YouSaid · the spoken record

Meece

lines on the record: 207
first: 2010-10-15
most recent: 2013-02-22
sittings or episodes: 8
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“In collaboration with the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa, we have also continued to support to the maximum extent possible regional efforts, including initiatives of the African Union to confront and eliminate the LRA threat. In Ituri district, we are continuing active coordination and support to Congolese Government efforts to deal with remaining militia activity in the southern part of the district, notably by militia leader Cobra Matata and his Forces de re'sistance patriotiques en Ituri militia.”
2012-11-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6868 (2012) · source
“Moreover, of course, LRA elements have the option of crossing the borders of South Sudan, the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo at will, underscoring the regional aspect of the problem. We have actively continued our efforts with the FARDC to combat the LRA threat in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, including operation of the Joint Intelligence and Operations Centre in Dungu, which currently has MONUSCO, Congolese, Ugandan and American officers present to share information and analysis. We have also sought to collaborate as much as possible in sharing information and ideas with neighbouring missions and other forces, for example as to how to increase the effectiveness of targeted repatriation programmes and increase operational coordination.”
2012-11-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6868 (2012) · source
“These ongoing tragedies underscore the importance of putting an end definitively to threats to security in North Kivu. This includes dismantling the zone of M-23 occupation and administration, renewing the interrupted programme of pressure on the FDLR and other groups, and pursuing related stabilization programmes. Even while focused on the immediate threats of these groups in the Kivus, we of course must not forget the ongoing threats to civilians and security elsewhere. While the Lords Resistance Army (LRA) combatant numbers in north-eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo are limited, and attacks in recent months have been at relatively low levels, this comes as small comfort to those civilians living in the area under constant threat from this very brutal group.”
2012-11-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6868 (2012) · source
“For example, one week ago our Joint Human Rights Office and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights published a report documenting the massacre of over 260 civilians in southern Masisi district arising from clashes between the FDLR and an associated group, Mai Mai Nyatura, and a network of local groups operating under the label of Rai'a Mutomboki, each increasingly attacking women, children, and other unarmed civilians, largely on an ethnic-driven basis, and producing appalling large-scale killings as documented in that report. The stretched MONUSCO civilian and military elements have sought to respond as effectively as possible to these and other reported events and threats, all in the context of a generally deteriorating security environment in North Kivu.”
2012-11-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6868 (2012) · source
“As well, I wish to reiterate my tribute to them and all members of the MONUSCO forces and their civilian counterparts, all of whom are dedicated to the cause of peace for the Congolese people while working in difficult and often dangerous conditions. The losses experienced by the FARDC, and the Congolese population more generally, have of course been of much larger magnitude, and I also wish to extend my heartfelt condolences to the families and friends of all victims of this conflict. We have also been very active in addressing renewed threats by other armed groups in the east, particularly in the Kivus, that have fed off inter-ethnic tensions heightened since the start ofthe M-23 rebellion, and the opportunities created by resultant security voids.”
2012-11-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6868 (2012) · source
“We have worked closely with the FARDC and Congolese authorities generally to confront the escalating security threats in North Kivu, including at times very robust engagement by MONUSCO ground and air elements in support of and alongside FARDC forces to defend population centres against attacks launched by the M-23. Unfortunately, these engagements have led to injuries, and one tragic death, of United Nations peacekeepers. I would like to use this opportunity to renew my deepest condolences to the family and colleagues of the fallen Indian peacekeeper, and my sympathies to all injured Blue Helmets.”
2012-11-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6868 (2012) · source
“Despite claims to the contrary, it is simply not true that the M-23 represents any particular community overall or that it has a particularly large base of support. This imposes a significant indigenous capacity limit on the group. In response to the situation, MONUSCO has actively supported the regional efforts of the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region to develop a neutral international force to confront the M-23, the Forces democratiques de liberation du Rwanda (FDLR) and other negative forces, and the establishment of an enlarged Joint Verification Mechanism and a joint intelligence fusion cell. We have also had ongoing consultations with the African Union and other partners regarding these issues, and the efforts to find a durable resolution leading to lasting peace.”
2012-11-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6868 (2012) · source
“Indeed, the M-23 does not enjoy broad support in North Kivu or elsewhere in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. Despite strong efforts, it has been unable to establish a base of support in South Kivu or elsewhere beyond its core area of occupation. While the M-23 military wing is dominated by senior officers from the former Congres national pour la defense du peuple (CNDP) movement, largely Tutsis from North Kivu province, the M-23 is far short even of enjoying the full support of that community, with for example the Banyamulenge community in South Kivu broadly and strongly opposed to the M-23, and the North Kivu Tutsi and Hutu communities deeply divided. Many former CNDP officers and troops continue serving well with loyalist FARDC forces.”
2012-11-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6868 (2012) · source
“The M-23 movement has generally expanded its list of demands from its original grievances, largely based on allegations of incomplete application of the 23 March 2009 agreements, although the specific list seems to vary somewhat by individuals and forums as demands are articulated. The M-23 has been unresponsive to date to the demands ofthe Security Council and others to withdraw to earlier positions or even cease its attacks. In fact, the latest reports indicate offensive moves from Goma towards Sake. I should note that despite its military advances, the Movement does confront limits. Contrary to some claims that it represents the people, or alternatively one or more ethnic communities, in the face of discriminatory treatment or worse the M-23 has not achieved the full support of any ethnic group or community.”
2012-11-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6868 (2012) · source
“Indeed, it appears to have been Ntaganda's growing fear of possible arrest that was his major motive for launching the rebellion. At this stage, the M-23 effectively occupies a significant portion of North Kivu province, and it has been establishing a formal administrative or governing structure. We have received numerous reports of targeted summary executions of those who stand in its way, including Government and traditional leaders who resist or fail to cooperate with an M-23 administrative structure. We also continue to receive ongoing reports of the widespread recruitment and use of children, unconfirmed cases of sexual violence, and other serious human rights abuses.”
2012-11-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6868 (2012) · source
“As we have seen in other areas occupied by the M-23, the occupation of Goma also poses a major risk of increased serious human rights violations, including killings and forced recruitment of civilians, including minors. The leader of the M-23 armed movement is Sultani Makenga, a former Congolese Army officer who was ostensibly integrated into the national army as a result of agreements reached in 2009. In reality, however, Makenga never accepted full State authority or central command orders. Like Bosco Ntaganda, he is a man with a well-documented history of very serious human rights abuses. These are qualities shared by many other senior M-23 officers, with Ntaganda himself the object of a long-standing arrest warrant issued by the International Criminal Court.”
2012-11-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6868 (2012) · source
“This was done despite significant resistance by the Congolese Army and MONUSCO forces engaged alongside of and in support of the Forces armees de la Republique democratique du Congo (FARDC), including engagement by FARDC and MONUSCO attack helicopters and ground forces. Initially, the offensive was held in check. Showing again renewed capacity, however, the M-23 continued its offensive, exhibiting sophisticated tactics. The Council has already been briefed on its capabilities and the reports of external support helping to provide those capabilities. By itself, this new advance has produced major new population movements, caused by the evacuation of many humanitarian workers and agencies, and has generally exacerbated an already major humanitarian crisis in the region.”
2012-11-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6868 (2012) · source
“Moreover, since the occupation of Goma by the Mouvement du 23 mars (M-23), we are facing violent and spontaneous demonstrations targeting both the Congolese symbols of power and United Nations personnel and installations. We cannot exclude the possibility of this phenomenon spreading to other Congolese towns. (spoke in English) At the heart of this grave situation is the armed rebellion initiated by Bosco Ntaganda, now usually referred to in short as the M-23 rebellion or mutiny. As Council members are aware, in recent days the M-23 undertook major new offensive operations and have now occupied the provincial capital of Goma.”
2012-11-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6868 (2012) · source
“I am honoured to have the opportunity to address the Council regarding the work of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) and the general situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in the context of the report of the Secretary-General (S/2012/838) distributed to the Council last week. Due to the very serious crisis currently afflicting North Kivu, I am obliged do so by video teleconference. The security situation in North Kivu and some other areas of eastern Congo has seriously deteriorated over the past few days, in addition to the large-scale humanitarian crisis affecting hundreds of thousands of Congolese.”
2012-11-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6868 (2012) · source
“The Mission and the Congolese people, which still need that support, have benefited considerably, in particular in the context of the recent worrying events that took place in the Kivus. Without that support, it would not be possible to consolidate the significant progress that has been made in recent years on the route to lasting peace and stability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. I therefore count on that sustained support as well as on the support of MONUSCO personnel and of the United Nations agencies, upon which I rely greatly and whose commitment and constant efforts merit due recognition. (spoke in English) I give my thanks to them, as well as to the Security Council for its support.”
2012-06-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6785 (2012) · source
“I am convinced, however, that beyond the current turmoil we see in the present security situation, there exist major opportunities and prospects for significant progress in all of those areas. I can assure the Council that I, MONUSCO and the United Nations agencies, constituting the United Nations country team presence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, are committed to doing everything possible towards those ends in the most effective and timely way possible. (spoke in French) Finally, I again wish to convey my sincere gratitude to the members of the Security Council and to the international community for the support that has been given to the Mission and the implementation of its mandate.”
2012-06-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6785 (2012) · source
“Likewise, I am optimistic that the United Nations and donors can do even more to support Government programmes and priorities to build on the very encouraging progress already achieved in civilian and military justice systems. In the military area, I look forward to viewing anew with the new Government how we can even more effectively utilize our operational partnership to end security threats by armed groups as quickly as possible and to explore options for doing more to bolster and support FARDC capabilities. In that regard, I would reiterate calls on all partners to review what resources may be available to support Congolese military training, professionalism and reform programmes. Those are not small challenges.”
2012-06-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6785 (2012) · source
“That process is already under way, and its importance is obviously complemented by the establishment of a new national Government. I look forward to the results of those reviews and to seeing how we in MONUSCO and the United Nations agencies may be more effective in realizing the mutually set goals for those programmes. I also look forward to working with the members of the new Government to look at how security sector issues can be most effectively addressed, and institutions strengthened as well. I am pleased with results from police training and related programmes, which I believe have been effective in helping expand the capacity of the Congolese National Police. In that regard, I would again appeal to all donors for additional resources that would permit us to expand and augment those programmes.”
2012-06-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6785 (2012) · source
“Many roads have been opened, and court facilities, police stations and other facilities have been built. But it is also important to ensure that personnel are deployed to work in those facilities, to identify and solve problems, and generally to extend and strengthen the reach of State authority and institutions. In my view, more focus needs to be placed on how fundamental land disputes and other issues underlying inter-community tensions can be resolved. As we move into a new phase of the Stabilization and Reconstruction Plan and, it is to be hoped, establish a parallel framework for efforts in other parts of the country under the prospective peace consolidation programme, it is right and proper that all parties review and revise as appropriate the priorities, operations and programmes being implemented.”
2012-06-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6785 (2012) · source
“It is important not to forget, however, the very important and considerable progress that has been achieved in a broad variety of areas since the transition marking the formal end of war, in particular in recent years. Clearly, it is of vital importance to recover from the security setbacks in the Kivus as soon as possible. It is also important, however, to move forward on a broader agenda aimed at addressing the key underlying causes of conflict in the eastern of the country and at ensuring much needed durable security and development throughout the country. The stabilization and general development agenda in eastern Congo has accomplished much under the general framework of the Stabilization and Reconstruction Plan for Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and the International Security and Stabilization Support programmes.”
2012-06-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6785 (2012) · source
“I know that major donors are also conducting their own similar assessments to determine potential future financial support. Obviously, I very much hope that the process can move forward in a timely and productive manner to achieve free and democratic elections at the earliest time practical, as such elections are clearly important for the Congolese people, for the continued consolidation of a democratic process as well as for further progress towards the achievement of the decentralization goals that the Congolese people have set for themselves. The security situation in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo is sobering, especially in North Kivu province.”
2012-06-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6785 (2012) · source
“The Conseil superieur de l'audiovisuel et de la communication also needs strong and appropriate actions to facilitate full and free media access and coverage. In that regard, I salute the recent decision of Government authorities to investigate reports of serious human rights violations and other violence committed during the 2011 election process. I reiterate that we will do everything possible to facilitate and advance those investigations and associated appropriate judicial actions. Also, under the guidance of the Security Council, we will actively assess progress towards the organization of provincial and local elections to determine the appropriate and needed levels of support to achieve free and fair, credible elections.”
2012-06-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6785 (2012) · source
“All ofthose recommendations will likely be critical to an assessment by donors, the Council and other partners in terms of engagement with, and support for, the provincial and local elections. It is clearly of paramount importance to have conditions in place that are conducive to credible, transparent and democratic elections. For the most part, those include actions and management by the Commission to ensure effective and timely organizational preparations, adequate checks and other procedures to prevent fraud, abuses or other irregularities, and full and complete implementation plans in place, including critical compilation and verification procedures. The Government as well will need to do everything possible to ensure free conditions for all to participate.”
2012-06-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6785 (2012) · source
“In that regard, I anticipate that a report soon expected to be presented by the Independent National Electoral Commission to the National Assembly will provide a basis for a national discussion of the past and future election process. That, in turn, could have an important impact on how things are to go forward to complete the election cycle. Major donors, other partners and the United Nations have expressed concerns about the 2011 election irregularities. The Independent National Electoral Commission itself has completed a review that includes extensive recommendations for changes to be adopted for future elections. It is entirely possible that the anticipated National Assembly debate will propose other significant recommendations.”
2012-06-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6785 (2012) · source
“I hope that trip will make an important contribution towards a continuing strong and effective partnership. The establishment of those bodies, however, underscores the fact that there are many challenges ahead for ensuring the successful conduct of the upcoming provincial and local elections. Provincial elections are needed to elect new provincial legislative bodies, which in turn are responsible for electing national senators and provincial governors. Local elections, which were never held in the initial 2006 electoral cycle, are also very important. It is clear, however, that steps are required to ensure that the problems of the 2011 exercise are not repeated.”
2012-06-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6785 (2012) · source
“I look forward to continuing those contacts and relationships when I return to Kinshasa. I strongly believe that it is in the interests of all parties for MONUSCO to have a strong and ongoing dialogue with regard to programme implementation and constructive collaborative relationships, as well as good collaborative relationships with relevant Government agencies and officials. I am firmly committed to doing everything possible to ensure that is the case. While I have been here in New York, I am very pleased that Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Ms. Leila Zerrougui, was able to accompany Prime Minister Matata Ponyo Mapon and his delegation on last week's very important trip to the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.”
2012-06-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6785 (2012) · source
“The officers include two members of the opposition party, the Union pour la democratie et la progres social, including the newly elected Assembly Second Vice-President Timothee Nkisi Kombo, and all committees include opposition representation and some presiding officers. I look forward to building MONUSCO relationships with the new National Assembly to support and facilitate their work and their understanding of MONUSCO and general United Nations programme activities. In the executive branch, the new Government, under the leadership of Prime Minister Augustin Matata Ponyo Mapon, recently assumed office and includes two members drawn from opposition parties. I, the two Deputy Special Representatives of the Secretary-General and other MONUSCO officials have had initial introductory meetings with a number of ministers.”
2012-06-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6785 (2012) · source
“Pursuant to the latest assessments, for example, we are now examining the need for a continued MONUSCO military presence in Equateur province, albeit already at modest levels, a legacy of the 2009 problems in that region. We are in frequent contact at multiple levels regarding a number of other issues and developments based on the joint assessment process, and I would strongly encourage the Council to continue authorization and support for that facility. The new institutions of Government arising from the problematic 2011 national elections have, frankly, taken longer to be established than I would have hoped. Nonetheless, the new National Assembly has now put in place new internal procedures, Assembly officers and standing committees.”
2012-06-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6785 (2012) · source
“I should also note that MONUSCO has now established a resident military presence in Bas-Uele district, an initiative long advocated by many humanitarian agencies and shared by MONUSCO. Much of the reporting and analysis work done most recently by the joint assessment process established in 2010 under Council resolution 1925 (2010) was performed prior to the outbreak of the mutiny in the Kivus in early April. I will state, however, that in my view the process conducted by the Congolese Government and MONUSCO provides an excellent vehicle for the analysis of overall threat conditions, provides useful mechanisms for the discussion of fast-breaking developments, such as the mutiny, and furnishes an invaluable basis for decisions regarding overall deployments and other actions.”
2012-06-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6785 (2012) · source
“We have continued to work closely with the FARDC in proactive operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo designed to forestall larger-scale LRA attacks, to track and respond to LRA activity through the Joint Information and Operations Centre in Dungu, and to do all that is possible to facilitate regional coordination and information-sharing, including increasing the effectiveness of targeted programmes to promote repatriation. We have supported, and will continue to support, regional initiatives promoted by the Africa Union and supported by the United Nations Office for Central Africa to address this threat and increase coordination and information-sharing among all forces in the region as much as possible.”
2012-06-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6785 (2012) · source
“The overall activity of the Lord's Resistance Army in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has shown little change in recent months, with LRA attacks tending to follow small individual unit requirements, which often include kidnapping and violent attacks in addition to the looting of target villages. Regardless of trends, however, the brutal LRA actions continue to provoke enormous fear throughout the region where they operate.”
2012-06-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6785 (2012) · source
“In that regard, I applaud the recent establishment of the Joint Intelligence Fusion Centre in Goma under the auspices of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), as well as actions by the ICGLR to monitor and control illegal regional trade in conflict minerals, and activities to promote cross-border contacts, such as the regional Governors meeting in Burundi organized by the Economic Community of the Great Lake Countries. As a final note on security threats, I will also report that the activities of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) continue to represent a threat not only to northeastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, but to other countries in the region as well.”
2012-06-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6785 (2012) · source
“Within MONUSCO, we have no means of independently confirming or verifying allegations of actions outside of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. I will state that for obvious reasons it is very important for all actions possible to be taken to put an end to any or all external support that the mutinous forces may receive. I appeal to all Member States in the region and beyond to investigate such information as may be available to the extent possible, to make that information available to the relevant national and international bodies and to take all actions necessary to ensure that any external support is stopped. The people of eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo have already suffered too much and for too long, and any actions that prolong violence and armed conflict in the region must stop.”
2012-06-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6785 (2012) · source
“Prime Minister Augustin Matata Ponyo Mapon has underscored to me his concern about the threat that the mutiny and its pernicious effects pose to his agenda of economic reform and development, as well as the obvious direct terrible effects on the civilian population. I am encouraged by the important senior-level delegation that the Prime Minister led last week to the region accompanied by a number of senior-level ministers and other officials to see for themselves what is happening and gain a better understanding of the current situation, the serious problems being faced, and the short- and longer-term options available to deal with them. I must also note, as members of the Council are aware, that there have been recent reports of support being provided to the mutinous forces from across the Rwandan border.”
2012-06-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6785 (2012) · source
“As is clear, it is important to put an end to the mutiny as soon as possible for multiple reasons. In addition to permitting the return home of large numbers of displaced civilians, that would also permit a timely resumption of coordinated efforts to target armed groups in the Kivus and southern Ituri District, including military operations. Furthermore, a variety of other related actions, including stabilization, conflict resolution and economic development programmes, all threatened by the renewed instability, should resume. All, of course, should be considered in the context of the reinforcement and augmentation of State authority throughout the region, an essential condition for basic order, security and economic and social development for the region.”
2012-06-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6785 (2012) · source
“For example, the highest number of FDLR combatant and dependant repatriations over the last 18 months had been recorded in March, a result certainly arising from the South Kivu operations. They built on a generally increasing trend of FDLR repatriation achieved in recent months, further weakening the FDLR as a part of the overall strategy to put an end to that long-standing threat. Related North Kivu joint operations were to get under way in April with the aim of further increasing that pressure and trend. Unfortunately, both the South and the North Kivu operations were suspended as a result of the mutiny. Not surprisingly, we have seen, since the suspension, a dramatic reduction in FDLR repatriations, with further damage arising from the Ntaganda and Makenga actions.”
2012-06-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6785 (2012) · source
“That is in dramatic contrast to the situation prior to the start of the mutiny. MONUSCO and FARDC had worked together closely early this year to plan a series of joint operations in North and South Kivu to target the FDLR and other armed groups, which included unprecedented steps to minimize the impact of those operations on civilians, establish monitoring centres and provide for humanitarian access, as well as include a stabilization operational phase, or a holding of cleared areas to prevent the return of armed groups, an action previously lacking usually. Those jointly planned operations had been under way in South Kivu in March and were showing very promising results.”
2012-06-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6785 (2012) · source
“Most often, those attacks occur sufficiently far from any FARDC or MONUSCO presence to minimize the prospects of intervention until after the killing is done. All of that activity has exacerbated, as well, the ongoing serious problem of rape and other forms of sexual violence. It has also greatly limited humanitarian access throughout the region, imposing further hardships on the population. We have deployed MONUSCO forces and stepped up our operations significantly throughout the affected area, and the recent addition of attack and other military helicopters has been invaluable to our response capability. Our resources have, however, been stretched to the limits attempting to cover developing hot spots, and the overall situation in North Kivu has been deteriorating.”
2012-06-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6785 (2012) · source
“The fighting has produced major displacements of civilians, including many who have fled across adjacent borders. In addition, the FDLR and numerous Congolese groups, including at least some previously working with Bosco Ntaganda, have sought to profit from the general increase in instability by stepping up their own activity, compounding the damaging effects on the civilian population. We have, for example, credible information regarding large-scale killings and other serious crimes committed in North and South Kivu. Those include the apparent deliberate targeting by the FDLR and a network of xenophobic domestic armed groups, generally identified as Raiya Mutomboki, of each other's dependents, primarily unarmed women and children.”
2012-06-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6785 (2012) · source
“Major arms caches, apparently belonging to Ntanganda's and Makenga's forces, respectively including roughly 25 tons and 32 tons of arms and ammunition, were seized in May by FARDC forces. Estimates of the size of the mutinous forces vary, but generally indicate several hundred combatants since the fighting became concentrated in the Bunagana area. Almost all civilians have fled the immediate area. The FARDC have concentrated substantial forces and arms around this pocket to gain control of the mutinous force positions. We have established jointly manned defensive positions with the FARDC in key strategic locations adjacent to the area of fighting, for example, around the town of Bunagana, aimed at ensuring that potential offensive actions of the mutinous forces can not successfully extend to threaten those areas.”
2012-06-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6785 (2012) · source
“We have been working in close collaboration with the Congolese Government, and specifically the FARDC, since the beginning of these events in early April, to seek to limit to the extent possible injuries to the civilian population, as much as feasible to provide aid to victims and displaced populations, to contain the area of active fighting and to restore order as quickly and effectively as possible. The mutinous forces were successfully driven out of their base areas relatively quickly, eventually establishing themselves in a small pocket of less than 100 square kilometres near the town of Bunagana, in the eastern part of Virunga National Park adjacent to the Ugandan and Rwandan borders.”
2012-06-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6785 (2012) · source
“That has substantially reduced the numbers available to Ntaganda's mutiny and to the parallel M-23 movement, started by Makenga shortly afterwards. The relationship between Ntaganda and Makenga is not clear, and the M-23 movement strongly denies association with Ntaganda, possibly because of the outstanding International Criminal Court arrest warrant against him. However, Ntaganda and Makenga clearly share fundamental positions, interests and objectives.”
2012-06-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6785 (2012) · source
“While Ntaganda, Makenga and others have asserted that the terms of the 2009 agreements central to their interests were not implemented, their recourse to an armed mutiny is not an acceptable means to address their grievances. It now threatens a general destabilization of the Kivus and the region and dramatically increases the general threat to millions of civilians. Ntaganda did not receive as broad support for the mutiny as he anticipated, and the response of the Congolese Government has been effective, including facilitating the continued presence in loyal military units of large numbers of troops loyal to the Congres national pour la defense du peuple and successfully persuading many other deserting troops to resume their posts without negative consequences.”
2012-06-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6785 (2012) · source
“That mutiny has made for a serious downturn in security for the civilian population of that area, especially in North Kivu, thereby leading to a reduction in pressure on the other armed groups operating in the region. (spoke in English) The mutiny was initiated largely by soldiers integrated in the national Congolese army - the Forces armees de la Republique democratique du Congo (FARDC) - essentially under terms of agreements reached in 2009. That integration was never complete, however, and I have spoken in past presentations to the Council of the challenge to State authorities posed by General Ntaganda and those allied to him, who exercised quasi-autonomous authority without accountability to central command or Government authority.”
2012-06-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6785 (2012) · source
“It is an honour for me to once again address the members of the Security Council in connection with the recent report of the Secretary-General (8/2012/355) on the current situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and on the work of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). Since my last briefing, at the beginning of this year (see S/PV.6712), considerable progress has been made, especially on the issue of the security challenges posed by the Rwandan group Forces democratiques de liberation du Rwanda (FDLR) in North and South Kivu provinces. However, that progress has been stalled by the recent mutiny of some soldiers, led by Bosco Ntaganda and Sultani Makenga.”
2012-06-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6785 (2012) · source
“Similarly, I wish to highlight my gratitude to the personnel of MONUSCO and the United Nations agencies in the Democratic 5 Republic of the Congo. Their work is indispensable, and I have the greatest admiration for it. Under the pressure of the electoral process, their efforts have been extraordinary and exemplary. Their work during that period deserves our thanks and praise. Strengthened by this support, I have no doubt that we will be able to continue progress towards stability and the establishment of a lasting peace, which are the legitimate aspirations of the people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.”
2012-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6712 (2012) · source
“Combating sexual violence will continue to be a major specific focus of our operations and programmes. Of course, as a new Government is formed, we will also engage in active dialogue with the new officials in order to move forward in all areas. I am convinced, however, that there are significant opportunities to take advantage of now and in the immediate future, and I can assure members that we will pursue all such openings to the maximum extent possible. (spoke in French) To conclude, I should like to thank the members of the Security Council and the international community for their uninterrupted support to the Mission. That support will be of extreme importance in the months to come, when we will attempt to make continued progress in response to the various challenges I have just described.”
2012-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6712 (2012) · source
“We believe that the early official adoption of the Peace Consolidation Programme will be an important component of that effort, and we will be working through the close collaboration of MONUSCO and United Nations agencies, along with key bilateral and multilateral partners, to realize further progress, always in partnership with Government authorities and agencies, all non-governmental and other organizations making their own contributions. We will be very actively pursuing opportunities to move forward in all these areas in the weeks and months to come, focusing on civilian protection and related security issues, associated reforms and augmentation of State capacity and authority, stabilization and development efforts, and successful completion of the election cycle.”
2012-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6712 (2012) · source
“Implemented within the framework of the Stabilization and Reconstruction Plan for Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, those activities are critical to the augmentation of State authority in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and an essential component of achieving sustainable security conditions and providing for social and economic development. For other areas of the country, such activities are no less important in addressing the urgent needs of the Congolese population and supporting general development.”
2012-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6712 (2012) · source
“To the extent that we can mobilize resources, work with other engaged partners to expand general programmes, and generally maintain and hopefully augment these programmes and others across all segments of security sector issues, including military programmes, significant progress can be realized to establish the conditions needed for the security of the civilian population and lasting security for the region. While I will not elaborate extensively today on stabilization programmes, I believe that everyone in 12-22477 the Democratic Republic of the Congo is very aware of the importance of progress across the spectrum in that area as well.”
2012-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6712 (2012) · source