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Mukongo

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2023-10-16
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2023-12-19
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un-security-council

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  1. We also thank the members of the Security Council for the efforts made, and in particular France, the African members of the Council and all partner countries, with whom we worked in close cooperation to make possible today’s adoption of resolution 2717 (2023), which enshrines the approach jointly agreed between the United Nations and the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo with a view to MONUSCO’s withdrawal. The meeting rose at 10.20 a.m.

    2023-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9512 (2023) · source

  2. Mr. Mukongo (Democratic Republic of the Congo) (spoke in French): On behalf of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and of the Congolese people, I sincerely thank the Security Council for having so swiftly agreed to our request to expand the logistical support of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) to provinces not initially covered by the current mandate, so as to effectively carry out the electoral process under way, which today has reached the stage of the end of campaigning and the beginning of the actual process itself, which will make it possible for the Congolese to go to the polls tomorrow.

    2023-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9512 (2023) · source

  3. Mr. Mukongo (Democratic Republic of the Congo) (spoke in French): I have spoken at length and have no intention of taking up much more of the Council’s time. I would simply like to respond to the representative of Rwanda. I would first like to congratulate Rwanda on being so up-to-date about everything that is happening in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. We ourselves are less certain about what is happening in Rwanda. They are very interested in what is happening in our country and we commend them for that. However, I would just like to point out that when it comes to genocide and genocidal discourse, which has become virtually a leitmotif in the language of Rwandan officials, if there is a reference point for genocide in Africa, it will not be found in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. That is all I wanted to say.

    2023-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9500 (2023) · source

  4. In conclusion, I want to assure the Security Council that the Democratic Republic of the Congo is staunchly committed to the new advances in the disengagement of MONUSCO. Backsliding is no longer an option. The only option is to move forward constructively and to meet any challenges in the operationalization of the disengagement plan proactively and creatively. Its provisions and other flexible clauses are all assets that can be leveraged in the light of any challenges that may arise. The clear vision of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo is to ensure that the disengagement plan becomes a model for other United Nations peacekeeping mission withdrawals and disengagements.

    2023-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9500 (2023) · source

  5. Lastly, to once again paraphrase my country’s Foreign Minister, the Council must act before it is too late. It is time to ensure accountability for the crimes that Rwanda has perpetrated against the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as well as the crimes of the M-23 on Congolese territory. It is high time to raise our voices and call firmly on the members of the M-23 to lay down their weapons, go to the cantonment zones provided to that end and join the Demobilization, Disarmament, Community Recovery and Stabilization Programme. It is also time to tell Rwanda to withdraw its troops from the Democratic Republic of the Congo unconditionally and to end its support for the M-23.

    2023-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9500 (2023) · source

  6. Other important or subsidiary tasks will also be considered for the mandate insofar as they do not prejudice the main goal of disengagement. The MONUSCO disengagement plan to which we agreed — or better still, MONUSCO’s withdrawal — is not an end in and of itself. The Security Council, which is responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security, will remain seized of the situation in our country. It cannot absolve itself of its obligation to bring an end to the insecurity plaguing the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Council possesses the legal and political capabilities and the resources needed to compel all of the recalcitrant parties to fully implement the road map resulting from the Nairobi and Luanda processes and thereby end the dangerous stalemate in the security crisis.

    2023-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9500 (2023) · source

  7. With regard to the renewal of MONUSCO’s mandate, my Government has demonstrated its flexibility by accepting that the joint disengagement plan will be implemented over the course of another year. The few major areas that MONUSCO will have to tackle are the protection of civilians in all its complexity, which is my Government’s main priority; support for security-sector reform; support to the Congolese national police and armed forces; the transfer of capacities to strengthen ownership; support for the Demobilization, Disarmament, Community Recovery and Stabilization Programme; advocacy for new programming frameworks in support of the Programme; support for joint operations with the FARDC; support to the general elections in December; and support for the regional forces officially engaged on the ground in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

    2023-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9500 (2023) · source

  8. Christophe Lutundula Apala Pen’apala stated in his most recent address to the Council on 28 September (see S/PV.9427), that the priority and urgency at present for the Democratic Republic of the Congo in terms of security are the end of Rwandan aggression and the withdrawal of its troops from North Kivu; the eradication of armed terrorist groups in the Congo, including the M-23; the return of displaced persons to their homes; the restoration of Congolese State authority in the territories occupied by the M-23 and the implementation of the Disarmament, Demobilization, Community Recovery and Stabilization Programme — in short, the restoration of peace and security throughout the country.

    2023-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9500 (2023) · source

  9. And lastly, there must be a resumption and continuation of political consultations between the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and local armed groups, within the framework of the Nairobi process; the resumption of bilateral dialogue between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda, with a view to normalizing diplomatic relations and resuming cooperation; the examination and resolution of the issue of the return of all refugees to their countries of origin; and the continuation of coordination meetings at all levels between the Luanda process and the Nairobi process. In short, it is essential to recall, as my Minister for Foreign Affairs, His Excellency Mr.

    2023-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9500 (2023) · source

  10. Fourthly, there must be disarmament and cantonment of the M-23 on Congolese territory, under the control of the FARDC and the ad hoc verification mechanism, with the collaboration of MONUSCO. Fifthly, displaced persons must be allowed to return to their homes.

    2023-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9500 (2023) · source

  11. Furthermore, dialogue is one of the stages set out in the Luanda road map. In that regard, it is important to recall that the Luanda road map, among other things, provides for the following stages. First, there must be a cessation of hostilities in general and in particular of the M-23’s attacks against the Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo and MONUSCO. Secondly, the M-23 must withdraw from the occupied zones and return to its initial positions on Mount Sabyinyo, on the Democratic Republic of the Congo side, under the control of the FARDC, the regional force and the ad hoc mechanism, in collaboration with MONUSCO. Thirdly, all political-military support for the M-23 and all other local and foreign armed groups operating in the east of the Democratic Republic of Congo and the region must cease.

    2023-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9500 (2023) · source

  12. Without recalling the spirit of openness of President Tshisekedi Tshilombo who, at the start of his mandate, embraced dialogue with neighbouring countries, in particular Rwanda, I would like to stress that the Democratic Republic of Congo is willing to engage in dialogue, provided that the objective conditions for meaningful dialogue are created, namely, the guarantee of the proper conclusion of the dialogue in the context of war and broken trust, because war is taking place on the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and it is the Congolese people who are dying. It is our fauna and flora that are being destroyed, our mineral resources that are being plundered and our people who have been forced to leave their homes, with over 7 million internally displaced persons.

    2023-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9500 (2023) · source

  13. The M-23 was expelled from the room at the start of the discussions in the first round of consultations for having launched armed attacks against the positions of the armed forces on 23 April 2022. In the current context, the conclusion of the political process, which has now reached its third phase and which has already brought together a total of 56 other local armed groups, requires a holistic approach involving the combined efforts of the Luanda and Nairobi processes. Most of our partners advocate dialogue with neighbouring Rwanda.

    2023-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9500 (2023) · source

  14. The political consultations conducted as part of that process between the authorities of the Democratic Republic of Congo and local armed groups on peace and security in the provinces of Ituri, North Kivu and South Kivu had made significant progress with the organization of the first consultations which brought together in Nairobi, from 23 to 27 April 2022, representatives of 23 local armed groups and the Kenya-Democratic Republic of Congo joint secretariat team. Having reached its third phase, the Nairobi process, in which the representatives of the M-23 had taken part at the beginning of the discussions, was interrupted because of the attitude of those rebels who believed they could profit from the motto “fight and talk”.

    2023-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9500 (2023) · source

  15. However, the war is not over, and if the Council is serious about protecting Congolese civilians caught up in the violence and restoring full peace to the Democratic Republic of Congo, it must commit itself inexorably to the full implementation of the Luanda and Nairobi peace processes, which have been regularly validated and endorsed by both the African Union and the United Nations through the Security Council. As a reminder, the Nairobi process calls for the resumption of the political process under the mediation of His Excellency Mr. Uhuru Kenyatta, former President of the Republic of Kenya.

    2023-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9500 (2023) · source

  16. Bintou Keita, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Head of MONUSCO, on behalf of the United Nations. The Democratic Republic of the Congo fully endorses what has been agreed and signed by the two parties and calls for the implementation in good faith of the resulting commitments. It is therefore up to the Security Council to endorse it and ensure that it be implemented as is, without modifying it, at the risk of jeopardizing the balance that has been re-established and undermining the trust that has been rebuilt after waves of crises that have shaken relations between MONUSCO and the local populations.

    2023-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9500 (2023) · source

  17. That presidential statement is the legal basis for MONUSCO’s disengagement plan, as agreed in Kinshasa on 21 November, following the deliberations between the Government and MONUSCO which, it should be noted, worked in perfect harmony on designing MONUSCO’s disengagement plan. I now turn to the withdrawal plan as it was negotiated. I welcome the fact that paragraph 75 of the Secretary-General’s report was concise. For the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the disengagement plan, as submitted to the Council, is the result of a consensual commitment by both parties, duly signed by His Excellency Mr. Christophe Lutundula Apala Pen’apala, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Ms.

    2023-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9500 (2023) · source

  18. Christophe Lutundula Apala Pen’apala, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, addressed to the President of the Security Council on 1 September, requesting the acceleration of MONUSCO’s withdrawal. Speaking frankly, my delegation was delighted by the convergence of views that so fortunately emerged between the Government of my country, the Secretary-General and the Security Council, through its presidential statement S/PRST/2023/5 of 16 October, both on the general assessment of the difficulties facing MONUSCO in carrying out its current mandate and on the need for its accelerated and gradual withdrawal.

    2023-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9500 (2023) · source

  19. We are grateful to the international community and to the United Nations for their support and their partnership, but we are also aware that the phased withdrawal of MONUSCO is a necessary stage to consolidate the progress that we have already achieved.” (see A/78/PV.7) For the President of the Republic, therefore, accelerating MONUSCO’s withdrawal had become an overriding necessity to ease tensions between the former and our fellow citizens. He therefore instructed the Government to enter into discussions with the United Nations authorities for an accelerated withdrawal of MONUSCO from the Democratic Republic of Congo, bringing the start of the gradual withdrawal from December 2024 to December 2023. That is the thrust of the correspondence (S/2023/648, annex), that His Excellency Mr.

    2023-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9500 (2023) · source

  20. The hostility of the population against MONUSCO in North Kivu has increased to the point of creating real panic among Mission personnel with regard to security, resulting in the violent incidents of 30 August 2023 in Goma, with the death of 42 Congolese, following other such incidents in June and July 2022 in Goma, Beni, Butembo and Kasindi, during which 30 Congolese and five Blue Helmets lost their lives. In that spirit, speaking from the General Assembly rostrum on 20 September, the President of the Republic, His Excellency Mr. Félix-Antoine Tshisekedi Tshilombo, stated: “Following a United Nations presence of more than two decades, it is time for my country to fully take its destiny in hand and to become the main protagonist of its own stability.

    2023-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9500 (2023) · source

  21. It should have triggered the responsibility of those who exercise world leadership through the Security Council and prompted them to impose peace in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. This situation lies at the root of the heated tensions that for some time now have plagued relations between MONUSCO and the Congolese people, especially in areas ravaged by those armed groups. Given the situation, the reaction of the population has been swift.

    2023-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9500 (2023) · source

  22. On the contrary, those abuses have continued and increased in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, particularly in the provinces of Ituri, North Kivu and South Kivu. That has been compounded by the fundamentalist terrorism of Da’esh, which has even extended its reach into Ituri through the Allied Democratic Forces. The massacres perpetrated in Rutshuru territory by the M-23, supported by soldiers of the Rwandan Defence Forces — on 28 November 2022 in Kishishe, in March 2023 in Kasimba, in May 2023 in Tongo and in July 2023 in Bukombo — once again brought the horror to the east of our country. That should have done more than stir the moral conscience of the community of nations.

    2023-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9500 (2023) · source

  23. Since then, with the support of the Rwandan Patriotic Front, the M-23 has stepped up its attacks and taken over several positions, which it has held for almost two years now, under the dumbfounded gaze of the international community and MONUSCO, which is no longer able to implement the mandate entrusted to it by the Council, namely, to support the FARDC or to ensure the protection of civilians abandoned to their sad fate. Despite its size — 20,000 military and police personnel in 2016 and 16,000 currently deployed in the Congo to support the Government’s efforts — MONUSCO has not been able to put an end to the vicious cycle of massacres of civilian populations, massive human rights violations, war crimes and crimes against humanity and the open illegal exploitation of the country’s natural resources by national and foreign armed groups.

    2023-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9500 (2023) · source

  24. One can therefore wonder why the issue of MONUSCO’s withdrawal is back in the headlines in the Democratic Republic of Congo and here at the United Nations. After its debacle in 2013, the M-23, utilized by Rwanda to destabilize the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, resurfaced in November 2021, when well- equipped fighters launched a series of deadly attacks on the FARDC and the Institut Congolais pour la Conservation de la Nature positions, occupying the corner of the border shared by the Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda and Rwanda, thereby aggravating tensions in the region.

    2023-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9500 (2023) · source

  25. History will record that MONUSCO has also achieved a great deal in the implementation of its mandate, notably through its contribution to the electoral process, the Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo (FARDC), the Congolese National Police and humanitarian action. In 2013, MONUSCO provided the FARDC with considerable support for defeating the M-23 insurgents in North Kivu, thanks to its Force Intervention Brigade, comprised of soldiers from South Africa, Malawi and Tanzania — a brigade created by the Security Council, exceptionally, with an offensive mandate and substantial military resources. Unfortunately, the Force Intervention Brigade lasted only as long as the operation.

    2023-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9500 (2023) · source

  26. We recall that when, on 30 November 1999, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1279 (1999), establishing the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), the Congolese people, victims of armed aggression from neighbouring countries, were assured that observance of the ceasefire and the resulting disengagement of forces, would bring lasting peace and stability to the conflict-ridden eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. MONUSCO, which was created from the ashes of the former MONUC pursuant to resolution 1925 (2010) of 1 July 2010, had a mandate to restore security, build peace, stabilize the country and promote long- term development, both in the Democratic Republic of Congo and in the Great Lakes region.

    2023-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9500 (2023) · source

  27. Bintou Keita for the briefing she has just delivered on the report of the Secretary-General (S/2023/932) of 30 November 2023, entitled “United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo”. I would also like to pay tribute to her leadership throughout the discussions that led to the adoption of the disengagement plan on 21 November, which has been discussed throughout this debate. Before getting to the crux of the matter, I would like to briefly review the history of relations between the Democratic Republic of Congo and MONUSCO, as well as the process that led to the MONUSCO disengagement plan we are discussing today.

    2023-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9500 (2023) · source

  28. I therefore wish to pay tribute to all those valiant peacekeepers, to those men and women who, in the name of the ideals of the Charter of the United Nations, work alongside local communities to advance political solutions, prevent conflicts, protect civilians, strengthen human rights and the rule of law and establish peace, often under difficult and complex circumstances, far from their families and countries. They have made many sacrifices, and some have made the ultimate sacrifice. I pay tribute to the troop-contributing countries and donors. The Government and the people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, through me, would like to express their gratitude for the efforts and sacrifices made. Finally, I would like to thank Ms.

    2023-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9500 (2023) · source

  29. My delegation would like to take this opportunity to express its sincere gratitude to Secretary-General António Guterres, for his steadfast and remarkable efforts to put an end to the ongoing confrontations, with a view to restoring lasting peace in my country, and to congratulate him on his sustained commitment to a negotiated withdrawal of MONUSCO from the Democratic Republic of Congo. The memories of the brutal attack on the MONUSCO helicopter by the rebels of the Movement du 23 mars (M-23), on 29 March 2022, are still fresh in our minds. Those attacks claimed the lives of eight United Nations peacekeepers who were on a reconnaissance mission in North Kivu.

    2023-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9500 (2023) · source

  30. To the Council members, the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo extends, through me, its most cordial greetings, along with those of the people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, who have been scarred by an unjustified war of aggression that has been imposed on them for more than three decades by a neighbour seeking spheres of influence according to expansionist agendas of a past time. Allow me furthermore, once again on behalf of my Government, to state how much we have appreciated working with the sister republics of Gabon and Ghana throughout their fruitful two-year Council mandate, which is coming to an end. We extend our gratitude for the diligence with which those two fraternal countries have supported the Democratic Republic of the Congo. I also applaud Ms. Sandrine Lusamba for her briefing.

    2023-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9500 (2023) · source

  31. Mr. Mukongo (Democratic Republic of the Congo) (spoke in French): I would ask you, Mr. President, to allow me to go into slightly more detail, because this is a matter of vital significance for my delegation at what is, as has been said, a crucial moment. As the negotiations on the announced withdrawal of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) enter their final stage, allow me to the pleasure of reiterating to you, Mr. President, on behalf of His Excellency Mr. Félix-Antoine Tshisekedi Tshilombo, President of the Republic and Head of State, on behalf of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and my entire delegation, and in my own personal capacity, our warmest and most sincere congratulations on your accession to the presidency of the Security Council.

    2023-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9500 (2023) · source

  32. To face those challenges and new threats, the Security Council must support the activities of crime prevention and criminal justice, combat the use of information and communications technologies for criminal purposes, strengthen a much more inclusive legal framework for combating cybercrime and cooperate with subregional, regional and national organizations to enhance strategies for responding to transnational organized crime.

    2023-12-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9497Resumption1 (2023) · source

  33. The latter has been active for several years in Syria, Iraq, Libya and in West Africa, in countries such as Mali, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Benin, Togo, Senegal, Liberia, Nigeria, Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea. Transnational crime is a scourge that has a major impact on global governance. Its modus operandi, which starts with human trafficking, illicit financial flows, drug trafficking, mineral trafficking, small arms and light weapons, cybercrime and more, has an impact on the security of States and citizens and, by extension, on regional and international stability and security.

    2023-12-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9497Resumption1 (2023) · source

  34. This is an opportunity to highlight the relationship between transnational organized crime and armed conflict in Africa, specifically in my country, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which for three decades has been suffering from recurrent armed conflicts in its eastern part, which has become a theatre of activity for armed groups. More than 100 armed groups, including the Movement du 23 mars, feed on this trilogy, illicitly exploiting mining resources to obtain arms in order to sow insecurity through atrocities, thus violating the provisions of international humanitarian law and human rights. The Central African region is affected by the criminal activities of the Lord’s Resistance Army, Boko Haram, the Allied Democratic Forces and others that have links with the Islamic State.

    2023-12-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9497Resumption1 (2023) · source

  35. Transnational organized crime and terrorism constitute a serious threat to peace and development because organized criminal groups, through their activities, jeopardize political processes, democratic institutions, the various development projects, as well as human rights and public freedoms. Sub-Saharan Africa is prey to transnational organized crime in most of its States, which undermines the rule of law, peace and the economies of those States through tax evasion, money laundering and other illicit financial flows, which have an impact on the States’ economic, political and social stability.

    2023-12-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9497Resumption1 (2023) · source

  36. Mr. Mukongo (Democratic Republic of the Congo) (spoke in French): First of all, I would like to welcome the initiative of holding this important meeting and above all, the relevance of the theme at the heart of this debate, “Threats to international peace and security, transnational organized crime, growing challenges and new threats”. It is also worth recalling that international peace and security are the twin issues that motivated the creation of the United Nations and remain at the heart of the work of the Security Council, which is entrusted with discharging that responsibility by the Charter of the United Nations.

    2023-12-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9497Resumption1 (2023) · source

  37. We should undertake and implement reforms to make the United Nations a more viable multilateral platform for common development, strengthen efforts to build synergies for development between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations, advocate new and innovative approaches to financing for development in support of peace and ease the processes for enabling access to financing for all, especially countries in fragile situations.

    2023-11-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9482Resumption1 (2023) · source

  38. The Democratic Republic of the Congo therefore expects to see this debate lead to the adoption of practical recommendations whose implementation will enable the internally displaced to return home and children to go back to school so that they can fully enjoy their right to education, which they have been deprived of since the aggression against my country began in 2021. With respect to conflict prevention, the Council should not lose sight of the fact that the internally displaced population consists mainly of children, and those children are key actors and potential agents of change in the vast common-development landscape that we are discussing today. Since time is short, I would like to offer several expectations and recommendations.

    2023-11-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9482Resumption1 (2023) · source

  39. They have also caused destruction in Virunga National Park, which is a World Heritage Site. To that war, unjustly inflicted on the Congolese people, we have to add the activity of negative forces and other local and foreign terrorist groups. For example, we can point to the increased activity of the terrorists of the Allied Democratic Forces, who are carrying out a jihad in pursuit of their insane goal of establishing an Islamic caliphate in the region of Beni and the south”. It is therefore clear that restoring peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo will be possible only if the Security Council, the principal United Nations organ responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security, can take appropriate measures.

    2023-11-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9482Resumption1 (2023) · source

  40. The ultimate goal is to bring 25 million Congolese out of poverty. Turning now to peace and security, as our President underscored in a statement on the state of the nation on 14 November, “The security situation in our country has been marked by the occupation of parts of the territories of Rutshuru, Nyiragongo and Masisi. That aggression has already claimed the lives of many of our compatriots through their cowardly murder in Kishishe, Kizimba, Bambu, Bokombo, Tongo and Kalake, and has internally displaced more than 2.4 million people, including 1.6 million around the city of Goma. In addition, the criminal actions of the coalitions of the Rwandan armed forces and the Mouvement du 23 mars have destroyed a large number of health and education facilities, as well as religious sites, in the occupied areas.

    2023-11-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9482Resumption1 (2023) · source

  41. As part of its commitment to achieving common development, my country, under the leadership of President Tshisekedi Tshilombo, has established a multisectoral road map for actions and reforms that can accelerate our progress towards achieving the Sustainable Development Goals and the 2030 Agenda. Besides that, with a view to making greater progress towards the emergence of an integrated national economy that can ensure that local development actions take root, in 2021 my Government launched a local development programme, PDL-145, that brings together 145 territorial areas and is specifically focused on rural development. It is financed primarily by the Democratic Republic of the Congo and is aimed at improving the resilience of local populations, reducing inequalities and strengthening public institutions, all at a local level.

    2023-11-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9482Resumption1 (2023) · source

  42. On top of this, today transnational and global challenges are becoming increasingly complex and interdependent, making them a growing threat to sustainable development for all and one that no country can face alone. Common development requires our collective commitment. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which was launched in 2015, and the efforts to revive its implementation and to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals, are a clear illustration of that. Countries in the grip of protracted conflict, such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, have two major challenges to address simultaneously — peace and security, on the one hand, and sustainable development, on the other. The Democratic Republic of the Congo is working on both fronts.

    2023-11-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9482Resumption1 (2023) · source

  43. Sustainable development for all is an imperative that cannot be ignored, as it contains within it the seeds of solutions to the challenges of the fragile situations in which many countries and a large part of the world’s population find themselves, some of whom live in areas affected by violent and multidimensional conflicts. It is also a part of efforts to overcome the challenges of marginalization, build resilience, address climate change and reduce inequalities, extreme poverty and the unequal distribution of resources. In short, sustainable development can address the underlying causes of conflicts and fragility at the global level and respond to them in a complementary, coherent and coordinated way.

    2023-11-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9482Resumption1 (2023) · source

  44. We take this opportunity to convey to him our encouragement. Peace and security are prerequisites for the achievement of sustainable development, as evidenced by the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, adopted by the General Assembly on 25 September 2015. That ambitious agenda also recognizes that sustainable development paves the way for building peaceful societies. That correlation is proof that development and lasting peace are inextricably linked and essential to one another, and it is therefore particularly important during this period — when the world, entire regions and certain countries are on the brink of conflagration, facing a number of multifaceted challenges — to pay equal and sustained attention to strengthening the preventive tool that is common development for peace.

    2023-11-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9482Resumption1 (2023) · source

  45. Mr. Mukongo (Democratic Republic of the Congo) (spoke in French): At the outset, my delegation would like to congratulate you, Mr. President, on your presidency of the Security Council in the month of November and your wise choice of the topic of this open debate, namely, “Maintenance of international peace and security: promote sustaining peace through common development”. My delegation is pleased to participate in this debate and expresses its gratitude to the members of the Security Council for the opportunity to add the Congolese vision to the Council’s efforts to resolve the conundrum at the heart of this theme. As well, allow me to pay tribute to His Excellency Mr. António Guterres, Secretary-General of the United Nations, for his involvement in peace efforts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

    2023-11-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9482Resumption1 (2023) · source

  46. We are speaking to the armed groups, and I recommend that Rwanda also be brave enough to enter into discussions with those armed groups, including the FDLR. That would be a positive development for the region.

    2023-10-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9440 (2023) · source

  47. They are not an armed group in the way that they are being presented here. We have spoken of dialogue, and the path for dialogue has been mapped out by the Luanda and Nairobi processes. The Luanda road map is clear, and it describes the steps leading to dialogue, which we all know. First, there is the cantonment of M-23, which we are talking about. Then there is the disarmament of the M-23, the return of displaced people — and we have spoken here of the severity of that humanitarian catastrophe. That is the way towards a resumption of dialogue with Rwanda. Lastly, there is also the Nairobi process, which is also being discussed here. I was one of the delegates at that process. The M-23 was part of that dialogue process in Nairobi. They left the room to go start the war while we were talking with the other armed groups.

    2023-10-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9440 (2023) · source

  48. To conclude, I would like to reaffirm the importance that my country attaches to the good relations with its neighbours and all countries of the region, as our Head of State, His Excellency Mr. Félix-Antoine Tshisekedi Tshilombo, has so clearly shown since he assumed office. The Democratic Republic of the Congo will continue to cooperate with dedicated and sincere partners with a view to the flourishing and prosperity of the Great Lakes region, our common heritage. If I may also respond briefly to some concerns that were expressed here, I would like to say that the Wazalendo, who are starting to keep Rwanda awake at night, are simply an organization of young patriots from the Democratic Republic of the Congo who are outraged by the massacres of the M-23 and who have organized in order to repel the enemy.

    2023-10-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9440 (2023) · source

  49. Such an approach would certainly remove any excuse from our aggressors, who are nevertheless waging an economic war, fraudulently and shamelessly exploiting natural resources they do not own and of which they have become global exporters. In terms of the illegal exploitation of my country’s natural resources, my Government urges the Council to apply the threat of severe sanctions against the actors and entities operating throughout the chain, from production right through to destination. Beyond sanctions, my Government, which aligns itself with the recommendations of the Khartoum workshop on natural resources in the Great Lakes region, held on 2 September 2021, also wishes to participate in debates and reflections on the creation of a process similar to the Kimberley Process to manage gold coming from conflict zones.

    2023-10-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9440 (2023) · source

  50. This tired mantra, which Rwanda repeats day in day out and in every forum, even if it were verifiably true, could under no circumstances serve as an excuse for the aggression of a sovereign country, under international law and the international and regional commitments of our States. That is why I wish to reiterate here the constructive proposal by my Government, which was presented to the Council on 28 September by His Excellency Mr. Christophe Lutundula Apala Pen’apala, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs and la Francophonie (see S/PV.9427). The members of the FDLR are not citizens of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the Security Council could therefore implement a plan to eradicate the FDLR, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo would be happy to participate in it.

    2023-10-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9440 (2023) · source