YouSaid · the spoken record

Mahtani

lines on the record
12
first
2022-04-27
most recent
2022-04-27
sittings or episodes
1
sources
un-security-council

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  1. “Dismantling armed and terrorist groups might in the meantime be better achieved by the region enhancing intelligence sharing and policing partnerships in order to better control borders and interdict recruitment networks and the circulation of combatants, illicit finances and material supplies.”

    2022-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9023 (2022) · source

  2. “While the use of force should eventually constitute an important component in any exercise to neutralize armed groups in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, it is crucial that all interested parties first work together to help implement the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s strategy on the demobilization of armed groups and rebuild and consolidate trust among the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s neighbours themselves. Without those ingredients, foreign military intervention might simply create a cascade of second- order problems on the ground, which Kinshasa’s authorities might struggle to cope with.”

    2022-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9023 (2022) · source

  3. “Even if all those forces could apply the necessary and coordinated pressure on Congolese armed groups and push them towards surrender, in a context of ongoing negotiations and dialogue elsewhere, does the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s national institution for disarmament have sufficient resources to implement a smooth demobilization and reintegration of the different armed factions back into society? What should happen to foreign armed group members who surrender or are taken captive?”

    2022-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9023 (2022) · source

  4. “Besides that regional trust deficit, there are also serious challenges to the implementation of any such proposed force. How would a joint force of East African States, including Uganda, sit alongside Uganda’s existing mission in North Kivu? How would it also sit aside the Force Intervention Brigade of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which is partly also comprised of Kenyan troops? They have command issues there that need to be considered.”

    2022-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9023 (2022) · source

  5. “For starters, many armed groups that the regional Governments propose attacking in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo have at times been proxies for those very same regional Governments against each other. Trust between two of the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s neighbours in the Great Lakes has been shaky in recent years, and despite signs of a recent warming of ties between them, it is unclear whether those nascent signs of solidarity can be sustained if the parties are thrust back into a situation in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo where they are not fully confident of each other’s motivations. Officials in those two countries have regularly voiced their belief to me in private that their counterparts across the border are in fact involved in supporting either the M-23 or the ADF.”

    2022-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9023 (2022) · source

  6. “The idea of a joint force, agreed by regional leaders in Kenya’s capital Nairobi, can at least be interpreted as a robust expression by the Democratic Republic of the Congo and its neighbours to finally bring security to the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s troubled east, and in so doing also suppress the playing field for jihadists. Confidence in military solutions is high after Rwanda’s intervention in Mozambique significantly dented the insurgency there. Uganda’s intervention against the ADF has meanwhile scattered the armed group from its bases. But in both theatres, in Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, military victory is far from achieved. More military operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in the form of the proposed joint force, are now on the table. Those pose significant risks.”

    2022-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9023 (2022) · source

  7. “Besides pursuing their own agendas in grabbing territory, plundering local natural resources, attacking security forces and terrorizing civilians, these armed groups are now also the agents and collaborators of criminals and jihadists looking to bolster their influence in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic. The foreign recruits who come in to join the ADF, for example, are often trafficked by different criminal and armed groups who move them through their own territory before they get to ADF camps. Partly for those reasons, the Governments of the Great Lakes and East Africa have now agreed to line up shoulder to shoulder and possibly launch joint military operations against armed groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.”

    2022-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9023 (2022) · source

  8. “Radicalized even further by their battlefield experience from their time in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Mozambique, they are likely to be a threat to security in their home countries should they ever return. It is no wonder therefore that East African Governments are worried. Not only do they have Al-Shabaab, an Al-Qaida affiliate, to deal with, but Islamic State is also likely building up its presence on their soil. In this context, the insecurity in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, fuelled by the presence of dozens of local and foreign armed groups scattered from the province of Ituri all the way down to Tanganyika province, takes on new meaning.”

    2022-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9023 (2022) · source

  9. “Around that time, radical youth from Kenya and Tanzania, including those who were once the East African foot soldiers of Somalia’s Al-Shabaab militant group, also began to flee security crackdowns at home in East Africa, migrating west towards the ADF camps in eastern Congo, with many others moving south from East Africa to join the insurgency in Mozambique, which is also claimed by Islamic State as its affiliate. These East Africans who have turned up in Congo and Mozambique are just some of the young men whom the Islamic State may be looking to support with continued financing, with money transfers originating from abroad, including, as has been discovered, from South Africa.”

    2022-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9023 (2022) · source

  10. “Conflict there, however, is today increasingly interconnected with dynamics in other parts of the continent. It is now known for example, that a number of Mozambican insurgents came to train in ADF camps just as the insurgency in Cabo Delgado began to emerge in 2017. They travelled by land from Mozambique to the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo through Tanzania and Burundi, crossing into the Democratic Republic’s South Kivu province before making their way to North Kivu. There, in the ADF camps, they learned battlefield tactics, passing this knowledge and training on to their fellow insurgents when they returned to Mozambique.”

    2022-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9023 (2022) · source

  11. “In recent weeks, the Mouvement du 23 mars (M-23), which fled the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and surrendered into the hands of Ugandan and Rwandan authorities in 2013, has re-emerged in the Democratic Republic’s North Kivu province, raising the spectre once again of a regional security crisis. The Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), also resurgent since 2013, and responsible for targeted and indiscriminate massacres against civilians also in North Kivu, has in the meantime found a new ally, the Islamic State, whose celebration of the ADF suicide attacks in Kampala last year in turn prompted Uganda’s military to deploy into North Kivu with Kinshasa’s approval. In the past, insecurity in the Great Lakes was largely confined to the region itself.”

    2022-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9023 (2022) · source

  12. “Mr. Mahtani: Mr. President, I thank you for giving me this opportunity to speak to the Security Council today. I am also honoured to be able to do so in front of attending representatives from the Great Lakes and East African regions, whose authorities I have engaged with in some depth over the last 20 years. The following comments are based on insights gathered during this period, as well as from fresh interviews I have conducted in the Great Lakes, East and Southern Africa over the last 18 months. We come together today in the wake of concerning developments in the Great Lakes.”

    2022-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9023 (2022) · source