YouSaid · the spoken record

MERIMEE

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993
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1992-01-06
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1995-09-15
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178
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un-security-council

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  1. From the outset, the French delegation has been dedicated to the successful establishment of the Tribunal as quickly as possible, taking into account the specific needs of the situation in Rwanda as compared to the precedent in regard to the former Yugoslavia. In particular, it is obvious that, given the very large number of perpetrators of serious offences, all of them cannot be tried by the International Tribunal. The Tribunal itself will have to determine which cases it can appropriately deal with. The other suspects will remain subject to the national jurisdiction of Rwanda or of other States. The Tribunal will be competent to deal with offences committed between | January and 31 December 1994.

    1994-11-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3453 (1994) · source

  2. This solution, which is binding on all States and hence requires that they meet the requests of the Tribunal and, if necessary, adapt their domestic legislation to enable them fully to cooperate with it, has the additional merit of eliminating the possibility of any prosecution that is undertaken against suspects being in any way tinged by suspicion of vengeance or subjectivity. Thus the Tribunal should in its own way contribute to restoring civil peace to the territory of Rwanda. This consideration should be borne in mind when, after the Secretary-General's report has been received, the Tribunal's headquarters and actual method of operation are decided upon.

    1994-11-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3453 (1994) · source

  3. Individuals, regardless of the community to which they belong, must be brought to trial and judged if they have violated the most fundamental rules of war, if they have committed crimes against humanity and, above all, if they have orchestrated attempts to destroy all or part of an ethnic group - that is to say, genocide. These acts unquestionably fall within the jurisdiction of an international court which can forcefully and impartially see that justice is served on behalf of all mankind. Because of their particular seriousness, the offences which fall within the competence of the Tribunal are a threat to peace and international security which justifies recourse to Chapter VII of the Charter.

    1994-11-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3453 (1994) · source

  4. Mr. Merimee (France) (interpretation from French): The Security Council has for the second time in its history established an international tribunal for the prosecution, judgement and punishment of persons who have engaged in acts so serious that they are repugnant to the conscience of mankind and have led those bodies that have the authority to do so to act immediately to ensure that they do not go unpunished. The horrendous acts that were perpetrated this year on the territory of Rwanda fully justify use having been made once again of the procedure which, on the initiative of France, was applied for the first time in regard to the territory of the former Yugoslavia.

    1994-11-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3453 (1994) · source

  5. It should provide a welcome addition to the initiative that I have just announced, an initiative the point of which will be to treat the problem at its root.

    1994-11-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3449 (1994) · source

  6. The current formula is that of work in informal meetings with a few rare exceptions, whereas we believe that eventually we should limit the non- public work to what is necessary in order to reach a broadly acceptable decision as speedily as possible. Within the next few days France will be circulating as an official document of the General Assembly and the Security Council an aide-memoire stating in detail our position on this point. We hope that all delegations will take careful note of it and will draw the same conclusion as we do that this is the true way to eliminate the frustrations keenly felt by many delegations that have to do with the Council's excessive use of non-public working methods. For the time being we welcome the presidential statement that has just been adopted.

    1994-11-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3449 (1994) · source

  7. This briefing which we feel is desirable - and how could it not be since France is one of the main troop contributors to United Nations peace-keeping operations - is still just a partial, insufficient solution to the general problem of transparency in the activities of the Council. For us, the solution to this problem is not a question of just slightly opening the door to certain States to allow them to be present in confidential meetings; rather it presupposes a new balance between the public part and the private part of the work of the Council. Contrary to what is the case at the present time, we believe that we should return to the wise principle of the tules of procedure whereby the Council meets in public unless it decides otherwise.

    1994-11-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3449 (1994) · source

  8. On questions of deployment or withdrawal of forces, for example, it would merely be a question of the Secretariat providing information. On questions of briefings, the presence in the room of members of the Security Council and at the rostrum of the President of that body would help to avoid the impression that certain troop contributors have of being insufficiently heeded by the Security Council. This would not prejudice the principles governing the Council's procedures which state that that body remains the sole master of its decisions, for there would be no setting up of a subsidiary body of the Council, no creating of a category of members with special prerogatives, and no encroachment on missions entrusted only to the Secretary-General.

    1994-11-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3449 (1994) · source

  9. Many Member States have stated that they want the President of the Security Council in certain cases to be present on the rostrum side by side with the representative of the Secretary-General in order to ensure an even stronger link between the concerns of the troop contributors and the action taken by the body responsible for peace-keeping. This formula is entirely supported by my delegation. When consultations deal with the establishment, extension or substantial modification of the mandate of an operation, a co-chairmanship formula would be used whereas in all other cases the current formula would be used, because we believe there should be no question of removing the operational conduct of operations away from the Secretariat.

    1994-11-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3449 (1994) · source

  10. Mr. Merimee (France) (interpretation from French): At the previous meeting a presidential statement was read out announcing the Security Council's intention to stay on the course it adopted in its decision of 3 May 1994. The approach contained in that decision was clarity in defining Security Council procedures and flexibility in the exchanges of information between the Secretariat, members of the Council and other Members of the United Nations. The formula that has been worked out demonstrates progress in the way in which briefing sessions have been held thus far with troop contributors. They have been conducted with outstanding care by the Secretariat and, apart from a few minor points, have been supported by interested delegations.

    1994-11-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3449 (1994) · source

  11. These tasks can be continued beyond 31 March 1995, as we hope, only if the factions agree to cooperate and to give Somalia a chance to set out again on the road to progress and democracy.

    1994-11-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3447 (1994) · source

  12. These valuable months must be used to keep trying to reach agreement between the factions and to avoid triggering a spiral of violence. My delegation is therefore pleased that the Secretary-General, in his report of 14 October, states that he has asked his Special Representative to continue efforts to that end. It is important also to stress that the countries of the region and the regional organizations in contact with Somalia have a crucial role to play in the settlement of the Somali crisis. The Security Council and the United Nations certainly do not wish to abandon the Somalis to their fate and remain ready to provide assistance in the form of political mediation if this is desired. Major progress in the economic and social fields has been made over the last two years.

    1994-11-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3447 (1994) · source

  13. My delegation has, in fact, received alarming information about an inflow of weapons and military equipment into that country. It is to be feared that the 10 departure of the "blue helmets" might be accompanied by an explosion of violence, which is why my country wanted the Council to issue a strong reminder that it decreed a military embargo at the beginning of 1992. This embargo must be fully applied. The sanctions Committee set up to that end must fulfil the mandate entrusted to it by resolution 751 (1992). The Somali factions must also be warned against any looting of UNOSOM property, which the "blue helmets" are authorized to prevent by force. In five months' time UNOSOM's mandate will be terminated and the "blue helmets" will be fully withdrawn.

    1994-11-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3447 (1994) · source

  14. The United Nations intervention in Somalia originally had as its main objective putting an end to the famine in that country - ruined by the rivalries of warlords - which led to the deaths of more than 300,000 people. That objective has been fully achieved. However, it should be recognized that on the question of national reconciliation, which should have enabled Somalia to establish lasting peace, there has been total failure. The United Nations is not responsible for that failure. Certain factions have consistently refused to cooperate with the Special Representative of the Secretary- General and the United Nations Operation in Somalia to find a peaceful solution to the political question of Somalia. These factions bear the responsibility for what might now happen in Somalia.

    1994-11-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3447 (1994) · source

  15. Mr. Merimee (France) (interpretation from French): Madam President, my delegation is pleased to see you in charge of the business of the Security Council in this month of November. The Council is in good hands, just as it was last month under the effective and wise guidance of the Ambassador of the United Nations, whom we thank very sincerely. My delegation voted in favour of the draft resolution, which reflects all the concerns expressed by the Security Council mission that visited the theatre of operations from 24 to 27 October. My country would have preferred the question of Somalia, in which the Council has invested so much, to have had an outcome different from the one we must note today.

    1994-11-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3447 (1994) · source

  16. The military situation in Angola is therefore still of concern to us, as is the humanitarian situation of a civilian population that is the real victim of the conflict ravaging Angola. The durability of the peace agreement must be guaranteed by the complete cessation of hostilities between the parties, and deeds must finally live up to stated intentions.

    1994-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3445 (1994) · source

  17. Through this resolution, the Security Council also shows its desire to consolidate the peace agreement that is to be concluded. In fact, the Council is now authorizing the restoration of UNAVEM II strength to its previous level. However, this gesture by the Security Council must be met by a gesture from the parties that clearly shows their good will and sincere desire for peace. This is why the deployment of the personnel is contingent on the Security Council's receiving a report from the Secretary-General that the Lusaka Protocol has been initialled - some days before its signing - and attesting to the establishment of an effective cease-fire between the parties. In my delegation's view, this last condition seems especially justified because the report of the Secretary-General mentions the continuation of fighting on the ground.

    1994-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3445 (1994) · source

  18. Mr. Merimee (France) (interpretation from French): My delegation voted in favour of resolution 952 (1994), which extends the mandate of the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II) until 8 December 1994. This extension is a special one. After the delays and the slow pace noted by the Security Council in the peace negotiations between the parties, we are today in a position to note substantial progress in the discussions. This progress must take shape quickly and must lead to the initialling and then the signing of the Lusaka Protocol within the allotted time. France wishes to offer its warmest congratulations to Mr. Blondin Beye and the three observer States on their continuing efforts. Their tenacity and patience make it possible for us finally to envisage the conclusion of the peace agreement.

    1994-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3445 (1994) · source

  19. Otherwise, given the deterioration of the security of personnel of international organizations, especially humanitarian organizations, it will finally no longer be possible for the international community to assist the Liberians in their search for peace within their borders. The extension of the UNOMIL mandate must therefore be a signal to the parties to engage, in good faith and unremittingly, in the peace process in Liberia.

    1994-10-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3442 (1994) · source

  20. We must not forget that it is in the first instance up to the Liberian parties and that country's people to be the true creators of national reconciliation and to establish a lasting peace. The signing of agreements accepted by all the Liberian factions - the Cotonou Agreement, in particular, but also the Akosombo Agreement, on which the Chairman of ECOWAS has expended much effort - has been encouraging in this respect. However, recent events have shown that much remains to be done. The parties must truly respect those agreements. The immediate restoration of the cease-fire, the disarming of the factions and institutional changes called for by the agreements will make it possible to envisage a resumption of the electoral process. I would add that human rights must be respected in Liberia, fully and scrupulously.

    1994-10-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3442 (1994) · source

  21. Mr. Merimee (France)(interpretation from French): France voted in favour of extending the mandate of the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) until 13 January 1995 and approves the Secretary- General's conclusions set forth in his seventh progress report on UNOMIL. The sending of a high-level mission to consult with States members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) on redefining the respective roles of UNOMIL and the ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in Liberia - we approve that proposal of the Secretary- General - as well as the various diplomatic initiatives we may expect by the end of the year justify an extension of UNOMIL's mandate. However, this extension has been limited to the time deemed necessary finally to secure implementation of a peace process in Liberia.

    1994-10-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3442 (1994) · source

  22. We are very aware of the suffering endured by the Iraqi population, and we deplore the fact that its Government has never wished to take advantage of the possibilities offered it under resolutions 706 (1991) and 712 (1991). We hope the Deputy Prime Minister will be convinced, and will be able to convince others, that he has the means to place the Council in a position to examine rapidly any positive developments. We express the wish that the Government of Iraq will heed this message and will draw the conclusion that it should step up its cooperation, which is the only way to ensure its reinsertion into the international community.

    1994-10-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3439 (1994) · source

  23. The International Committee of the Red Cross will have to be put in a position to give the authorities of Kuwait all the information necessary on the fate of prisoners and missing persons. I have referred to the importance my delegation - which originated the adoption of resolution 688 (1991) - attaches to Iraq's respect for the rights of minorities and, more generally, for human rights. All the goods plundered during the occupation will have to be returned, and those not returned will have to be paid for in the framework of the compensation fund. The presence before the Council of the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq should be an opportunity for the authorities of that country to realize that our only goal is the restoration of peace and security to that region.

    1994-10-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3439 (1994) · source

  24. The Chairman of the Special Commission considered that an interim period was now beginning and that it would be reasonable to proceed to an evaluation of Iraq's active cooperation in six months. My delegation reminds the Iraqi authorities that during this period it expects them to continue to demonstrate their peaceful intentions. Disregard for other provisions of resolutions, whether they involve the fate of prisoners and missing persons or respect for the rights of minorities in Iraq, could only lead the international community to question Baghdad's intentions. The lifting of the other sanctions imposed on Iraq - apart from the application in due course of paragraph 22 of resolution 687 (1991) - will depend on the fulfilment of all of its other obligations.

    1994-10-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3439 (1994) · source

  25. In the view of my country's authorities, this vital gesture, an indispensable precondition for the study of any positive development, would constitute a turning point. It is also indispensable that Iraq continue to cooperate, and in exemplary fashion, with the Special Commission, as the Security Council once again demanded the day before yesterday in its resolution 949 (1994). This cooperation is all the more necessary since, as Iraq knows, it is a condition for the Council's continued consideration of the application of the sanctions it decreed; furthermore, Chairman Ekeus made it a condition last week for the beginning of long-term monitoring. We will have to see genuine good will and cooperation on the part of the Iraqi Government, as well as its readiness to respect fully and lastingly the terms of resolution 687 (1991).

    1994-10-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3439 (1994) · source

  26. To demonstrate their good faith, the Iraqi authorities will have to make these gestures by means of the same procedure they used to annex Kuwait: a decree by the Revolutionary Command Council of Iraq, signed by its President and published in the Official Journal of Iraq, will have to be transmitted to the President of the Security Council through official correspondence of the Iraqi Government, and the National Assembly of Iraq will have to issue a public declaration in the same terms. What we are demanding of the Iraqi authorities is, in fact, more than a legal procedure; it is a public political gesture showing that Iraq is entering a new stage in its relations with Kuwait.

    1994-10-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3439 (1994) · source

  27. In order to be sure of Iraq's peaceful intentions, my Government demands that the State of Iraq pledge solemnly, explicitly and unconditionally to respect the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State of Kuwait, as well as to respect, in accordance with the provisions of resolution 833 (1993), the inviolability of the international boundary drawn by the agreement of 4 October 1963 and definitively demarcated by the Commission established in accordance with paragraph 3 of resolution 687 (1991) and guaranteed by the Security Council.

    1994-10-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3439 (1994) · source

  28. The Council could not but react to these provocations, and it indeed did so by unanimously adopting resolution 949 (1994), designed to dissuade that country from ever resorting to such methods again. Iraq must immediately complete the withdrawal to which it is committed. It must in future refrain from any movement of this kind. The French Government hopes that relations between Iraq and the international community can gradually be normalized. The Iraqi Government knows that it alone holds the key to that normalization. If it wishes to overcome the negative effects of recent developments, it is urgent that, prior to any other initiative, the declaration of intent published on the occasion of the visit to Baghdad by Mr. Kozyrev be followed by deeds.

    1994-10-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3439 (1994) · source

  29. Mr. Merimee (France) (interpretation from French): I wish first to welcome the presence among us today of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Mr. Andrei Kozyrev, and the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, Mr. Tariq Aziz. The crisis caused by the latest Iraqi initiatives has seriously jeopardized the progress achieved in recent months because of the good cooperation established between the Government of Iraq and the Special Commission. By deploying over the space of a few days its armed forces in the direction of the Kuwaiti border and by having no qualms about making threatening statements in regard to its neighbours and the United Nations, the Iraqi authorities seemed to be reverting to the confrontational policy they had practised for a number of years.

    1994-10-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3439 (1994) · source

  30. I emphasize in particular the information reaching us regarding the declared intention of the Iraqi authorities to undertake to respect the political independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State of Kuwait. Resolution 833 (1993) must be implemented without delay and with the utmost precision. We call on the Iraqi authorities to proceed with this implementation in due form. This would constitute considerable progress in the right direction. Resolution 949 (1994) quite properly reminds Iraq of all of its obligations. Those relating to the fate of prisoners and missing persons as well as those relating to the respect of human rights in Iraq remain of the greatest importance to the French authorities.

    1994-10-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3438 (1994) · source

  31. This is one of the conditions for us to be assured of its peaceful intentions. This resolution requires that Iraq refrain from adopting a hostile or provocative stance with regard to its neighbours and the United Nations. It would be the task of the Security Council to take up any action on the part of Iraq which could be regarded as non-compliance with this present resolution. In the event the Council were led to take such a decision, Iraq is aware of the serious consequences to which it would be exposed. My delegation calls on the Iraqi authorities to implement all resolutions of the Security Council and to cooperate fully with the Council, and particularly with the Special Commission.

    1994-10-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3438 (1994) · source

  32. Mr. Merimee (France) (interpretation from French): The deployment of Iraqi troops towards the Kuwaiti border was a deplorable development to which it was proper for the Security Council to react as it did. The Iraqi action, which contradicted the assurances of cooperation offered over the last few months, made it necessary for the Security Council to remind Iraq of the obligations to which it must comply and to assure the international community of its resolve to guarantee peace and security in that region. My delegation co-sponsored resolution 949 (1994) whose two main objectives we agree with fully. We must have Iraq fully withdraw the forces it deployed in recent days in the direction of the Kuwaiti border. In addition, we must insist that Iraq abstain in the future from undertaking similar actions.

    1994-10-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3438 (1994) · source

  33. Whatever reservations were expressed when resolution 940 (1994) was adopted, no one can now refuse to acknowledge that without the deployment of the Multinational Force in Haiti President Aristide would not have returned to his country today and the Haitian people would have continued to suffer military dictatorship and to live in poverty. Hope has thus been restored to the people of Haiti, along with their ability freely to choose their own future. My delegation would like once again to pay a tribute to the leaders of the Multinational Force and all those participating in it. I would reiterate that my country will contribute substantially to the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), which we hope will take up its functions as quickly as possible.

    1994-10-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3437 (1994) · source

  34. This is a major success for the international community and for the Security Council, which, notwithstanding the many setbacks, has pursued the goal embodied in the Governors Island Agreement and reaffirmed in all the relevant resolutions of the Security Council. I am pleased that after these three long years Ambassador Longchamp is here with us today to share in this success. In this connection my delegation regrets that the Council was not able to hail this clear success of the international community with unanimity.

    1994-10-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3437 (1994) · source

  35. Mr. Merimee (France) (interpretation from French): Mr. President, the French delegation would like to express to you its pleasure at seeing you leading the work of the Council for this month with your well-known skill. I should also like to tell the Ambassador of Spain how grateful we are to him for the manner in which he performed his duties as President last month. My delegation voted with a very great sense of satisfaction in favour of the resolution welcoming the return of President Aristide to Haiti and recognizing the efforts of the Multinational Force that, in fact, made his return possible.

    1994-10-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3437 (1994) · source

  36. Thus this is undoubtedly the last time the Council will be called upon to extend its mandate in a routine manner. -.The next stage, therefore, will be crucial and UNPROFOR will have a central role to play in it. It will have to reassure those parties that, although in a position of military inferiority, have made the courageous choice to negotiate. It will have to prove to them that they were right to place their trust in the international community. This means that UNPROFOR will have to strive to ensure strict implementation of the Council's decisions, particularly those concerning safe areas. This might imply the use of force, if necessary, especially to ensure respect for the exclusion zones. The French Government therefore hopes that very explicit instructions along those lines will be issued to the leaders of the Force.

    1994-09-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3434 (1994) · source

  37. Nevertheless, it has performed its task admirably, averting the resumption of hostilities, providing protection for humanitarian assistance and preventing the extension of the conflict beyond the borders of the former Yugoslavia. In so doing, it has paid a heavy toll, for 118 Blue Helmets have died since the creation of the Force. My delegation would like once again to pay them a solemn tribute. Everyone is aware that we have undoubtedly reached a turning point in the history of the Force. Either a dynamic for peace will gain strength in the coming weeks, leading to the conclusion of an agreement that will be implemented in radically new circumstances, or, on the contrary, hope of a negotiated settlement will fade, and then decisions will inevitably have to be taken involving the withdrawal of UNPROFOR.

    1994-09-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3434 (1994) · source

  38. At a time when things are developing in such a manner that they may well eventually lead to the complete withdrawal of the United Nations presence from the tertitory of former Yugoslavia, my delegation feels it is legitimate to ask one simple question: Where would we be without UNPROFOR? For us, the answer is clear: There would be increased suffering for the civilian population, increased movements of refugees and irreversible developments on the ground that would confront the international community with an insoluble problem. In the worst-case scenario, there would be generalized conflict throughout the Balkans. Of course, it would have been nice if more could have been done. But UNPROFOR has neither 'the mandate nor the military means to impose peace.

    1994-09-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3434 (1994) · source

  39. Mr. Merimee (France) (interpretation from French): It is entirely right that the resolution we have just adopted should emphasize the essential role played by the United Nations Protection Force (OUNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslavia and pay tribute to the performance of those serving in that Force. The Force has been the target of some criticism - completely unwarranted, in the eyes of my delegation - which is especially paradoxical in that it has been voiced by those whose protection it provides or by some whose support for the cause they defend is usually purely verbal.

    1994-09-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3434 (1994) · source

  40. The time has truly come to convene the conference that has been postponed so often. Only a political solution will enable the economy and _ the institutions to be rebuilt with the assistance of the international community. But it is clear that the international community cannot take the place of the Somalis, who are solely responsible for their own future.

    1994-09-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3432 (1994) · source

  41. Thus, this debate must be based on precise information and recommendations of the Secretary-General, which he is to include in the report that he intends to submit to the Council on 15 October next. In any case, my country considers that the United Nations should continue, in one way or another, to play a role in Somalia, with a view to consolidating the achievements of UNOSOM, helping to achieve national reconciliation, if that is within the Organization's power, and providing humanitarian assistance and contributing to the reconstruction of the country. Until that debate takes place the Somali parties must be aware of the consequences of the decisions that the Council may have to adopt. France appeals to them once again to settle their quarrels and promote genuine national reconciliation.

    1994-09-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3432 (1994) · source

  42. Mr. Merimee (France) (interpretation from French): France has voted in favour of this technical resolution extending the mandate of UNOSOM until 31 October 1994. My country is aware that the lack of progress towards a political solution and the impotence of that force at this time justify a genuine, thorough debate in the Security Council - a debate after which decisions regarding the future of UNOSOM and the maintenance of the United Nations presence in Somalia should be taken. This summer, France supported a progressive reduction of UNOSOM forces with a view to the end of the operation in March 1995, as scheduled in Security Council resolutions. We still support that schedule, even if we are ready to participate in a debate on this subject. It would be a serious decision for the Security Council to terminate a force prematurely.

    1994-09-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3432 (1994) · source

  43. I recall in this respect that, as the French Minister for Foreign Affairs stated this morning, we are also going to lift the sanctions which we had adopted unilaterally when the technical conditions so permit.

    1994-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3430 (1994) · source

  44. It is a provision which is contained moreover in the Governors Island Agreement and in all of the resolutions of the Security Council. The situation has evolved very quickly in Haiti. It seems to us that the time has come to signal the fact that the return of the legitimate authorities will mark the beginning of normalization for Haiti: first political normalization, with the restoration of democracy, then economic normalization, giving this country an opportunity to return without restriction to the system of international trade. The lifting of the sanctions regime will in our view make it possible to consolidate democracy by ensuring the development of the country.

    1994-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3430 (1994) · source

  45. Mr. Merimee (France)(interpretation from French): It was with a feeling of hope that my delegation voted in favour of this resolution by which the Council decided to lift the sanctions against Haiti on the very day following the return of President Aristide. I am pleased that this resolution was co-sponsored by the legal Government of Haiti. France never gives its support lightheartedly to coercive measures against a country. It takes this difficult decision only if it is certain that there is no other way. We have always said that these sanctions, which have been voted on in several stages up to the level of a general embargo, with of course the exception of humanitarian products, would be lifted definitively following the return of the legitimate President.

    1994-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3430 (1994) · source

  46. For the Bosnians, it would mean military defeat, further exodus, more suffering for their people and perhaps the vanishing of any territorial base for the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina. At the same time, a lifting of the embargo would once again condemn the Serbs, united again in their determination, to remain indefinitely the outlaw among nations. Any possibility of a negotiated solution acceptable to the international community would be put off to some distant future. The approach proposed by the Contact Group - and we hope that in a few moments it will be endorsed by the Security Council - is a sensible one. We hope that after months of blindness all parties to the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina will resolutely commit themselves to it. 28

    1994-09-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3428 (1994) · source

  47. On the one hand, some hope that this will lead to some hypothetical outside military intervention which everyone knows would most likely come too late. On the other hand, some would see here an opportunity to extend their territorial gains and thus realize their fantasy of a Greater Serbia. In order to obtain these goals, all sides impatiently await a lifting of the arms embargo, which would be inevitable - as recalled by the five Ministers of the member States of the Contact Group in their most recent communique from Geneva - if there were no further prospect of a political solution. France has consistently stated that this lifting of the arms embargo would be a solution born out of despair.

    1994-09-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3428 (1994) · source

  48. It is quite natural that the draft resolutions which we will be adopting contain a number of unprecedented measures against the leaders of Pale - who are now subject to total economic, financial and human isolation - and send a message to the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to make it understand that it pays to cooperate with the Security Council and that it could pay even more if the leaders of that Government pursue their new policy. The adoption of these three texts will also mark a defeat for extremists of all stamps. Everyone is aware that the latter are determined to do anything to impede progress in the diplomatic process and that they ardently hope for a general resumption of hostilities.

    1994-09-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3428 (1994) · source

  49. Mr. Merimee (France) (interpretation from French): The adoption of the three draft resolutions before the Council could mark a turning-point in the handling of the Yugoslav crisis. Indeed, in these three decisions, the Council, we hope, will be taking note of a basic change 27 that came about in August. The territorial settlement proposed by the Contact Group has now been accepted by all parties concerned, with the exception of the Bosnian Serbs. This means that, for the first time, the Belgrade authorities have committed themselves unequivocally to a negotiated settlement and have begun to offer concrete proof of their determination. It is therefore essential that we encourage them to continue in this direction.

    1994-09-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3428 (1994) · source

  50. Before concluding, I should like to emphasize the special responsibility of the media that incite ethnic hatred and violence. France urges those in charge of the radio stations concerned, and primarily Radio Mille Collines, to put an end to this criminal propaganda. France will do all in its power to ensure the cessation of these broadcasts.

    1994-07-01 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3400 (1994) · source