YouSaid · the spoken record

Lutundula Apala Pen’apala

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111
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2022-05-31
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2023-09-28
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3
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un-security-council

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  1. We are waiting to see what happens next, so we will not come back to this. This does not justify the landing yesterday of a Rwandan army helicopter carrying soldiers on Congolese territory. I do not think the Ambassador is informed. We must always try to get the real information to be constructive in a high-level debate such as this.

    2023-09-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9427 (2023) · source

  2. That is what is called the Nairobi process. We have been in discussions with our compatriots, even with the Mouvement du 23 mars (M-23). Members of the M-23 were at the meeting, but at the instigation of Rwanda, they did not want to continue. As of today — I ask that the Ambassador of Rwanda respond — has that recommendation of the Nairobi process been implemented by the Rwandan Government? Nothing has been done. We always come back to genocide, but as I said last time, we do not know about matters of genocide. We stand by that. I would like the Council to consider, at another time perhaps, the proposal that the Democratic Republic of the Council is making that a mechanism be put in place — by either the African Union, the East African Community or the Security Council — so that we can go into the field and dislodge the notorious FDLR.

    2023-09-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9427 (2023) · source

  3. What Rwanda has been saying is, “I am in the Democratic Republic of the Congo because the FDLR is there.” However, there is nothing in international law or the Charter of the United Nations that obliges a country to behave in that way. I would like to remind the Ambassador and the Council, in the context of the Nairobi process, since last year, all the Heads of State, including His Excellency the President of the Republic of Rwanda, have agreed that any Head of State or Head of Government who has armed groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo must initiate discussions with those armed groups so that they return to their country of origin. And if they refuse, at that time, the East African Community regional force shall use, what one might call, coercive means so that those groups return to their countries.

    2023-09-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9427 (2023) · source

  4. Secondly, since the Ambassador is unaware of it, two weeks ago the meeting continued in Nairobi because we had agreed in Geneva that that was what we would do. The meeting did indeed take place, and everyone agreed to meet in Goma last week to continue discussions, particularly on the issue of identification cards. The Rwandan delegation refused to attend. I do not know if the Ambassador will deny that. We are at a stalemate. I asked the representative of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, whom I met here last week, if we could propose a compromise either on returning to Nairobi or going to Addis Ababa. The Ambassador does not know about that. With regard to the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR), I believe that we must respect the Security Council and the United Nations. That old refrain is not important.

    2023-09-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9427 (2023) · source

  5. Mr. Lutundula Apala Pen’apala (Democratic Republic of the Congo) (spoke in French): I will be brief. I will start with the easiest point. I can see that the Permanent Representative of Rwanda has not been not following the situation on the ground as it pertains to the issue of Rwandan refugees and refugees from the Democratic Republic of the Congo in Rwanda. We can call the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees right now and he will confirm that in May we held a meeting with the Rwandan and Congolese delegations, which I myself chaired, at which we resumed discussions on the refugee issue. The meeting was convened at the request of President Tshisekedi. There is a communiqué that the Ambassador can consult. He will find it on the Internet, on the official website of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

    2023-09-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9427 (2023) · source

  6. In conclusion, I want to emphasize how important our Head of State and our Government consider good relations with the United Nations, and how firmly they believe that only through close collaboration with the United Nations, in mutual understanding, harmony, sincerity and with greater political will, will it be possible to restore lasting peace and security in the eastern areas of our country and throughout the Great Lakes region. To that end, I want to assure the Council that the Democratic Republic of the Congo remains at its disposal.

    2023-09-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9427 (2023) · source

  7. Why can the Security Council not create a plan to eliminate the FDLR? The Democratic Republic of the Congo is ready to take an active part in implementing that plan. We are offering the Council a helping hand. For its part, the Democratic Republic of the Congo has not failed to honour its commitments. We will never stop fighting to protect our country’s territorial integrity and independence and ensure the welfare of our population. That is why our compatriots who were forcibly displaced in the country as a result of the war imposed on us by Rwanda and the M-23 will very soon return home to exercise their legitimate right to elect their leaders at every level. They can no longer continue to live like cattle in makeshift displaced-persons camps. State authority will be restored in the areas occupied by our aggressors.

    2023-09-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9427 (2023) · source

  8. It is time to speak up and to uphold the law by sanctioning Rwanda’s documented aggression against the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the crimes of the M-23 and other armed groups on Congolese territory. It is high time for us to raise our voices and demand that the M-23 lay down its weapons, go to the cantonment sites established for that purpose and join the Disarmament, Demobilization, Community Recovery and Stabilization Programme. Rwanda should withdraw its troops, unconditionally, from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and cease its support to the M-23. As far as the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR) are concerned, the Congolese Government is making a simple proposal to the international community. The members of the FDLR are not Congolese citizens.

    2023-09-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9427 (2023) · source

  9. The United Nations Organization is, above all, the expression of the desire of the peoples of our planet to coexist based on a minimum of shared fundamental values, notably justice, respect for human rights, mutual respect, solidarity and humanism. The Council bears a heavy responsibility to ensure that those values are upheld and to guarantee peace in the world. The Council has the legal, political and material capacities to compel all recalcitrant parties to fully implement the road map resulting from the Nairobi and Luanda processes, which the Council endorsed, and thus to stop the dangerous stalemate of the security crisis in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Council must act before it is too late.

    2023-09-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9427 (2023) · source

  10. The Council should know that, as of today, all the political families and independents have submitted their application packages to the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI), and the Constitutional Court has resolved all candidacy disputes. For three days now, the definitive list of candidates for community, provincial and national legislative elections is being published. The submission of candidacies for presidential elections are under way. In addition, we invited the United Nations to send an electoral observation mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The United Nations Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs visited the country in March and carried out work with the CENI. Our elections are under way, and the Council can be reassured on that front.

    2023-09-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9427 (2023) · source

  11. Our country hopes that this time the Council will deign to look into the matter in earnest and follow the good examples set by the Government of the United States of America, which sanctioned Rwanda for its support for the M-23 terrorists, and by France, which has just sanctioned two leaders of the same group and criminals from the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda. Withregardtoelections, Icanconfirmthewordsofmy country’s Head of State, delivered during the seventieth eighth session of the General Assembly, that they will indeed be held within the constitutional timeline, on 20 December. Be assured that they will be transparent, inclusive and free. Everyone who meets the legal requirements will be allowed to participate.

    2023-09-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9427 (2023) · source

  12. There have been massacres in Kishishe, in Rutshuru territory, and elsewhere, for which no investigation has been conducted. Those files have been forgotten. That is why, on 19 September, the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo submitted to the Republic of Gabon, Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004), concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the names of the persons and entities listed in the above-mentioned reports for their inclusion on the Security Council sanctions list.

    2023-09-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9427 (2023) · source

  13. Indeed, to paraphrase the President of our Republic, in his address to the General Assembly during its seventy-eighth session, on 20 September, it is inadmissible and unjust, in particular, that several reports by groups of experts mandated by the United Nations itself to investigate the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, duly submitted to the Council, have been gathering dust for several years without being examined; that the people named in those reports as responsible for, and repeat offenders in the commission of, serious crimes against humanity, war crimes and massive human rights violation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo remain unpunished, with the total silence of the Council, as if they were somehow being encouraged to continue their criminal acts.

    2023-09-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9427 (2023) · source

  14. This neighbouring country and this armed terrorist group have transformed North Kivu into a powder keg, just waiting for a spark to once again set ablaze this province, which has been martyred for two and a half decades. As evidenced by the assessment of the Secretary- General in his recent report (S/2023/691), which we have spoken about, the security and humanitarian situation in the east remains catastrophic. At the international level, the Secretary-General’s observation is undoubtedly a concern, first and foremost, for the Security Council, the central organ of the United Nations for matters of international peace and security. The Democratic Republic of the Congo therefore calls on the Council to shake off its lethargy and assume its statutory responsibilities.

    2023-09-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9427 (2023) · source

  15. Be that as it may, the Democratic Republic of the Congo has no intention of breaking with the United Nations or with other bilateral and multilateral partners that wish to support internal efforts in the ways agreed with our Government. It would be unwise and untrue to erroneously deem MONUSCO’s withdrawal an end in itself or a panacea for the insecurity and recurring violence in the east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and in the Great Lakes region. Rather, the withdrawal serves to facilitate efforts to unfreeze of a very laborious and complex peace process deliberately blocked by Rwanda and its M-23 supporters, who are continuing to defy the Congolese people and thumb their noses at the community of nations.

    2023-09-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9427 (2023) · source

  16. It is within that framework that the Chiefs of Staff of their respective forces and that of the FARDC will meet next week, on 4 October, in Addis Ababa, to examine all current initiatives and agree on actions to be taken to remove all obstacles to the resolution of the armed conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Just yesterday, the Heads of State of the member States of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security of the SADC met and agreed on practical modalities for the deployment of the SADC regional force in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. That recent initiative represents a significant step forward.

    2023-09-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9427 (2023) · source

  17. As for the coordination of regional peace initiatives, it is important to remember that, under the auspices of the African Union, the Joint Summit of Heads of State and Government of the East African Community, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region and the Economic Community of Central African States, held on 27 June 2023 in Luanda, set up a Quadripartite Summit of the above-mentioned regional communities to coordinate and harmonize their initiatives in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

    2023-09-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9427 (2023) · source

  18. There is no surer way of guaranteeing respect for human rights and the stability of the Congolese institutions — make no mistake — than putting an end to the war. Everything else is just a stop- gap measure. In fact, on closer inspection, it is precisely the protection of the civilian population that is at the heart of the population’s demand for an accelerated withdrawal of MONUSCO.

    2023-09-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9427 (2023) · source

  19. We once again thank all our partners for their interest in the return of peace and an end to the war in those two provinces and for their show of solidarity with the Congolese people. On behalf of the President and the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, I would like to reassure everyone that our leaders, who have a constitutional duty to provide security for all the inhabitants of our country, are sufficiently aware of the problems raised and that, in addition, effective measures have been taken so that, together with the people themselves, our defence and security forces can ensure their security. Of course, it goes without saying that there is no surer way of guaranteeing their security than putting an end to the war.

    2023-09-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9427 (2023) · source

  20. During the sincere exchanges that my accompanying delegation and I have had bilaterally in the past week with the representatives of the five permanent members, the three African members and the President of the Council, as well as with delegations of other States Members of the United Nations, we have noted with satisfaction that a consensus is emerging on the substance of MONUSCO’s accelerated phased withdrawal. However, two relevant concerns emerged as a leitmotif in the statements made by our interlocutors, as they did just now, namely, the protection of civilians after the departure of MONUSCO and the coordination of regional initiatives to manage the security crisis in Ituri and North Kivu.

    2023-09-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9427 (2023) · source

  21. It goes without saying that MONUSCO’s withdrawal, being gradual, will be assessed regularly, and that any difficulties that arise during its implementation will be examined jointly by the two parties — the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the United Nations — with a view to finding appropriate solutions. Our Government also expects the Security Council, at a meeting to be held in December, to consider all the consequences of the new approach to MONUSCO’s withdrawal in the draft resolution to be adopted on the Mission’s status.

    2023-09-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9427 (2023) · source

  22. That is especially pertinent as I know that discussions on the budget will begin at the United Nations in October, in particular for projects, programmes and agencies. Therefore, now is the time to carry out those tasks in order to integrate them into the withdrawal process. The reports of the MONUSCO-Democratic Republic of the Congo Joint Committee on the fundamental issues I have mentioned must be submitted to the Government and the Security Council by the end of October at the latest. I have just explained why we are making such a proposal.

    2023-09-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9427 (2023) · source

  23. Fifthly, the tasks to be carried out by MONUSCO during the transition under the four benchmarks set out in the revised transition plan — namely security, the protection of civilians, electoral support and the Disarmament, Demobilization, Community Recovery and Stabilization Programme — must be precisely defined. What is now expected of MONUSCO in terms of security? In terms of protecting the civilian population, what are the tasks to be accomplished during the transition? Electoral support is working very well, as is the Disarmament, Demobilization, Community Recovery and Stabilization Programme. These tasks, as I stated in my letter, constitute essential preparatory activities to give the withdrawal real substance, to be able to visualize it and above all to gauge the scope and scale of what needs to be accomplished.

    2023-09-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9427 (2023) · source

  24. Keita to act as a witness in order to move forward with the withdrawal process. First — and this is a concrete measure to be taken — the general staff of the FARDC and the MONUSCO Force Commander must prepare a plan for MONUSCO’s disengagement and a timetable for the gradual and orderly withdrawal of United Nations troops. Secondly, practical arrangements must be defined for the gradual transfer of the activities currently being carried out by MONUSCO to what I would call traditional agencies and United Nations funds and programmes, as well as to the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Thirdly, the gradual reduction of the number of MONUSCO staff must be discussed. Fourthly, an operational plan to implement the withdrawal must be developed.

    2023-09-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9427 (2023) · source

  25. In order to achieve the objectives I have mentioned, the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo urges the Security Council above all to follow the logic of the withdrawal that we have already decided on, through an accelerated but not a hurried withdrawal. MONUSCO’s withdrawal, in our view, should start no later than the end of 2023. I would recall that such an acceleration was also recommended by the Secretary- General in his most recent report. We also ask the Council to instruct the Secretary- General to begin discussions with the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo as a matter of urgency within the framework of the Joint Committee established by resolution 2409 (2018), to which I have referred, on the following matters, discussion of which has been lacking in the past five years, and I therefore call on Ms.

    2023-09-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9427 (2023) · source

  26. This is the place to underscore that it is time for the United Nations, particularly the Security Council, to learn the lessons of its interventions in Africa and to change the paradigm of its peace missions on our continent. We need to properly think things through, and under no circumstances can we afford to forego such reflection. The Council should note that for the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, this is not a question of simply reconfiguring MONUSCO. We would be making a mistake — or rather the members of the Council would be making a mistake — if we were to give the impression that for any reason, even due to a misunderstanding, we wanted to move towards a MONUSCO B. That would not be merely a mistake but a grave error.

    2023-09-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9427 (2023) · source

  27. In that respect, it is essential to recall that the most urgent security priorities for the Democratic Republic of the Congo at the moment are putting an end to the Rwandan aggression by means of the withdrawal of its troops from North Kivu; the eradication of armed terrorist groups in the country, including the M-23; the return of displaced persons to their homes; the restoration of the authority of the State in the territories occupied by the M-23; the organization of elections throughout the country; and the implementation of the Disarmament, Demobilization, Community Recovery and Stabilization Programme. In short, our top priority is to restore peace and security throughout the country.

    2023-09-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9427 (2023) · source

  28. The third objective is to ensure an honourable exit for MONUSCO and preserve the achievements of its work in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. MONUSCO has done a great deal of work — there is no denying that. The fourth objective is to restore confidence between the people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the United Nations while restoring the credibility of the United Nations and its tarnished image. The fifth objective is to experiment with alternative partnership mechanisms for peace with the United Nations that are better developed and more effective, based on the real and current needs and priorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in order to resolve the security and humanitarian crises in the country and in the Great Lakes region.

    2023-09-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9427 (2023) · source

  29. The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo is proposing a tactical reorganization of MONUSCO’s withdrawal with the following objectives. The first objective is to defuse the ever-increasing tension between MONUSCO and the civilian population and to avoid repeating the sad experiences of a hasty, forced and sometimes violent withdrawal of United Nations troops. In that respect, the ambition of the President and Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo is for our country to be a model of a successful and honourable withdrawal of United Nations troops from an African country. The second objective is to prevent a repeat of the dramatic incidents in Goma, Beni, Butembo and Kasindi, with which we are all familiar.

    2023-09-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9427 (2023) · source

  30. That is why, in order to avoid going round in circles at a moment when the seriousness of the situation calls for swift and effective action, our Government has chosen to speed up the withdrawal of MONUSCO, a withdrawal that the Security Council decided on five years ago in resolution 2409 (2018), of 27 March 2018, by moving the start of this gradual — and I do mean gradual — orderly, responsible and sustainable withdrawal from the end of 2024 to the end of this year, 2023. And I want to stress that we should not confuse acceleration with haste. We have already decided on the withdrawal. The transition plan has already been adopted by the Security Council. What remains are the modalities for withdrawal, but I will not come back to that — the letter I wrote to the Council clearly sets out the facts.

    2023-09-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9427 (2023) · source

  31. What some people mistakenly regard as a lull or a ceasefire is in actual fact merely a sham cessation of hostilities on the part of the M-23 and its progenitor, Rwanda, a stalemate that allows them to consolidate the Rwandan army’s occupation of the Congolese province of North Kivu and the attempted partition of our country. Let me say once again, echoing our Head of State, that the Congolese people, their President, Félix Antoine Tshisekedi Tshilombo, and his Government can never accept such martyrdom and infamy, to which they are neither predestined nor condemned.

    2023-09-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9427 (2023) · source

  32. The M-23 refuses to participate in pre-cantonment in the Rumangabo camp or in the disarmament and cantonment sites set up in Maniema province before returning to the Nairobi process and enrolling its members in the Disarmament, Demobilization, Community Recovery and Stabilization Programme. In short, the process of resolving the security crisis in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Great Lakes region is now stalled and completely blocked by the M-23 and Rwanda. I believe Ms. Keita mentioned the misadventure of the East African Community and the FARDC, which wanted to go to Rumangabo and Bunagana to look into the possibility of the pre-cantonment of the M-23, as had been agreed.

    2023-09-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9427 (2023) · source

  33. With their impunity guaranteed, Rwanda and the M-23 have stubbornly refused to uphold any of the commitments they have made to implementing the peace plan resulting from the Nairobi and Luanda processes, abiding by the recommendations of the international community or responding to the repeated appeals of the Security Council, the African Union, African regional organizations and bilateral partners to withdraw from the occupied Congolese territories. Rwanda is reinforcing its troops in North Kivu right now. I would also like to inform the Council that not two hours ago, my colleague the Minister of Defence informed me — and I just received the message — that a Rwandan army helicopter landed in Rumangabo yesterday morning. Rumangabo is in the Congo.

    2023-09-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9427 (2023) · source

  34. On the contrary, as might have been expected, the population in North Kivu has grown more hostile to MONUSCO, which has left the Mission’s personnel with a fearful and insecure mindset and sparked the violent incidents of 30 August in Goma in which 42 Congolese died, following on from the incidents of June and July 2022 in Goma, Béni, Butembo and Kasindi, in which 30 Congolese and five peacekeepers lost their lives. As evidenced in the Secretary-General’s latest report to the Security Council (S/2023/574), dated 2 August, the security situation in North Kivu has only deteriorated, and the humanitarian tragedy has grown and has now affected some 5 million displaced persons. In fact, according to a report I received this morning, that figure has already reached 6.2 million. Nor have tensions in the region eased.

    2023-09-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9427 (2023) · source

  35. However, we regret that in its resolution 2666 (2022) of 20 December 2022, the Security Council took neither the concerns and proposals of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo nor the Secretary-General’s judicious advice into consideration. It simply renewed MONUSCO’s mandate without any changes, as if nothing had happened. Clearly, the Security Council’s rigid attitude — turning a blind eye to the realities on the ground, ignoring the legitimate demands of the Congolese people and showing its reluctance to change MONUSCO’s status — has failed to give the peace process in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo any new momentum.

    2023-09-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9427 (2023) · source

  36. It acknowledged with great sincerity, it must be said, and a high sense of responsibility, how impossible it was for MONUSCO to confront the M-23, who possess heavy weapons that are more advanced than MONUSCO’s equipment, and proposed, as did the Secretary-General, that MONUSCO’s mandate and military equipment be strengthened in order to enable it to fulfil its mandated responsibilities of protecting civilian populations and supporting the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC). On the same occasion in December, I reiterated my Government’s request that the Council firmly condemn Rwanda’s aggression against our country and severely punish those who have planned and perpetrated the war crimes and crimes against humanity committed on our national territory.

    2023-09-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9427 (2023) · source

  37. In order to prevent the situation from continuing to deteriorate, give the Nairobi and Luanda peace processes a chance to succeed and prevent the worst from happening, at that meeting in December I not only suggested that the Council clarify MONUSCO’s mandate but also made it clear that the Democratic Republic of the Congo would prefer to see MONUSCO imposing and making peace and equipped with weapons adapted to its current challenges and issues, including having to deal with a Member State’s conventional army, the Rwanda Defence Forces, and its M-23 proxies. Incidentally, that request overlapped with the statement made by Secretary-General António Guterres to the international press, specifically Radio France International and the France 24 television network.

    2023-09-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9427 (2023) · source

  38. I also alerted the Council to the heightened tensions that were poisoning relations between the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Congo (MONUSCO) and the Congolese people, especially those living in the territories ravaged by those armed groups. Those citizens have consistently criticized the Mission for its demonstrable passivity and inability to protect them from criminal groups or to help put an end to the almost perpetual insecurity to which they have been subjected.

    2023-09-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9427 (2023) · source

  39. Allow me to refresh the Council’s memory by pointing out that, in December last year (see S/PV.9215), I had the privilege of drawing the attention of members to the fact that the massacres of Congolese populations, the most barbaric atrocities, the acts of sexual violence against women, the recruitment of child soldiers, the massive human rights violations and the illegal exploitation of the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s natural resources by armed terrorist groups were continuing and increasing in the east of the country, despite the presence there of some 16,000 United Nations troops over the past 25 years and the billions of dollars spent to restore peace and security.

    2023-09-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9427 (2023) · source

  40. Indeed, in my letter of 1 September addressed to the President of the Security Council, I communicated the vision and proposals of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo for an effective and fruitful partnership — I repeat, a partnership with the United Nations to restore real and lasting peace and security throughout our national territory that will undoubtedly help to restore the broken trust between the Organization and the Congolese people and restore the tarnished image of our Organization in the country. I confirm the contents of the letter and reiterate my thanks to the Council for considering it in depth, with what I hope will be the utmost lucidity and objectivity and in a constructive spirit.

    2023-09-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9427 (2023) · source

  41. My statement today before the Council will be a brief reminder of the Democratic Republic of Congo’s current approach to the grave security crisis that has raged for a quarter of a century in the eastern part of the country, specifically in the provinces of Ituri and North Kivu, which have suffered as a result of the criminal activities of armed terrorist groups, including the so-called Movement du 23 mars (M-23), supported in terms of war materiel and troops by Rwanda, our country’s aggressor — which is known to the United Nations and denied by no one.

    2023-09-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9427 (2023) · source

  42. My President’s Government requested that I speak here today in order to provide clarification for everyone and to contribute to the Council’s search for solutions. I would have preferred to be the last speaker so that I could address the concerns of all the other speakers. I therefore would like to be able to clarify certain points after delivering my statement, if need be, in order to move the discussion forward objectively and transparently.

    2023-09-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9427 (2023) · source

  43. I listened very attentively to the various statements delivered prior to my own, and in doing so I noted a significant determination and clear commitment on the part of the Council to cooperating with the Democratic Republic of the Congo in order to ensure, as soon as possible, that the tragic aggression and suffering endured by my compatriots for 25 years becomes a memory and is relegated to the archives of history; I thank the Council for that as well. In my statement, I will try to answer members’ concerns and, above all, to help them understand the essence of the approach of my country’s Government and Head of State, which is outlined in the letter I transmitted to the Council (S/2023/648, annex). I would first like to say that the focus of this meeting is on the security situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

    2023-09-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9427 (2023) · source

  44. Mr. Lutundula Apala Pen’apala (Democratic Republic of the Congo) (spoke in French): On behalf of President Félix-Antoine Tshisekedi Tshilombo of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Congolese Government, I would like to thank you, Madam President, for convening today’s meeting, which is devoted exclusively to the security situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. That action demonstrates to me the focus of the countries here — and through them, the Security Council — on a swift and definitive settlement of the security situation and the humanitarian issues in my country, and I reiterate our gratitude for that.

    2023-09-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9427 (2023) · source

  45. It was here in New York that we were told no, and that we had to respect the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. Other African countries refused, but we obeyed the United Nations. And today it is we who are paying a heavy price for a genocide we did not experience in our own country. That approach is not working any more, and the international community must denounce the completely cynical and brazen exploitation of an act debasing humankind that has been systematically carried out on the other side of our borders. It has nothing to do with us. That is the outcome they want — to provoke this kind of response so that they can say, “See, we told you so”. But that will never happen. President Tshisekedi said it here at the United Nations. Neither ethnic cleansing nor anything else will ever occur in our country.

    2022-12-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9215 (2022) · source

  46. The representative of Rwanda spoke about ethnic minorities, ethnic cleansing and genocide, which leaves me with the impression that he may be confused about the country he is referring to. We in the Democratic Republic of the Congo are not familiar with terms such as “ethnic minorities”. Even adults in the Democratic Republic of the Congo learned of the existence of the term of genocide only in 1994. It was Rwandans who carried out genocide in Rwanda. No Congolese citizen has been associated in any way with such vile and disgraceful acts, which brought shame on the whole of humankind. Indeed, quite the contrary, it is we in the Democratic Republic of Congo who have suffered the effects of genocide for the past 23 years. At the time, we wanted to turn away Rwandan fugitives.

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  47. It has been three months now and we are still waiting. Secondly, as I said, there is currently an ad hoc mech- anism, agreed with Rwanda in Luanda, for verifying ac- cusations made by one country about another, led by a general of the Angolan armed forces. The mechanism is now operating in Goma, assisted by a Congolese liaison officer, who is a general, and a Rwandan liaison officer who I hope has been appointed. In other words, there are mechanisms that are now in place. We are waiting — and I have reiterated here in the Security Council the call by President Tshisekedi at the United Nations — for anyone with information to pass it on to us. We have even heard an FDLR leader speaking on the radio since leaving the Congo. We are at his disposal.

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  48. First, I would like to remind the United Nations that on 20 September (see A/77/PV.5), in the General Assem- bly Hall, President Félix-Antoine Tshisekedi Tshilombo called on all our partners, multilateral and bilateral, on non-governmental organizations, national and interna- tional, and on the leaders of Rwanda and all individuals and groups who have information on an FDLR leader who may be somewhere in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; on an area in the Democratic Republic of the Congo where the FDLR is stationed; on FDLR attacks carried out with the Forces armées de la République dé- mocratique du Congo (FARDC) on Rwandan territory; on any FDLR activity against Rwanda, even if only political rather than military — to tell us about it. The President said that right here at the United Nations.

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  49. Mr. Lutundula Apala Pen’apala (Democratic Re- public of the Congo) (spoke in French): I will be brief. I had two reasons for not wanting to address the is- sue of the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR).

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  50. I would like to correct the French Ambassador’s remarks about Justin Bitakwira when he referred to him as a member of the National Assembly of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. He is no longer a member. As President Tshisekedi Tshilombo continues to reiterate, “Africa has better things to do than wage war. The Congolese are not and never will be a genocidal people.”

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