YouSaid · the spoken record

Moreno-Ocampo

lines on the record: 318
first: 2005-06-29
most recent: 2012-06-05
sittings or episodes: 18
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“Osman's rights and invite him to present any exculpatory information, and it will check his intentions, including if he was aiming to further the criminal purposes of a group of perpetrators in Darfur. In that case, the Office will not hesitate to take appropriate action if the evidence leads to the conclusion that he is participating in the crimes.”
2012-06-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6778 (2012) · source
“Mr. Moreno-Ocampo: With due respect for the Council and the Government of the Sudan, it is my duty as Prosecutor to inform the Council and to put on notice the Ambassador of the Sudan, Mr. Daffa-Alla Elhag Ali Osman, that in accordance with article 25 3(d) of the Rome Statute, his activities denying crimes in Darfur could be considered part of those crimes. The Office has an obligation to investigate anyone responsible for the commission of crimes. The Office will therefore investigate if Mr. Daffa-Alla Elhag Ali Osman's denial of the crimes committed could be considered a contribution to a group of perpetrators acting with a common purpose. Since Nuremberg, it has been clear that obeying illegal orders is not a valid excuse for the commission of crimes. The Office will respect Mr.”
2012-06-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6778 (2012) · source
“UNAMID should not be authorized to carry out, or assist in securing, arrests. Instead, the Council can in due course evaluate other possibilities, including asking United Nations States Members or regional organizations to execute arrest operations in furtherance of the arrest warrants issued by the International Criminal Court. I understand that such decisions would be problematic, but the victims will receive a message, namely, that they are not being ignored. The perpetrators will receive a different, clear message, that is, that there will be no impunity.”
2012-06-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6778 (2012) · source
“The next phase in these Darfur cases is to arrest those indicted. The failure to arrest and surrender Mr. Harun, Mr. Kushayb, Mr. Hussein and President Al-Bashir is a direct challenge to the Council's authority. It is for the Council to determine the measures to be adopted to ensure the compliance of the Government of the Sudan with Security Council resolutions. The reality is that Council members have to reconcile their national interests with their responsibilities for peace and security. I have witnessed where they have done so. I have witnessed the impact of the Security Council acting with consensus. My Office would like to contribute by presenting an option that the Council could explore in due time. The execution of the arrest warrants on Sudanese territory is the primary responsibility of the Government of the Sudan.”
2012-06-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6778 (2012) · source
“A few months ago, the Council also expressed regret that some individuals affiliated with the Government of the Sudan and armed groups in Darfur had continued to commit violence against civilians, impede the peace process and disregard the demands of the Council. The situation is therefore clear. Implementing the arrest warrant issued by the Court will produce a dramatic change in Darfur. Interestingly, in a normal criminal case, it is difficult to locate the fugitives; in this case it is easy. The whereabouts of the four fugitives in Darfur cases are known. Ali Kushayb remains in Darfur, Ahmad Harun can be found in the Governor's residence in Southern Kordofan, Abdelrahim Mohamed Hussein sits in his office at the Ministry of Defence in Khartoum, and Al-Bashir can be found in the Presidential Palace in Khartoum.”
2012-06-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6778 (2012) · source
“Recently, on 17 February, resolution 2035 (2012) was adopted, demanding an end to military action, including aerial bombardments, and an end to sexual violence and indiscriminate attacks on civilians. The resolution also expressed concerns about obstacles deliberately placed in the way of the work of the Panel of Experts and that of the United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). The resolution also called for the Government of the Sudan to undertake effective efforts to ensure accountability for serious violations of international law and to ensure unrestricted humanitarian access.”
2012-06-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6778 (2012) · source
“The international community chases promises of peace agreements that are systematically ignored while President Al-Bashir's force commits more attacks and creates the conditions for new promises of peace agreements. The fifth aspect is the announcement of justice initiatives that are followed only by new announcements, not by action. After more than seven years of instituting judicial mechanisms, the Government of the Sudan has conducted no proceedings relevant to the crimes committed in Darfur. The sixth element entails open defiance of the authority of the Security Council, including through public announcements that Council resolutions will not be implemented. The Council is well aware of this situation.”
2012-06-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6778 (2012) · source
“The second element includes the denial ofthose same crimes and of the rapes in the villages and in the camps, attributing the killings to banditry and sporadic clashes between rebel groups or reducing their relevance through statistical comparisons and attributing conditions in the camps to different factors, such as drought, lack of proper seeds or inability to access farm land. The third factor I would like to mention in the strategy of President Al-Bashir is the forcing of the international community into a never-ending negotiation in order to gain access to displaced victims. The fourth factor is the permanent promise of peace negotiations.”
2012-06-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6778 (2012) · source
“The evidence collected uncovered the functioning of a State apparatus used to commit genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. Those who bear the greatest responsibility have been indicted. The current challenge is their arrest. In accordance with resolution 1593 (2005), the Government of the Sudan has the legal obligation to implement the arrest warrants. However, President Al-Bashir is taking advantage of his position of power to continue with his strategy and to ensure his own impunity and that of those who follow his instructions. There is no information to believe that the crimes against humanity and genocide have stopped. The report is clear that President Al-Bashir's strategy includes, first, threats to the international community to commit new crimes in other areas of the Sudan.”
2012-06-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6778 (2012) · source
“I would like to clarify that the responsibility of those individuals is not a simple consequence of their official roles. In all the cases, the Office collected information and there are witnesses that describe in detail their active participation in the strategy to commit crimes - in the gathering of forces, in the financing, in actually committing the attacks, in supervising operations and in protecting the attackers. The charges against President Al-Bashir include the crime of genocide. The Pre-Trial Chamber concluded that Omar Al-Bashir acted with specific intent to destroy in part the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa ethnic groups. In all of those cases the Pre-Trial Chamber considered that arrests were necessary in order to stop the commission of crimes. The Court fulfilled its judicial mandate.”
2012-06-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6778 (2012) · source
“My Office is prepared to discuss the matter in the courtroom, at The Hague, or before the judges. That is where we discuss evidence. Ten judges, members of the Pre-Trial and Appeals Chambers, discussed the value of the evidence collected by the Office of the Prosecutor. They concluded that the forces of the Government of the Sudan had committed war crimes and crimes against humanity in Darfur following a strategy adopted in the higher echelons of the State apparatus. The Pre-Trial Chamber identified the individuals who would have to face justice and issued arrests warrants against a militia/Janjaweed leader, Ali Kushayb, who reported to the then Minister of State for the Interior, Ahmed Harun, who in turn reported to the then Minister of the Interior, Abdelrahim Mohamed Hussein, who ultimately reported to President Al-Bashir.”
2012-06-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6778 (2012) · source
“The Office of the Prosecutor conducted an impartial investigation, receiving documents collected by the United Nations Commission of Inquiry, as well as reports from the Government of the Sudan itself, which even authorized us to interview a general as a suspect in Khartoum. To respect its duty to protect witnesses, my Office has had to investigate the crimes without visiting the crime scene. Members of the Office of the Prosecutor have travelled around the world collecting hundreds of testimonies of victims and eyewitnesses who had escaped from the Sudan. Most of our evidence is confidential so as to protect the lives of the witnesses and their relatives. During the previous briefing (see S/PV.6688), the Sudan challenged the value of the evidence.”
2012-06-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6778 (2012) · source
“Mr. Moreno-Ocampo: As former Costa Rican Minister for Foreign Affairs Bruno Stagno Ugarte stated in the Security Council in 2008, the "never again" promise is being tested in the Sudan (see S/PV.5905). With resolution 1593 (2005), the Council took the initiative to refer a situation involving ongoing atrocities to a permanent, existing court. That was a conscious decision, namely, that a judicial investigation of the facts and the identification of those responsible should not wait for the end ofthe conflict. In fact, the ability of the Court to implement its mandate immediately was a crucial factor mentioned by members of the Council in adopting that resolution. Investigating Darfur was an enormous challenge for the Court. There were serious allegations of thousands of crimes committed in a vast territory by different parties.”
2012-06-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6778 (2012) · source
“Recently, during my April visit to Tripoli and Misrata, members of the National Transitional Council and of the Libyan public expressed their deep appreciation for the decisive intervention of the Security Council and the International Criminal Court. They started the rebellion, requesting justice for the crimes committed in Abu Salim prison on 29 June 1996, because they believed that, under the Al-Qadhafi regime, there would be no justice in Libya. Now, the Government has expressed both its gratitude and its conviction that it should seize this historical moment to provide justice for all Libyan victims. They believe in that possibility. My Office remains committed to working with the Government of Libya and with the Council to maintain this common effort and to ensure that justice for all of the victims of Libya is achieved.”
2012-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6772 (2012) · source
“3 I would like to conclude by emphasizing again the importance of the adoption by consensus of resolution 1970 (2011), which defined the need to do justice in Libya to ensure peace and security. Such consensus was also expressed during my previous briefings and in the recently adopted resolution 2040 (2012), which states that the Council is "[l]ooking forward to a future for Libya based on national reconciliation, justice, respect for human rights and the rule of law" (resolution 2040 (2012), fourth preambnlar paragraph). This commitment to justice and the rule of law plays a crucial role in the current post-conflict situation; it provides a framework for the national authorities to act.”
2012-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6772 (2012) · source
“The Government of Libya has adopted a transitional justice law creating a fact- finding and a reconciliation commission that could contribute to strengthening the rule of law in the country. My Office will fulfil its mandate to investigate those who bear the greatest responsibility for the most serious crimes under the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, while respecting genuine national proceedings. The Office will monitor Libya's national proceedings closely. My Office is also gathering information about the activities outside Libya of high-level Al-Qadhafi officials who were allegedly involved in Rome Statute crimes and who reportedly continue to seek to destabilize the situation in Libya.”
2012-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6772 (2012) · source
“It was one of the many thousands of cases that the authorities had to deal with. But the authorities released the man, because there was no evidence and no witnesses against him. The father asked me what he should do. He had weapons; should he kill the man? But he said he did not want to be a killer. He only wanted justice for his son. This was just one example of the thousands of similar problems that Libya will have to face in the coming months. At the same time, all unofficial and unacknowledged detention centres should be dismantled and all possible steps taken to curb mistreatment or torture. The Government of Libya has expressed its commitment to conducting investigations and prosecutions to address the most serious crimes committed by all sides.”
2012-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6772 (2012) · source
“The strategy must address as a priority the transfer to the central authorities and the screening of thousands of detainees, the investigation of whether allegations of crimes by those detainees where warranted, measures to ensure justice for the victims and the release of those against whom there is no basis for investigation. Allow me to share with the Council a personal experience I had when I visited Tripoli. I was in the lobby of my hotel and a man approached me and showed me his nine-year-old son. He said that he had been exposed on television holding a flag of the rebellion, and then the Al-Qadhafi forces targeted him, captured him and raped him in a tank. He was able to trace the perpetrator, who was arrested. That is why I find it relevant to tell this story.”
2012-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6772 (2012) · source
“The Office of the Prosecutor takes due note of the Commission of Inquiry's findings. The Office has no jurisdiction to evaluate the proper scope of the NATO mandate in relation with resolution 1973 (2011), but the Office is requesting further information about those five incidents identified by the Commission of Inquiry. The Government of Libya has committed to a comprehensive strategy to address all crimes and end 12-34157 impunity in Libya. While the Government faces challenges on many fronts, that comprehensive strategy must remain a priority if the Government is to show that impunity will no longer be tolerated.”
2012-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6772 (2012) · source
“There are thousands of allegations of crimes committed by Al-Qadhafi forces and thousands of individuals allegedly involved in such crimes who are in detention. Many of them are still not under the jurisdiction of the national authorities and allegedly subjected to mistreatment or torture by rebel forces. There are also allegations of crimes committed against civilians in Tawergha, and questions remain to be answered about the circumstances of the death of Muammar Al-Qadhafi. Additionally, the United Nations Commission of Inquiry found that NATO did not deliberately target civilians in Libya. Of a total of 25,944 air strikes and 7,642 air-to-surface weapons employed, the Commission cited evidence with respect to five air strikes that reportedly produced civilian casualties.”
2012-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6772 (2012) · source
“He is subject to extradition requests from France and Libya, as well as a request for surrender from the International Criminal Court. Mauritania shall decide. My Office continues to collect evidence in relation to a second case in Libya on gender crimes committed against men and women alike. The United Nations Commission of Inquiry's findings confirmed the commission of those crimes. My Office is mindful of the sensitivity surrounding rape in Libya and has adopted a strategy to limit the exposure of victims by focusing on obtaining evidence from doctors and soldiers. The investigation is progressing. The report of the Commission of Inquiry issued on 2 March 2012 (A/HRC/ 17/44) presents a comprehensive view of the crimes committed in Libya.”
2012-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6772 (2012) · source
“The Prosecution will present its observations on this admissibility challenge, as requested by the Pre-Trial Chamber, on 4 June. Let me be clear. There are no doubts on the legal principles. The Rome Statute is based on the primacy of national proceedings. As mentioned on numerous occasions in relation to Darfur and other situations, the 12-34157 Office will not evaluate the Libyan judicial system as a whole. The Office will check the factual situation in accordance with the Statute's requirements, which include the intervention of an independent and impartial judiciary. The Security Council may decide to present observations, but this is a judicial issue that will be decided by the judges of the Pre-Trial Chamber. Abdullah Al-Senussi was also arrested on 17 March 2012 by Mauritanian authorities.”
2012-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6772 (2012) · source
“Rule 59 of the ICC rules of procedure and evidence provides that those who have referred a situation, in this case the Security Council, must be notified of the challenge and may in response make representation on the jurisdictional challenges. The Registry has transmitted the notification through a note verbale to the Secretary-General. This is the first time in the brief history of the International Criminal Court that a State has requested jurisdiction to conduct a national investigation against the same individual and for the same incidents under investigation by the International Criminal Court. The challenge goes to the heart of the system of justice established in 1998 by the Rome Statute. National States have the primary obligation to conduct proceedings and the International Criminal Court intervention shall be complementary.”
2012-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6772 (2012) · source
“Libyan authorities also said that Saif Al-Islam has been kept in adequate conditions of detention, provided with sufficient and good quality food, and given access to the ICC and the option of retaining a domestic lawyer of his choosing. He has also received visits from the International Committee of the Red Cross, non-governmental organizations and family members, been provided with proper medical and dental care, and not been subject to physical abuse. That is what the Libyan Government presented to the judges. Following the submission of the Libyan admissibility challenge, the Pre-Trial Chamber requested observations from different parties to the proceedings, as well as from the Security Council.”
2012-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6772 (2012) · source
“Today, I inform the Council that the Libyan authorities have arrested Saif Al-Islam Al-Qadhafi and 2 presented such a challenge. The application was filed on 1 May and notes that, on 8 January 2012, the Libyan Prosecutor-General commenced an investigation of serious crimes, which include murder and rape, allegedly committed by Saif Al-Islam Al-Qadhafi during the 2011 revolution, including in the period between 15 and 28 February 2011. The filing also states that the Libyan Government is committed to attaining the highest international standards both for the conduct of its investigations and any eventual trials.”
2012-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6772 (2012) · source
“When I briefed the Council for the second time (see S/PV.6647), we explained that the arrest warrants issued by the judges on 27 June detailed the crimes committed against civilians in Tripoli and other areas under the control of Al-Qadhafi. The judges concluded that in order to stop the crimes and protect civilians it was necessary to arrest the three individuals identified as the most responsible: Muammar Al-Qadhafi, Saif Al-Islam Al-Qadhafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi. The Office informed the Libyan authorities that, should they decide to prosecute the same individuals for the same crimes under investigation by the International Criminal Court (ICC), they should submit an admissibility challenge that would be decided by the ICC judges.”
2012-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6772 (2012) · source
“Mr. Moreno-Ocampo: It is my honour to present my third briefing to the Security Council on the activities of the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court on the situation in Libya in furtherance of resolution 1970 (2011). At the meeting when I first briefed the Council (see S/PV.6528), I emphasized the importance of the Council's consensus adoption of resolution 1970 (2011) and announced that we would request arrest warrants in subsequent weeks. That significant consensus greatly enhanced the cooperation my Office has received and allowed it to present a first case in the space of a few months.”
2012-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6772 (2012) · source
“The African Union and the League of Arab States should play a central role to achieve a solution that respects the Security Council's authority and the Judges' decisions. The Government of the Sudan has to review its policy and receive a clear message and adjust to the world. People in Darfur need the Security Council's leadership.”
2011-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6688 (2011) · source
“Civilians in Darfur continue to be subject to indiscriminate aerial bombardment, despite numerous injunctions by the Council that such bombardments cease. Likewise, the numerous injunctions by the Council that the militia/Janjaweed be disarmed have not resulted in their disarmament. It is very easy to produce a long list of false promises and refusals to abide by previous commitments. The execution of the arrest warrants will end the crimes in Darfur. In the coming months, the Court will decide on the arrest warrant requested against Minister of Defence Hussein. Such a decision will provide a new opportunity to the Council to develop a strategy to implement resolution 1593 (2005) and presidential statement S/PRST/2008/2 1. My next report, in June 2012, could offer an opportunity to establish consensus on the way forward.”
2011-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6688 (2011) · source
“In conclusion, the arrest warrants issued by the International Criminal Court shall be implemented. The Security Council resolutions shall be respected. Millions of civilians in Darfur shall be protected. The individuals sought by the Court are still allegedly committing genocide and crimes against humanity in Darfur. It is the case that the world knows where the fugitives from the Court are, for they are in official positions, controlling the Government of the Sudan and commanding military operations in different parts of the Sudan. Harun is the Governor of Southern Kordofan state, presenting himself as the man to solve problems. The attempts to appease them and reward them with money and recognition are not working.”
2011-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6688 (2011) · source
“The Chamber found that "customary international law creates an exception to Head of State immunity when international courts seek a Head of State's arrest for the commission of international crimes. There is no conflict between Malawi's obligations towards the Court and its obligations under customary international law". Therefore, the Chamber concluded, article 98(1) of the Statute does not apply. Furthermore, the Chamber decided that Malawi had failed to comply with its obligations to consult with the Chamber and failed to cooperate with the Court by failing to arrest and surrender President Al-Bashir. A similar decision was taken a day later by Pre-Trial Chamber I in relation to Chad. The Security Council and the Assembly of States parties were informed of both decisions.”
2011-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6688 (2011) · source
“On 28 November, the High Court of Kenya implemented an arrest warrant against President Al-Bashir following the decision of the International Criminal Court. President Al-Bashir retaliated diplomatically against the Kenyan decision and threatened economic and trade sanctions. Most importantly, Malawi - pursuant to the argument laid out in the African Union resolution that I cited earlier fl recently refused to arrest President Al-Bashir. However, on 12 December, Pre-Trial Chamber I issued a decision pursuant to article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the failure by the Republic of Malawi to comply with the cooperation requests issued by the court with respect to the arrest and surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir.”
2011-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6688 (2011) · source
“Muammar Al-Qadhafi supported this campaign and, as the Chairman of the African Union, at the last minute of the African Union Summit in Sirte, on 3 July 2009, he promoted the adoption of the following clause: "In view of the fact that the request by the African Union for an article 16 deferral had never been acted upon, the African Union Member States shall not cooperate pursuant to the provisions of article 98 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court relating to immunities, for the arrest and surrender of President Omar Al-Bashir of the Sudan". On 26 May 2010, Pre-Trial Chamber I decided that the Government of the Sudan was not cooperating with the Court, in violation of resolution 1593 (2005) and communicated this decision to the Security Council. Cooperation is being extended by other countries.”
2011-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6688 (2011) · source
“However, in 2007, after the issuance of the arrest warrant against Harun and Kushayb, President Al-Bashir publicly refused to implement them, challenged the Security Council's authority and stated that Harun had done what he had been ordered to do. In 2009, after the Court issued an arrest warrant against him, President Al-Bashir expelled humanitarian organizations that provided more than half of the total amount of aid delivered. He confirmed his criminal plans to exterminate those ethnic groups displaced. In addition, President Al-Bashir blackmailed the international community by threatening to commit the same crimes in the south of the country, threatening the North-South peace process. President Al-Bashir was trying to avoid isolation and campaigned at the African Union and elsewhere for political support.”
2011-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6688 (2011) · source
“We are still evaluating the responsibility of Mr. Abu Garda, the leader of the rebel attack, against whom charges were not confirmed. These are the persons identified as most responsible for the most serious crimes committed in Darfur over the past six years. In order to facilitate any decision of the Council, I want to state that there is no sealed arrest warrant requested or pending. There is no other case at this stage. My duty as Prosecutor is to galvanize efforts to implement the arrest warrants issued by the Court. In accordance with resolution 1593 (2005), the Government of the Sudan has the legal obligation to cooperate with the International Criminal Court.”
2011-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6688 (2011) · source
“The two commanders charged, Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain and Saleh Mohammed Jerbo Jamus, are members of the Zaghawa, one of the ethnic groups targeted by President Al-Bashir. On 17 June 2010, they appeared voluntarily before the Court and both have committed to surrender to the Court for trial. The trial should start in 2012. Interestingly, the rebel commanders accepted their actual participation in the attack and are contesting only three specific issues at trial: Whether the attack was unlawful; whether they knew it to be so; and, most importantly, whether the African Union Mission in the Sudan was a peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. If such issues are settled in favour of the Prosecution, the accused persons will plead guilty to the charges against them. These are the cases.”
2011-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6688 (2011) · source
“11-63973 That was the conclusion reached by the Pre-Trial Chamber on 4 March 2009, when it issued an arrest warrant against President Al-Bashir for war crimes and crimes against humanity, including the crimes of extermination and rape. More than one year later, on 12 July 2010, Pre-Trial Chamber I issued a second arrest warrant for President Al-Bashir for three counts of genocide, including rape as a form of genocide and genocide by deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about physical destruction. In our third case, we are prosecuting two commanders of the rebel groups that attacked African Union peacekeepers in their base at Haskanita in September 2007. They killed 12 African Union peacekeepers, looted the entire base, and left thousands of people displaced in the area without protection.”
2011-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6688 (2011) · source
“President Al-Bashir confirmed his genocidal intentions by ordering a different type of attack against those in the camps through rape and hunger. President Al-Bashir appointed Ahmed Harun Minister of State for Humanitarian Affairs to be in charge of the victims he had displaced. As of September 2005, Harun obstructed humanitarian efforts each step of the way. The crimes of extermination and genocide under article 6(c) do not require killing by bullets. They consist of intentionally inflicting conditions of life - such as the deprivation of access to food and medicine * calculated to bring about the destruction of part of a population or a group.”
2011-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6688 (2011) · source
“Hussein played a central role in coordinating the crimes, including in recruiting, mobilizing, funding, arming, training and deploying the militia/Janjaweed as part of the Government of the Sudan forces, with the knowledge that these forces would commit crimes. In the second case, the Office identified the responsibility of the President of the Sudan, Mr. Al-Bashir. He launched attacks against villages and publicly instructed his forces to take no prisoners or wounded, but to leave behind only scorched Earth. President Al-Bashir's genocidal intentions were clear when he denied any assistance to entire groups forced out of their homes to inhospitable areas. They were condemned to die in the desert. The United Nations and other humanitarian agencies saved lives by setting up the largest humanitarian operation in the world.”
2011-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6688 (2011) · source
“A few days ago, the Office requested an additional warrant of arrest for then Minister of the Interior Abdelrahim Mohamed Hussein, who is currently Minister of Defence. We are charging him with the same crimes charged in the case Prosecutor vs. Harun and Knshayb, thus expanding the number of suspects in the first case. The evidence shows that Mr. Hussein was also involved in the crimes committed by his subordinate Harun. Between 2003 and 2005, Mr. Hussein was the Minister of the Interior and Special Representative of the President in Darfur, with all of the powers and responsibilities of the President. Mr. Hussein delegated some of his responsibilities to his deputy, Mr. Harun, but the evidence shows that, directly and through Mr. Harun, Mr.”
2011-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6688 (2011) · source
“The evidence showed the role of the then Minister of State for the Interior, Ahmad Harun, as the coordinator of the Government of the Sudan forces and of militia/Janjaweed leader Ali Kushayb as the ground commander of some of the attacks. On 27 April 2007, Pre-Trial Chamber I issued arrest warrants against both individuals for war crimes and crimes against humanity. The Chamber found that the crimes were the consequence of a coordinated effort supervised by a clear chain of command. The Pre-Trial Chamber ruled that local security committees had coordinated those attacks. They were supervised 2 by State security committees, which reported to Mr. Harun, acting at the Darfur security desk.”
2011-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6688 (2011) · source
“Mr. Moreno-Ocampo: I am honoured to brief the Security Council on the activities of the International Criminal Court following the adoption of resolution 1593 (2005). As the Council will recall, in our first case, we investigated attacks by the forces of the Government of the Sudan against the civilian population during the period from 2003 to 2005. The evidence showed that the Sudanese Armed Forces would bomb villages in Darfur and surround them, and then ground troops would move in to kill, rape and pillage civilians in their homes. Those attacks forced the displacement of 4 million civilians to a hostile environment.”
2011-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6688 (2011) · source
“This is a matter currently under discussion and will be decided in December 2011 at the upcoming session of the Assembly of States Parties.”
2011-11-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6647 (2011) · source
“The Office is coordinating with Commission Chairperson Philippe Kirsch. At its third briefing to the Security Council in May 2012, the Office will be prepared to present to the Security Council a comprehensive report on the crimes allegedly committed by the different parties in Libya since 15 February 2011 and the existence of genuine national proceedings. In summary, the Office will continue investigations into Saif Al-Islam Al-Qadhafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi and into rapes. As I have said, in May we will present a comprehensive analysis of the crimes allegedly committed and on the possibility for further investigations. I should clarify that the possibility of carrying out all of these investigations will depend on the budget available to the Office.”
2011-11-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6647 (2011) · source
“The Office has been informed that the new Libyan authorities are in the process of preparing a comprehensive strategy to address these allegations, including the circumstances surrounding the death of Muammar Al-Qadhafi. In accordance with the Rome Statute, the International Criminal Court should not intervene if there are genuine national proceedings. Should the Libyan authorities decide to prosecute the case we are investigating * that of Saif al-Islam Al-Qadhafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi - for the same 3 crimes, they should submit an admissibility challenge, and it will be for the International Criminal Court's judges to decide. In assessing the situation, the Office will benefit from the work of the United Nations Commission of Enquiry, which should present a report in March 2012.”
2011-11-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6647 (2011) · source
“We have some evidence showing that commanders gave orders to commit rape in the Western Mountains area and our screening of possible witnesses indicates that Muammar Al-Qadhafr himself, Al-Senussi and other high officials were discussing the use of rape to persecute those considered dissidents or rebels. In conclusion, there are allegations of crimes committed by NATO forces; allegations of crimes committed by forces of the National Transitional Council, including the alleged detention of civilians suspected to be mercenaries and the alleged killing of detained combatants; and allegations of additional crimes committed by Al-Qadhafi forces. These allegations will be examined impartially and independently by the Office.”
2011-11-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6647 (2011) · source
“While it is premature to draw conclusions about specific numbers, the information and evidence indicate at this stage that hundreds of rapes occurred during the conflict. The investigation will benefit from a reporting system that has been set up by the Libyan authorities through the Ministry of Women's and Social Affairs, with the purpose of affording rape victims the opportunity to come forward. The Office of the Prosecutor has also interviewed a limited number of victims who were kidnapped and raped in unknown, secret detention centres. The information and evidence thus far collected do not yet indicate who may be most responsible for such gender crimes.”
2011-11-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6647 (2011) · source
“With respect to the second aspect of the investigation, the Prosecution is mindful that, in Libya, rape is considered to be one of the most serious crimes, affecting not just the victim, but also the family and the community, and can trigger retaliation and honour- based violence. Accordingly, the Prosecution has adopted a strategy that seeks to limit the exposure of 11-57695 victims. The Office is organizing its investigation by focusing on obtaining alternate evidence and identifying avenues of investigation that support charges without the need for multiple victim statements. In this respect, the Prosecution has been in contact with different sources reporting multiple victims of sexual violence allegedly committed by Al-Qadhafi security forces.”
2011-11-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6647 (2011) · source
“The Office will continue to search out the personal assets of Saif Al-Islam Al-Qadhafr and Abdullah Al-Senussi for the potential benefit of the victims, through reparations awarded by the Court. Since the opening of the investigation, the Office has been in contact with the Sanctions Committee, which is assisted by a Panel of Experts, and with INTERPOL to coordinate its investigative efforts in relation to the personal assets of the suspects. In late September, the Court sent requests for assistance to Libya, States parties and five Security Council non-State parties to identify, trace, seize and freeze all the personal assets of the suspects. The Office encourages the Security Council and States to assist the Court in identifying and freezing these assets.”
2011-11-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6647 (2011) · source
“Over this past weekend, the Office conducted its first assessment mission in Libya in order to prepare for the collection of further evidence in the territory where the alleged crimes took place. The Office coordinated with local authorities and local civil society. The Office met with various local committees mandated to investigate crimes committed by different parties in Libya. The current focus of the investigations is twofold. First, it continues the collection of evidence against Saif Al-Islam Al-Qadhafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi in preparation for their eventual trial. Secondly, the Office is continuing its investigations into gender crimes committed in Libya.”
2011-11-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6647 (2011) · source