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Lubbers

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2001-03-08
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2004-05-20
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un-security-council

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  1. If the presence of ECOWAS and the presence of UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone is sufficiently, let us say, robust, then we can challenge the RUF better. We can say that if something happens there, it is the RUF's responsibility, unless we can prove that there are other groups. I do not exclude the possibility that at some point it will be in the interest of the RUF to report to those observers, because otherwise they will be blamed for everything that happens in that area. I do not like to go into the technical aspects of this question, but indeed I see a long-term connection in the future between ECOWAS and UNAMSIL. Turning now to the statement made by the representative of China, I would like to thank him for what he said.

    2001-03-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4291 (2001) · source

  2. The ECOWAS initiative has been developed more in relation to the borders, including the border between Liberia and Guinea, which is the main interface for trouble. I think that if ECOWAS, maybe in a somewhat renewed form - and I touched on this in my presentation earlier this afternoon and the discussions I had with President Konare' - could safeguard, in an effective way, at least a crucial part of the border, then that would be a good opportunity, as long as we can ensure that the behaviour of RUF is non-interventionist in the area of Guinea and that the military presence is coordinated. I think that at some point the basic question will be that, if the RUF refrains from action, there are still many other groups in that area - all sorts of groups that could take action.

    2001-03-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4291 (2001) · source

  3. In my opinion, he did a wonderful job as Chairman of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and is still doing it. I have very good memories of the conversation I had with him. It was not an easy one. He had to cope with the realities of countries that saw things differently, but I am convinced that there will be another opportunity - and, hopefully, soon - in the context of ECOWAS. Maybe at this point I should explain once again the relationship as I see it between the UNAMSIL effort and the ECOWAS effort. The UNAMSIL effort, in accordance with the Mission's mandate, is to strengthen Sierra Leone and to restore stability in an acceptable way, and it is working on that. To do that, it has to strengthen its presence in Sierra Leone.

    2001-03-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4291 (2001) · source

  4. As a former politician, I have to say that they will go for a different course only when they consider it to be in their own interest. But it could be in their own interest, if they gradually change their role of partner in crime to a political entity in Sierra Leone, and that is the basic question. It is very difficult to judge this, and maybe RUF is not as homogeneous as it is sometimes said to be. But to give some perspective and a chance to the better parts of RUF might be a good investment. We shall see, but I do think that the experiences of recent weeks are reason, at least, to see how far we can go - again, step by step. Turning now to the statement made by the representative of Mali, I take this opportunity to pay tribute once again to President Konare'.

    2001-03-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4291 (2001) · source

  5. At least at this moment there is some movement in the right direction, but, to answer the question, I am reasonably sure that if there is no follow-up action, within a number of months there will be pessimism again. Now that things have started to move ahead a little bit, we have to think hard and go forward with prudence, but go forward and do certain things. The representative of Colombia also asked me about the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). I will be very frank and open. One should learn from history and from past experience, so there is reason to be cautious. But having said that, other representatives, speaking after him, said that we couldn't afford to exclude the possibility that they will choose a different course.

    2001-03-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4291 (2001) · source

  6. I would say that none of the steps, even the short-term ones, should damage the long-term perspective. If we can take short- term steps that serve the long-term perspective, why not do that? I turn now to what was said by the representative of Colombia, who strongly emphasized the regional aspect. He had a few questions that were intriguing to me, and maybe also to his colleagues - two questions, in fact. One concerns the timing of a return to normal life, and how long will it be before donor fatigue sets in again? This was one of the reasons for going there. There was donor fatigue, and it seemed that everyone thought that there was no solution at all in western Africa. That was the reason they tried to set a different political agenda, because we cannot accept this donor fatigue and this downward spiralling of the whole situation.

    2001-03-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4291 (2001) · source

  7. That is related also to other questions concerning the return of the refugees - where do they go, to what territory and so on. So we talk here, and we make assessments in terms of the past, but we can never forget that there is also a scenario for the future. My advice would be to be cautious, but not to overlook windows of opportunity. What would represent a window of opportunity? A gradual decrease in violence, greater access to refugees, and passage in Guinea and at some point into Sierra Leone territory - territory controlled by UNAMSIL. That is the basic picture. Now this can only be done gradually, step by step. One cannot force things. Here I should like to repeat what I said earlier: that I have some hesitation with the reasoning concerning the short term and long term.

    2001-03-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4291 (2001) · source

  8. One can never exclude the possibility that the RUF, at some point in time, will become more aggressive. Therefore, I would say that the UNAMSIL presence has to be robust, but one should not exclude the fact that the RUF itself also has an interest, a political interest. One should not exclude the fact that the RUF has gradually come to understand that, given the fact of UNAMSIL and the somewhat stronger position of the Sierra Leone Army, with the assistance of the United Kingdom, its ambition cannot simply be to take the whole of Sierra Leone and that it must therefore also play the political position. In the context of improving its political position, it has its own reasons, its own political interests, to use less violence and to try to build a minimum of credibility with the population of Sierra Leone.

    2001-03-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4291 (2001) · source

  9. That is in the context of the RUF's pulling out and its becoming UNAMSIL territory. We have other dealings with the RUF that are relevant to us, but that does not involve any action on the territory of Guinea. I am not saying that we should simply trust the words of the RUF. I would say that we should test its behaviour and that, at least at this moment, that behaviour does not give us reason for complaint. Nevertheless, I use the word "prudence" because we have to approach this step by step. At this point, I shall also answer the reaction of the representative of Ireland and others to comments about hesitations among at least a number of non- governmental organizations. I think that this, too, is related to a certain misunderstanding. There is, of course, a risk involved, to be frank.

    2001-03-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4291 (2001) · source

  10. It is a problem of troops being available or not available, and maybe of priorities in using these troops. I wanted to make that point clear. I am grateful for the support that will be positively considered by the Government of France, as referred to by the representative of France. I now turn to the representative of the United States of America. I start with the same point of thanks for the financial support and for the possibility of even more. We certainly will come back to that point. The representative of the United States of America said that his country cannot support corridors or passages through territory held by the RUF. That is not our intention. It seems to me that there is again a certain misunderstanding. The conversation with RUF is only about the F orecariah-Kambia route.

    2001-03-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4291 (2001) · source

  11. There is a certain problem with explaining to them that they should stay where they are and that we cannot allow them to go to Sierra Leone, in particular. I would add, because that was the question, that this is the smaller part of the total number at this stage. I want to make a remark about the mandate of UNAMSIL. I have studied that mandate time and again, of course. I must say that the mandate itself, in my opinion, does not create a problem. It is not a problem of the mandate - it is a problem of resources and the numbers of troops. For example, I suggested that it might be possible for UNAMSIL troops to take over the Kambia area, literally, from the Revolutionary United Front. They are prepared to do so. It is not a problem with the mandate. It is within the mandate.

    2001-03-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4291 (2001) · source

  12. He asked a question as to whether we had any impression of what the refugees themselves want in terms of staying or going back. He asked this for Liberia and he asked this even more for the refugees of Sierra Leone. At this point, I want to explain that the main policy, the first priority of UNHCR at this stage is to relocate, find safer places within Guinea. That is our main action. We are not in a programme to repatriate as many as possible, but, having said that, we appreciate that a number of refugees have an opportunity to make that choice. This is still a minority, but a substantial minority. I do think that, at this stage, from the perspective of the refugees, they want to have more opportunities.

    2001-03-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4291 (2001) · source

  13. I am grateful for the financial support of the United Kingdom to our actions and I do hope that there can be some further increase with other countries. I turn now to the representative of Tunisia, who had no specific question. He supported our approach. He asked about the possibilities with the financial institutions. This was brought up by some other representatives as well. Yes, we were in Bamako, together with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, but frankly speaking, I did not get the idea that they were very focused on financial support. Obviously, this was an important conference and gathering, but it was not productive for refugees. We will see what is possible from here. I turn next to the representative of France.

    2001-03-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4291 (2001) · source

  14. I would say that we should count our blessings there. The second remark I allow myself to make is that, indeed, it is not the opinion of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) that we should open the border from Languette to Kenema, as was said by the representative of the United Kingdom. There must be a misunderstanding. In the letter I sent on 11 February, I mentioned that this was the wish of the President of Sierra Leone, but that we at UNHCR preferred to be a little more cautious - not to do that, but to limit ourselves to the possibility of opening up the border from Forecariah to Kambia. We think this will require fewer troops from the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), but that can be sorted out.

    2001-03-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4291 (2001) · source

  15. This relates, then, to my approach that, at some point, we need to have more territory in Sierra Leone where returnees can really go home to their own villages and the places they come from. This is, of course, a process that takes time, but that is the basic line. I now turn to the representative of the United Kingdom. He, too, made the distinction between the short term and the long term, as, by the way, did the representative of Jamaica and others. I appreciate that. Our plans also have to be good for the long term. It would be stupid to have successes in the short term and not in the long term, but, having said that, I claim simply that what we did last month was good for the long term as well. It was good for the long term; at least it created a moment of a little bit more stability.

    2001-03-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4291 (2001) · source

  16. Nevertheless, we are glad the road is open and numbers of people are coming out, and we will assist them. We will concentrate on the most vulnerable ones. With other non-governmental organizations, we monitor the health situation and specific problems very closely. We will try to assist them as well as possible. But I hesitate to come forward with a plan to evacuate them all. The second point is related to Sierra Leone and the intervention. It is my opinion that we can still have only limited numbers of internally displaced persons in Sierra Leone. They are now coming by boat from Conakry to Freetown. We can handle them, but I am not in favour of very big numbers.

    2001-03-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4291 (2001) · source

  17. Mr. Lubbers: I will, of course, not repeat the many points on which we agree but perhaps will make a few comments on questions where there may be misunderstandings. I will start with Jamaica. First, on a plan to bring the refugees in the Languette out, 130,000 of them, because of the continuous fighting, as was stated by the representative. I may be a little more optimistic about this. Because of the action to prioritize the safety of refugees, we have seen a remarkable slow-down of the hostilities and fighting in that area. That is precisely one of the reasons that we stress this point and put it as a priority on the agenda and invite the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) to participate in that. I am not saying that we can trust the arrangement permanently, but at least at this moment this is the situation.

    2001-03-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4291 (2001) · source

  18. I think it is essential to make it possible from here, and that is the reason I explained the situation as it is developing, and it is the reason for coming here to your Security Council, especially as regards the role of UNAMSIL and the need for strengthening its capacity to fulfil its mandate.

    2001-03-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4291 (2001) · source

  19. I urged the Presidents of those three countries, after 10 years of misery, 10 years of violence and endless numbers of refugees, at this time to prioritize putting an end to violence, to provide human security, and to do that by observing the principles of the protection of refugees, in the form of safe access to refugees and safe passage of refugees. From there on, one could build on further efforts aimed at more durable solutions for all refugees in the area. That was the message I wanted to convey there, Mr. President. If you will allow me to express the message here, it is a more practical one - that is, to make it possible for them to assist in fulfilling these priorities.

    2001-03-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4291 (2001) · source

  20. We of UNHCR have strengthened our presence in the area; we are providing a lot of assistance; and it costs a lot of money. So I will go to the donor countries once again and ask them for $20 or $30 million additional so that we can continue our activities. I want to repeat what I said earlier, which is that although we are trying to make the situation better for the refugees, as far as the practical choices to be made are concerned, it is up to the refugees themselves to decide whether things are safe enough to go home. Finally, I made a trip to the three countries in the region and to the Chair of ECOWAS.

    2001-03-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4291 (2001) · source

  21. By the way, there are 100,000 Liberian refugees in Guinea waiting to return home. There are, of course, many aspects involved here. In general, we at UNHCR accept the free choice of refugees to go whenever they want to go. But one thing is certain: if some day the situation stabilizes enough for them to go home, then a safe passage is needed from Macenta to Foya in Lofa county. That would relate exactly to the suggestion I made earlier to the President of Mali. By the way, the Presidents of Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia, as well as President Konare of Mali, had these ideas earlier. I just want to share them with you today at this briefing. In order not to speak too long, I have a few concluding remarks. First, our practical work is important for us.

    2001-03-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4291 (2001) · source

  22. Because it was very clear that Guinea could not accept ECOWAS troops on its own territory and, at the same time, it was building on the willingness of President Taylor of Liberia to accept ECOWAS troops on Liberian territory. The concentration of such a force - one not dispersed along a wide distance but rather very concentrated on that particular part of the border- could produce - together with what is happening in the Languette and the refraining from action on the part of the RUF - a more coherent approach leading to safety and stability. Now, as we all know, the Guinea ECOWAS initiative did not materialize. Maybe it will come back one day, perhaps under different conditions. But from my perspective, it would be important to see these initiatives also in relation to developments in the three countries and the refugee situation.

    2001-03-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4291 (2001) · source

  23. Since then the sanctions on Liberia have been adopted - yesterday, if my information is correct. The ECOWAS initiative that was very much alive in those days has not materialized. It might be revived, possibly in another form. We will see. In relation to ECOWAS, I have only a few remarks for the record, because in the aforementioned letter I mentioned discussions and some suggestions made three weeks ago to President Konare'. This could be useful for the future, although not very relevant today. Therefore, I am saying this for the record. One suggestion was the deployment of available military capacity in the territory of Liberia, at the border with Guinea between the point where the boundaries of Sierra Leone, Guinea and Liberia meet each other up to the area of Zorzor, Liberia. Why was this suggestion made?

    2001-03-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4291 (2001) · source

  24. But in my reading, in any case, strengthening UNAMSIL is now the first priority, and then UNAMSIL can look into the real situation, and when it is safe enough, do its job. Another subject I want to talk about is poverty and the need for assistance in Sierra Leone. All over Sierra Leone, including in the RUF-dominated part, the time has come to prioritize humanitarian needs. Prudence, yes; but action - really doing something in connection with the humanitarian needs - is needed. Mr. President, you asked me to come and brief the Council further in connection with the report the Council received earlier. In that connection, I shall say a few words on the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Liberia. The letter of 21 February relates the situation on that day.

    2001-03-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4291 (2001) · source

  25. But in my reading, it is also key for the stability and future of Sierra Leone. I would like to make a few additional remarks. If UNAMSIL is strengthened to the extent that it controls the Kambia area, a number of refugees who wish to do so will be able to return home. However, the numbers will be limited. But even with these limited numbers, this will diminish the burden of internally displaced persons in Freetown and, for that matter, of refugees in Guinea. The second thing I want to stress is that refugees returning to the Kambia area will not return to areas dominated by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). They will return only if UNAMSIL is in control. Of course, all this has to be checked and rechecked in pursuing this course.

    2001-03-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4291 (2001) · source

  26. However, UNAMSIL is still too weak at this moment to fulfil that function. It will be able to fulfil that function only once it is strengthened. I realize that is not an easy thing, but it is rather key; because opening the road from Forecariah to Kambia is, in my reading, a responsible act only if it can be done in such a way that the area is no longer RUF-dominated country. That can be guaranteed only once UNAMSIL goes in with sufficient strength. So this is exactly what I would like to ask the Council: to strengthen the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and to provide sufficient troops with a robust mandate. I ask this on behalf of the refugees. It is key for them. It is key for the refugees who want to return. That will be only a first step, of course.

    2001-03-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4291 (2001) · source

  27. But Sierra Leone is still fragile and very vulnerable. One has to proceed cautiously and step-by- step. The next step will be to prepare what is needed so that the road from Forecariah to Kambia can become a safe passage for the return of refugees from Guinea to Sierra Leone and then, of course, from the whole area. I have indications that the Government of Guinea, with its army, is prepared to ensure security along that road up to the border while at the same time - and I am now speaking about Guinea -refraining from all military activity - shelling, incursions and the like - on the other side of the border. At this moment, the other side of the border is RUF-dominated territory. But I have also received indications that the RUF is prepared to leave the Kambia area in order that it may become territory under the control of UNAMSIL.

    2001-03-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4291 (2001) · source

  28. The efforts to convince them to refrain from action on the territory of Guinea have, until now, proven to be successful. This has had positive effects on the situation in Guinea. It has also contributed to better working relations between UNAMSIL and the RUF. Beyond that - and this is something that is very relevant to the Council- this is in fact a real beginning of the successful implementation of the mandate. I draw special attention to paragraph 8 of resolution 1270 (1999), in which we can see that the goals laid out by the mandate are fully in line with these recent developments. Safe access to, and safe passage of, refugees proved to be of importance not only for refugees, but also functions as a confidence- building mechanism and, in so doing, creates new windows of opportunity.

    2001-03-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4291 (2001) · source

  29. Beyond that, we signalled to the RUF that as soon as they were able to make a public statement to adopt this as their formal policy, we would use our good offices to invite the Government of Guinea to refrain from all military actions in the area of Kambia so that the road from Forecariah to Kambia could become a safe passage for the return of refugees from Guinea to Sierra Leone. This action plan- the first part of it- has started to function and has been the basis for our contacts with the RUF for the past three weeks. It was crucial for the safe access to, and the safe passage of, refugees in Guinea - I stress, in Guinea - especially to and from the Languette region. By and large, the principles - to which I refer to as "safe access to and safe passage of" - are being respected not only by the three countries, but also by the RUF.

    2001-03-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4291 (2001) · source

  30. It reads as follows: "UNHCR, via the Contact Group, invites RUF to relate to the agreement that has been already endorsed by the Presidents of Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia on the following points: first, safe access to refugees; secondly, safe passage for refugees; and thirdly, condemnation of any act that would obstruct or hinder these principles. "Assuming that RUF is also ready to comply with the above three principles, UNHCR also requests the RUF to make a declaration regarding refraining from taking any actions on the Guinean territory." This message went via the Contact Group to the RUF. At least up until today, it seems to be functioning.

    2001-03-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4291 (2001) · source

  31. With the concurrence of President Kabbah, the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) together realized, via the Contact Group, initial contacts and results with the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) regarding the principles of safe access and passage. In my letter of 21 February I made one remark about the RUF. At that time I preferred to maintain confidentiality. I can now disclose the first elements of the action plan on the RUF.

    2001-03-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4291 (2001) · source

  32. From that update the Council will see that there has been considerable improvement in terms of the numbers of people we were able to help to relocate, that new sites are developing, and that we have safe access to the sites thanks to cooperation with the Government and army of Guinea. Lastly, as will be recalled from my letter, the situation in the Languette region is a very isolated one. But in the last two weeks we were finally able to take food in and to help those who had to get out to do so. The paper I distributed provides more details in this regard. I would now like to make a few remarks about Sierra Leone. I know the Council knows of my letter of 21 February, but has happened since then?

    2001-03-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4291 (2001) · source

  33. On behalf of those refugee women, during my mission in West Africa I claimed the right to safe and free access to refugees and the right of safe passage for refugees. During my mission I claimed and promoted safe access to, and safe passage for, refugees. Through the Secretary-General, the President has received a report of that mission that I submitted to the Secretary- General in a letter dated 21 February. I will of course not repeat all the things I wrote in that report. With regard to Guinea, I would like to say that, in general, cooperation with the Guinean authorities and the army has improved. To save time, I will distribute an update on main developments concerning the relocation exercise, relocation sites and the situation in the Languette region.

    2001-03-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4291 (2001) · source

  34. Mr. Lubbers: Thank you for inviting me, Mr. President. Today is International Women's Day. I would therefore like to begin with a tribute to women in general but, as the Council will understand, to refugee women in particular: to widows and mothers of children- of boys, who may become child soldiers, and of girls, who are not seldom victims of rape or who are at risk of being victims of prostitution or sexual exploitation; to mothers who will have to build a new life, empowering themselves and their children - their sons and daughters; and to women who will set the right priorities in Africa and all over the world: no violence, no arms trade, no further killings, and no further degradation of the environment.

    2001-03-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4291 (2001) · source