YouSaid · the spoken record

Major-General Obi

lines on the record: 31
first: 2010-08-06
most recent: 2012-06-20
sittings or episodes: 3
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“As to robustness, I think that we demonstrated in Jonglei that even when we were not fully staffed we held out, and our troops had very clear instructions to protect. That is exactly what we did in the case of Jonglei. I therefore wish to say that we are committed to being robust and, of course, we appreciate all the support we have been getting. We hope that our demands will receive the support that we are asking for in terms of helicopters and riverine capability. Of course, manpower is always limited and the area of coverage is very wide.”
2012-06-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6789 (2012) · source
“Those also have to do with monitoring instruments not being available. In that regard, therefore, we think that the use of technology will assist us in identifying the movement of persons who may want to attack others, cattle rustlers and the rest of them. In that regard, I also want to say, as I have long said, that in order to effectively monitor the border between the Sudan and South Sudan with a mission that does not have much manpower and a limited range of helicopter movement, the mission will need everything it can get in terms of technology to be able to support its ability to monitor cross-border movements between the two countries. I think that will be very important.”
2012-06-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6789 (2012) · source
“Together with the LRA-affected countries, the Uganda People's Defence Force and other stakeholders, we are sharing information and are able to focus on the issue of the LRA as it affects civilian protection in South Sudan. That has been helpful to us in UNMISS. With regard to the issue of technology, I also want to say I think that would have been very useful to us in Jonglei, which is a large expanse of land without access. It is waterlogged and people moving on foot to attack other communities can hide under shrubs and so on. The helicopters available to us, especially the civilian helicopters, are cumbersome for one to observe through the windows to be able to locate people. They are limited in range, visibility and the ability to carry out operations at night and in different types of weather. Therefore, there are a lot of challenges.”
2012-06-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6789 (2012) · source
“All of that has been possible through the system of the global field support strategy, which allows support elements to move across missions. We also have the issue of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), where we are mandated to protect civilians as it relates to the LRA. UNMISS works very closely with the missions - UNAMID and MONUSCO - we also share information with the United Nations mission in Khartoum and recently we have had to have meetings together. We have had conferences, including in Entebbe, and we are engaging right now. I have been to the African Union Regional Task Force, with which we have established a liaison.”
2012-06-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6789 (2012) · source
“We also went as far as to the disputed areas to verify incidents of bombings, and we were able to report effectively to DPKO and, subsequently, to the Council. I also want to say that there will be a lot of need for cooperation between the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and UNAMID in the area of border monitoring. The Sudan and South Sudan share a border that is very extensive - about 2,200 kilometres - and we also know that we must share access with UNAMID, which we have been doing in terms of logistics. As UNAMID deploys, UNMISS is already cooperating and stands by to cooperate even more in the areas of logistic support and information-sharing. We have also benefitted from Mi-26 helicopters deployed on 6 June from UNAMID for our deployment in South Sudan. We think that has been very helpful.”
2012-06-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6789 (2012) · source
“In that regard, I also want to say that the Special Representative of the Secretary-General was very involved in her communication with Khartoum to see how we could move in to facilitate that process. But I also want to say that there was a challenge of access to helicopters from the south. That is where I think the Council would be very helpful to us. When lives are involved, I think it is important that helicopters move in from whichever direction possible to save lives. With regard to the issue of border verification, let me give an instance where we had to cooperate with the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) to cover the area bordering South Darfur and Northern Bahr Al-Ghazal. There we were able to work together on verifying bombings and, at times, on troop cooperation.”
2012-06-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6789 (2012) · source
“Those helicopters were available and we used them for the movement of dangerous cargo. That was a very clear example of inter-mission cooperation. I also want to say, with regard to the other areas in which we cooperated, that we wished we could have done even more. In that regard, let me cite an unfortunate incident involving the troops of United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei who went into a mine and lost persons. That was a very clear-cut case where helicopters from the south were placed on standby to move in to transport out the casualties. Of course, we were in communication to share information. There was also the possibility of helicopters coming from the north to also move the casualties.”
2012-06-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6789 (2012) · source
“Major General Obi: I will first attempt to address the issue of inter-mission cooperation. I will also touch on the issue of the use of technology in early-warning situations and perhaps also comment on robustness. With regard to the issue of inter-mission cooperation, I would like to give examples of how we are going about it and also highlight some problems that I have been asked to cover. Withregardto theissue of inter-mission cooperation, I want to start with the Jonglei crisis. In that regard, I must thank the Under-Secretary-General and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic ofthe Congo (MONUSCO), which came to our rescue through their support with military helicopters, which we did not have.”
2012-06-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6789 (2012) · source
“Here, we have been able to incorporate our efforts through training, the development of concepts, the sharing of information, and the creation of joint operations centres and joint movement centres. These are all developments that have been found to be very useful in the field and have greatly assisted us. During the recent crises in Kordofan and Abyei, we put them widely into practice. All pillars shared information, met very actively in crisis management teams, and were largely able, collectively, to address the challenges that faced us. These reforms have been useful to us in the field, in addition to getting us together in meetings of force commanders - as in the case of the Entebbe meeting, which was referred to earlier - to exchange information. That is also a new development that we have found to be very useful.”
2011-07-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6592 (2011) · source
“In terms of the quality of troops, I also want to say that the introduction of pre-deployment training and pre-induction inspections of equipment has helped in ensuring that we have a higher quality of troops, which has also helped in our mandate implementation. The aspect of integration is one of those areas that have been well emphasized in recent reforms. My Mission, the United Nations Mission in the Sudan, has been integrated, and to that extent we have been enabled to work jointly with the civilian, military and police pillars and the United Nations country team. A case in point is the protection of civilians strategy, which takes into account the fact that the protection of civilians is not just a military responsibility, but involves all.”
2011-07-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6592 (2011) · source
“Major General Obi: I am the Force Commander of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan. I would like to say that the reforms introduced so far have had a very positive impact on our operations in the field in a number of ways. I would like to start with the issue of the quality of troops that was raised here today. We need a very high quality of troops in the field to be able to execute our mandate. One of the reforms deals with that subject, and to that effect infantry units are standardized in terms of personnel and equipment. That has made it easier for a force commander to appreciate what is available to him. He is able to assess what personnel are available to him and to task them appropriately.”
2011-07-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6592 (2011) · source
“But now we are dealing with 79 counties, so preparation for the referendums requires reconnaissance missions and the setting up of infrastructure; after which the Force must be prepared to extend into these areas to provide the security that is required of us, since we must provide security to the United Nations observers and protect civilians. Now, with a limited force in a large area, and with more counties to cover and more team sites that we must address, we must do more frequent patrolling; we must be in the air most of the time; we must operate with mobile reserves that can react quickly and be delivered where they are needed in the shortest possible time. So our operations will be heavily dependent on mobility, and that generally has to be air mobility because of the terrain and the absence of infrastructure.”
2010-08-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6370 (2010) · source
“I should also add here that Southern Sudan presents the very big challenge of a lack of infrastructure capacity. There is an absolute lack of roads. In the rainy season, the place is muddy. Even on foot one can hardly move. One needs special tires to drive in Southern Sudan. Thus, to move in Southern Sudan one needs mostly air mobility. Water transportation is limited to the Nile, and so will not provide enough coverage. Here I would like to add that UNMIS has been asked by the parties to play a bigger role in supporting the referendums. For this, UNMIS will now be required to give support down to the county level. During the last elections, our support was up to the state level in the state capitals, of which there are 10.”
2010-08-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6370 (2010) · source
“The UNMIS military force is 10,000 strong. I believe that is related to its mandate, which is mostly about monitoring and giving support to the host nation. Sixty per cent of the force is made up of enablers, while the other 40 per cent includes such components as infantry - the forces you really need for physical operations, patrolling and the like. Its deployment is over a very wide area. I can give an example of one of my battalions in Juba, which is one of my sectors. The battalion covers an area larger than its own home nation. This means that its team sites are located far apart, perhaps 70 kilometres from each other. One finds oneself travelling long distances by helicopter to go to one team site. Support for this force obviously requires mobility.”
2010-08-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6370 (2010) · source
“It was also generally felt that the permanent responsibility for addressing the issue of the LRA is that of the host nations around the region, and that they should coordinate their efforts. For our part, we share information and generally address the issue as it relates to civilian protection, because the LRA's activities also affect the protection of civilians. In my own Mission, our planning takes due consideration of activities around the coastal border. We also encourage the Sudan People's Liberation Army, which has permanent responsibility for addressing the issue, while we address the challenges as they relate to civilian protection. On the issue of helicopters, I would like to say here that the Sudan as a whole is the largest nation in Africa in terms of land mass, and that Southern Sudan is bigger than most African countries.”
2010-08-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6370 (2010) · source
“I would also like to say that the various missions have what we call the Force Commanders conference, which is held periodically. During these conferences, issues such as the LRA are also addressed. I would also like to say here that the issue of the LRA was discussed at the meeting held in June in Entebbe, which took place days after I assumed command. At that meeting, it was generally agreed that right now the LRA operates in small numbers, that it moves across borders, and that it revolves around the leadership and most of the time is surviving by instinct. It also undertakes missions to recharge its ranks by taking on new captives to increase its numbers.”
2010-08-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6370 (2010) · source
“Major-General Obi: I will touch briefly on the issue of cooperation as it relates to the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), and also on the requirement for helicopters. As far as the LRA is concerned, it is useful to clarify that cooperation exists between the missions. Here, I would like to say that the missions - the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS), the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad - jointly exchange intelligence and have recently designated desk officers for this purpose. We share intelligence on the activities of the LRA.”
2010-08-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6370 (2010) · source
“All pillars of UNMIS and the United Nations country team are working together in this regard. In addition to the physical protecting of civilians, mitigation and deterrent troop patrolling are also being employed to discourage violence against civilians. Finally, I would like to state that the referendums to be organized in Southern Sudan in January 2011 are of historic significance. The outcome could have vast consequences, not only for the Sudan but for the region and for Africa as a whole. The experience of the last elections revealed challenges related to the lack of capacity of local institutions. The challenge for UNMIS and the international community to ensure credible referendums is huge. UNMIS is conscious of this responsibility and all hands are on deck to ensure successful mandate implementation.”
2010-08-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6370 (2010) · source
“The plan has five strategic objectives, which include the holding of credible referendums in Southern Sudan and Abyei; fruitful consultations in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states; the successful negotiation of post-referendum engagement arrangements; overall Mission area stability and protection of civilians; and finally, improved governance capacity and rule of law in Southern Sudan. The military will lead in Mission area stability and protection of civilians. My plan is to deliver a more agile and mobile force to achieve Mission area stability. To this end, emphasis is being placed on patrolling and use of mobile reserves. In view of the extensive area of responsibility and the absence of roads, the demand for air assets is huge. We have also identified one sanctuary per team site for the protection of civilians.”
2010-08-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6370 (2010) · source
“We are constrained by inadequate assets available to the force to undertake operations. This creates inevitable drag in our planning and tasking flexibility. Resources are limited and, given that across Southern Sudan the rains make movement almost impossible, the only manner of projecting the force is by air. We continue to work with the Mission Support Unit to try to acquire the support necessary for agility and flexibility in our intended manoeuvres and force projection. Looking to the future, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General has developed an UNMIS/United Nations country team integrated action plan for the Sudan.”
2010-08-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6370 (2010) · source
“Freedom of movement is a constant challenge to the force and all elements of the Mission; incidents range from the deliberate obstruction of logistical convoys to the feeding of false information on current situations in the area. Forceful abuses have happened as well. Two recent examples are the hijacking of an UNMIS helicopter and the manhandling of an UNMIS patrol, including a helicopter crew, in Kodok, Southern Sudan, in July. This latter case has triggered high-level political demarches and engagements with the Government of Southern Sudan, and mechanisms to prevent such future abuses have been agreed upon. The issue of freedom of movement and harassment of United Nations personnel is thus being treated very seriously, as it could impact on UNMIS mandate implementation and the credibility of the referendum.”
2010-08-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6370 (2010) · source
“Operation Safe Refuge is one such operation, and requires that every team site to pre- select and plan a refuge for internally displaced persons (IDPs). The challenge is significant as it involves coordinating not only military, but also civilian pillars, and encouraging United Nations country teams to come on board to provide through non-governmental organizations the key requirements of water, shelter and sanitation for a predetermined number of IDPs. Permit me to now discuss the key challenges we face in UNMIS, in addition to the referendums I have already touched on. Throughout most of this year, we have seen our ability to operate both North and South of the 1-1-5-6 line deteriorate because of the belligerence of both parties.”
2010-08-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6370 (2010) · source
“Our primary focus is the protection of civilians, and we do this in partnership with our civilian pillars, as well as with the host nation. The provision of safe and secure areas around the team sites has already been planned. Currently, the situation across the Sudan, with the exception of Darfur, has improved on the whole. However, in particular areas in the South - specifically Jonglei and Upper Nile states, some areas along the North-South border and specific districts along the border between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Sudan - cases of intimidation and violence towards civilians continue. We cannot be complacent and are in the process of planning operations specifically designed to combat the targeting of civilians.”
2010-08-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6370 (2010) · source
“All the violence in the UNMIS area of responsibility is triggered at lower levels, either over resources or because of local political and tribal grievances. The Sudanese elections took place between 11 and 15 April without major security-related incidents. The canvassing and polling periods were characterized by noticeable restraint in the incidence of violence across the country, although independent SPLM. candidates were openly intimidated. Northern Sudan is outside of our area of responsibility, and we cannot say what may have happened there. The post- elections period was tense and not helped by the delayed announcement of results at the end of April. Posturing by losing candidates demanding political accommodation and a significant increase in SPLA obstruction of UNMIS operations were noticed.”
2010-08-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6370 (2010) · source
“However, to date, we have a verified figure of 34.85 per cent of the stated strength of SPLA that has redeployed south of the current boundary line, as opposed to 100 per cent of the SAF. It is, however, possible that the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) may have overstated the numbers of its actual armed forces to begin with, and thus the percentage of redeployment may be much higher, as not much SPLA presence or activity has been visible within the current boundary line. I would like to focus now on the achievements of UNMIS and in particular the UNMIS military force. Despite the wide gap between the political stance of both parties, the ceasefire has continued to hold to a great extent.”
2010-08-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6370 (2010) · source
“Regarding the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), we receive unconfirmed reports of violent crimes in the border areas between Western Equatoria and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Our concern is that the LRA activities have an impact on the security of the population. We are therefore taking this threat very seriously. One of the key CPA milestones is the redeployment of forces across the border line between the North and the South. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) have redeployed north of the current boundary line, which is known colloquially as the 1-1-5-6 line, as mandated by the CPA, and this has been verified. Generally speaking, the SAF is compliant with the terms of the CPA.”
2010-08-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6370 (2010) · source
“This has manifested itself in clashes with the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) in three areas of our sector 3, resulting in the displacement of the civilian population and human rights abuses by SPLA elements. On our flanks, we watch the events in Darfur unfold and keep a close eye on the analysis that is available. Of specific interest is where the southern border of Darfur meets with western Bahr el Ghazal in Southern Sudan. This is a large expanse of ground that is not easily covered by UNMIS patrols. We are thus largely unsighted on activities in this area, and we have evolved plans to deliberately insert long-range patrols into this area in order to enhance information- gathering. This effort has, however, often faced obstructions from the SPLA.”
2010-08-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6370 (2010) · source
“In terms of the current situation, most of the day- to-day violence in the Mission area is primarily in Southern Sudan and is tribal in nature. Cattle rustling and abductions are routinely taking place in many parts of Southern Sudan. Although these are practices that have gone on for generations among and, at times, within tribes and in a wider area than Southern Sudan alone, currently they are often inextricably linked to minor political players and local renegade actors posturing for their own benefit. The emergence of rebel groups in a number of areas, linked very closely to tribal affiliations and dissatisfied losers of the last elections, has been the trend recently.”
2010-08-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6370 (2010) · source
“While the Southern Sudan Referendum Commission has been established, it has yet to become fully operational and only has until September to supervise the registration of voters. Worryingly, the Abyei referendum commission has yet to be formed. UNMIS planning and preparation are in full flow to provide support to the referendums. Technical reconnaissance of the 79 country referendum bases is complete, and logistical and engineering planning is at full tilt in an effort to set up the bases ready for occupation. It is from these bases that United Nations election teams will operate to support the referendums. Lessons learned from elections earlier this year are being applied, but the task is complex because of the increase of the number of polling sites at the county level, as opposed to the state level in the previous election.”
2010-08-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6370 (2010) · source
“The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) requires that two referendums be held by 9 January 2011 - one in which the people of Southern Sudan will vote for unity or secession, and the other through which the people or the region of Abyei will remain in Northern Sudan or become part of Southern Sudan. Although the referendums are to be a nationally managed process, both parties have called on UNMIS to play a strong role in support of the referendums. The referendums are arguably the most momentous events to happen in the country since its independence and, with five months to go until 9 January, time is swiftly running out for the parties to come to political agreement on a number of issues.”
2010-08-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6370 (2010) · source
“Major General Obi: I thank you, Mr. President, for this opportunity. I bring you warm greetings from my Special Representative of the Secretary-General. In my briefing this morning, I will attempt to acquaint the Security Council with an overview of the military activities of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS). I am the Force Commander of UNMIS. I will briefly discuss the current situation, our achievements, the challenges facing us and the outlook for the future. UNMIS is in a critical period of its mandate implementation in the Sudan as the country approaches the 9 January referendum.”
2010-08-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6370 (2010) · source