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Mazimpaka

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2001-05-03
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2002-08-08
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un-security-council

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  1. Allow me to conclude my remarks by reiterating the commitment President Paul Kagame made on behalf of the people of Rwanda on the occasion of the signing of the Peace Agreement in Pretoria at the end of last month. "Rwanda is ready to fulfil its part of the obligations as agreed in this Memorandum of Understanding. We are going to sign. We stand ready to work with you, our African brothers and sisters, and to work with the rest of the international community so as to bring about peace and security, which are very important to the people to Rwanda, the people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the whole people of Africa."

    2002-08-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4596 (2002) · source

  2. We appeal for continued support for all the parties involved in the conflict, as this effort alone cannot resolve all the outstanding problems - such as the need to work out an all-inclusive agreement and to achieve the withdrawal of all other foreign forces. On this occasion, Rwanda fully recognizes the problems caused by the presence and activities of our nationals in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. That is why we salute and welcome the decision of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to negotiate this Agreement, as well as the leadership demonstrated by President Joseph Kabila in signing the Pretoria Agreement. In this spirit, we believe that all the other outstanding issues should find solutions through a sincere and pragmatic exchange among the countries of our region.

    2002-08-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4596 (2002) · source

  3. The repatriation exercise will require more resources, particularly for transport and resettlement. The Government of Rwanda will continue to do its part in ensuring that this process is successful. Rwanda is grateful for all the assistance the United Nations has provided in our trying times. We hope that the Council will see the resolution of the conflict in the region as a shared challenge. Rwanda is grateful to President Thabo Mbeki and the rest of the leadership of the Republic of South Africa for their commitment to peace in our region. Equally, we warmly welcome the commitment of President Mbeki as Chairman of the African Union (AU), as well as that of the Secretaries-General of the AU and of the United Nations, to see the Agreement implemented as signed.

    2002-08-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4596 (2002) · source

  4. Unfortunately, for that particular operation, the heavy presence of detractors of this process made it impossible for the group to go home, although they had been waiting for two months to be repatriated. We hope that in the future such groups will not be exposed to so-called political leaders and other agents who interfere with their wish to return home. Through the work of MONUC and the JMC we are all aware, or will have an idea, about where the ex-Far and Interahamwe are operating from in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and how they are organized. Indeed, it is on that basis that assembly areas were planned. Those plans were approved by the signatories to the Lusaka Agreement. We need MONUC's assistance to make the assembly areas operational and secure.

    2002-08-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4596 (2002) · source

  5. Since 1994, a large number of members of the former Armed Forces of Rwanda have rejoined the military service in our country or been demobilized like any members of the national forces. The militias who accompanied these forces in the wars in the Congo have also come home in large numbers and have been resettled into normal civilian life. The now-well- documented 2,000 captives of the 2001 war in the north-west of Rwanda have by now been settled, and some of them have actually formed a group to carry out sensitization work among those who are still in Congo, using the themes of national unity and reconciliation, which they have witnessed in the country. Recently, this group accompanied MONUC to Benin to help in confidence-building among the small group of combatants who had indicated that they wanted to go home.

    2002-08-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4596 (2002) · source

  6. What the Pretoria Agreement brings to the process is a solemn commitment by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to track, assemble and disarm ex-FAR and Interahamwe, in collaboration with the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), the Joint Military Commission (JMC) and the third party. Rwanda, in turn, undertook to withdraw its troops from the Democratic Republic of the Congo as soon as this process gets under way and is judged to be irreversible. Let me recall here that Rwanda's commitment to the repatriation and reintegration of combatants has withstood the test of time, numbers and adverse conditions.

    2002-08-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4596 (2002) · source

  7. By addressing those two issues, the Agreement paves the way for peace and stability, which have eluded our respective countries for a long time. Those familiar with the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, including the Council, know that we have been painfully aware of the poor record of our performance in the area of the disarmament, demobilization and repatriation of the armed groups. As crucial as that part of the Lusaka Agreement may be, the parties have so far failed to make any headway in effecting any meaningful disarmament and, hence, in reducing the security threat to affected countries, principally Rwanda.

    2002-08-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4596 (2002) · source

  8. Today we firmly believe that our plan, worked out with the help of the President of the Republic of South Africa and with the encouragement and support of the Secretary-General, has a chance to succeed. We appeal to the Council to do its utmost to assist us along this path. At the signing ceremony in Pretoria, South Africa, of what is now known as the Pretoria Agreement or the Peace Agreement between the Governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic of Rwanda, President Paul Kagame characterized the Agreement as very important. He said that because the Agreement addresses two core issues that underlie the conflict: first, how to resolve the problem of the ex-FAR and Interahamwe and, secondly, the withdrawal of all former forces from the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

    2002-08-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4596 (2002) · source

  9. The Pretoria Agreement provides solutions for what up to now have been intractable problems in the implementation of the Lusaka Agreement. The problem of the forces that carried out genocide and then relocated to bases in Zaire, later the Democratic Republic of the Congo, has preoccupied the Council and the signatories for a long time, without their having found a clear solution. Throughout, the Council continued to urge Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to work together to resolve the root causes of the conflict, that is, to find how to dissuade the former Rwandan Army (ex-FAR) and Interahamwe forces from carrying out attacks on Rwanda from bases in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

    2002-08-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4596 (2002) · source

  10. It is my honour to congratulate you, Sir, as others who have spoken before me have done, on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of August. In addition, allow me, through you, to extend our recognition to your predecessor, the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom, for the way in which he conducted the affairs of the Council last month. We have come to the Council today, at its invitation, to present what we believe is an unprecedented step towards the resolution of the conflict that has afflicted Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in the main, and the Great Lakes Region as a whole, since the signing of the Lusaka Agreement for a ceasefire in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in 1999.

    2002-08-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4596 (2002) · source

  11. The concept of the plans for the final withdrawal of all foreign forces from the Democratic Republic of the Congo was approved last month, and planning will start soon. The Lusaka process provides us with the only realistic and long-lasting approach to the problems of the Great Lakes region. Rwanda believes that its security concerns cannot be minimized by any other considerations. It believes also that in Lusaka all the parties will find equitable solutions to the problems that face their respective countries. The Security Council and the whole United Nations system should continue to accompany our countries in the quest for the successful and timely implementation of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement as it is.

    2001-05-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4317 (2001) · source

  12. The Council will be encouraged to know that, since the last meeting between the Council and the Lusaka signatories, the commitment to the implementation of the Lusaka Agreement demonstrated then has borne some fruit. The disengagement exercise, in spite of a few problems, is effectively complete. Joint planning between the Joint Military Commission and the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) for the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation and resettlement of negative forces is under way, as envisaged by resolution 1341 (2001). The inter- Congolese dialogue, crucial for re-establishing common State authority over the whole Congolese territory, was due to be launched in Lusaka this morning.

    2001-05-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4317 (2001) · source

  13. Secondly, clear definitions of terms loosely used in the previous report, such as "illegal", "legitimate", "power" and "control", should be established in relation to the specific and unique political situation prevailing in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and in the region. Thirdly, treaties, agreements and protocols governing the trade regime in the region should be duly recognized. And fourthly, the responsibilities of countries of destination of the resources should be determined with regard to both import and export activities. My delegation respectfully wishes to urge the Security Council to keep on course insofar as securing peace and security in the Great Lakes region is concerned.

    2001-05-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4317 (2001) · source

  14. It does not reflect the genuine desire of members to establish the state of affairs in the Democratic Republic of the Congo so as to recommend ways and means of rectifying the situation, in the interest of the Congolese people. It does not do justice to countries like Rwanda, which went out of its way to cooperate with the Panel. However, should it please the Council to reopen the investigations and correct the numerous lacunae in the report just presented, then Rwanda wishes to propose the following. First, the Council and the Member States which are the subject of this investigation should agree on the terms of reference and spell out the appropriate methodology.

    2001-05-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4317 (2001) · source

  15. The Council may recall that in February 2001 the preliminary report was considered inadequate and inaccurate. At that time we pointed out those inaccuracies. To our knowledge, the Panel never went back to the field to cross-check the information. We are also forced to deal with a "final" report that the Panel itself admits to be only 70 per cent done, and on the basis of which Rwanda, its leaders and its citizens are unreservedly condemned. Such a request is simply meant to pre-empt reactions from people and countries, like Rwanda, that have been wrongly accused by the Panel. Rwanda proposes that this report should be dropped altogether because it is inaccurate and inconclusive and does not in any way interpret the wishes of the Council.

    2001-05-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4317 (2001) · source

  16. We urge the Council to re-examine its resolutions on the situation, and in particular with regard to the activities of the Interahamwe and ex-FAR troops, namely, resolutions 918 (1994), 997 (1995), 1011 (1995), 1013 (1995) and 1161 (1998), as well as the letter contained in document S/l998/438 and the report contained in document S/1998/1096. We also urge the Council to take action without further delay so as to neutralize these groups and their mushrooming allies - such as the Forces pour la defense de la democratic (FDD) and the Mayi-Mayi. All countries should be discouraged from continuing to support these forces by all means available to the Council. It came to our attention that the Panel is seeking the extension of its mandate to do what it terms the remaining 30 per cent of the work to be done.

    2001-05-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4317 (2001) · source

  17. Signatories to Lusaka, today at least, appear to be working in tandem to implement the Agreement as it is, and need unconditional support from this body. At this stage, the implementation of both the Lusaka Agreement and Security Council resolution 1341 (2001) is of paramount importance. We are also busy preparing plans for the disarming of the forces upon which the Security Council had imposed sanctions in connection with rearming through resolution 918 (1994). Had the Council reinforced that resolution, the Lusaka Agreement would be far advanced today and the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the region would certainly have improved.

    2001-05-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4317 (2001) · source

  18. The war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo brought in several countries and generated rebellions against the Government. In a genuine attempt to find solutions to the multiple causes of the conflict, the belligerents negotiated the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement with the assistance of countries of the region. That Agreement addresses the sovereignty of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, including control over its resources, the rights of the Congolese people and the security of neighbouring countries. The Lusaka Agreement provides for mechanisms to rid the Democratic Republic of the Congo of all the negative forces. That is a task the Security Council can ignore only at the peril of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the region.

    2001-05-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4317 (2001) · source

  19. Security was gradually restored in Rwanda and, though not completely to date, in North Kivu, That situation enabled Rwanda to continue to repatriate refugees and to reintegrate them into our society. Close to 100,000 refugees have returned in the last six months alone, and a total of 18,000 ex-FAR soldiers have been reintegrated in the national army - the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) - at command, staff and other ranks. The improvement in security and other developments in the human rights area convinced the Special Rapporteur to recommend, successfully, that the Commission on Human Rights put an end to its monitoring of Rwanda. We hope that this can be achieved in the whole region once we succeed in putting an end to the activities of the negative forces.

    2001-05-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4317 (2001) · source

  20. The report contained in document S/l998/1096 described as profoundly shocking the network of forces from Rwanda, Burundi, Angola and Uganda, the unhindered flow of arms to them, and the support they were receiving from the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. At that time western Rwanda, the prefecture of Gisenyi, Ruhengeri, Kibuye and Cyangugu and parts of Byumba, Kigali and Gitarama were described as red zones by United Nations agencies because of insecurity due to incursions by those forces based in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The situation changed dramatically when Rwandan forces were able to put an end to those infiltrations and push those forces back into the Democratic Republic of the Congo - helped that time by a rebellion against the Kabila Government.

    2001-05-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4317 (2001) · source

  21. It became necessary for Rwanda and its allies to find a solution to that situation. I am glad to say that this was done with a measure of success, because 1.5 million refugees were able to return home and security was restored to Rwanda for a while. However, the situation changed dramatically when the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL) Government of President Laurent Kabila decided to regroup and rearm those forces. Once again, appeals to the United Nations to avert the looming crisis multiplied. The Security Council set up an International Commission of Inquiry that established beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of well-organized forces bent on destabilizing the Great Lakes region. Those included, and were organized around, the Interahamwe and ex- FAR militia, which at the time numbered 70,000.

    2001-05-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4317 (2001) · source

  22. It surely should not include condemnations of heads of State and their families, companies and individuals without meeting the burden of proof of guilt. The way heads of State are treated in this report is simply unacceptable and sets a dangerous precedent. Since the report concludes that economic reasons have superseded the security concerns of Rwanda, allow me to reiterate the reasons why Rwanda has had to defend its citizens against a murderous war waged from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Members of the Council may recall that, after the genocide of 1994, the Security Council was on numerous occasions seized of the matter of the precarious security conditions caused by Interahamwe militia and ex-Rwandese Armed Forces (FAR) soldiers in refugee camps in Zaire. No solution was found by this body.

    2001-05-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4317 (2001) · source

  23. We can only conclude that the panel relied on unacceptable sources variously described in the report as deserters, a "high number of insiders living in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and in Europe" (S/2001/357, para. 11) and "reliable sources" (ibid., passim) that are not identified. One wonders why the Panel could not appreciate that such politically motivated sources would only give information to serve their own political agendas. Deserters would in normal circumstances be defectors from one side to another, and would only slur the side they had left. We find it unusual that a panel of experts would evaluate its own report, pass judgement and impose punitive measures - as this one did - and that it would do that on the basis of a report that the Panel admits is today only 70 per cent complete.

    2001-05-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4317 (2001) · source

  24. Thirdly, the sources cited by the Panel do not reflect the efforts that the Government made to facilitate access to information. The Panel had an opportunity to meet Rwanda's head of State, President Paul Kagame, for two hours. Nothing in the report indicates that the Panel benefited from that meeting. It is also true that none of the conclusions were put to the President for discussion. The same goes for the large number of ministers and officials who made themselves available to discuss the issues with the panel. Fourthly, the private sector, which was characterized as pivotal in the illegal exploitation, was never contacted to clarify their business practices or credentials to the Panel. That is against the norms of natural justice.

    2001-05-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4317 (2001) · source

  25. In our region, these are regulated by multinational agreements, which include those between our three countries 4 the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi and Rwanda - and the conventions of the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL), as well as regional arrangements, such as those under the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the Northern Corridor arrangement; these conform also to World Trade Organization conventions. Ignoring these historical ties among the peoples of the region is prejudicial to the socio-economic well- being ofthe people of the region, and more particularly those of the Democratic Republic of the Congo cut off from Kinshasa, who have been historically linked to the world through eastern routes through Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda.

    2001-05-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4317 (2001) · source

  26. Those concepts, which are generally accepted, are, in the context of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, defined also in the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement: article 111, paragraph 18, stipulates that State administration shall be exercised by the Congolese signatories until new institutions emanating inter-Congolese dialogue are set up. That has not yet happened. Since that Agreement received and, we hope, continues to enjoy the support of the Council, we would have expected the Panel to adopt the letter and spirit of the Agreement. Secondly, the Panel extended the definition of natural resources and other forms of wealth to include services, transport, finance, and other movements of goods and people.

    2001-05-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4317 (2001) · source

  27. Rwanda fully cooperated with the Panel, as is rightly recognized in the report; since the publication of the report we have put forward the reaction of the Government of Rwanda, which is set out in document S/2001/402, to which reference has been made, for everybody to read through in order to see our detailed comments. We believe that the mandate given to the Panel was not carefully defined; this led to contentious interpretations. In our view, there are four major issues that made the Panel of Experts produce a report that we do not endorse. First, the report interpreted "illegality" to mean activities carried out without the consent of a legitimate Government or of an authority exercising power and control over territory.

    2001-05-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4317 (2001) · source

  28. My delegation would like to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for the month of May. Our congratulations also go to your predecessor, Sir Jeremy Greenstock, for a job well done last month. I wish to thank you and, through you, the Security Council for convening this open meeting, at which delegations can express themselves on the contents of the report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, document S/2001/357 of 12 April 2001, which has just been presented to the Council.

    2001-05-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4317 (2001) · source