YouSaid · the spoken record

Mankeur Ndiaye

lines on the record

22

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2021-01-21

most recent

2021-01-21

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1

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un-security-council

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1. “The resilience and enthusiasm shown by the people of the Central African Republic during the 27 December elections encourage the Mission and the entire international community to continue to support them on the path of reconciliation, reconstruction, dialogue and inclusion, as indicated by the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic, whose second anniversary will soon be celebrated. It is certainly a difficult road to travel, but it remains the one and only path towards lasting peace. I therefore call on the Council to consider the most appropriate measures to ensure that MINUSCA adapts to the new situation.”

   2021-01-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/76 (2021) · source

2. “The Central African Republic is at serious risk of a setback in terms of security and peacebuilding, which could undermine all that the Council and the Central African Republic’s partners have helped to build. Nevertheless, the courage shown by the men and women of the Central African Republic during the crisis demonstrates that they are no longer willing to tolerate the use of violence to deprive them of a fundamental right, such as the right to vote. In large numbers, citizens have braved the threat of arms and have gone out to vote at the risk of their own physical safety, overcoming the old identity conflicts that the same armed groups — now trying to subvert the constitutional order — have too often manipulated to justify their existence.”

   2021-01-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/76 (2021) · source

3. “As armed groups continue to exploit mining resources in order to strengthen their own capacities, it is essential to highlight and support the restoration of State authority over that activity in order to reduce the threat from armed groups and to allow the State to reappropriate resources, which would ultimately lead to a better redistribution of wealth and, in turn, reduce poverty. We therefore advocate for a mandate that authorizes more resources to support the national security and defence forces to that end. Specifically, we need to consider how the international community — the United Nations, bilateral partners and regional actors — could best collectively support the strengthening of governance and the assiduous building of the country’s institutions.”

   2021-01-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/76 (2021) · source

4. “Internally, increased technical support to the National Commission for the Fight against the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons for the implementation of its national action plan of July 2019 could help to ensure responsible management of Government arms and ammunition and to control the flow of weapons in the country. In view of the country’s fiscal austerity, support for the restoration of State authority in the mining sector, through the revival of the institutional and legal framework for mining security in relation to the Kimberley Process, would be an excellent tool for economic recovery.”

   2021-01-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/76 (2021) · source

5. “I therefore propose that, in order to combat cross-border criminal networks and armed militias involved in arms trafficking, aggressive transhumance and the illicit exploitation of natural resources, the bilateral commissions should be reactivated, in line with paragraph 6 of resolution 2552 (2020), including by adopting innovative cross-border security cooperation mechanisms, such as the establishment of Joint Intelligence Fusion Centre in Goma by the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region in November 2011, as well as to urge the Government to re-establish joint border security, surveillance and management mechanisms, which MINUSCA can support. These factors are all the more important, as neighbouring countries are also facilitators of the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic.”

   2021-01-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/76 (2021) · source

6. “We request the Council’s authority, as agreed in the mandate of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, to provide adequate logistical support to the Central African security forces, namely, for the protection of civilians, the restoration and maintenance of public safety and the rule of law, as well as to establish sustainable governance and command-and-control mechanisms and to secure the country’s borders. This is the time and place to recall the subregional context, characterized by the multiplication and sophistication of cross-border organized crime networks.”

   2021-01-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/76 (2021) · source

7. “At present, we can provide only limited logistical support for the progressive redeployment of a limited number of Central African Armed Forces units trained or certified by the European Union Military Training Mission in the Central African Republic, as well as a limited number of vetted or trained internal security forces, engaged in joint operations with MINUSCA, including joint planning and tactical cooperation, to support the implementation of MINUSCA’s current mandated tasks, including the protection of civilians, and to assist the national authorities in restoring and maintaining security and the rule of law.”

   2021-01-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/76 (2021) · source

8. “As the prison demilitarization strategy is in its early stages, the reinforcement of the prison administration officers is an urgent need, which the Mission will have to help the Central African authorities meet. I take this opportunity to request the lifting of the restrictions on our logistical support to the Central African Armed Forces, as provided for in paragraph 32 (a) (iv) of resolution 2552 (2020) under MINUSCA’s mandate.”

   2021-01-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/76 (2021) · source

9. “Without any prospect of increasing UNPOL’s resources, the only mechanism available is therefore to improve performance, but also to prioritize to the utmost. The UNPOL component continues to work with Headquarters for the provision of task-specific personnel, but we will require an increase in the number of individual police officers and formed police units to be able to perform all tasks in all field offices. With the changing situation and the detention of alleged combatants, the judicial process is under severe pressure. While it is hoped that proceedings against detainees will be expedited, a solution will have to be found to the overcrowding in prisons, which is exacerbated by prolonged police custody and pre-trial detention.”

   2021-01-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/76 (2021) · source

10. “During the attacks on the outskirts of Bangui on 13 January, as in other recent operations, the MINUSCA police component mobilized its full potential to support the military operations and civilian responses. The United Nations police (UNPOL) component, in particular its special units, the formed police units, is carrying out robust actions similar to military operating procedures for the protection of civilians, but also provides the judicial and police components. UNPOL provides support to the International Criminal Court, the Special Criminal Court and other jurisdictions in order to bring the alleged perpetrators of major crimes to justice. The demands of the Heads of Office and many MINUSCA entities often exceed UNPOL’s capacity.”

    2021-01-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/76 (2021) · source

11. “In parallel with the combat actions under way, the force has conducted a review of its capabilities to enable it to respond in the long term to the new threat that is further destabilizing the country. The force generation proposal has been developed, substantiated and assessed to ensure a lasting resolution of the conflict. While the force may look substantial, with 3,000 peacekeepers requested, those additional troops will provide the Mission with a robust tool adapted to the threat. It is therefore proposed to raise the ceiling of authorized peacekeepers to 14,650 troops. There are further details in the annexed document entitled “Force surge”.”

    2021-01-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/76 (2021) · source

12. “In order to address that new threat, which could take root on Central African territory if our request is not heeded, the Mission response, particularly that of the force, must be bold, clear and robust. The troops currently deployed are operating over an extremely large territory with few communication channels. Furthermore, the force has only a limited reaction capability in terms of personnel strength, which cannot operate over the entire territory due to the size of the country. Finally, there is a lack of critical capabilities in the theatre of operations, such as unmanned aerial vehicles, attack helicopters, clearance capabilities and special forces, further impeding our capacity to act and react.”

    2021-01-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/76 (2021) · source

13. “President, for a two-month extension, at least of the inter-mission cooperation already rapidly established thanks to the Council’s strong support through the deployment of troops and helicopters from the United Nations Mission in South Sudan. The force is now facing a paradigm shift. The armed groups belonging to the CPC voluntarily attack any manifestation of the State, whether they be civil servants, such as prefects, or members of the defence and security forces. Moreover, the recent losses among our peacekeepers in both Grimari and Bangassou demonstrate the readiness of those armed groups to now attack the Mission directly. Finally, the difficulties encountered by the defence and security forces for more than a month are significant and leave entire areas without any State presence.”

    2021-01-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/76 (2021) · source

14. “This means that, if the Mission’s current capacities are to be further tested at a time when, more than ever before, it must ensure the protection of civilians and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance, which has been seriously impacted by the latest waves of violence and threats from the CPC, a strategy for adjusting the mandate is needed. To that end, a substantial increase in the strength of the Mission’s uniformed components, namely, the Force, the Police and the Prison Service, should enable it to maintain its robust posture while having greater mobility. In that regard, given the increase in violence and the practice of ambushes as a modus operandi by CPC combatants, to date causing the deaths of more than five peacekeepers, I would also be grateful to you, Mr.”

    2021-01-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/76 (2021) · source

15. “Without those priorities, the State will not be able to fend for itself and the country will find it difficult to get back on its feet. That will continue to cause populations further suffering. An analysis of the Mission’s capacities in the light of the evolving security situation and the reliability of the defence and internal security forces shows that the CPC will continue its violence and attacks wherever it can in order to undermine the stability of Central African institutions and the integrity of the territory.”

    2021-01-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/76 (2021) · source

16. “The situation is exacerbated by a weak chain of command, an absence of penalties due to the lack of functioning internal oversight mechanisms within the defence and security forces, such as the General Inspectorate of the Armed Forces, the military justice system and the military command. Human rights abuses and violations are common. While recognizing the efforts made so far with regard to security sector reform, it is important for the Government to redouble its efforts, with more coordinated and focused support from the international community, in order to build institutions and sustainable governance of the sector security, including regarding weapons management. Serious work on border control must also start.”

    2021-01-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/76 (2021) · source

17. “Allow me to draw the Council’s attention to the current security challenges of the national side that we support. Elements of the defence and security forces, including some 2,600 military personnel, were deployed in July 2020, having received only two months of training, and some 1,000 new gendarmes and police officers have limited tactical capabilities and still seem to have little experience on the ground. Added to that is the lack of logistical and material resources to be able to carry out their missions. The result is the great desertion observed during the first rebel assaults.”

    2021-01-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/76 (2021) · source

18. “In addition, a renewed dialogue with elements of armed groups that have opted to join the CPC, but have not perpetrated serious crimes, will be fundamental in order to embark on a path of reconciliation that can stabilize the country without compromising the pursuit of justice and the fight against impunity — a balance that is truly difficult to achieve, that between justice and peace, which is at the heart of every successful peace process. The second anniversary of the signing of the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation should surely offer a new opportunity to reaffirm the commitment of the signatories to the provisions of the Agreement, as well as to revitalize its implementation mechanisms, which will be fully realized only with the full support of all stakeholders.”

    2021-01-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/76 (2021) · source

19. “That has not only increased the Mission’s capabilities, but also the morale of the personnel working in particularly difficult conditions, especially with the coronavirus disease. I am grateful for that. The only sustainable response to today’s challenges, however, is clearly political. The re-election of President Touadera will benefit the country only if the new Government is able to calm the situation by building bridges with the political actors of the opposition, as well as the social sectors they represent. An even more integrated Government will be necessary, with the most radical elements being replaced by those who are more committed to peace and reconciliation in Central African Republic.”

    2021-01-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/76 (2021) · source

20. “This situation of violence caused in the regions by allied armed groups, such as the Unité pour la paix en Centrafrique, the Retour, réclamation et réhabilitation group, the Mouvement patriotique pour la Centrafrique, some factions of the Front populaire pour la renaissance de la Centrafrique and the anti-Balaka, against the civilian population, public authorities, defence and security forces and MINUSCA, is testing the Mission’s capacity to carry out its key mandate for the protection of civilians in a tense political and electoral context, exacerbated by identity-based divisions. I therefore thank the Council for its support, which has enabled the rapid deployment of troops and helicopters of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan in the context of inter-mission cooperation.”

    2021-01-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/76 (2021) · source

21. “However, since 3 December, when the Constitutional Court validated the final list of candidates and rejected the candidacy of former President Bozizé, the latter has mobilized elements of some of the 14 armed groups, signatories to the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic, that joined together to form the CPC with the stated intention, first, to prevent the holding of elections and, recently, to bring about the fall of President Touadera.”

    2021-01-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/76 (2021) · source

22. “I would like to thank you, Mr. President, for giving me this opportunity to report on the latest major developments in the Central African Republic since the recent release of the final results of the 27 December presidential election by the Constitutional Court on 18 January, which validated the re-election of the incumbent President, Mr. Faustin Archange Touadera. As Council members already know, the situation on the ground remains tense due to the continuing violence since the first round of elections owing to the new Coalition des patriotes pour le changement (CPC), whose collusion with some political figures, notably former President François Bozizé, has now been established.”

    2021-01-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/76 (2021) · source