YouSaid · the spoken record

Major General Finn

lines on the record
18
first
2015-06-17
most recent
2015-06-17
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1
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un-security-council

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  1. “In that regard, Observation Group Golan and UNDOF are well placed to continue to carry out the mandate as best as they can, within the constraints that currently exist, while not being able to position themselves within the area of separation to the extent that we would want. I think that that more or less covers what I wanted to say in response.”

    2015-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7464 (2015) · source

  2. “With regard to how the caveats were reported, there were no major sudden notifications. They were done in a reasoned way, I think, through the Permanent Representatives to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. The representative of Spain asked a question as to what extent we can still carry out our mandate. Observer Group Golan is doing that to the best of its ability, meeting the tasks set by the Force Commander of UNDOF. It is still manning observation points on the Alpha line, and it has taken up additional temporary observation posts - all ofwhich, to some extent, fill the gaps created by having to leave the area of separation.”

    2015-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7464 (2015) · source

  3. “As mentioned by the representative of New Zealand, countries with UNDOF and the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), have mitigated the problems to a large extent with better medical evacuation facilities, contingency planning, armoured vehicles, strict movement control and special surveillance, among other elements. The conditions were such that the Secretary-General in his reports to the Security Council was able to point out those mitigating measures and encourage troop-contributing countries (TCCs) to lift their caveats. There were also many briefings to TCCs by UNDOF and to UNTSO TCCs by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Thankfully, countries like New Zealand and many others did lift those caveats, but, as I said, there are still some that did not.”

    2015-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7464 (2015) · source

  4. “We had issues of observation posts being overrun, car- jackings, observers - even UNDOF members - being detained for short periods, and deficiencies in medical evacuation and casualty evacuation. That was well described by the representative of New Zealand, which was one of the countries that imposed caveats, and has been raised by all the countries that have imposed caveats. It is completely understood what drove the imposition of those restrictions. In short, UNDOF underwent a big reorganization, and by the end of 2013 and in early 2014, it had become a much more assertive force with a robust force reserve and capability.”

    2015-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7464 (2015) · source

  5. “Major General Finn: I thank you, Mr. President, and the other members of the Security Council for your statements and supportive comments. I think, in relation to the queries raised, that I can perhaps stay with them and make a few general comments, starting with the United States query regarding how troop- contributing countries notify us of their caveats. By the way, a caveat for myself is the Force Commander of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), who is the operational commander in the Golan. I hope that I do not step on his toes in any way. In relation to caveats, we should recall that UNDOF existed for many years in a very benign situation, with both parties to the agreement, Israel and Syria, largely abiding by the terms of the Disengagement Agreement, a situation that completely changed from 2012 to 2013.”

    2015-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7464 (2015) · source

  6. “I am grateful to all our TCCs for the support they continue to give to the work of peacekeepers during these challenging times. In particular, I extend my thanks to those nations that enable the deployment of their officers to all areas ofUNTSO's area of operations, without restrictions.”

    2015-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7464 (2015) · source

  7. “They restrict a commander's ability to exercise command and control and are an impediment to performance. I fully recognize the national interests that drive caveats, but I also see that caveats threaten to drive a wedge between contributing nations, also threatening United Nations peacekeeping and observer capabilities. It is welcome that the High- Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations has made important recommendations in that regard. Despite those challenges, the presence of United Nations peacekeepers on the Golan has played a key role in helping to prevent the Syrian conflict from becoming a Syrian-Israeli conflict. Our well-trained observers continue to provide impartial and expert reports. I encourage contributors to UNTSO to continue to provide officers with the right profile and experience to match the challenges ahead.”

    2015-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7464 (2015) · source

  8. “It also recommended reducing the number of military personnel contributed to UNTSO by countries that continue to have restrictions on the deployment of their military personnel, increasing the contributions of those that do not have caveats and expanding the pool of UNTSO TCCs by inviting new contributors without caveats. With the support of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, some of those recommendations have been adopted, including the deployment of United Nations military observers from new TCCs and reducing the numbers of United Nations military observers from countries with national caveats. In addition, senior staff appointments or positions in the mission are being filled only by countries without caveats. Caveats impact all United Nations peacekeeping missions, notjust UNTSO.”

    2015-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7464 (2015) · source

  9. “While that has limited impact at the moment, the limitations on performance and flexibility will again come to the fore when a decision is eventually made to return to the Bravo side. When that might occur will be determined on the basis of very best assessments of the security conditions, which UNDOF, with our support and that of DPKO, is continually monitoring. Therefore, the removal of the remaining national caveats remains a priority issue. A recent review ofUNTSO led by DPKO highlighted the mitigation measures that have been implemented by UNDOF and UNTSO in respect to the operations and physical security of military observers in Observer Group Golan. The review recommended that UNTSO contributors with caveats should be strongly urged to lift them.”

    2015-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7464 (2015) · source

  10. “Under-Secretary-General Ladsous has continuously stressed the importance that his Department and all peacekeeping operations place on the safety and security of personnel in the field. He has emphasized that contributors' personnel are our most critical asset. Since September of last year, all UNTSO observers, as well as the majority of UNDOF personnel, have been relocated to the Israeli-occupied side of the ceasefire line, due to the security situation, as a further mitigation measure implemented by my colleague the Force Commander of UNDOF in conjunction with DPKO. Yet seven countries - not counting the four permanent members of the Security Council - that contribute observers but whose military personnel are restricted by the Disengagement Agreement from serving on the Golan continue to impose caveats.”

    2015-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7464 (2015) · source

  11. “We fitted our observation posts with ballistic skirts and bulletproof glass on the observation towers. We reassured TCCs by emphasizing the tight coordination between the Force Commander of UNDOF and myself and by the provision of contingency planning that was, and still is, manifested by regular evacuation exercises and the deployment of security parties for the observation posts to either augment or replace unarmed observers, if required. That close coordination, reflecting the priority placed by the UNDOF Force Commander and myself on safety and security, was demonstrated as recently as last month, when heavy firing over the course of a week impacted one of our observation posts.”

    2015-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7464 (2015) · source

  12. “I fully understand what drove the imposition of those restrictions, and I share the desire of troop- contributing countries to see the risks to their deployed personnel mitigated to the greatest extent possible. In peacekeeping missions, removing the threats of course rests ultimately with the parties to the conflict and with those with influence over them. But I worked closely with the Force Commander of UNDOF to carry out a range of mitigating measures, including improved medical evacuation and casualty evacuation capacities. We raised and reinforced perimeter fences and equipped observers with advanced night vision equipment with remote viewing to allow them to anticipate threats. Work continued right up until our eventual relocation from the area of separation by UNDOF in September 2014.”

    2015-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7464 (2015) · source

  13. “It also limited the flexibility to assign officers ofthose nations to other locations where UNTSO operates - at our headquarters in Jerusalem, at our liaison offices in Beirut, Damascus, Jerusalem and Cairo, or to Observer Group Lebanon, the operation within UNIFIL in south Lebanon. Caveats imposed distinctions among military observers and the roles they perform, affecting the morale of individual observers. As the Secretary- General has reiterated in his reports on UNDOF, those restrictions have hindered the implementation of UNDOF's mandate, and they limited the capacities and hampered the operational flexibility of Observer Group Golan, on whose skills UNDOF relied move heavily when the deteriorating situation required increased focus on static observation and reduced mobile activities.”

    2015-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7464 (2015) · source

  14. “To give an idea of the effect of caveats, when the Force Commander ofUNDOF and I briefed our TCCs in April 2014, I mentioned that only six nations provided over 75 per cent of the observers deployed on the Bravo side -that is, on the Syrian-controlled Golan. Naturally, the situation posed an undue burden on those nations, including in terms of exposure to risk. The restrictions also affected performance in that they complicated my efforts to maintain the desirable mix of three observers of different nationalities in any observation post in order to ensure better impartial reporting as well as an appropriate mix of experienced and inexperienced officers in teams and in our observation posts.”

    2015-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7464 (2015) · source

  15. “Returning to the work of UNTSO, the deterioration ofthe situation in Syria has led to a number of countries, as stated, imposing restrictions on the activities of their personnel assigned to Observer Group Golan on the Syrian-controlled side of the ceasefire, which I referred to as the Bravo side. At one stage in 2013, all except seven of our 25 TCCs had caveats of varying effects on their observers deployed in Observer Group Golan. It even reached a situation where, if one more troop- contributing country had imposed restrictions, UNTSO would have been unable to meet its commitment to provide professional, trained military observers to the Force Commander of UNDOF on the Bravo side of the area of separation.”

    2015-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7464 (2015) · source

  16. “Unfortunately, while UNDOF, UNTSO, the United Nations Department of Safety and Security and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations have sought to improve security measures and reduce risks, several of our troop-contributing countries imposed national caveats that restrict where their observers could deploy. Caveats are a controversial subject, and their impact on United Nations missions has been much discussed. Indeed, they impose significant restrictions on multinational operations and often restrict the operational role and functions of individual national contingents or United Nations military observers employed on multinational missions such as UNTSO.”

    2015-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7464 (2015) · source

  17. “Focusing on supports to the Force Commander of UNDOF has been provided by Observer Group Golan, tasked within UNDOF to observe and report violations in the area of separation, located east of the disengagement line between Syria and the Israeli-occupied Golan, and the areas of limitation on both sides of the disengagement line, the Alpha side in the Israeli-occupied Golan and the Bravo side in the Syrian-controlled Golan. Since the outset of the conflict in Syria, and especially as it spread to the Golan, we have all faced legitimate concerns regarding the safety and security of our personnel, including the UNTSO unarmed military observers of Observer Group Golan.”

    2015-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7464 (2015) · source

  18. “Major General Finn: It is an honour and a pleasure for me to be invited to speak today on the subject of caveats and impediments to command and performance. Since I was appointed Head of Mission and Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), almost two years ago, the subject and effects of caveats imposed by many of the 25 troop-contributing countries (TCCs) have never been far from my attention. The UNTSO military component is made up of approximately 153 unarmed military observers. My key tasks as the Head of Mission for UNTSO are to assign well-trained military observers under the operational control of the Force Commanders of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF).”

    2015-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7464 (2015) · source