YouSaid · the spoken record

Major General Lollesgaard

lines on the record: 23
first: 2015-06-17
most recent: 2015-06-17
sittings or episodes: 1
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“I can live with caveats, as long as I know what they are and they do not come up the day after I have issued a task call. If they are fully clear and we know about them beforehand, we can work around them. Of course, it would be preferable if countries did not insist on caveats. That was a quick run-through, although there is much more to say. Lunch hour is drawing near. I will conclude here on the lessons learned, and I fully agree with France. And I also apologize for my poor French, among other things, but I am trying to improve. That is also a lesson learned.”
2015-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7464 (2015) · source
“I think that we should also be more receptive of actually having evaluation teams coming into the TCCs to look at the final training and verify that it is scenario-based and also that we are taking the right approach and understand the environment in which we are going to work. In response to the French representative, let me say that I will provide some lessons learned on what I believe my particular Mission needs in terms of training. We will develop that during the next couple of months, so that information will be shared with both the Secretariat and the troop-contributing countries. There are many questions on the issue of the caveats, and I asked what the Council could do. We need to encourage contributors not to set too many caveats. I understand, however, that there are national issues related to operations in such environments.”
2015-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7464 (2015) · source
“This is very easy, because in Mali it always 100 kilometres to the nearest place; so you drive 100 kilometres and stop in the village and talk to the people. Then you drive another 100 kilometres and so on. This is a bit of an exaggeration, of course. But this is the way we are doing it, so as to get out of these armoured boxes. In terms of the many issues relating to training, I think that we need to step up training. I think that the training programme provided by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations is rather good, but perhaps we need to align it more with the thinking of the troop- contributing countries (TCCs).”
2015-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7464 (2015) · source
“To the representative of New Zealand, I would say a few things about the information campaign. I think that on the conceptual level and on the Force level, I am in a good position. With the assistance that I have now, the staff can provide me with the necessary input for my information operations. I need to train and teach within my organization; we are working on that, and I have asked a few experts to devise a concept for us. But I might come back, maybe, with additional requirements in that respect. When it comes to the protection of vehicles, I have made it a rule in the Mission that we do not drive through a village without stopping and talking to civilians. This is a common operational tactic.”
2015-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7464 (2015) · source
“I can also cite several cases in which we lost civilian lives because we did not have the necessary intelligence. I think, therefore, that we need to do more. In answer to the United States representative's question on what we can do with respect to the issue of casualty evacuations, the answer is: more helicopters. That is quite easy. We are quite limited; we have limited night capability for casualty evacuations. In connection with the the issue of caveats, certain Member States now actually request that their forces be within a one-hour reach of a helicopter. This puts a lot of pressure on my helicopter capabilities before I can put certain troops on the ground. So, definitely, more helicopters with night capabilities is the best way of mitigating this issue.”
2015-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7464 (2015) · source
“I am also happy to learn that Chad is bringing in more protective vehicles for their forces. The representative of Chile asked a question about intelligence. I think that the sharing of intelligence is extremely important, and I look forward to the upcoming report on intelligence. Intelligence-sharing in United Nations missions is complicated. We know from previous experience that even in smaller alliances, intelligence-sharing is complicated, and it is even more complicated in the United Nations. I think we need to find a good way to approach this issue, and I look forward to the report, which may be able to help us in that respect. Has the availability of intelligence increased security? Yes, definitely. I can cite several situations in which we have saved lives by having good intelligence.”
2015-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7464 (2015) · source
“I think that the issue regarding the intervention brigade is a very complex one, because we would step that up and then get the anti-terrorist mandate, which would make things extremely complicated for the Mission. I do not think we are set up for that or that we are ready for that. We do not have the intelligence, the equipment or the mobility to do that. I believe that having this mandate and having an intervention brigade under us would complicate things. So, again, I think that this issue need to be dealt with in closer cooperation with Barkhane and the security forces of Mali. In terms of minimizing the risk, yes, we are doing that; we are doing everything we can. We are improving all of the bases now with a shorter timeline than originally envisaged.”
2015-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7464 (2015) · source
“Major General Lollesgaard: Mr. President, I thank you for all the support from the members of the Council and for the questions posed; I will try to be brief in my responses. First, with respect to the question posed by the representative of Chad, on how we can prevent asymmetric threats, I think that that is a very difficult question. I do not think that we are capable, with this mandate, of preventing it, but we can deter it through the effective use of our forces; with increased cooperation with Operation Barkhane, which is working in the area; and, of course, with the help of the local security forces from Mali. So that is what we will be stepping up after the signing of the peace agreement. I have given my guidance for the next quarter, and clearly the focus is on northern Mali.”
2015-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7464 (2015) · source
“While conducting operations, we work very hard in the Mission to improve capabilities and standards by stepping up our training efforts. New equipment is also coming in, and first and foremost, I am lucky that in general I have brave, robust, courageous soldiers who every day face the threat without shying away. But we need to prepare and support them better.”
2015-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7464 (2015) · source
“We need to be properly equipped with protected vehicles, to put a big effort into counter-IED and robust logistics, to protect the camps, to have proper intelligence, and we need to ensure that all staff posts are manned and manned with skilled officers. I know that sounds like a lot, but it is what we need if we want to be able to survive in an asymmetric environment. I know well that to achieve it, we are demanding a lot from ourselves internally in the United Nations, for instance, from the Mission support, but also from the Member States paying the bill. I am also well aware that we are fully depending on troop-contributing nations providing the units that can do it. Let me finish by assuring the Council that, under the circumstances, we are doing just OK in a way.”
2015-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7464 (2015) · source
“To conclude, drawing on my personal experience from MINUSMA for a general recommendation, I am not in doubt that in future there will certainly be a continuous need for peacekeeping operations in asymmetric environments. I do not doubt that the United Nations will be called upon to establish those kinds of missions, because who else would? But if we want to be able to do it - and do it effectively - we need to be fully capable of facing that environment in all aspects. That means having the capability to face hostile armed groups hiding among the population and to face challenging climates, geography and infrastructure. To do that, we need to be properly trained.”
2015-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7464 (2015) · source
“I am sorry to say that I believe that we have suffered losses, because of insufficient predeployment training, that could have been avoided. The most important skill of all those mentioned is counter-IED training. Every single soldier needs to be able to search, detect and avoid IEDs and mines at a basic level. That training is quite simple to obtain. It does not require a very demanding training programme, and it will save lives. If we can manage to improve the predeployment training level, therefore, I will promise to maintain the skills of the troops once they have arrived in the Mission. IfI did possess the envisaged mentor teams, the overall effectiveness of the Force would be enhanced.”
2015-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7464 (2015) · source
“We also need the requisite aviation assets to help manage the burden of supplying distant bases, and we need contractors with the right equipment to be able to transport effectively along difficult supply routes, even in areas that are not highly contested. Let me say a few words on training. It is ofthe utmost importance that United Nations forces be properly trained before deployment. Among the most important issues are patrolling, procedures and techniques, basic counter-IED capability, how to call for helicopters to evacuate casualties, the code of conduct and weapons training. There are other important skills as well, for instance, how to conduct crowd control. I say that because I have experienced that many of my troops are not good enough at those basic skills.”
2015-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7464 (2015) · source
“To be very specific, north of the Niger River, the hostilities are so imminent and the road conditions are so poor that it is irresponsible to keep going there with old, fragile civilian trucks that are unprotected and driven by people who are not soldiers. That is one of the main reasons that we cannot sufficiently support our troops and our camps in the north. Therefore, we strongly need a military logistics unit to work in the most hostile parts of the country. It is not so important who commands the Mission support - whether it be the Force Commander - but the capacity is important.”
2015-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7464 (2015) · source
“I am aware that much of that is basically the responsibility of troop-contributing nations, one that I believe should be assessed and certified before the contingent is allowed to deploy. But to the extent that a unit does not bring those capacities into the Mission, I suppose it is only the United Nations that can help them. Finally, I should mention that we need robust logistics. What do I mean by that? The proven United Nations system, whereby mission support delivers supplies using civilian contractors throughout the mission area, may work in certain well-established, low-threat missions. But it does not work in a hostile environment like that in Mali.”
2015-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7464 (2015) · source
“We should also provide well-protected camps with good living conditions, particularly when we set up camps in contested areas where troops conduct risky operations out of their camps on a daily basis. They need a safe haven to come home to. We can never achieve full protection against everything, but our troops deserve to be well protected in their camps against shelling or suicide-vehicle IEDs, which in Mali is unfortunately not always the case. However, I should add that we are working on improving that by, among other things, implementing new technology, an example of which is the indirect fire warning device. Soldiers also need access to proper accommodation, water, power sources and a basic level of welfare.”
2015-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7464 (2015) · source
“While working on understanding the environment, preventing attacks and convincing and reassuring the population - in a word, stabilizing the situation - we have to protect ourselves. Anything that moves by road in an environment as hostile as that in northern Mali has to be protected. That means protected against mines, and all units should be able to search for, detect and avoid mines and IEDs. It goes without saying that eight United Nations soldiers sitting in the open air on top of a soft Landcruiser pickup do not stand much of a chance if the vehicle is hit by a mine or IED. The same goes for unprotected civilian supply trucks. In short, we must make sure that any contingent operating in a hostile environment is well equipped with protected vehicles for troops operating outside the camps.”
2015-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7464 (2015) · source
“Commanders and soldiers on the ground should talk and interact more closely with the population, talking about what we are doing, why we are there, what is going on and so forth. By combining those messages with quick-impact projects and other outreach activities, we will be able to create a positive perception of the force, and of what is an alternative to war, in a coordinated way. I am therefore happy to see that the first draft of MINUSMA's new mission concept actually mentions information operations. That is also why I have now established a small information operations cell in my planning section at force headquarters. We should exploit that concept further.”
2015-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7464 (2015) · source
“Intelligence is a priority. The next function is reassuring and convincing the population. The best way to counter an asymmetric threat, of course, is to get the people's support. If the population believes in the alternative - in the peacekeeping force - they will be reluctant to support terrorists or other armed groups, including bandits, and eventually such groups could lose their hiding places. The Mission has a strong public information section that works effectively with the media, issuing communiques, making radio news and so forth. But we need what I would call an information operation concept that combines all our messaging activities in a coordinated manner.”
2015-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7464 (2015) · source
“Accepting intelligence-gathering as an integrated function of our operations is a huge step forward in the United Nations modus operandi. I now have a number of sophisticated assets, including unmanned aerial vehicles, and a strong, centrally placed intelligence staff capable of doing the assessments. We have come a long way, and I am now definitely being provided with good, solid intelligence that helps me understand the environment. However, if we - the United Nations - continue to operate in such environments, we have to exploit that concept further. We need more intelligence-gathering assets at the lower levels and, most important, we need the staffing capacity to make better use of the intelligence. I am making a strong push for the full manning of all my headquarters with, importantly, the proper skills set.”
2015-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7464 (2015) · source
“The first of those is understanding the environment - who, when, where, how and so on. Only through that understanding can we prevent attacks, either by influencing the leadership or deterring groups by being in the right spot. We also need strong situational awareness in order to monitor a ceasefire in such a vast country. Secondly, we have to reassure the population and convince them to believe in the possibility of a future without the armed groups. And while doing that, we must be able to protect ourselves. It is with the first function, that of understanding, that we have the good news. In MINUSMA we have implemented a new intelligence concept - the All Sources Information Fusion Unit. In support of that I also have at my disposal special operations forces and helicopters.”
2015-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7464 (2015) · source
“Their preferred methods are improvised explosive devices (IEDs), suicide attacks, laying mines along our routes, ambushes and shelling our camps with rockets and mortars. The consequence is that MINUSMA has by far the most fatalities among United Nations mission troops, with 36 soldiers killed and more than 200 wounded since 2013, something that deeply concerns and upsets me. We have a robust self-defence mandate for conducting peacekeeping in such an environment. However, we cannot, and should not, be mandated to conduct offensive operations against the threats we face. We are therefore limited to trying, mainly defensively, to protect the population and ourselves as well as we possibly can. In my opinion, that requires the ability to master three main functions.”
2015-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7464 (2015) · source
“Major General Lollesgaard: It is a great honour to speak in this forum on the subject of operating in an asymmetric environment. As the Council is aware, I command the force of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), and in answer to the question underlying the topic - whether or not MINUSMA is geared to operate in an asymmetric environment - I would say no, not really. I have some good assets, but overall there are some major shortfalls that make us extremely vulnerable. Since Mali is often on the Council's agenda, I will not explain the threats and challenges in the country in detail. While we consider the Platform and the Coordination coalitions to consist of so-called compliant armed groups, it is primarily, but not only, thejihadist groups that are hostile to MINUSMA.”
2015-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7464 (2015) · source