YouSaid · the spoken record

Major General Deconinck

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23
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2018-05-09
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2018-05-09
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un-security-council

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  1. “It is of course my job in the case of threats or attacks against civilians and any body. When I say body, I mean including hospitals and so on, on Malian territory; of course it is myjob. But the Malian Defence and Security Forces are on the front line. I am there in support in such cases.”

    2018-05-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8251 (2018) · source

  2. “Security sector reform is therefore key, not only for Mali but also for the surrounding countries. My last point will touch upon female personnel, in response to the question from the representative of Sweden on how to attract more female military personnel within the force. First, I will say that the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali is the most dangerous mission in the world, limiting its effectiveness. Secondly, we need women to engage with the population. Again, it is about situational awareness and so on. We need women. However, it is the responsibility of troop-contributing countries to engage more and to commit more female personnel. On the question about the protection of hospitals - which hospitals? The hospitals of the force or the civilian hospitals in the country? That is not my job.”

    2018-05-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8251 (2018) · source

  3. “We also coordinate with the European Union Training Mission in Mali, the Group of Five for the Sahel and Operation Barkhane, as they are all mutually reinforcing. I cannot perform any kinetic action related to counter-terrorism; instead, I must rely on our partners to do that. There is therefore a need for coordination and better synchronization among the partners, which we undertake every day. I will mention one point about one of our partners, the Malian Defence and Security Forces. I do not think I mentioned the need for sound security sector reform plan for the Malian Defence and Security Forces. Such a plan is key because those forces are not only part of our exit strategy, but they also represent part of the solution for implementing the peace agreement.”

    2018-05-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8251 (2018) · source

  4. “That allows us to employ a bottom-up approach to integrate the Mission at that level. Command control is also on my wish list, as I cannot change policy alone. To do that, I need the support of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Lessons learned from past errors are also essential, so as to avoid future failure and to better act or react to recurring incidents. On effectiveness and coordination with military actors. I am only the Force Commander; there are many military actors active in Mali. I have sometimes heard talk of a military traffic jam in Mali. That is certainly not the case - I would be happy to have 10 more battalions in any of my forces. We coordinate on our main areas - operations, logistics, support, intelligence and so on - with five partners. The first of those partners is the Malian armed forces.”

    2018-05-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8251 (2018) · source

  5. “(spoke in English) On the performance of contingents, we are continuously evaluating units. My Deputy Force Commander is in Kidal this week to evaluate two battalions. We do that not only evaluate, but also to take action and to correct what is wrong. We are also measuring the performance of our operations. When it comes to operations, Madam President, you asked how we could avoid inactivity and how our mandate could be more active. We are of course working with the whole Mission in that regard with all the means at our disposal, every six to eight weeks. We conduct such activity, first, for situational awareness, secondly, to ensure the freedom of movement of the force and of our partners and, thirdly, to counter the threat and operate within the seven pillars.”

    2018-05-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8251 (2018) · source

  6. “Three weeks ago, in the aftermath of the attack in Timbuktu, I told my intelligence people that they would have to predict the next location, the next date and the form of the next attack. There is a need for intelligence. Presence, posture and profile have nothing to do with kinetic action, but it is important to be present, have a good posture and profile. It is also about being present and maintaining credibility among populations and deterring the opponent. I will now move onto force protection. (spoke in French) The French delegation asked what technological capacities we still need to strengthen protection. The answer is straightforward: we need more early-warning radars, as we only have a few and I need one in every compound. I also need additional short-range and medium-range drones and command systems.”

    2018-05-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8251 (2018) · source

  7. “Counter-threat is also about countering improvised explosive devices, countering indirect fire and so on, which should not be done with kinetic action alone. When it comes to countering indirect fire, for instance, we have to address the whole chain of command of the opponent, which we do in the Mission as a whole. It is a whole-of-mission concept. We spoke about intelligence. Of course, there is a crucial need to have current and actionable intelligence to first understand the situation, not only for the force but also primarily for the mission. Where and how should effort be directed f in which domain and location - in order to increase situational awareness. Secondly, we need intelligence to prevent attacks.”

    2018-05-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8251 (2018) · source

  8. “For instance, we must stop guarding some small compounds, close them and regroup units. It is about stopping guarding Operational Coordination Mechanism compounds and mixed unit compounds. But they have to be capable of doing that. It is about simply receiving more force protection units, which would mean I would be able to generate additional units using my own resources. That is about increasing effectiveness. Of course, training and equipping soldiers and advising are mentioned in the Santos Cruz report, as is working on the mindset of the soldiers. It is about counter-threat, which should not be confused with counter-terror: "I have to live and I have to act under threat continuously".”

    2018-05-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8251 (2018) · source

  9. “So when we are talking about effectiveness, I have to cope with that gap in capacities. I will live with that gap until the end of my mandate at the end of this year, and my successor will likely live with that gap too. What we have to do is increase our effectiveness. And that relates to the Santos Cruz report. I will not enter into a debate about whether that report is or is not endorsed or approved by the Council. I will say that, in April or May oflast year, I started taking measures to increase effectiveness, because I have to do that. It is about force generation, and I kept pushing the force-generation button with the Council and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. We definitely need that. It is about tasking: reducing tasks with no added value.”

    2018-05-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8251 (2018) · source

  10. “In theory, I could say, "Yes, I can achieve that mandate, of course." But I have to bring safety, security and peace in an asymmetric environment, and sometimes - indeed, more and more often - in combat conditions. In answer to the question as to whether the mandate is achievable, we would therefore have to say perhaps not. On the other hand, with respect to ways and means and ends, I could say, as my predecessor did in 2016, that I need - we need - more resources, capabilities, people and so on. In 2016, we increased the personnel ceiling by almost 2,000. At the moment we are still working with a gap of 1,400. But the number 1,400 says nothing. It is about capacities. We are still lacking some capacity. Capacity is the product of people, equipment, training and mindset - people, training, equipment and mindset.”

    2018-05-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8251 (2018) · source

  11. “I would have to explain the operation design of the whole Mission, the desired end-state of the Mission, the military end-state and the decisive points and objectives. After laying all that out, I might be able to say whether it is achievable or not. But I would first like to turn to effectiveness, starting with my own Mission. As Force Commander, my task is to support the implementation of the Peace Agreement, create or recreate a safe and secure environment throughout Mali so that we can redeploy the armed forces and security forces, so that the national, regional and local authorities can be redeployed, and so that basic services can be ensured. As Force Commander, I also support the entire Mission with a force in various domains in the field. I also have to protect United Nations personnel and uphold the United Nations mandate.”

    2018-05-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8251 (2018) · source

  12. “Major General Deconinck: I thank you, Madam President, and all members of the Security Council for their support to the missions in the field and for their tributes, which I will convey when I return to Bamako, and to Mali, next week. I would like to add something to what my colleague from the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur said. It is important to develop our planning process, to study the equation between the mandate and the means so that we can define the ways and means and ends. But that is not enough. What is missing is what we call in the military a restated mission: did we understand what is expected of us and what is expected of the mission? That is important. In answer to the United States representative's question as to whether the mandate is achievable, I cannot answer that.”

    2018-05-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8251 (2018) · source

  13. “Complex conflict environments call for such missions to confront the multitude of factors needed to address the crisis in Mali, and nowhere more so than in the central region. A multidimensional mission must also include a regional approach to addressing the crisis from all the dimensions, in all countries of the Sahel region. The force is committed to facilitating several missions and to further developing and implementing such effective multidimensional policies to generate the conditions for sustainable peace and security in Mali and for the Malian people.”

    2018-05-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8251 (2018) · source

  14. “In Mali, as in many other peacekeeping missions, airborne intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance platforms, helicopters and aircraft are essential force multipliers. MINUSMA's access to the population, for both civilian and military peacekeepers, is greatly constrained by the shortfall in aviation assets. Furthermore, a robust approach also calls for military components to take greater ownership of their operational logistics - to be able to set priorities, to control military transport assets and to determine convoy composition. In MINUSMA, every convoy has to be considered as a military operation of its own. Finally, the added value of a multidimensional and integrated mission cannot be overstated.”

    2018-05-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8251 (2018) · source

  15. “We also need to guard more effectively against intelligence collected on our force elements. We must invest in improving the training standards for our military peacekeepers both before and during their missions. We know the challenges they will face and we must ensure they come prepared. Within the force headquarters we have adapted our structure to provide more support to training, and we now need to create mobile training teams to support our contingents and troop-contributing countries. We must insist on appropriate and universal standards of first-line medical equipment, in conjunction with a mandatory combat casualty care course for all troops. In addition, current United Nations procedures for casualty and medical evacuation need to be reviewed.”

    2018-05-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8251 (2018) · source

  16. “A commitment from the Security Council to Mali must be supported by a number of measures to deliver this new, more robust approach and to provide the necessary means to support the Government of Mali. As outlined in the Santos Cruz report, we have to change our mindset. The force requires competent leaders and commanders with the right knowledge, skills and experience to lead in a complex security environment. In return, we must decentralize some of our decision-making processes in order to enable them to deliver what we ask of them, in particular the means to ensure a lasting effect on operations. In complex conflict environments, intelligence analysts must support our commanders with the ability and the means to collect and process all forms of intelligence.”

    2018-05-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8251 (2018) · source

  17. “The regional dimensions of such attacks call for a regional approach to the crisis in Mali. We also see activity by the Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin in Mali's central region as exemplifying a changing security and operational environment, which calls for a robust approach to peacekeeping. Rightly, MINUSMA has invested in understanding the changing character of the conflict in Mali and the Sahel, but now we have to adapt to that changing security and operational environment in order to support the people and to support peace, stability and the fulfilment of our mandate, pursuant to resolution 2364 (2017). It is in that sense that robust peacekeeping is required.”

    2018-05-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8251 (2018) · source

  18. “Nevertheless, the north is also the seat of the Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin terrorist organization and its many subordinate groups, which actively seek to undermine MINUSMA's efforts to bring about peace and stability. Those groups frequently conduct complex attacks on the force involving improvised explosive devices and indirect fire, giving MINUSMA its reputation as the most dangerous peacekeeping mission in the world. Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin attacks on MINUSMA's bases, such as the one last month in Timbuktu, have targeted civilian and military peacekeepers alike. The criminal trafficking networks sustain the activities of the Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin groups in the north of Mali, but their regional influence is also evident in the attacks in Ouagadougou earlier this year.”

    2018-05-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8251 (2018) · source

  19. “We have to adapt to the circumstances that define the current challenges. The north is sparsely populated. There the force remains fully committed to the implementation of the Peace Agreement and to achieving stability in the regions as well as the restoration and deployment of the Malian State. In key population centres, the force, in coordination with the Malian Defence and Security Forces and armed groups compliant with the Peace Agreement, provides security to the local population and to the good offices of the MINUSMA Mission. The force also plays a key role in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process to establish inclusive and representative Malian Defence and Security Forces in the north.”

    2018-05-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8251 (2018) · source

  20. “Perhaps more important, I believe we have to recognize the significance of the central region in relation to the 2015 Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, which is at the heart of MINUSMA's mandate. From the perspective of peacekeeping in a changing security and operational environment, how we understand the current security situation in Mali is as important as what the situation currently is. In a contested security environment, where the force and the civil population are targeted, the attitude of the force and of MINUSMA towards terrorist and insurgent armed groups is put to the test. Understanding the character of the conflict between those groups and the strategy they are waging against us is key to determining what our response should be - within our mandate and our rules of engagement.”

    2018-05-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8251 (2018) · source

  21. “In that connection, the inner Niger delta, to the west of Kona, served as a fortunate natural obstacle to further jihadist movement southward. Last month, a MINUSMA force operation to Kona aimed to deliver security and stability in the face of the insurgent activities of Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin terrorist armed groups Other than by geography, those two events are not directly related - there has not been an enduring jihadist or terrorist presence in Kona since 2013. From 2015, however, terrorist armed groups have steadily re-established themselves in Kona and across the central region, particularly since the founding of the Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin organization, at the start of 2017. I perceive that as an example ofa changing security and operational environment.”

    2018-05-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8251 (2018) · source

  22. “To the many troop-contributing countries from around the world, I would like to express a sincere debt of gratitude for their commitment, and I call for their continued support to peace and stability in Mali. With that in mind, I believe the way that peacekeeping operations are conducted is shifting. The Santos Cruz report compellingly defines the environment in which we now operate. We owe it to our peacekeepers, both civilian and military, to implement the Action for Peacekeeping, to change our mind- sets and to adapt how we lead at all levels to the new challenges we face. Allow me to share my perspective on the security context. The capture of the central region town of Kona marked the southernmost advance of the jihadist groups in Mali during the rebellion of 2012-2013.”

    2018-05-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8251 (2018) · source

  23. “Major General Deconinck: I would have liked to be in Kidal this week to officially and proudly initiate the build-up of the Operational Coordination Mechanism unit. I was in the famous capital of Kidal exactly one year ago. That is just to say that time is passing, but we must be patient. I am also proud to be at this meeting today and to interact with the Security Council on Mali and on the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). The Mission in Mali is made up of peacekeepers with great dedication and a commitment to bring peace and stability to the people of Mali. Nevertheless, we are extremely aware that our peacekeepers are making the highest sacrifice to bring lasting peace to Mali.”

    2018-05-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8251 (2018) · source