YouSaid · the spoken record

Mogae

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75
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2016-02-19
most recent
2018-01-24
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7
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un-security-council

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  1. I wish to reiterate my firm belief that the South Sudanese parties should continually be encouraged by IGAD, by the African Union and by the Council to respect the commitments in the Agreement. Such commitment is even more vital as we reach the cusp of the formation of the new Government. There is little time to be lost if the next two and a half years - the transition period provided for in the Agreement - are to be meaningful and see genuine implementation of the Agreement's provisions. I thank the Security Council for its continued attention to the situation in South Sudan and urge that, at this critical time, the Council continue to focus on the situation in South Sudan.

    2016-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7663 (2016) · source

  2. As I said to the representatives of JMEC at our most recent meeting in Juba, without action on economic reform and restructuring, the Agreement will be imperilled. I urge the parties to consider what steps can be to taken immediately to mitigate the situation, as well as what steps can be taken immediately following formation of the new transitional government. The parties must also turn their attention to the resolution of the State's internal administrative boundaries. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) communique of 31 January, later endorsed by JMEC, outlines the formation of a new, ad-hoc national boundary commission to review the number of States and their boundaries. It is critical that this commission be quickly established to address the issue and prevent any further destabilization.

    2016-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7663 (2016) · source

  3. As I observed in my statement to the Council in February, the act of forming the new Government will not automatically relieve the humanitarian, development, political, military and economic crises that the country continues to face. While both the present Government and the SPLA in Opposition have vowed to strengthen their cooperation with the humanitarian response, and the Government has formally announced that all military units have been ordered to cooperate with the humanitarian response, the overall situation remains dire, with millions remaining at risk. In economic terms, South Sudan's economy is in desperate trouble and urgent measures are needed by both this Government and the next to address the situation and implement agreed reforms and procedures.

    2016-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7663 (2016) · source

  4. in Opposition representatives have confirmed that there are no further conditions or obstacles to the return of the First Vice President- designate, and therefore I am cautiously optimistic that the new Transitional Government will be in place by the middle of next month. While this is months behind schedule, it is a vital step forward in the implementation of the Agreement, which I welcome. That said, the parties can do more to prepare for the return of the First Vice President-designate to Juba and ensure that the formation of the new government is not itself destabilizing. Although developments in recent days are positive, there is still much work to be done by the parties and by the international community in support of a more robust peace in South Sudan.

    2016-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7663 (2016) · source

  5. The role of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan in the operation has been critical, not only in terms of making aircraft available, but also in providing crucial logistical support to this operation, both in Malakal and in Juba. Flights are planned to continue over the coming week, until the full complement of1,370 has been transported. Following the arrival of these forces, the First Vice President-designate, representing the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) in Opposition, has assured us that he will return to Juba, thus permitting the formation of the new government. SPLM.

    2016-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7663 (2016) · source

  6. The Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC) has publicly released these violation reports so that the full details ofthe investigation are made known to the South Sudanese and to the broader international community. Notwithstanding the continuing trend, in recent days there has been notable progress, and the formation of the Transitional Government of National Unity now seems within reach. In response to the plan for transitional security arrangements for Juba, the capital, which I issued on 23 February in my capacity as Chair of the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, the first of the 1,370 troops of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) in Opposition have now returned, by a combination of United Nations and charter aircraft.

    2016-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7663 (2016) · source

  7. Mr. Mogae: I thank you, Mr. President, for the opportunity to again address the Security Council. Following my last briefing to the Council on 19 February (see S/PV.7628), I must unfortunately report that the implementation of most aspects of the August 2015 Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan continues to be delayed. The key milestone for the initial element of the Agreement - the formation of the Transitional Government of National Unity - has yet to be reached. Violations of the permanent ceasefire also continue, as most recently documented by the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism, in the states of Upper Nile, Western Equatoria and Western Bahr el-Ghazal.

    2016-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7663 (2016) · source

  8. Focusing the attention of the parties on implementation, and showing that the consequences of failure have ramifications far beyond individual decision makers, is critical. I thank the Security Council for this opportunity and for its continued attention to the situation in South Sudan.

    2016-02-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7628 (2016) · source

  9. Finally, while the task of implementing vital economic, humanitarian and transitional justice processes should fall principally to the South Sudanese, the United Nations could assist with a number of them, including the provision of support to the African Union in its obligation to establish the independent hybrid judicial body, the hybrid court for South Sudan, and to the commission for truth, reconciliation and healing due to be established by the prospective Transitional Government of National Unity. The Agreement, as I said earlier, has great potential. But for that potential to be realized, no more time should be lost, and the pace of implementation must be accelerated.

    2016-02-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7628 (2016) · source

  10. I would request the Council to endorse the principles that underpin my intended plan - security arrangements that are appropriately phased, sequenced and realistic. Thirdly, given the fragility of the security situation in South Sudan, the continued risk of conflict and the ongoing insecurity affecting the humanitarian relief effort, the Council should demonstrate its resolve to take all necessary measures against those who seek to impede implementation of the Agreement, and to underscore the seriousness of the situation faced by the Sudanese people, half of whom are projected to need humanitarian support to survive.

    2016-02-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7628 (2016) · source

  11. Riek Machar, leader of the SPLM/A In Opposition, a letter in which he stated that he would travel to Juba to form the Transitional Government only once 2,910 of his police and troops were in place in the capital, with a further 1,200 police sent to Bor, Malakal and Bentiu. This proposal does not constitute a phased approach to the implementation of security arrangements for the capital, as outlined in the IGAD communique of 31 January. The time it would take to fully deploy these forces would incur further delay of the formation of the Transitional Government of National Unity. Therefore, I plan to offer a compromise proposal on security arrangements for Juba that would be sufficient to ensure security for Mr. Machar's return and consequently allow for the formation of the Transitional Government of National Unity.

    2016-02-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7628 (2016) · source

  12. First, the Council should unequivocally state that while the Agreement does not offer solutions to all problems or fulfil all of the objectives each party pursued militarily, its genuine provisions of compromise are worth implementing in the interests of peace and reform, and that continued renegotiation of the terms of the Agreement is not an option that will be entertained. Secondly, the Council should underscore the absolute urgency of completing the security arrangements necessary to establish the Transitional Government of National Unity, as already urged by IGAD and the African Union. In this regard, last night I received from Mr.

    2016-02-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7628 (2016) · source

  13. I am grateful for the willingness ofUNMISS to support the return of SPLM/A in Opposition personnel - both military and civilian - as the transitional security arrangements for Juba start to be implemented. I am grateful for the support of the United Nations to the work of the ceasefire monitors now deployed in 8 out of 10 locations, most recently Yambio and Aweil, as well as the soon to be formed area joint military ceasefire committees and joint military ceasefire teams, due to play a crucial role in the consolidation of the ceasefire. I urge the United Nations to continue to play a leading role in support of JMEC and in support of the Agreement. In support of the Agreement, I would request that the Security Council consider the following actions.

    2016-02-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7628 (2016) · source

  14. The South Sudanese parties should not believe that they can bypass the Agreement's commitments, difficult though they may be, or that any divergence in the views of the international community can be exploited for partisan interests. Continued pressure on the parties will remain necessary because the limits of time and political will remain significant constraints. Peace is the popular demand of the people of South Sudan. Unfortunately, among South Sudan's political leadership, the threat to resort to war in the event of political dispute arises all too frequently. The United Nations, both through the Security Council and through UNMISS, has a critical role to play.

    2016-02-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7628 (2016) · source

  15. Does the new Government demonstrate a commitment to the ambitious but necessary reform agenda provided for in the Agreement? Can the new Government consolidate peace and effectively manage the country, which is suffering from drastically reduced revenues but facing enormous needs? Will the new Government honour its commitments to accountability and reconciliation - processes that are desperately needed in the world's newest country? We in the international community must remain vigilant if we are to ensure that the Transitional Government is not only formed, but delivers on the promises and commitments contained in the Agreement. In order to accelerate implementation of the Agreement, a high-level, coordinated international effort, comparable to that which led to the signature of the Agreement in August 2015, must be maintained.

    2016-02-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7628 (2016) · source

  16. Despite the IGAD communique, which was subsequently unconditionally endorsed by the parties and the entire JMEC membership in Juba on 2 February, as of today we still do not have a Transitional Government of National Unity in place. We are, I believe, today closer to the formation of that new Government, but the mere act of formation will not deliver relief overnight, and does not necessarily mean that the path of implementation ahead will become any easier. The new Government must quickly confront the humanitarian, development, political and military crisis that the country continues to face. In addition to these facets of the crisis, the rapid deterioration of South Sudan's economic situation in recent months is an additional challenge. Therefore, the significance of the new Transitional Government will be determined by its performance.

    2016-02-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7628 (2016) · source

  17. The subsequent reset date, which should have led to the establishment of the Transitional Government of National Unity between 15 December 2015 and 15 January 2016, was also missed, as was a further date for the new Government's formation, in part because ofa number of new political obstacles, not least the creation by the present Government of new administrative boundaries within South Sudan. The calendar issued in my capacity as Chairperson of JMEC accelerated the implementation of the Agreement's provisions in the latter half of December 2015, and the obstacle of new administrative divisions, I hope, has been overcome by the latest communique offered by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in Addis Ababa on 31 January.

    2016-02-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7628 (2016) · source

  18. Two years after the conflict began, few yet have any confidence that they will be able to return to their homes and resume normal lives. This is because political progress has been so slow and because the provisions of the Agreement, while filled with potential, have yet to demonstrate real achievement on the ground for most. The current preoccupation of the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission remains the formation of the Transitional Government of National Unity, which should have been formed in November 2015 following the expiry of the Agreement's pretransitional period of 90 days.

    2016-02-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7628 (2016) · source

  19. Humanitarian agencies remain unable to preposition adequate supplies before the rainy season arrives, given general insecurity and access restrictions by the authorities on both sides. So there should be no doubt that South Sudan's leaders can, if they wish, act to ameliorate the conditions in which their people live. I witnessed the depths of the crisis when I travelled to Bor, Malakal and Bentiu - three of the conflict's worst-affected towns. Let me thank the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) for its facilitation of my travel to those areas. In those three towns, I met internally displaced persons who remain in United Nations protection of civilian sites in vast numbers, but who are, I understand, only a fraction of the population affected by the conflict and its resultant crisis.

    2016-02-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7628 (2016) · source

  20. Most recently, violence in Malakal over the past two days left at least 18 people dead, many hundreds more reportedly displaced, and significant damage to the United Nations protection-of- civilians camp, which is meant to be a place of refuge. I deplore this violence and call for a swift investigation to determine responsibility for these incidents. I urge all armed factions to show restraint. More broadly, across the country, access restrictions and localized insecurity have made the humanitarian response extraordinarily complicated, and large parts of the country, both directly and indirectly affected by the conflict, continue to face humanitarian catastrophe, for reasons that are largely within the control of political actors.

    2016-02-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7628 (2016) · source

  21. These achievements, though notable, should be seen in the context of a worrying escalation of instability and violence in other areas of the country, particularly in Western Equatoria and Western Bahr el-Ghazal, which were regions largely unaffected by the conflict that began in late 2013. Freedom of access of ceasefire monitors is a recurrent challenge, most recently in the vicinity of the town of Mundri, Western Equatoria. While the significant reduction in violence in the most conflict-affected states of Unity, Jonglei and Upper Nile is most welcome, even here the security situation remains fragile, and the tentative progress made is vulnerable to reversal if political dynamics shift. Even if mass violence has largely subsided in the areas that experienced the most intense conflict, serious incidents are still occurring.

    2016-02-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7628 (2016) · source

  22. Thirdly, some steps towards the formation of the Transitional Government of National Unity have been taken, including the amicable distribution of ministerial portfolios in the new Government, the appointment by President Salva Kiir of Mr. Riek Machar, in absentia, as First Vice-President, as provided for in the Agreement, and the start of redeployment of Government forces to locations at least 25 kilometres from the capital. And finally, and perhaps most crucially, the permanent ceasefire is largely holding in the former theatre of conflict of Greater Upper Nile, although as the latest events in Malakal amply demonstrate, violence continues to occur.

    2016-02-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7628 (2016) · source

  23. The parties have consistently demonstrated that there is still much distrust and reluctance to overcome. Before suggesting what could usefully be done to accelerate implementation, I should acknowledge the progress that has been made to date. First, after several months of discussion, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army In Opposition (SPLM/A In Opposition) advance team returned to the capital, Juba, in late December 2015, after JMEC intervened to determine the parameters for return. Secondly, JMEC and a number of other institutions provided for in the Agreement, such as the Joint Military Ceasefire Commission, the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism and the National Constitutional Amendment Committee, have begun to meet.

    2016-02-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7628 (2016) · source

  24. It is my duty to report that in the months intervening since the Agreement was signed and JMEC began its work, as I reported to the Peace and Security Council of the African Union about three weeks ago, the progress made to date in implementation has been limited and lags far behind the timetables specified in the Agreement and in subsequent arrangements between the parties themselves. Despite its imperfections, the Agreement provides the best opportunity for South Sudan to restore peace and stability. But the Agreement is only as strong as the political will that accompanies it, and, on this front, the resilience of the South Sudanese people continues to be severely tested by their leaders. Despite the repeated commitments leaders have made to uphold the Agreement, the test of timely implementation has not been met.

    2016-02-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7628 (2016) · source

  25. Mr. Mogae: Mr. President, I thank you for the opportunity to address the Security Council by video- teleconference today. In October 2015, I was appointed to chair the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC), the body charged with overseeing the implementation of the August 2015 Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan. The Agreement provides that the JMEC Chairperson may report to the Security Council at any time should there be need for remedial action in the implementation ofthe Agreement.

    2016-02-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7628 (2016) · source