YouSaid · the spoken record

Major General Uba

lines on the record
25
first
2017-05-23
most recent
2017-05-23
sittings or episodes
1
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un-security-council

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  1. “They should all be taken on board in order to ensure that they understand the concept of drawdown, mission closure and departure. The meeting rose at 6.45 p.m.”

    2017-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7947 (2017) · source

  2. “There is therefore a need for early, robust engagement between the mission and the host nation. What this means is simply that, as a mission is deployed, a time line and specific benchmarks should be set so that an exit strategy can be worked out in the meanwhile. We should be able to say that a mission is likely to last two or three years, and within those years we want the mission to achieve a, b and c, and then drawn down and close. Inasmuch as that is not a given, it leaves leeway for a mission to keep gallivanting, neither here nor there, until such time that the Security Council may decide to end it. In a nutshell, a key lesson was that the transition programme should be all-encompassing and involve the host nation, international partners, strategic partners and even the downtrodden people of the host nation.”

    2017-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7947 (2017) · source

  3. “In a nutshell, peacebuilding should begin concurrently with peacekeeping in any mission so that the two can take place together. While we keep the peace, peacebuilding should be ongoing. We hope that Headquarters will have a look at that and adopt a critical approach to it so that there is no demarcating line where we say "Now we have finished peacekeeping we can roll back to peacebuilding", and so on. Development and peacebuilding should go hand in hand withpeacekeeping. At the same time, we have observed a trend whereby, when it comes to drawdown, there is a need for robust engagement. Naturally, a dependency syndrome will emerge when a nation that has been given everything suddenly sees its United Nations mission close. There is a fear and apprehension that the nation may revert to where it was at the start.”

    2017-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7947 (2017) · source

  4. “Another aspect was elections-related assistance, which was mainly centred on logistics that suffered from critical gaps. UNMIL was mandated to assist where we observed critical gaps in logistics related to elections. At the same time, when it came to security, we were expected to interfere only when the situation threatened a strategic reversal that was not palatable to anybody. With respect to lessons learned associated with drawdown, a lot has been learned through UNMIL. UNMIL has been a very important force, with all the paraphernalia of a multidimensional and integrated force. It interfaced with all facets of Liberian life. Now we have drawn down, we are left only with a residual force. The first aspect that we saw to be lacking was early preparation for peacebuilding. Peacebuilding in Liberia could have taken place much earlier.”

    2017-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7947 (2017) · source

  5. “The next point is on security in Liberia ahead ofthe upcoming October elections. According to resolution 2333 (2016), the Government of Liberia is responsible for ensuring security, as a result of the handing-over of security responsibility to the Government. That underscored the need for the final drawdown, which kept only a residual force in Liberia. It is also wise to mention that we have a force that is capable of only just maintaining the security of the United Nations and its assets. The military has a force of only 230 troops and the police force has just 260 officers. Those are the combined forces that keep the United Nations entities and equipment safe and provide a platform when an eventual force is required to assist the mission. In a nutshell, we have just what is required for basic self- sustenance in the Mission.”

    2017-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7947 (2017) · source

  6. “It must be mobile enough to be able to move when requested and be able to adapt to the terrain in which it is going to operate. When the force was a part of UNOCI, we had the opportunity to exercise with it in April 2015. The force came to Liberia and we had an exercise that went very well. At the same time, we saw the capacity of the force when it offered assistance in the Central African Republic. Now, the force has changed, which is quite normal, and its entire focus will also change. I am aware that the Office of Military Affairs is working on settling the unit requirements and the concept of operations of the force. It is expected that once all of that has been sorted out and the force is deployed in MINUSMA, we shall have the possibility of exercising together to understand each other.”

    2017-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7947 (2017) · source

  7. “Major General Uba: First, I would like to respond to the comments made by the Permanent Representative of Senegal, concerning the quick reaction force. The quick reaction force was established under the United Nations Operation in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI). Now that UNOCI has closed down, the force is being prepared and refitted for deployment to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). We understand the issues and the problems. MINUSMA is a just a short distance from there to Liberia, if the need arises and, at the same time, under inter-mission cooperation we are supposed to have the quick reaction force fulfilling an over- the-horizon mandate in Liberia. That simply means that the force that is being refitted must be flexible enough to provide that over-the-horizon capacity.”

    2017-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7947 (2017) · source

  8. “Missions should undertake early staffing-needs assessment to determine the skills required throughout the liquidation phase. Missions should set processes for the building of national capacities early in the life cycle of a mission. Information and records management should be given priority at the outset of a mission - not only during the liquidation phase. Documentation should include lessons-learned exercises and after-action reviews of transition processes and mandate implementation - and the challenges thereto - undertaken by the outgoing mission and the lead department.”

    2017-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7947 (2017) · source

  9. “The strategic assessment of field missions must take into account the need to balance the security forces required to secure United Nations assets and personnel in the midst of drawdown and closure of missions. I would like to make a few recommendations. Planning considerations addressing the transition phase should be made clear and flexible. The drawdown of missions should be planned using a graduated approach, keeping in mind the need to retain a force of reasonable strength and adequate manpower until a mission is liquidated. Headquarters should adopt strategies that will reduce the negative impact of the drawdown and the withdrawal of mission assets in the field. A mission-liquidation strategy should be carefully planned, communicated and politically supported by both the mission leadership and the host nation.”

    2017-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7947 (2017) · source

  10. “Planning considerations addressing the transition phase must be transparent and flexible and be regularly reviewed and adjusted to ensure their practical relevance. A successful United Nations transition will require broad national buy-in and ownership, strong support of the Security Council, as well as the major donors and regional partners. Planning guidance should therefore involve all relevant partners and engage in high-level consultations at the United Nations Headquarters and in broader consultation with national actors, including key political players, minority group representatives, civil-society groups, women leaders and the media.”

    2017-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7947 (2017) · source

  11. “UNMIL has consistently undertaken a proactive approach to ensure all camps that are closing down comply with environmental sustainability standards. All measures necessary are taken regularly to inform and sensitize Liberians and members of the international community on the transition timelines. Resolution 2333 (2016) is the final resolution on UNMIL, as it sets out a final closure timetable for the Mission. In the broadest sense, a multidimensional mission's transition and drawdown indicate significant changes in its mandated presence in a country. While transition may include start-up, reconfiguration and drawdown or withdrawal of a United Nations mission, the need for early and integrated transition planning needs to be firmly in the minds of the mission leadership.”

    2017-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7947 (2017) · source

  12. “That resolution came up with a mandate that includes the protection of civilians; support for reform of justice and security institutions by assisting the Government of Liberia in developing the leadership, internal management, professionalization and accountability mechanisms of the Liberian National Police, with a particular focus on elections security; the promotion, protection and monitoring of human rights activities in Liberia; the protection of United Nations personnel, installations and equipment and the ensuring of security and freedom of movement of United Nations and associated personnel; and support for the capabilities of the Government of Liberia to meet urgent gaps in the 2017 general elections.”

    2017-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7947 (2017) · source

  13. “The review of the strategic asessment team report and the subsequent release of resolution 2333 (2016) all underscored the retention of UNMIL's residual capacity through Liberia's general elections in 2017.”

    2017-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7947 (2017) · source

  14. “The consequent handover of security responsibilities to the Government of Liberia in June 2016, the establishment of the transition plan and benchmarks and the visit of the Strategic Assessment Team in September 2016 were all part of the drawdown process of UNMIL. The transition leading to liquidation in June 2018 was supported by resolution 2333 (2016) and a budget procedure is ongoing in support of such endeavours. Processes were carefully planned in line with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations/ Department of Field Support Liquidation Manual, aptly communicated to stakeholders and politically supported by the Government of Liberia.”

    2017-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7947 (2017) · source

  15. “UNMIL and other international community members have been doing the best they could to provide mentorship, training and logistics to the security agencies and the Armed Forces of Liberia as the case may be. UNMIL transition leading to phased drawdown of military forces started early following the first successful post-conflict elections in Liberia. Thereafter, UNMIL continued to right-size its personnel, coordinate its activities and collaborate with other international partners for coherence between peacekeeping, peacebuilding and development necessary for post- conflict peace and stability. The Mission drew up a drawdown plan and continued to implement the plan by closing its field offices systematically and reducing its footprints in several endeavours.”

    2017-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7947 (2017) · source

  16. “UNMIL continued to undertake staffing needs assessments to determine the skills required throughout the drawdown to liquidation phase with a view to meeting up critical staffing gaps. Capacity-building and the capability of the Liberian National Police and the Armed Forces of Liberia, including other security apparatuses, have been mixed. There are about 2,000 trained Armed Forces of Liberia members, including engineering, band and military police platoons respectively, while the Liberian National Police is about 5,000 in strength and mainly domiciled in Monrovia. Equipment and logistical sustenance have been daunting for the security services, particularly when deployed outside Monrovia.”

    2017-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7947 (2017) · source

  17. “Patrols for early-warning and mapping exercises to assess and report the situation as it truly was, particularly in the hinterland, became conditional on friendly weather in the areas. Expired ammunition certification and disposal and camp maintenance became an issue owing to a lack of qualified workforce. UNMIL had to resort to borrowing experienced ammunition technical officers from sister missions for the certification of ammunition before troops' rotations. Consistent with drawdown requirements, UNMIL engaged national staff capacity to function in some critically vacated areas, while the need to keep qualified international staff in support of the Mission to the end was similarly appraised and balanced.”

    2017-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7947 (2017) · source

  18. “While UNMIL was interested in keeping the transition on track to achieve its objective timelines, the Government of Liberia was similarly made to see the transition as its own product in which failure could have a serious backlash on the Government and the people of Liberia. Managing the logistics support in the transition was Herculean to UNMIL, as Pakistani, Bangladeshi and Chinese engineers were earmarked for repatriation in the process of the drawdown. Engineering support for the maintenance of UNMIL main supply routes became unfeasible due to heavy rain and poor road conditions in Liberia. UNMIL resorted to the planned use of air to replenish most critical supplies in some key locations in the field.”

    2017-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7947 (2017) · source

  19. “During the transition phases, UNMIL inculcated and engaged the views of the Government of Liberia, the Economic Community of West African States, the African Union and other international partners in the entire process of the drawdown. The UNMIL good offices interfaced and informed on the timing, scope and expected benchmarks of the transition. The iniative of UNMIL to engage in regular dialogues and series of engagements with all stakeholders assisted the Government of Liberia in buying into the transition agenda seamlessly. Consultations continued with all, including civil society groups, opposition parties, women and minority representatives in Liberia.”

    2017-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7947 (2017) · source

  20. “These included early and integrated transition planning, which was firmly rooted in the minds of the leadership, other staff members and the host nation. The planning guidance mapped clear objectives of the drawdown and indicated some benchmarks and timelines just as the Mission integrated transition issues into an all-encompassing planning tool. A planning officer was appointed and dedicated for such tasks while intermission cooperation with the United Nations Operation in Cote d'Ivoire was intensified to cover gaps in the transition planning process and to assist in a potential security setback in Liberia by using the quick reaction force where possible.”

    2017-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7947 (2017) · source

  21. “The UNMIL transition was planned to ensure continuity in the development and security agendas of Liberia with the goal of consolidating a peace dividend and ensuring the nation focuses more on building a holistic security system for the society. My briefing will focus on drawdown considerations and associated issues, the current UNMIL configuration and mandate and proffer some recommendations in considering the drawdown and related issues. Guidance for considerations when planning and managing the transition of United Nations missions scheduled for a significant drawdown, withdrawal or closure are many and varied. The drawdown of UNMIL considered several planning preparations and guidance from United Nations Headquarters and the Mission.”

    2017-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7947 (2017) · source

  22. “The Government of Liberia has fully taken over all security responsibilities and has developed a concrete plan and timelines for the third post-conflict general election, scheduled for 10 October. It is a well-known fact that, as countries emerge from conflict, they undergo critical socioeconomic, development and political changes in which United Nations missions are expected to adapt to encourage depth of reconciliation and peace consolidation within the national polity. While United Nations transitions can be as diverse as the contexts in which they take place and are heavily influenced by decisions made by host Governments, transitions must be a response to significant changes in a country's political, security and socioeconomic development.”

    2017-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7947 (2017) · source

  23. “As a mission in transition, the Mission handed over all security responsibilities to the Government of Liberia in June 2016 and completed its drawdown in February of this year, leaving only a residual force capacity of 434 made up ofa Nigerian company of 230 troops and a Ukrainian aviation unit and a Pakistani Level II hospital manned by 105 and 69 troops, respectively. The force headquarters is compact, consisting of 15 staff officers and 15 military observers, who are double-hatted and generally carry out several headquarters functions. The residual UNPOL contingent is made up of two formed police units at an authorized strength of 260, and 50 individual police officers, for a total of 310, while the civilian component consists of 783 international, national and United Nations volunteer staff.”

    2017-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7947 (2017) · source

  24. “UNMIL has worked assiduously ever since in accordance with the various relevant Security Council resolutions as they were adopted. The first post-conflict democratic elections in Liberia were held in 2005, following the establishment of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and a programme of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. In 2006, in the wake of those successful elections, UNMIL began a phased drawdown of the Mission and by 2010 had adjusted troop strengths down to 7,952, while the police totals, including the formed police units, were reduced to about 1,375.”

    2017-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7947 (2017) · source

  25. “Major General Uba: I am Major General Salihu Zaway Uba, Force Commander of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). It is a privilege for me to address the Security Council and to share some of my thoughts on our experiences and the challenges brought on by UNMIL's drawdown, based on my experience in the United Nations Mission in Liberia, established pursuant to resolution 1509 (2003). After 14 years ofback- to-back civil wars in Liberia, UNMIL was established with a robust force of about 15,250 personnel, including formed police units, United Nations Police (UNPOL) officers and a significant civilian component, whose job, among other things, was to assist with the peace processes and support security-sector reform.”

    2017-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7947 (2017) · source