YouSaid · the spoken record

Lyons

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96
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2001-01-23
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2022-03-02
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un-security-council

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  1. Let me say that, while the overall security situation has indeed improved as the conflict has largely ended, we regularly receive credible reports of incidents impacting the right to life and physical integrity of Afghans. Those include house searches and extrajudicial killings of former Government security personnel and officials. The judicial system itself is unevenly applied. The availability of judges, civil servants, police personnel and legal and financial resources vary across the country. There are no women working in the justice sector. And it remains unclear how the de facto authorities intend to assure and ensure women’s access to justice. Another major negative development has been the Taliban’s inability to curb the expansion of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant-Khorasan Province (ISIL- KP).

    2021-11-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8908 (2021) · source

  2. The Afghan population is of course hugely concerned about their paralysed economy, the inability to withdraw money and fears of not being able to feed themselves and their children during the winter in the coming months. There are also limitations on demonstrations and other attempts at freedom of expression. Media outlets continue to close, sometimes due to financial reasons and sometimes due to ongoing restrictions by the de facto authorities on the content of their publications and broadcasts. Continued inter-ethnic tension and violence give rise as well to concern for minority rights, with reports of forced evictions targeting minority communities.

    2021-11-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8908 (2021) · source

  3. The composition of the caretaker Cabinet — so called by the Taliban themselves — remains entirely male, essentially Pashtun and almost all Taliban. At both the capital and provincial levels, recent appointments continue to appear designed more to reward fighters than to promote governance and inclusion. Be assured also that we maintain close contacts as well with other sectors of Afghan society around the country, including media, former Government officials, civil society, professionals and, most certainly, women’s groups. Afghans in general remain apprehensive about the future intentions of the Taliban de facto authority. Those apprehensions mitigate some of the relief that has come from the notable decline in conflict.

    2021-11-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8908 (2021) · source

  4. While the de facto authorities had initially assured the protection of women’s rights within Islamic law, including education, there has been a general curtailment of Afghan women’s and girls’ fundamental rights and freedoms. Those range from limiting their right to work to the absence of women from major decision-making forums and from senior echelons of the civil service. It should be noted that those policies are applied disparately around the country, with some provinces becoming significantly less restrictive than others. We continue to call for a far more inclusive administration in which Government institutions reflect Afghanistan’s broad diversity. We have seen limited progress on that issue, however.

    2021-11-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8908 (2021) · source

  5. Be assured that we have not shied away from raising difficult issues with the Taliban, particularly on ethnic rights, women’s rights, girls’ education, inclusivity and on reports we have heard of harassment and extrajudicial killings. In general, they have taken cognizance of those concerns and have often acknowledged that they have made mistakes and are trying to address them. However, they also make clear that, for now, there are limits to concessions they are willing to make on certain issues. On girls’ education, the de facto authorities have indicated that they are working on a nationwide policy so that the right to girls’ education can be exercised across the country, but they say that they need more time to clarify the policy and its implementation.

    2021-11-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8908 (2021) · source

  6. The de facto authorities have assured us that they want a United Nations presence and value our assistance. They continue to seek international recognition, as well as ways to overcome the major trust deficit that they recognize exists between them and the international community. In terms of governance, they have begun to raise revenues from customs and have used some of those revenues to begin addressing pressing issues, such as partially paying civil servant salaries. As well, the Taliban continue to provide security to the United Nations presence throughout the country and allow broad humanitarian access, including for female humanitarian workers. That changed security situation has allowed us to visit parts of the country that we had not visited in 15 years, providing vital assistance.

    2021-11-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8908 (2021) · source

  7. Ms. Lyons: I thank you, Mr. President, for this opportunity. I also thank Council members for the opportunity to speak about Afghanistan at this very critical time. For the past 20 years, the needs of Afghanistan have been discussed and acted on in the Chamber with particular sympathy and generosity. But with the Taliban takeover, the Afghan people now feel abandoned, forgotten and indeed punished by circumstances that are not their fault. To abandon the Afghan people now would be a historic mistake — a mistake that has been made before with tragic consequences. I would like to begin by providing first a general assessment of the de facto Taliban Administration, based on our engagement with them in Kabul and the provinces over the past three months. Let me highlight that our formal interactions have been generally useful and constructive.

    2021-11-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8908 (2021) · source

  8. Now is the moment for the Taliban to visibly demonstrate to the people of Afghanistan — to all the people of Afghanistan — that it is committed to each and every one of them, in guaranteeing their safety, their freedoms, their health, their education and their future prosperity. The Afghan people are the least responsible for this unfolding crisis and yet the most affected by it. It is clear that they will still need the Security Council and the international community. I thank the President and Council members for their consideration of Afghanistan at this very important time.

    2021-09-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8853 (2021) · source

  9. Members of the Security Council are, like us, still evaluating the new situation. I look forward to our ongoing discussions regarding the United Nations role in Afghanistan at this critical time and as we move forward. The best and still possible outcome would be for the Taliban to demonstrate that it seeks to create an Afghanistan where people do not live in fear, where those with talents are invited to participate in the rebuilding of their country, and where boys and girls, young women and men, can receive the sort of education that will allow this development to continue.

    2021-09-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8853 (2021) · source

  10. Our commitment to delivering for the people of Afghanistan means that we must engage with the Taliban on operational and security issues. The recent visit, therefore, of Emergency Relief Coordinator Martin Griffiths to Kabul earlier this week paved the way to continue discussing the terms of future humanitarian assistance, as well as to prepare the ground for the Geneva conference on 13 September. I cannot express enough my admiration for those United Nations staff, national and international, who are in Afghanistan now, facing the daily uncertainties. Their presence and their persistence are proof of our ongoing commitment to delivering to the people of Afghanistan. I would also like to make a final comment on the subject of UNAMA’s mandate, which is due for renewal in about a week.

    2021-09-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8853 (2021) · source

  11. What is essential for this effort, and for Afghanistan in general, is a functioning airport in Kabul. We are grateful, therefore, for the prompt and generous actions taken by Qatar and Turkey to begin restoring the airport, in cooperation with the Taliban, so that it is fully functional and regular commercial flights can resume. Thanks to these efforts, the United Nations Humanitarian Air Service is already in a position to begin making regular flights to Kabul, and the UNAMA air fleet of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) will soon be able to do so as well. I take this opportunity to thank the Government of Kazakhstan for agreeing on short notice to host a United Nations satellite office to support our efforts in Afghanistan.

    2021-09-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8853 (2021) · source

  12. There is now a more urgent agenda for regional and international cooperation around Afghanistan. Without it, the negative repercussions will be felt near and far, and will be much more difficult to address later on. Certainly, a key part of this agenda is counter- terrorism. Al-Qaida members remain in Afghanistan, visibly welcomed and sheltered by the de facto Taliban authorities. The Islamic State-Khorasan Province remains active and could gain strength. Concerns on these essential matters of international terrorism will not be allayed simply by Taliban promises. On this issue, the region and the wider international community share clear, common and critical interests. Of course, the United Nations family remains in Afghanistan, committed to doing what we have done for the past 75 years — delivering to the people of Afghanistan.

    2021-09-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8853 (2021) · source

  13. They fear the consequences of the large number of arms left behind in Afghanistan. They fear that the Taliban will be unable to thwart the illegal economy and the flow of drugs from Afghanistan. It is most important now that the region use its available mechanisms to not just speak with one voice but to act in concert for the benefit of the entire region. We therefore look forward to the upcoming meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in Dushanbe. Other mechanisms include the extended troika format created by Moscow, which last met in Qatar in August, as well as ad hoc mechanisms, such as the regional foreign ministers meeting hosted by Pakistan that took place this week. But it is also important that the wider international community not become irrevocably divided.

    2021-09-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8853 (2021) · source

  14. Some have asked for patience and even advice as they attempt to transition from a military insurgency to a Government. They have complained that the widespread corruption of previous Government officials left many parts of the country without assistance and squandered the generosity of the international community. But they themselves risk squandering the potential generosity of the international community if they govern against the explicit interests and rights of their own people. The impact of these recent developments is also being felt beyond the Afghan borders. Many countries around Afghanistan are apprehensive about how Taliban rule will affect their own security. They fear the effect of an expanded Islamic State that the Taliban cannot contain. They fear a wave of refugees coming across their borders.

    2021-09-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8853 (2021) · source

  15. They have limited girls’ access to education in some regions and have dismantled departments of women’s affairs across Afghanistan and targeted women’s NGOs. We are also extremely disturbed about the increasing violence used against Afghans who are protesting Taliban rule. That violence includes shooting above the crowds, persistent beatings, intimidation of media and other repressive measures. Instead, the Taliban should seek to understand the legitimate grievances of these many Afghans who fear for their futures. Despite these concerns, perhaps we can still help to shape this new reality into a more positive direction. In our initial engagements with Taliban leaders over this past year and in recent weeks, we have received a clear message — that they need and want international assistance.

    2021-09-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8853 (2021) · source

  16. We are also concerned that despite the many statements granting general amnesties to Afghan National Defence and Security Forces personnel and those who have worked as civil servants, there have been credible allegations of reprisal killings of Afghan National Defence and Security Forces personnel and the detention of officials who worked for previous Administrations. We have received reports of members of the Taliban carrying out house-to-house searches and seizing property, particularly in Kabul. And while the Taliban have provided many assurances that they will respect the rights of women within Islam, we are receiving increasing reports that the Taliban have prohibited women from appearing in public places without male chaperones and have prevented women from working.

    2021-09-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8853 (2021) · source

  17. As I mentioned, we are disappointed in the lack of inclusivity of the so-called caretaker cabinet, but the new reality in Afghanistan is, in fact, still being shaped. A mixed picture has formed in the weeks since the Taliban took power. For the most part, with some exceptions, the premises of the United Nations in Afghanistan have been respected. We are, however, increasingly worried by the growing number of incidents of harassment and intimidation against our national staff. We will continue to do everything possible to support our staff and keep them out of harm’s way. The United Nations cannot conduct its work — which is so essential for the Afghan people — if its personnel are subjected to intimidation, fear for their lives and cannot move freely.

    2021-09-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8853 (2021) · source

  18. Afghanistan is heavily import-dependent and will be unable to finance its imports of food and medicine, as well as fuel, electricity and other essential items. A modus vivendi must be found quickly — one that allows money to flow to Afghanistan in order to prevent a total breakdown of the economy and social order. Safeguards must be found to ensure that this money is spent where it needs to be spent and not misused by the de facto authorities. The economy must be allowed to breathe for a few more months in order to give the Taliban a chance to demonstrate flexibility and a genuine will to do things differently this time, notably from a human rights, gender and counter-terrorism perspective.

    2021-09-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8853 (2021) · source

  19. Secondly, there is an additional, looming crisis to which I must draw the Council’s attention. Billions of assets and donor funds have been frozen by members of the international community. The understandable purpose is to deny these funds to the de facto Taliban Administration. The inevitable effect, however, will be a severe economic downturn that could throw many more millions into poverty and hunger, may generate a massive wave of refugees from Afghanistan and set Afghanistan back for generations. As the Afghan currency plummeted, prices of fuel and food skyrocketed. Private banks no longer have cash to distribute, meaning that even Afghans with assets cannot access them. Salaries cannot be paid.

    2021-09-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8853 (2021) · source

  20. Additionally, there are countries that have their own sanctions that apply to certain members or groups that are now part of the de facto authority. Relevant mechanisms must be found quickly to allow for the United Nations organizations and NGOs to provide the necessary humanitarian relief. In the meantime, we look forward to the high-level conference in Geneva on 13 September, which the Secretary-General will convene, that seeks pledges to meet the requirements of the humanitarian appeal on which Afghan lives now depend. In the current environment, the United Nations role must be clear and must build on our humanitarian imperative. There is an immediate and pressing need to deliver, on a huge scale, essential humanitarian aid in areas such health, food security, non-food items and sanitation.

    2021-09-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8853 (2021) · source

  21. What is of immediate and practical importance to those around the table is that, of the 33 names presented, many are on the United Nations sanctions list, including the Prime Minister, the two Deputy Prime Ministers and the Foreign Minister. All Council members will need to decide which steps to take regarding the sanctions list and the impact on future engagement. First, however, we must focus on the pre-existing humanitarian crisis, mostly in rural areas, that is worsening as we speak. Addressing this crisis cannot wait for political decisions regarding the removal of sanctions. Millions of ordinary Afghans are in desperate need of help. That means that needed humanitarian aid must be provided through the United Nations or non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

    2021-09-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8853 (2021) · source

  22. The answers I have for the Security Council are not comfortable. They present real dilemmas and will require united leadership from the Security Council, the Member States that make up the Council, neighbouring countries and, more broadly, the international community. As of two days ago, we are faced with a de facto Administration announced by the Taliban. Those who hoped for and urged inclusivity will be disappointed. There are no women in the names listed. There are no non-Taliban members, no figures from the past Government and no leaders of minority groups. Instead, it contains many of the same figures who were part of the Taliban leadership from 1996 to 2001.

    2021-09-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8853 (2021) · source

  23. Ms. Lyons: With the fall of Kabul, on 15 August, the city’s population and the people of Afghanistan were confronted with a new and, for many, worrisome reality. The Taliban moved into the capital and proclaimed victory, defeating the Afghan republic that had been in place for the past 20 years. That, however, was followed by scenes of panic and chaos at Kabul airport, as tens of thousands sought to flee Afghanistan by any means available. Those scenes, watched around the world, have now been replaced by scenes of protest around the country. They show that the Taliban has won power, but not yet the confidence of all Afghan people. The new reality is that the lives of millions of Afghans will depend on how the Taliban will choose to govern. However, we must also ask ourselves: what can we do, and what must we do?

    2021-09-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8853 (2021) · source

  24. We, as the members of the regional and international communities so well represented here by the Council, must put aside our own differences on the question of Afghanistan and send a strong signal — not only in our public statements but also in our bilateral communications to both parties — that it is essential to stop fighting and negotiate, in that order. Otherwise, there may be nothing left to win. I again thank the Council for this opportunity. The people of Afghanistan are listening.

    2021-08-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8831 (2021) · source

  25. UNAMA strongly supports greater efforts by the United Nations and the regional and international communities to find ways to hold the perpetrators accountable. Sixthly, the Council should give serious consideration to providing the United Nations with a mandate that allows it to play — if requested by both parties — a greater role in facilitating the negotiations. We will meet again to discuss Afghanistan in a little over a month. But we cannot wait. These next weeks will be decisive, but I am absolutely convinced that whatever happens on the battlefield — whether the Taliban take additional cities or whether the Government regains districts — the result will only prolong Afghanistan’s agony.

    2021-08-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8831 (2021) · source

  26. Thirdly, as I already mentioned, the travel ban exemption on Taliban members exists in order to allow them to travel for the sole purpose of peace negotiations. The exemption is to be renewed on 20 September. Any further extension must be predicated on real progress on peace. Fourthly, if the Taliban will not agree to the general ceasefire that the Afghans truly require, the Council and those States that meet with them must urge them to grant humanitarian access to areas they control and commit to humanitarian ceasefires in contested areas. At the same time, Member States should contribute to the severely underfunded humanitarian appeal for Afghanistan, which is currently only 30 per cent funded. Fifthly, we need to put on notice the architects and perpetrators of the most serious violations of human rights.

    2021-08-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8831 (2021) · source

  27. Next week there will be meetings in Doha of a number of the Special Representatives of key countries, including a meeting of the extended troika. And we, of course, will meet here again on 10 September for the regularly scheduled Security Council briefing on Afghanistan. How can we use these opportunities to address the deteriorating situation that we face? First, the Security Council must issue an unambiguous statement that attacks against cities must stop now. Secondly, those countries that meet with the Taliban Political Commission should insist in those meetings on a general ceasefire and a resumption of the negotiations and should reiterate the position of the Security Council and that of the regional and international communities — that a Government imposed by force in Afghanistan will not be recognized.

    2021-08-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8831 (2021) · source

  28. Afghans face this coming darkness with a sense of being abandoned by the regional and international communities. They expect far greater engagement and visible support from the Council, which is mandated to maintain international peace and security. In that regard, the 3 August Security Council press statement (SC/14592) condemning the attack against the United Nations office in Herat was greatly appreciated by us for the show of support for UNAMA but, more important, for calling again for an end to the violence and a resumption of a meaningful peace process. This solidarity matters to Afghans. They need to see and hear more of it in actions and in words. But there are also several important opportunities in the near future where our words and actions could help bring an end to this war.

    2021-08-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8831 (2021) · source

  29. This increase, logically, must either be a response to the prospect of greater conflict or the desire to not live under Taliban governance. In speaking to Afghans, the impression I have now is of a population waiting apprehensively for a dark shadow to pass over the bright futures they once imagined. It is difficult for me to describe the mood of dread we are faced with every day. As one Afghan put it to us recently, “We are no longer talking about preserving the progress and the rights we have gained; we are talking about mere survival.” Another woman told us that she sometimes regrets that she had educated her daughter, as that had put her daughter in a more vulnerable position. For all of us who are parents of daughters, I can hardly think of a more despondent comment.

    2021-08-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8831 (2021) · source

  30. These are the real concerns of people who are close to the edges of the Taliban advance. Let me be clear, because I know that the Taliban also pay attention to what we say in these meetings — I am reporting comments that have been expressed directly to us, not incidents we have been able to fully confirm. We have also seen Taliban denials. But these reports that we are receiving from ordinary Afghans throughout the country are so consistent, uniform and urgent that we simply cannot wait for them to be proven before bringing them to the Council’s attention. I would add that these fears seem also to be corroborated by the large numbers of people seeking to leave Afghanistan. We expect both irregular and legal migration numbers to double this year.

    2021-08-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8831 (2021) · source

  31. It should be made clear to the Taliban Political Commission that the exemptions to the travel ban and the high protocol with which they have been received by many countries were in fact predicated on a commitment to, and progress in, the peace process. What is reportedly happening in areas under Taliban control is also of great concern to us. It is heartbreaking to hear, for example, reports of summary executions, beatings and a clampdown on media. Radio stations in particular have stopped broadcasting. We also hear the fears voiced to UNAMA by many Afghan women. They tell us that they fear they will be killed if the Taliban return to power simply because they worked for the Government or a non-governmental organization. They fear they will not be able to access medical or educational services.

    2021-08-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8831 (2021) · source

  32. There is a striking contrast between the activity on the battlefield and the quiet stalemate at the negotiating table in Doha, where we should be seeing the opposite — quiet on the battlefield and engagement around the negotiating table. I have focused today on the war against cities because a party that was genuinely committed to a negotiated settlement would not risk so many civilian casualties, because it would understand that the process of reconciliation will be more challenging the more blood is shed. It would also recognize that it cannot risk the destruction of infrastructure that would be badly needed to rebuild the country once an agreement was reached.

    2021-08-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8831 (2021) · source

  33. We have accepted this in the name of the peace that ordinary Afghans desperately need. The Council will remember that there had been an expectation when the United States-Taliban deal was signed in February 2020 that we would see a reduction of violence. We did not. When the talks between the Afghan Republic and the Taliban began in September of last year, there had been an expectation that we would see a reduction in violence. We have not. There had been an expectation that, when international troops left, we would see a reduction in violence. We did not. Instead, despite significant concessions for peace, we have seen a 50 per cent increase in civilian casualties, with the certainty of many more as cities are attacked.

    2021-08-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8831 (2021) · source

  34. The suffering caused by war comes on top of an already increasing humanitarian crisis, with severe drought affecting the country. Indeed, 18.5 million people, or nearly half of the country’s population, are in need of humanitarian assistance. And yet, in the meantime, attacks on aid workers continue, with more than 25 aid workers killed and more than 60 injured in just the first six months of this year. For the past three years, the members of the international community, including members of the Council and UNAMA, have dealt with the Taliban as a potential partner for peace. We have had numerous discussions with their political representatives in Doha aimed at ending the conflict and finding a true political consensus. Many of us have done this with some reservations but with relentless hope for the Afghan people.

    2021-08-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8831 (2021) · source

  35. This is now a different kind of war, reminiscent of Syria recently or Sarajevo in the not-so-distant past. To attack urban areas is to knowingly inflict enormous harm and cause massive civilian casualties. Nonetheless, the threatening of large urban areas appears to be a strategic decision by the Taliban, who have accepted the likely carnage that will ensue. The Afghan National Defence and Security Forces are defending those cities. But that defence will also undoubtedly cause civilian casualties. Urban warfare will also inflict daily miseries when basic infrastructure such as electricity and water networks are damaged. These tactics may amount to a serious violation of international humanitarian law for which individuals can be held accountable and may quickly amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity.

    2021-08-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8831 (2021) · source

  36. In Kandahar, since the start of the offensive there, on 9 July, a month ago, more than 460 civilian casualties have been registered. Further to the west, in and around Herat, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) has credible reports of more than 135 civilian casualties from the onset of the Taliban offensive. Let me quickly summarize that just in these three cases, I am talking of more than 1,000 casualties just in this last month. In addition, homes, hospitals, shops, bridges and other infrastructure are being destroyed. In that dire situation, the United Nations and humanitarian partners continue to be present to assess, of course, the needs and, where possible, to deliver assistance where we have the access. But that is becoming increasingly difficult.

    2021-08-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8831 (2021) · source

  37. The human toll of that strategy is extremely distressing, and the political message is even more deeply disturbing. Regarding the human toll, let me provide some evidence. Fighting has been especially severe in Lashkar Gah, the capital of Helmand province. Since 28 July, just a mere 10 days ago, at least 104 civilians have been killed and 403 wounded, as registered by the two main hospitals. Ground engagements and air strikes are causing most of the civilian harm. All roads leading to and going out of the city are closed by the Taliban. Hospitals have nearly reached full capacity and can no longer accept patients. The available food supply in the city is fast diminishing, which raises the possibility of an acute food shortage in the coming days as well as a shortage of medical supplies.

    2021-08-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8831 (2021) · source

  38. Let me assure the Council that such a catastrophe would have consequences far beyond the borders of Afghanistan. I believe that the Security Council and the broader international community can help prevent the direst scenarios. But that will require acting in unity and acting quickly. It will require acting. In the past weeks, the war in Afghanistan has entered a new, deadlier and more destructive phase. The Taliban campaign during June and July to capture rural areas has achieved significant territorial gains. From that strengthened position they have begun to attack the larger cities. The provincial capitals of Kandahar, Herat and Lashkar Gah in particular have come under significant pressure. That is a clear attempt by the Taliban to seize urban centres with the force of arms.

    2021-08-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8831 (2021) · source

  39. Ms. Lyons: I am extremely grateful for the opportunity of this special meeting on Afghanistan and the opportunity to brief the Security Council today. It is particularly important because Afghanistan is now at a dangerous turning point. Ahead lies either a genuine peace negotiation or a tragically intertwined set of crises: an increasingly brutal conflict combined with an acute humanitarian situation and multiplying human rights abuses. Today we have an opportunity — an opportunity to demonstrate the commitment of the Security Council and the regional and international community that it represents to prevent Afghanistan from descending into a situation of catastrophe so serious that it would have few, if any, parallels in this century.

    2021-08-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8831 (2021) · source

  40. Adopting a participatory approach, it emphasizes the contributions of non-governmental organizations and grass-roots communities and focuses on income- generating activities and ensuring access to basic social services and productive assets. Continued close collaboration will be maintained with the Department of Political Affairs and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in the development ofthese activities, and we look forward to sharing with the Council information on the future progress of our programme activities in the Central African Republic.

    2001-01-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4261 (2001) · source

  41. I am pleased to inform the Council that the International Organization of la Francophonie has expressed an interest in collaborating with this programme, and that a formulation mission is travelling to the Central African Republic this month to prepare the programme, following which UNDP and la Francophonie will be seeking additional funding for this purpose. Closely linked with the governance programme is the Central African Republic's poverty and sustainable livelihoods programme, an ongoing programme implemented in close collaboration with all the United Nations agencies in the Central African Republic.

    2001-01-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4261 (2001) · source

  42. To ensure the effective start- up of the programme, the Government of the Central African Republic will need to meet the prior obligation of settling outstanding civil service wages, including those of the 700 military and others who are to be demobilized under the programme. Timely contributions of the donor community to the PNDR will also be critical. More generally, the PNDR needs to be seen as one of a number of programme initiatives aimed at enhancing human security and governance in the Central African Republic. In this connection, for the period 2000-2003, UNDP has allocated $9 million to intensify its programme support in several areas. The first area is good governance for sustainable human development, encompassing both the political and economic aspects of governance.

    2001-01-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4261 (2001) · source

  43. These include the installation of a central operational office; the conduct of a series of preliminary studies; the drawing up of an administrative and financial record of all military personnel and gendarmes; the establishment of a computerized data bank; the formulation of legal instruments for demobilization; the implementation of the first phase of an information campaign; the completion of a study on the socio-economic profile of military personnel and gendarmes; and the organization of a workshop on strategies for the financing of micro- projects. In an initial phase, approximately 700 military and gendarmes will be demobilized. There will be approximately 5,000 beneficiaries, when families and dependants are included.

    2001-01-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4261 (2001) · source

  44. Working together with other development partners that pledged resources last May, namely, the European Union and the Governments of France, Italy, Norway and Germany, and with Canada, which made a pledge recently, the United Nations system hopes to have a positive and direct impact on the livelihood and security of the population of the Central African Republic. I am pleased to report that the PNDR has now established the technical conditions for the implementation of the demobilization and reintegration programme.

    2001-01-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4261 (2001) · source

  45. Building on the Bangui Agreement of 1996 and the recommendations of the 1998 National Reconciliation Conference, and within the framework of its National Plan to Fight Poverty, the Government and UNDP agreed in April 1998 on a demobilization and reintegration programme, with initial UNDP financing of approximately $2 million. The new $7 million National Programme for Demobilization and Reintegration (PNDR), which was adopted at last year's Special Meeting on Security and Development, is a continuation and consolidation of this earlier programme, to which UNDP is now allocating additional resources.

    2001-01-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4261 (2001) · source

  46. Mr. Lyons: The Representative of the Secretary- General has outlined the severe social, economic and financial difficulties brought about by prolonged political tension, the army mutinies in 1996 and 1997 and repeated crises of governance in the Central African Republic. The fundamental problems of human insecurity that have resulted from this have led the Central African Republic's Government, with the support of the United Nations missions in Bangui, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and other partners of the Central African Republic, to engage in a disarmament programme.

    2001-01-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4261 (2001) · source