YouSaid · the spoken record

Major General Iqbal Asi

lines on the record: 27
first: 2013-06-26
most recent: 2013-06-26
sittings or episodes: 1
sources: un-security-council

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“It is a major project, and we look forward to enhancing the capacity of the FRCI in a big way if the project gets through somehow or the other.”
2013-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6987 (2013) · source
“We have even allowed commanders to use helicopters. As I mentioned in my statement, we have provided security in elections to different voting centres and regional offices throughout the country. My entire force was deployed as recently as April. I am sure the Council received numerous reports on that. It was a very successful operation. We provide security to strategic sites. By the end of last year, the spoilers were attacking strategic sites after the FRCI found it very difficult to defend some of those sites, which were very important to them. So we moved in and provided security to 11 sites. We are continuously providing security there to VIPs. For my last point, we are starting a partnership project with the FRCI. I have a lot to say on this, but I am constrained by time.”
2013-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6987 (2013) · source
“I have 29 different bases that I occupy throughout all of Cote d'Ivoire. From those bases, I initiate patrolling all over the country. FRCI has about eight major bases that I know of. We complement one another. Wherever it is not possible for them to dominate the area, my troops dominate that area. This is actually what I would call complementarity in operations to dominate the area. There is joint patrolling. Whenever there is a problem, we run to assist them, even in terms of information-sharing. We conduct training on a regular basis. My force has conducted more than one session. In fact, the Mission on its own is also conducting training for FRCI troops. Our logistics support is phenomenal. We have provided transport on more than one occasion since I took over responsibility for the force.”
2013-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6987 (2013) · source
“A mission has a certain identity, and one develops sympathy with that identity. One develops sympathy with the local authorities. They have their own respective points of View on different issues. Until such time that we regionalize this entire concept, bring people together and discuss these thingsjointly, we will not be able to develop a commonality of views on this. That is important, and although I did not cover it in my statement, I think it is the most important challenge. The last question was from the representative of Togo, concerning cooperation between UNOCI and the Forces republicaines de Cote d'Ivoire (FRCI). I assure the representative of Togo that such cooperation is wide-ranging. It is in the field of operations, training, logistics, and security operations.”
2013-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6987 (2013) · source
“Some of these things will have to be sorted out. This is a real challenge. But I should like to digress a little bit here. There is one more very important challenge to which I alluded earlier. That is regionalizing our approach to conflict resolution. I was talking with my colleague, the Force Commander of the United Nations Mission in Liberia. We are neighbours. Day in and day out, we are sorting out some of our problems in Sector West along the border. He is on the other side and I am on mine. Although we talk regularly to each other on the telephone and meet, and I always thought our understanding of some of our issues was really common and we had no problem, but having talked with him here, I realize how differently he thinks of his own problems than I do of mine.”
2013-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6987 (2013) · source
“There were three things that I spoke about in terms of challenges: legal and administrative challenges, restrictive mission mandates, and the non-availability of standard means. The last two are important, but the most difficult challenge is the legal, political and administrative part. What number of troops is acceptable to a particular country? What types of weapon are acceptable to a particular troop-contributing country? Is a country politically prepared to move into the mission area or not? Is it acceptable to that country or not? Maybe they are neighbours; maybe in a regional context they are not ready to operate in a certain country. As to contingent- owned equipment, the United Nations wants a certain standard and a certain type of weapon, whether that country has it or not. What are the capabilities?”
2013-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6987 (2013) · source
“As to a central quick reaction force, there is force available that is placed centrally, maybe somewhere in northern Cote d'Ivoire. This force is available to react anywhere. Again, some of the teething aspects will have to be sorted out in the memorandums of understanding, the status-of-forces agreements or the status-of-mission agreements in order to ensure that it works out smoothly. The use of technology, again, is one of those areas of cooperation that I believe to be feasible. Finally, I come to the most challenging question, which came from the representative of Pakistan. What are the challenges in inter-mission cooperation? I covered that particular issue in my presentation.”
2013-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6987 (2013) · source
“We actually started working the logistics support part ourselves, without any clear direction from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, because we thought that a mission in Mali would certainly require some initial support from UNOCI to help it settle in, because there was such natural logistical support available from Cote d'Ivoire. We have broad infrastructure; we just brought it to Bamako and there was no problem. That support is there; it is very possible. There is the use of helicopters. I have learned here that the MI-24s are being transferred to UNOCI. That is very much the central point of the three missions in Cote d'Ivoire, Mali and Liberia. We may have to work out some of the logistical aspects of refuelling in-between, but otherwise operationally there should be no problem. I think this should be pursued.”
2013-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6987 (2013) · source
“We have to agree that this framework is acceptable to all of us in all missions around the globe before we can think of establishing border-control units, although this too will not be without its challenges. Who controls and commands the battalion? Where is the battalion deployed? What are the terms of reference of operation of this battalion across different missions? All that will have to be sorted out. I now come to some of the more challenging questions. The French and Australian representatives had questions regarding inter-mission cooperation within the context of Mali. I remember that when the crisis in Mali started, I was in the United Nations Operation in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI).”
2013-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6987 (2013) · source
“That is how one can take care of the shortage of resources that we are experiencing in the field in one form or another. The representative of Azerbaijan spoke about particular logical and administrative problems in inter-mission cooperation. There is no doubt about it. These problems are there, but we have the mechanisms of status-of-forces agreements, status-of-mission agreements and memorandums of understanding, of which I have already spoken. We can reduce or even eliminate these problems through this legal framework. The representative of Luxembourg asked about the creation of border-control units. There is no doubt that they can be very useful, but they have to be subordinated to the inter-mission cooperation framework.”
2013-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6987 (2013) · source
“However, it is my personal observation that the collective attitude of the contingent and the ability of the battalion commander and the officers to inspire performance make all the difference on the ground. If that can be done - if somehow or other the national authorities and the local commanders on the ground can make that much difference - I am sure that troops' performance in the field will improve. In response to the representative of Rwanda, inter-mission cooperation as a short-term solution cannot replace a permanent solution. I agree that there is absolutely no doubt about that, but a permanent solution needs resources. We actually talk in the context of a lack of resources. A lack of resources can be dealt with only by multiplying resources through the use of those available in other missions.”
2013-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6987 (2013) · source
“There is no doubt that such cooperation is an extremely viable option. The only issue is the need to sort out the approach to conflict resolution taken by the United Nations. I would also like to deal with the training question that was raised. Regarding training gaps among troops working in the field, my opinion is that such gaps will continue to exist, and we will not be able to remove them on a permanent basis. That is not possible. The military contingents come from very different national backgrounds. There are very wide gaps in their training standards. We cannot do much about that, although we must try to reduce these gaps as far as possible.”
2013-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6987 (2013) · source
“The representative of the Republic of Korea mentioned that troop transfers should be dealt with carefully. I could not agree with him more, but I have also spoken about status-of-forces agreements, status-of-mission agreements and memorandums of understanding. We need to formalize this practice for proper sanction. Without that, such transfers will not be possible. The representative mentioned that there was no movement of troops between UNOCI and UNMIL. I would just like to make the clarification that troops have moved twice - three companies in 2010 and one company in 2011, which was significant. We have definitely utilized helicopters more than once for security and reconnaissance sorties, which was useful. The representative of the United States spoke about inter-mission cooperation viability.”
2013-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6987 (2013) · source
“But to achieve that, we must first agree that there has to be a regional approach to conflict management by the United Nations, a common threat perception and a common mechanism for initiating responses. These things have to be agreed upon first. There could be no better examples than those provided by the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), the United Nations Operation in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI) and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali. The three Missions are so contiguous that resources can be placed centrally and utilized in all of the Missions. We have to work at that. In the light of the continuing implications of the current financial crunch, we should seriously consider such options. They are bound to be useful.”
2013-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6987 (2013) · source
“Major General Iqbal Asi: At the outset, I wish to thank all of representatives for their very kind remarks and expressions of support for troops in the field. Questions were asked with regard to three areas, including inter-mission cooperation, my subject. Secondly, there was one question regarding cooperation between United Nations Operation in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI) and the Forces republicaines de C6te d'Ivoire? And thirdly, I will make a short comment on training based on my experience in the field. I will handle the questions in reverse order. A joint analysis centre, covering two or more missions, is very much a possibility and, in fact, desirable.”
2013-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6987 (2013) · source
“The availability of standard maps and communication means should be examined to facilitate cross-border operations and the sharing of operational information. Inter-mission cooperation needs to be strengthened and expanded. Obviously, there is no one-size-fits- all solution, each mission being a unique case. But there are important opportunities and sometimes even compulsions to enhance cooperation and coordination among them, thereby maximizing available resources. Such cooperation is becoming increasingly important as a tool to ensure the optimal utilization of limited resources in an environment characterized by the regional nature of conflicts and fiscal considerations.”
2013-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6987 (2013) · source
“Secondly, status-of-mission agreements, status- of forces-agreement, memorandums of understanding and rules of engagement should be worked out with the Governments concerned, providing legitimacy for crossing into neighbouring mission areas and facilitating cross-border operations in cooperation with the Office of Legal Affairs. Thirdly, the commercial provision of some of the military capabilities required to make efficient use of technology to implement mandates in a cost- effective manner should be considered from a regional perspective. Such means would be made available on a cost-sharing basis among different missions. Finally, the joint mapping of armed groups and criminality across the borders should be carried out by contiguous missions, which would prove useful to an effective response against miscreants.”
2013-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6987 (2013) · source
“The use of maps to share operational information 4 especially contiguous locations - becomes time-consuming due to lack of standard maps. Moreover, lack of standard communication means is another area of concern that needs to be addressed for coordinating important operational activities, such as patrolling along the border. On the way forward for the future, I shall proffer certain recommendations. First, DPKO should negotiate prior agreements between the United Nations and troop-contributing countries (TCCs) that allow TCC units to be utilized during reinforcing missions. That would ensure timely deployment of assets when needed.”
2013-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6987 (2013) · source
“Legal and political constraints are a major challenge as the shifting of assets across national borders requires the prior approval of the host country and troop-contributing countries, which can be an organizational and administrative challenge. Invariably, it results in the delayed deployment of troops and assets. The second challenge emanates from restrictive mission mandates. Protection, privileges, immunities, exemptions and facilities in missions, the respective status-of-forces agreements, as related to United Nations personnel and property, must be worked out in a timely manner with host countries in cases where United Nations personnel and material may required to deploy and operate. The non-availability of standard means at the tactical level is also another impediment.”
2013-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6987 (2013) · source
“The establishment of a joint information and analysis centre is a possible field of cooperation. A centre could be established for UNOCI and UNMIL and fed through all internal and external resources to provide a clearer picture for decision-makers in order to achieve well-thought-out and informed decisions. It will improve the quality of information and assist in its speedy dissemination to all concerned. Such an arrangement would be beneficial for both missions, for better crisis management. The successful execution of inter-mission cooperation has certain challenges, which I shall briefly highlight here.”
2013-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6987 (2013) · source
“As a physical presence along and monitoring of an extended border is not possible, for obvious reasons, shared monitoring and surveillance of border areas through technological means is another achievable field of cooperation. To compensate for a paucity of troops, technological means can be jointly employed by missions located in geographic proximity. Rapid surge capability is another area of opportunity. The identification and earmarking of a quick reaction force based in one mission, but able to deploy to operate in neighbouring mission areas, need to be pursued. The earmarking of such a flexile force could have a considerable impact in crisis situations and provide a strong United Nations presence in areas where it otherwise has limited troop presence.”
2013-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6987 (2013) · source
“Lastly, the ability to take counter measures in terms of intelligence-sharing is a valuable outcome of inter-mission cooperation. An effective intelligence sharing mechanism exists between UNOCI and UNMIL at the force headquarters, sector and unit levels. To cite a couple of examples among many, vital information provided by UNMIL made it possible to take counter- measures and thereby avert attacks against Blolequin and Guiglo in May 2012, and against Djouroutou in April. Having indicated workable and constructive effects accrued from cooperation between UNOCI and UNMIL, I shall now identify a few areas where opportunities exist to further enhance such cooperation.”
2013-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6987 (2013) · source
“Under that framework, two operations, generally called "mirror patrolling", each of one week duration per month, are conducted on both sides of the border in selected areas. The practice enables the establishment of the United Nations footprint in remote border regions, which effectively deters border crossings of miscreants in large numbers. Enhanced local cooperation at the tactical level is yet another area of cooperation with obvious benefits. I am referring to Operation Mayo, in which border meetings are held twice a month. Representatives of all components of the two missions, national law enforcement agencies and local administrative authorities participate in those meetings. They provide a forum for liaison, coordination, the exchange of information and review of progress on agreed action points.”
2013-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6987 (2013) · source
“The shifting of three armed and two military utility helicopters from UNMIL to UNOCI for the two elections just mentioned provided UNOCI with the mobility required to enhance monitoring of the sensitive areas surrounding the borders, as well as the ability to quickly respond to cross-border violence. A number of reconnaissance sorties are being conducted on a required basis by UNMIL armed helicopters on both sides of the border. Recently, prior to regional and municipal elections in Cote d'Ivoire in April, regular reconnaissance and security sorties were flown along the border by UNMIL armed helicopters. Thus, the United Nations aerial platforms available in the region were optimally utilized and the show of force dissuaded the miscreants from acts of violence. Another area of inter-mission cooperation is joint border surveillance.”
2013-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6987 (2013) · source
“The current global economic environment necessitates a more efficient approach to United Nations peacekeeping operations. Although the concept has been practiced, and UNOCI has first- hand experience in benefiting from inter-mission cooperation, areas for further expansion exist. I shall now identify the dividends of inter-mission cooperation accrued from the cooperative framework of UNOCI and UNMIL. The temporary redeployment of three infantry companies from UNMIL to UNOCI in late 2010 helped UNOCI to fill a critical shortage of personnel needed to protect Abidjan. In December 2011, one infantry company was temporarily redeployed from UNMIL to reinforce UNOCI during legislative elections in Cote d'Ivoire. That shifting of personnel within the region saved precious time, as well as the cost ofbringing in troops during the crisis.”
2013-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6987 (2013) · source
“When unforeseen events threaten to destabilize a country, inter-mission cooperation can be an adaptive and effective response to help provide key assets in a timely and efficient manner. The concept is not new, as initial efforts to stimulate it began as early as 2005 under the sponsorship of the United Nations Office for West Africa, headquartered in Dakar, Senegal. That regional office initiated the practice of convening regular meetings of Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) missions based in three West African countries, namely, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Cote d'Ivoire. Those meetings are considered to be pioneering efforts in that particular direction. Today, there is greater need for coordination and cooperation among United Nations missions operating in geographic proximity.”
2013-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6987 (2013) · source
“Major General Iqbal Asi: I am greatly honoured to be here this morning, sharing my thoughts on how planned inter-mission cooperation can impact mission crisis management capability. During my discourse, I will briefly dilate upon the existing framework of cooperation between the United Nations Operation in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI) and the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), highlight opportunities for further cooperation, identify challenges and recommend a way forward. Inter-mission cooperation optimizes the use of available assets for peacekeeping operations by facilitating, through pooling or the temporary redeployment of equipment and personnel in geographically contiguous missions on a short-term basis, as well as strategic gains.”
2013-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6987 (2013) · source