments to health workers and the procurement of medicine and other supplies. Vaccination programmes will also soon start winding down. That means that people are almost certainly already dying as a result of those funding gaps.”
2019-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8551 (2019) · source
“Depending on the time of year and water currents, the spill could reach from the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait to the Suez Canal and potentially as far as the Strait of Hormuz. I leave it to Council members to imagine the effect of such a disaster on the environment, shipping lanes and the global economy. If a major spill occurs, the world will surely demand answers from anyone who could have prevented the catastrophe but chose not to. Provided Ansar Allah-affiliated authorities continue to facilitate this work, the assessment team should be able to deploy to the FSO SAFER tanker within the next two weeks. The other major concern about interference and access relates to the diversion of food aid. I will leave it to David Beasley to update Council members on that.”
2019-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8551 (2019) · source
“Monitoring restrictions, issues with beneficiary targeting and other interference all require constant engagement. Despite those challenges, we have seen some progress recently. For example, it is encouraging that Ansar Allah-affiliated authorities have issued more entry permits for aid workers recently. And last week, Ansar Allah-affiliated authorities told us that they wanted us to proceed with a technical assessment to assess the decaying FSO SAFER oil tanker, which is storing an estimated 1.1 million barrels of oil off the coast of Al-Hudaydah. I have repeatedly alerted the Council to the risks in that regard. If the tanker ruptures or explodes, we could see the coastline polluted all along the Red Sea.”
2019-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8551 (2019) · source
“Secondly, we need all parties to facilitate rapid and unimpeded humanitarian access, as again required under international humanitarian law. More than 5 million people who need help, including 3.8 million people in acute need, live in 75 districts that are hard to reach because of bureaucratic impediments, insecurity or logistical constraints. In April and May, access constraints prevented or delayed humanitarian assistance for more than 1.5 million people. That is half a million more people than in the previous two months. Bureaucratic impediments remain a major problem, costing lives and increasing suffering. So far this year, Ansar Allah-affiliated authorities have prevented or delayed 55 United Nations field missions, which is an average of three per week.”
2019-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8551 (2019) · source
“But as conflict continues, underlying conditions keep deteriorating. How do we get out of this deadly loop? What needs to change to break the cycle altogether? Last October, I set out five priority actions to avert catastrophe in Yemen. At the time, I emphasized that all five steps needed to be taken together to bring about real change. It is worth reviewing where we stand with those priorities today. First, I said that we needed an immediate ceasefire across the country and to silence the guns and ground the war planes. There has been a reduction in violence in Al-Hudaydah since December, but that has been essentially offset by escalating conflict elsewhere. Enough is enough. The parties must also respect international humanitarian law, sparing civilians and civilian infrastructure at all times, whether or not there is a ceasefire.”
2019-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8551 (2019) · source
“It is also three times more than we needed in 2015, but if the fighting does not stop, today's requirements will be a fraction of what we will need to keep people alive a few years from now. Some Yemeni activists have rightly asked why the international community is spending so much money in Yemen but things keep getting worse. Unfortunately, humanitarian organizations cannot do much more than keep people alive, and we have been reasonably successful at that. In early 2017, we were providing aid to about 3 million people every month. Two years later, we are now reaching more than 10 million a month. Working with local institutions, we have rolled back the risk of famine in some areas, stemmed the world's largest cholera outbreak and greatly increased the number of malnourished children who are being treated and cured.”
2019-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8551 (2019) · source
“If fighting lasts until 2022, we can expect close to half a million total deaths, including more than 300,000 people who will die from hunger, lack of health care and related causes. That is twice as many people dying as the model predicts ifthe war were to stop this year. We would also see a profound decline in the status of survivors throughout the country. A quarter of all children would be malnourished, and nearly 40 per cent would be out of school. Council members can imagine better than I can what the implications of this might be for security and stability in the wider region. That brings me to the second answer. We will need an even larger and an even more expensive relief operation. At $4.2 billion, this year's response plan is already the world's largest.”
2019-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8551 (2019) · source
“So when people ask about what the effect of all the fighting has been, the answer is clear: untold death, damage and destruction; the immiseration of a nation; and the fracturing and fragmentation of its society - all amounting, in sum, to the world's worst humanitarian tragedy. Let me turn now to the question ofwhat will happen if the war continues. There are two immediate answers. First, many more people will die and conditions will get much worse for those who survive. An independent study by the University of Denver, commissioned by the United Nations Development Programme, recently used a global model to forecast the impact of continuing conflict in Yemen.”
2019-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8551 (2019) · source
“Four years ago, Yemen was already the region's poorest country and millions of people were receiving aid. That is true. But there was also a functioning economy. Public institutions were providing essential services and basic infrastructure reached across the country. Yemen was even seeing improvements in food security and nutrition. All that has now been undone. Today, the number of people who need assistance is 50 per cent higher than it was before the war. For the first time this year, assessments confirm pockets of famine-like conditions in dozens of places across Yemen.”
2019-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8551 (2019) · source
“Everyone agrees on that, at least in their public statements, and yet the fighting continues. So the next question is: If all the fighting has not materially changed the military facts on the ground, what has it achieved? We give the Security Council the figures every month. Eighty per cent of the population - more than 24 million people - need assistance and protection, including 10 million who rely on food aid to survive. Some 600 incidents per month damage or destroy civilian infrastructure. More than 100 hospitals, health facilities and schools were hit just last year. A quarter of Yemeni children are out of school. More than 3.3 million people remain displaced. The economy has been devastated, shrinking by 40 per cent or more. Some may suggest that the war is not solely to blame for this tragedy.”
2019-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8551 (2019) · source
“Yemen is getting more violent, not less. The conflict is getting worse, not better. Fighting this year has displaced more than 250,000 people. The number of incidents killing or injuring children more than trebled between the last quarter of 2018 and the first quarter of this year. In recent days, we have also seen a dangerous and reprehensible increase in attacks on Saudi Arabia, as well as air strikes in Sana'a and other areas. All the fighting has, however, led to relatively few major shifts in control. Today, the large majority of Yemenis live in areas controlled by Ansar Allah and its allies. After tens of thousands of air strikes, shells, mortars and ground clashes, this has changed only marginally since 2016. So the war is not only brutal; it is unwinnable.”
2019-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8551 (2019) · source
“What are we doing about it? And what is needed to help Yemen break this cycle for good? Let me begin with the nature of the war. From the start, it has been brutal. One independent monitoring group, the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), estimates that more than 70,000 people have been killed just since 2016. Violence has also been remarkably consistent. Fighting may decrease in one area - as we have seen recently in Al-Hudaydah with the Stockholm Agreement - only to mushroom elsewhere, as we are seeing right now in Al-Dhale'e, Hajjah and Taiz. Today there are more than 30 active front lines in Yemen - more than enough to absorb fighters redeploying from quieter areas. In fact, ACLED data indicate that conflict incidents across the country have been mostly increasing since 2016.”
2019-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8551 (2019) · source
“Mr. Lowcock: Every month, I update the Security Council on the humanitarian situation in Yemen. Today marks my fifteenth briefing and the thirty-sixth members will have heard since 2015. My experience is just like that of the main character in the hit Hollywood movie Groundhog Day. Many in the Chamber will have seen it. He finds himselftrapped in a time loop, repeating the same day over and over. He tries to escape in many different ways - to no avail. Every morning, he wakes up back where he started. Just as in Groundhog Day, the details in my briefings to the Council change from month to month. The larger picture, however, does not. Today I want to step back and consider the time loop we seem to be experiencing in Yemen. How has this war evolved in the past four or five years? What has it wrought? What can we expect if it continues?”
2019-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8551 (2019) · source
“I am sorry to say that I just do not know. I feel desperately sorry for parents in that horrible position. Has the Security Council not adopted a resolution reinforcing the fact that countries should not bomb hospitals? Yes: resolution 2286 (2016) specifically covers that. Finally, I am asked: what is the point of the Security Council adopting such resolutions if States are not going to comply with them? That, Mr. President, is also a very good question. It is, of course, not really addressed to me.”
2019-05-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8527 (2019) · source
“If I were a non-governmental organization running a hospital, why would I want to give you details of my location if that information were simply being used to target the hospital? That is a good question. We are thinking about what conclusions to draw from recent events in respect of the de-confliction system insofar as it covers health facilities. What is your advice to parents of children who live in the de-escalation zone; should they take their children to the hospital in case of an illness or injury? That is a very difficult question. I am deeply concerned about the impact on the health of children and their safety, when so many medical facilities are being attacked. What would you do if you were the parent of a child needing hospital care in the so-called de-escalation zone in Idlib right now?”
2019-05-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8527 (2019) · source
“Is the information being provided about the locations of hospitals in fact being used not to protect hospitals but to target them? I answer that I do not know. Once again, the people who can answer that question are the ones dropping the bombs. Many deconflicted sites that are not hospitals have not been attacked. Has this kind of thing happened before during the Syria conflict? Yes. Last year, the then Special Envoy, Staffan de Mistura, and I raised concerns about similar attacks in eastern Ghouta with Council members that we thought might have relevant information and could prevent a recurrence. Did you get satisfactory answers at that time? We have yet to receive full answers to the questions we raised last year.”
2019-05-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8527 (2019) · source
“I answer that I cannot say, but that at least some of those attacks are clearly organized by people with access to sophisticated weapons, including a modern air force and so-called smart and precision weapons. Are our hospitals being deliberately targeted? I say that I do not know. The people who do are the ones dropping the bombs. What I can tell them is that there are a lot of attacks on those health facilities. Is it true that you provide details of where hospitals are in order to protect them? I answer that, yes, the obligation to protect civilian objects, including hospitals, emanates from international humanitarian law. We give details of some hospital locations to the parties to the conflict so that they can comply with those obligations.”
2019-05-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8527 (2019) · source
“That is then verified by WHO, and it is checked against additional sources. Only those that are fully vetted and confirmed by a variety of sources are included in the list of confirmed attacks. That system, by the way, is the one used for reporting on such attacks from Afghanistan to Yemen. It is widely respected. In the light of the events of the past three weeks, my office and I have been asked a lot of questions by Member States, non-governmental organizations operating in the area, doctors in the hospitals and families affected by the fighting. Let me tell the Council some of the questions, and what I can say in answer to them. They ask: Who is bombing all these hospitals?”
2019-05-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8527 (2019) · source
“Some facilities have been hit twice. Other hospitals are closing for fear of being attacked. A total of 49 health facilities have partially or totally suspended activities. Among them, they provided an average every month of at least 171,000 medical outpatient consultations and 2,760 major surgical operations. They helped more than 1,400 women deliver their babies every month. Now they are not doing those things. The 20 attacks are confirmed attacks, using WHO'S global methodology for cataloguing attacks on health facilities. That system relies on WHO'S global reporting system and a specialized network of partners on the ground to triangulate and confirm what has happened. In the case of a reported attack, those partners on the ground provide a detailed incident report.”
2019-05-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8527 (2019) · source
“Following the attacks, almost all are currently unusable, including a hospital in Latmana, in Hama governorate, attacked on 28 April; a hospital in Madiq Castle, in Hama governorate, attacked on 28 April; a primary health- care centre in Hbeit, in Idlib governorate, attacked on 30 April; a primary health-care centre in Qastun, in Hama governorate, attacked on 1 May; a WHO- supported surgical unit in the Kafr Nabudah area, in Hama governorate, attacked on 1 May; and a primary health-care centre in Al Madiq, in Hama governorate, attacked on 2 May. I know that the Council appreciates brevity, but I could continue listing such attacks for some time. The trend has continued day after day. In total, WHO and health actors have reported 20 attacks on those 18 facilities, amounting to almost one a day over the past three weeks.”
2019-05-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8527 (2019) · source
“Tents and other shelter items for 25,000 people are being distributed, but, as we have told the Council before, a full military incursion would overwhelm all ability to respond. We are rapidly approaching that scenario. I am most of all concerned about the number of attacks damaging or destroying medical facilities. I need not remind the Council that medical facilities are specially protected under international humanitarian law. Since 28 April, the World Health Organization (WHO) and health actors have identified at least 18 facilities that have been damaged or destroyed by air strikes, shelling or other fighting. All of them are inside the so-called de-escalation zone.”
2019-05-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8527 (2019) · source
“Three days ago, an attack near a market place in Jisr Al-Shughur reportedly killed at least eight civilians and injured three others. Some 17 schools have been damaged or destroyed, and many more are closed, with more than 400,000 students unable to sit for their exams. Areas in Government-controlled western Aleppo and northern Hama have also been affected by hostilities, resulting in civilian casualties and injuries. On 14 May, rockets hit the densely populated Al-Neirab camp for Palestine refugees in Aleppo, killing at least nine civilians and wounding 11. Humanitarian agencies are trying to help people caught up in the fighting, but the response is already stretched. Pre-positioned stocks of food have been given to 100,000 people since the start of this month.”
2019-05-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8527 (2019) · source
“And yesterday the Deputy Regional Humanitarian Coordinator updated the International Syrian Support Group humanitarian task force in Geneva on yet a further spate of barrel bombs from helicopters, air strikes, heavy shelling, ground attacks and counter-attacks. In the past three weeks, we have received reports that up to 160 people have been killed. At least 180,000 people have been displaced, and millions of people are crammed into an ever-smaller area - 180,000 in three weeks. While many people have moved to camps, more than 80,000 people have found themselves with nowhere to go. They are therefore simply parked in open fields or sheltering under trees. We now have reports of three internally displaced persons settlements being attacked.”
2019-05-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8527 (2019) · source
“On 24 April (see S/PV.8515), my Deputy briefed Council members here on a further increase in air strikes and shelling, with attacks both in the de-escalation zone and from the zone into Government controlled areas. She described how approximately 200 people had been killed since February, and the number of newly displaced had grown to 120,000 people. Just days later, the pace of attacks increased even further, with some of the most intense hostilities in almost a year. My Director of Operations briefed the Council once again last Friday on the effect of the air strikes, the barrel bombs, the ground attacks and the shelling.”
2019-05-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8527 (2019) · source
“Even before the recent escalation, they were among the most vulnerable people in Syria, particularly the 1 million children and the 1.3 million people who fled to Idlib from other parts of the country. The area is now largely controlled by Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham - a proscribed terrorist group. The innocent civilians, of course, hugely out-number the men with guns. We have briefed the Council every month as the conflict has escalated. On 27 March, my Director of Operations alerted the Council to the alarming spike in civilian casualties and displacement owing to fighting, noting that 90 people had been killed and nearly 90,000 displaced (see S/PV.8493).”
2019-05-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8527 (2019) · source
“Mr. Lowcock: The past three weeks have seen a deadly escalation of the conflict in north-western Syria. The Secretary-General has been warning about this for months. In a September 2018 press release (SG/SM/19208), he stressed that it was, absolutely essential to avoid a full-scale battle in Idlib. And he warned that that would "unleash a humanitarian nightmare unlike any we have seen [in Syria]". When I briefed Council members here on 18 September, I said a full-scale military onslaught could result in "the worst humanitarian tragedy of the twenty-first century" (S/PV8355, p. 5). Despite our warnings, our worst fears are now coming true. As Ms. DiCarlo just summarized, the United Nations estimates that 3 million people live in the area of the de-escalation zone in the north-west of the country.”
2019-05-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8527 (2019) · source
“I am looking forward to travelling to Riyadh again in the next several days to meet Saudi and Emirati officials and finalize the arrangements for the new joint pledge of $1 billion they made in Geneva. Those two donors' block grant to the United Nations last year was absolutely instrumental in scaling up the aid operation, and I continue to view the approach they took as a global best practice in humanitarian support and donorship.”
2019-05-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8525 (2019) · source
“The most immediate issue is funding. The slight improvements I have just described will not be sustained unless donors continue to fund the relief operation. Last month, the Council will recall that I said that the 2019 United Nations humanitarian response plan had received only 6 per cent of the required resources and that major cuts to core relief activities were imminent. As oftoday, 20 per cent of the required resources have now been provided. I want to thank in particular the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates for their funding since last month, which, as I understand it, came from the pledge that they announced last November. But there is still a long way to go. We again call on all our donors to fully disburse the pledges they made in Geneva in February.”
2019-05-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8525 (2019) · source
“Our first goal, to be clear, has been simply to keep people alive and I hope it is obvious that we have been reasonably successful at that. There has been no widespread famine, at least up to now. But we are also now starting to see the beginning of more positive, sustained outcomes. A year ago, agencies estimated that 107 districts were at risk of famine. Based on the new data available to us today, the food and nutrition situation has improved in more than half of those districts and one-fifth of them are, as of today, no longer at risk of famine Again, one-fifth of districts that were at risk of famine last year are not currently at risk. That has been possible only because last year our operation was relatively well funded. That brings me to my fourth and final point, which is the help we seek from the Council.”
2019-05-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8525 (2019) · source
“Data was collected from 108 districts across the country, using a mix of beneficiary surveys and key informant interviews. Thousands of people were contacted and asked what humanitarian assistance they had received. The results tell a clear story. Some 94 per cent of randomly selected intended beneficiaries of food aid confirmed that they had received food baskets, and 96 per cent of them said they were satisfied with the distribution process. Health services that humanitarian agencies said they had delivered were confirmed at 95 per cent of facilities. Beneficiaries confirmed that water systems supported by agencies were functional 84 per cent of the time. One ofthe questions I am often asked is whether we are seeing a reduction in suffering and famine risk as a result of the huge relief operation.”
2019-05-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8525 (2019) · source
“A United Nations assessment team plans to deploy to the site very soon so that we can work out the best way forward to minimize the risks. Thirdly, I want to address what, despite all the problems, we are able to deliver in what, as I have said, remains the world's largest humanitarian operation. In January and February, 130 agencies worked together to provide 9.8 million people with food, water, health care and other assistance. In March, the World Food Programme fed 10.6 million people; that is more than in any previous month. In April, a cholera vaccination campaign reached 1.1 million people in Sana'a. We now have additional, independent confirmation that help is reaching people. With funding from our largest donors, my Office has commissioned an independent third-party monitoring exercise covering the entire response.”
2019-05-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8525 (2019) · source
“That is an example of how deconfliction with the coalition continues to be a key enabler of the response across Yemen. Technicians are working now at the Red Sea Mills to assess damage, repair equipment and process whatever grain can be salvaged. That will probably take several weeks. Last month, I flagged our concerns over the FSO SAFER oil tanker (see S/PV.8512). The tanker, which the Council will recall is moored off the coast of Al-Hudaydah, has had no maintenance since 2015 and is at risk of rupturing or exploding, potentially spilling 1.1 million barrels of oil into the Red Sea. Just to give a sense of the scale of the problem, that is four times as much as was spilled in the Exxon Valdez disaster 30 years ago. All parties have now assured us that a technical assessment can proceed for the FSO SAFER oil tanker.”
2019-05-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8525 (2019) · source
“Over the past few weeks, we have had intensive discussions with Ansar Allah-affiliated authorities on the steps required to ensure that all assistance in Yemen is delivered in line with humanitarian principles. Those discussions are progressing, and I hope that previously agreed measures - including biometric registration of beneficiaries ~ will soon be fully implemented. We are making progress on some issues. On 5 May, a joint United Nations mission reached the Red Sea Mills again, for only the second time since September 2018. I want to acknowledge the support we received for that mission, including security assurances from all parties. The assessment team travelled from Aden to Al-Hudaydah through Government-controlled areas, and the coalition was especially helpful in facilitating those movements.”
2019-05-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8525 (2019) · source
“Heavier trucks, including those carrying food aid, now take more than 60 hours to travel between Sana'a and Aden - about four times longer than used to be the case. Recently, one of the major Aden-Sana'a routes effectively closed, and without it humanitarian operations will become even slower and more expensive. Severe access restrictions imposed by the parties continue to be a major problem. In February and March, more than 900,000 people were affected by delays or interruptions in assistance. Restrictions on movement of goods or staffare by far the biggest cause ofdelay. A large majority of those incidents occurred in areas controlled by Ansar Allah-affiliated authorities, but there are too many problems arising from decisions by others as well.”
2019-05-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8525 (2019) · source
“Fortunately, the number ofnew cases seems in recent days to be on a declining trend; but it is too soon to know if that will continue. Secondly, with regard to current challenges, violence rages still, as Mr. Griffiths has just said. In the first quarter of the year, more than 900 civilian casualties were reported, and it is a sobering fact of the war in Yemen that civilians are more likely to die in their own homes than anywhere else as a result of the war. The fighting also affects the aid operation. Because many main routes are not usable, travellers, humanitarian agencies and traders now rely on a patchwork of back roads and mountain passes, often going through insecure areas with numerous checkpoints.”
2019-05-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8525 (2019) · source
“Mr. Lowcock: In complement to but without repeating what Mr. Griffiths has just said, I will first update the Security Council on the overall humanitarian situation. Secondly, I will summarize the current challenges we face in the response. Thirdly, I will briefly review what the world's largest humanitarian operation - which is what we have in Yemen - has achieved and is achieving. And fourthly, I will set out what help we are seeking from the Council at this stage. First, on the current humanitarian situation, the spectre of famine still looms. Ten million Yemenis are still reliant on emergency food assistance to survive. A resurgent cholera outbreak has already affected 300,000 people this year, compared to 370,000 cases in the whole of2018.”
2019-05-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8525 (2019) · source
“And I therefore implore all our donors to convert their pledges - the promises they made in Geneva - into cash as quickly as possible. We remain keenly aware that f as Mr. Griffiths said - a sustainable peace would be the most effective remedy for the humanitarian crisis in Yemen. Without peace we will simply go on treating the symptoms of this crisis instead of addressing the cause. Let me summarize. Violence has again increased. The relief operation is running out of money. Barring changes, the end is nigh.”
2019-04-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8512 (2019) · source
“And it is 80 per cent less than what we had received in cash at this time last year. United Nations agencies are rapidly running out of money for essential relief activities. The World Health Organization projects that 60 per cent of diarrhoea treatment centres - the central approach we have to tackle the cholera outbreak - could close in the coming weeks, and services at 50 per cent of secondary-care facilities could be disrupted. The World Food Programme reports that its pipeline for food vouchers and the in-kind food pipeline will break in June, unless they immediately receive new money. Closing or scaling back such programmes - at a time when we are struggling to prevent widespread famine and roll back cholera and other killer diseases - would be catastrophic.”
2019-04-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8512 (2019) · source
“Last year's contribution from those two donors was channelled through the United Nations as a single, unearmarked grant early in the year, which I consider a best practice in humanitarian donorship. That was also a major factor in enabling us last year to counter the cholera outbreak, roll back food insecurity in half of the pre-famine districts and help us save more children suffering from complicated severe acute malnutrition - more children than we were able to save in any other comparable operation globally. While we were encouraged by the pledges made in Geneva, I need to tell the Council that, nearly four months into the year, the United Nations Yemen humanitarian response plan has actually received in cash only $267 million. That is about 10 per cent of what was pledged, and 6 per cent of requirements.”
2019-04-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8512 (2019) · source
“Without maintenance, we fear that it will rupture, or even explode, unleashing an environmental disaster in one of the world's busiest shipping lanes. We have been working with all parties to address the risk, supported by funding from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, starting with a technical assessment. Final approvals for the assessment have been pending since September. We hope that recent indications that a United Nations project will soon be able to begin work on this critical issue prove correct. The second, potentially insuperable, challenge we face is funding. In February donors pledged $2.6 billion for humanitarian action in Yemen this year, including a further $1 billion joint pledge for the United Nations by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.”
2019-04-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8512 (2019) · source
“With huge numbers of desperately poor, hungry families being priced out of local food markets, decision makers on all sides need urgently to find ways to speed up the berthing of ships in Al-Hudaydah, ease credit requirements and facilitate in-country shipments of fuel. As I discussed with the new Governor of the Central Bank two days ago, we also need to see the exchange rate stabilized at a level that, as Mr. Griffiths alluded to, makes it affordable for ordinary people to buy food. We are also increasingly concerned about the FSO SAFER oil tanker, a floating storage and offloading facility about eight kilometres off the coast of Ras Issa terminal in the Red Sea. Used to store and export oil since 1998, the tanker currently has about 1.1 million barrels of oil on-board. It is in poor condition and has had no maintenance since 2015.”
2019-04-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8512 (2019) · source
“In Government-controlled areas, we also continue to engage the coalition with regard to requirements introduced in December 2018 at Al-Dhubab checkpoint, which have caused delays for agencies seeking to deliver aid in Government- controlled areas along the west coast. Commercial food imports through Al-Hudaydah and Saleef in the first quarter of the year were about 40 per cent lower than the previous quarter, and average food prices were more than twice the pre-crisis level. Commercial fuel imports are only 30 per cent of estimated requirements. Correspondingly, fuel prices have nearly quadrupled in some places in the past several weeks. People are waiting for days to secure the very limited supplies of fuel that are available.”
2019-04-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8512 (2019) · source
“We continue to work with all the parties to find the safest, most efficient way to get that food to millions of desperately hungry people who need it as soon as possible. The litany of other problems involving access that we have reported to the Council before continue. Movement and customs clearances are withheld, visas are denied, project agreements are side-tracked and missions are delayed at checkpoints. Most of the restrictions that we are currently facing are imposed by Ansar Allah-affiliated authorities in the north. We appreciate their recent decision to grant additional visas, and we hope that that will lead to further improvements in the access situation.”
2019-04-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8512 (2019) · source
“The Mills contain enough grain to feed 3.7 million people for a month, and they became inaccessible in September 2018, as coalition forces advanced into the city. Ever since then, we have faced serious challenges in accessing the Mills, which Mr. Griffiths and I both addressed in public statements in February (see S/PV.8464). A United Nations team was able to conduct a one-day visit - finally - on 26 February. That mission allowed us to establish that most of the grain could still be salvaged if it were immediately fumigated. Efforts have repeatedly been made since then to cross the front lines to bring in workers to do the fumigation and start milling the grain ~ a process that would take several weeks.”
2019-04-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8512 (2019) · source
“The World Food Programme has so far delivered emergency food assistance to more than 9 million people every month. It intends to increase that to 12 million people in the coming months. Thousands of humanitarian personnel are staffing approximately 1,500 cholera treatment facilities in 147 districts across the country. Emergency response teams are treating patients, distributing hygiene kits, chlorinating water sources, sponsoring clean-up campaigns and educating the public. They are, as Dr. Mughni said, working tirelessly. Humanitarian agencies have kept millions of people alive so far, but we still face two major challenges. The first is access. We still encounter far too many restrictions on humanitarian action. The Red Sea Mills in Al-Hudaydah, about which we have talked to the Council previously, are a compelling example.”
2019-04-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8512 (2019) · source