YouSaid · the spoken record

Markram

lines on the record

26

first

2018-04-04

most recent

2022-05-13

sittings or episodes

4

sources

un-security-council

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1. “As Under-Secretary-General Nakamitsu had mentioned in her previous statements to the Council, the Biological Weapons Convention needs to be operationalized and institutionalized to ensure that it is properly equipped and resourced to face future challenges. The Convention’s upcoming Ninth Review Conference in November and December presents an ideal opportunity for its States parties to strengthen the Convention.”

   2022-05-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9033 (2022) · source

2. “Such consultation and cooperation can take place through appropriate international procedures, including on a bilateral basis between the concerned States parties. One such international procedure that has been elaborated within the framework of the Biological Weapons Convention is the convening of a consultative meeting. Other possibilities for addressing concerns between States parties also exist under article V of the Convention, as well as under article VI. I would therefore encourage any States parties with compliance concerns to use the procedures available under the Convention. The United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs stands ready to support any procedures under the Biological Weapons Convention that States parties may decide to use.”

   2022-05-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9033 (2022) · source

3. “I recall that the relevant instrument of international law is the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, which prohibits the development, production, acquisition, transfer, stockpiling and use of biological and toxin weapons. The Russian Federation, the United States and Ukraine are all States parties to the Biological Weapons Convention. The Biological Weapons Convention does contain several measures to which concerned States parties can have recourse in order to address situations in which they have concerns or suspicions about the activities of their peers. For example, pursuant to article V of the Convention, its States parties undertake to consult one another and to cooperate in solving any problems which may arise in relation to the objective of, or in the application of the provisions of, the Convention.”

   2022-05-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9033 (2022) · source

4. “Mr. Markram: I would like to extend my appreciation to Council members for the opportunity to brief them this morning. I am aware that the Russian Federation has submitted new information regarding allegations of biological weapons programmes in Ukraine. I wish to note that Under-Secretary-General Nakamitsu informed the Council in her respective briefings on 11 and 18 March (see S/PV.8991 and S/PV.8999) that the United Nations was not aware of any biological weapons programmes in Ukraine. That remains the case today. I would like to note that the United Nations currently has neither the mandate nor the technical or operational capacity to investigate that information.”

   2022-05-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9033 (2022) · source

5. “Moreover, as long as the use of chemical weapons continues or the threat of their use remains, we must maintain our focus on preventing those threats. Unity in the Security Council is required to re-establish the norm against chemical weapons. The use of such weapons must always be seen as a clear violation of a deeply held taboo. Accordingly, the identification and accountability of those responsible are imperative.”

   2021-08-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8830 (2021) · source

6. “According to paragraph 8 of that decision, the rights and privileges of the Syrian Arab Republic will be reinstated by the Conference of the States Parties once the OPCW Director-General has reported to the Executive Council that the Syrian Arab Republic has completed all the measures contained in paragraph 5 of Executive Council decision EC-94/Dec.2. I have been advised that the Syrian Arab Republic has yet to complete all of those measures. I therefore reiterate my call to the Syrian Arab Republic to cooperate fully with the OPCW Technical Secretariat in that regard. Although almost eight years have now passed since the adoption of resolution 2118 (2013), there is still work to be done before that resolution can be considered to be fully implemented.”

   2021-08-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8830 (2021) · source

7. “The IIT will issue further reports in due course, subject to the evolution of the COVID-19 pandemic. I take this opportunity to reiterate the Secretary-General’s full support for the integrity, professionalism, impartiality, objectivity and independence of the work of the OPCW. As I informed the Council, on 21 April 2021 the Conference of the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, at its twenty-fifth session, adopted decision C-25/Dec.9, entitled “Addressing the Possession and Use of Chemical Weapons by the Syrian Arab Republic”, suspending the rights and privileges of the Syrian Arab Republic under the Convention.”

   2021-08-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8830 (2021) · source

8. “With regard to the work of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic (FFM), I note that the FFM remains in the process of studying all available information related to allegations of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic. It also continues to engage with the Syrian Government and other States parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention with regard to “a variety of incidents”. As previously reported, further FFM deployments will be subject to the evolution of the COVID-19 pandemic. I understand that, following the issuance of its second report, in April, the Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) continues its investigations into incidents in which the FFM has determined that chemical weapons were used or likely used in the Syrian Arab Republic.”

   2021-08-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8830 (2021) · source

9. “In addition, the Technical Secretariat recalled that it had previously advised the Syrian Arab Republic that it was not to open, move or alter the containers or the contents in any way without seeking the prior written consent of the Technical Secretariat. I understand that the Syrian National Authority did not notify the OPCW Technical Secretariat that the cylinders had been moved to a new location until it reported their destruction. Accordingly, in its note verbale dated 15 July, the OPCW Technical Secretariat requested Syria to provide all relevant information regarding the movement of the two cylinders and any remains of their destruction.”

   2021-08-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8830 (2021) · source

10. “In its note verbale, the Syrian National Authority also reported the destruction of two chlorine cylinders related to the chemical weapons incident that took place in Douma on 7 April 2018. In its reply, the OPCW Technical Secretariat recalled the last inspection of those cylinders in November 2020, for which the inspection team was mandated to transport the cylinders to the OPCW headquarters. During that deployment, the Syrian Arab Republic notified the inspection team that the cylinders could not be shipped outside its territory. The OPCW Technical Secretariat recalled that the cylinders were stored and inspected at another declared site, approximately 60 kilometres from the location at which they had reportedly been destroyed on 8 June.”

    2021-08-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8830 (2021) · source

11. “Mekdad agreed to the OPCW Director-General’s proposal. As noted in the monthly report (S/2021/692, annex), the OPCW Technical Secretariat stands ready to engage for the Syrian Arab Republic to initiate preparations for the meeting and will update the OPCW Executive Council in due course. I have been advised that, on 9 July, the Syrian National Authority sent to the OPCW Technical Secretariat a note verbale reporting an attack that had taken place on 8 June targeting a military facility that housed a declared former chemical weapons production facility. On 15 July, the OPCW Technical Secretariat requested further information regarding the damage caused to the declared site given that it was related to an outstanding issue recently opened by data assessment team.”

    2021-08-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8830 (2021) · source

12. “I have been advised that the OPCW Technical Secretariat still plans to conduct two rounds of inspections of the Barzah and Jamraya facilities of the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC) in 2021. I am also advised that the Syrian Arab Republic has yet to provide sufficient technical information or explanations that would enable the OPCW Technical Secretariat to close the issue related to the detection of a Schedule 2 chemical at the Barzah facility of the SSRC in 2018. I note that the OPCW Director-General sent a letter to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Expatriates of the Syrian Arab Republic, Mr. Fayssal Mekdad, proposing an in-person meeting to discuss relevant developments and the way forward regarding the OPCW Technical Secretariat’s mandated activities in the Syrian Arab Republic. On 7 July, Mr.”

    2021-08-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8830 (2021) · source

13. “As a result of the identified gaps, inconsistencies and discrepancies that remained unresolved, the OPCW Technical Secretariat continues to assess that, at this stage, the declaration submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic cannot be considered accurate and complete in accordance with the Chemical Weapons Convention. I reiterate my call to the Syrian Arab Republic to extend its full cooperation to the OPCW Technical Secretariat to resolve all outstanding issues. As noted on many prior occasions, the confidence of the international community in the complete elimination of Syria’s chemical weapons programme depends on such issues being finalized.”

    2021-08-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8830 (2021) · source

14. “In that context, the OPCW Technical Secretariat remains of the position that the Syrian Arab Republic must declare all chemical warfare agents produced and/or weaponized at the former chemical weapons production facility that was declared by the Syrian Arab Republic as never having been used to produce and/or weaponize chemical weapons. As previously reported, the OPCW Technical Secretariat intended to deploy the Declaration Assessment Team to Damascus in May to conduct the twenty-fifth round of consultations with the Syrian National Authority. However, in the absence of a response from the Syrian Arab Republic, the OPCW Secretariat informed the Syrian Arab Republic that the deployment was postponed until further notice.”

    2021-08-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8830 (2021) · source

15. “Nevertheless, the Secretariat maintains its readiness for deployments, which are being conducted subject to the evolution of the pandemic. Despite the travel restrictions, the Technical Secretariat continues to undertake its mandated activities related to the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme and its engagement with the Syrian Arab Republic in that regard. Efforts by the OPCW Declaration Assessment Team are still ongoing to clarify all outstanding issues regarding the initial declaration of the Syrian Arab Republic to the OPCW.”

    2021-08-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8830 (2021) · source

16. “Mr. Markram: I thank Council members for the opportunity to brief them again on the implementation of resolution 2118 (2013), on the elimination of the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic. I am conducting this briefing on behalf of the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Mrs. Izumi Nakamitsu, who is currently away from the Office. Since the previous Security Council meeting on resolution 2118 (2013), held on 12 July, the Office for Disarmament Affairs has maintained regular contact with its counterparts at the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) on its activities related to this matter. As I have previously informed the Council, the ongoing coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic has affected the OPCW Technical Secretariat’s ability to deploy to the Syrian Arab Republic.”

    2021-08-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8830 (2021) · source

17. “Just over one year ago, in responding to the attack on Khan Shaykhun, the Secretary-General called for those responsible to be held accountable, stating that there can be no impunity for such horrific acts. Just over one week ago, speaking on behalf of the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, I noted that unity in the Security Council on a dedicated mechanism for accountability would provide the best foundation for success in that regard. I reiterate that belief here, as well as the readiness of the Secretary-General and the Office for Disarmament Affairs to assist.”

    2018-04-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8225 (2018) · source

18. “Nor does it lessen the truth behind them, which is that what we are seeing in Syria cannot go unchallenged by anyone who values the decades of effort that have been put in to bring about the disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. As the body charged with the maintenance of international peace and security, the Council must unite in the face of this continuing threat and fulfil its responsibilities. To do otherwise, or simply to do nothing, is to accept, tacitly or otherwise, that such a challenge is insurmountable. The use of chemical weapons cannot become the status quo, nor can we continue to fail the victims of such weapons.”

    2018-04-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8225 (2018) · source

19. “The Office for Disarmament Affairs has been in touch with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) on the matter. The OPCW, which implements the Chemical Weapons Convention, to which Syria is a State party, is gathering information about the incident from all available sources, through its Fact-finding Mission in Syria. After completing its investigation, the Fact-finding Mission will report its findings on the alleged attack to the States parties to the Convention. Sadly, there is little to say today that has not already been said. The use ofchemical weapons is unjustifiable. Those responsible must be held to account. That those views have been stated on many previous occasions does not lessen the seriousness with which the Secretary-General regards such allegations.”

    2018-04-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8225 (2018) · source

20. “Mr. Markram: I thank you for the opportunity to address the Council again today, Mr. President. The High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Mrs. Izumi Nakamitsu, is away on official travel. It has been less than a week since I last briefed the Council (see S/PV.8221) on the issue of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic. In the intervening period, new and deeply disturbing allegations of the use of chemical weapons have come to light. Over the past weekend, there have been reports on the alleged use of chemical weapons in Douma, in the Syrian Arab Republic. According to reports that came in yesterday, it is alleged that at least 49 people were killed and hundreds more injured in a chemical-weapon attack. More than 500 other individual cases reportedly presented with symptoms consistent with such an attack.”

    2018-04-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8225 (2018) · source

21. “The Secretary-General and the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs have repeatedly underlined the need to avoid impunity and to ensure that those responsible for the use of chemical weapons are identified and held responsible. Let me take the Organizationpportunity to reiterate that conviction once again. Unity in the Security Council - unity of the kind that gave rise to resolution 2118 (2013), to the OPCW-United Nations joint mission and to the JIM itself - provides the best foundation for success. The Office for Disarmament Affairs stands ready to assist.”

    2018-04-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8221 (2018) · source

22. “However, and as we are all aware, conclusions of the Fact-finding Mission do not entail attribution of responsibility in those cases where the use of chemical weapons is determined. The OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) was created for that purpose, but regrettably its mandate was not renewed. While allegations of the use of chemical weapons have not stopped, the consideration of a mechanism for accountability has apparently slowed, if not come to a standstill. The persistent allegations of the use of chemical weapons in Syria underscore the need to identify solutions and to reach agreement on an appropriate accountability mechanism.”

    2018-04-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8221 (2018) · source

23. “The Secretary-General has repeatedly urged cooperation by the Government of Syria with the OPCW. Resolving these outstanding issues will permit shared confidence in Syria's declaration within the international community. The OPCW Fact-finding Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic is continuing its work. An Mission team is currently in Damascus, looking into allegations of the use of chemical weapons that were brought to the attention of the Director-General by the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic. I understand that the next report of the Fact-finding Mission will be submitted when it considers that it has sufficient information and is in a position to draw a conclusion.”

    2018-04-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8221 (2018) · source

24. “Efforts have continued towards the destruction of the two remaining chemical weapons production facilities by the Syrian Arab Republic. The destruction of these facilities, which will be verified by the OPCW, is expected to be completed within two to three months from the start of destruction. The long- awaited and verified destruction of these two facilities is an essential step towards the full implementation of resolution 2118 (2013). On the outstanding issues related to Syria's declaration, discussions between the OPCW Technical Secretariat and the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic are continuing. However, these discussions have not permitted the resolution of any of those remaining issues. The OPCW Technical Secretariat continues to be unable to confirm the completeness and accuracy of Syria's declaration.”

    2018-04-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8221 (2018) · source

25. “The Secretary- General, in speaking of the same, stated that there can be no impunity for such abhorrent acts. Today seems an especially fitting date to reiterate and underscore those views, as well as to remember the victims of the attack. As per established practice, I met with representatives of the Syrian Arab Republic in advance of these consultations. The Office for Disarmament Affairs has also continued its regular contact with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. In view of the fact that, just over two weeks ago, the Director-General briefed the Council on developments related to the OPCW's work on the elimination of Syria's chemical weapons programme, my own intervention today will be brief.”

    2018-04-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8221 (2018) · source

26. “Mr. Markram: I thank you, Sir, for the opportunity to brief the Security Council on the implementation of resolution 2118 (2013), on the elimination of the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic. The High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Ms. Izumi Nakamitsu, is away on official travel. I am honoured to be able to address the Council in her stead. Before providing the Council with the latest information on the status of the implementation of resolution 2118 (2013), I would first like to recall the tragic anniversary today of the use of chemical weapons - specifically the nerve agent sarin- in Khan Shaykhun. The Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) referred to this attack as an atrocity.”

    2018-04-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8221 (2018) · source