YouSaid · the spoken record

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28
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1995-08-10
most recent
1995-11-22
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2
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un-security-council

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  1. “Needless to say, my Government will expect the Council, and thus the implementation force and Transitional Administration, to respect this important element of sovereignty granted to all Member States by the Charter. Moreover, we are of the strong View that this element should be reflected in no ambiguous terms in future documents and resolutions on this issue.”

    1995-11-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3595 (1995) · source

  2. “Finally, the new implementation force and the Transitional Administration cannot overlook still-relevant elements and the spirit of previous Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, operative paragraph 12 of resolution 820 (1993) in particular. I should like to remind the Council that that paragraph is not related to the sanctions regime imposed on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and now suspended. That paragraph simply supports the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Croatia by allowing the Croatian Government to regulate all export, import and transshipment activity through its territory, and therefore it remains valid.”

    1995-11-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3595 (1995) · source

  3. “We look forward to continuing United States leadership in this regard, not only because the United States is trusted by both sides in the region, but also because of its commitment to utilize all elements of the peace process, including the credible threat and use of force. Following demilitarization, the emphasis should be on the role of the civilian sector in the reconstruction and confidence-building aspects. Again, this part of the mandate will require not a large force but a reasonable number of specialists and non-military professionals. My Government also supports the appointment of a United States national to lead the civilian part of the mandate as head of the Transitional Administration.”

    1995-11-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3595 (1995) · source

  4. “The situation in Croatia requires a Chapter VII mandate that can only be realized through regional arrangements. While the present UNCRO mandate will end on 30 November, existing UNCRO resources can remain in Croatia as a nucleus for the new implementation force. The Belgian and Russian battalions could be quickly reinforced by the United States battalion, so that the most important element of the Basic Agreement, the demilitarization of the region, can commence immediately. My Government is of the view that a large and expensive force is not needed. Rather, what is needed is a proactive and robust force that can implement the demilitarization requirements immediately, and quickly turn over the remaining elements of the mandate to the civilian administration.”

    1995-11-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3595 (1995) · source

  5. “They require that the region must be demilitarized in 30 days. The only missing elements that still need to be decided upon are related to the economic reconstruction package for the region, especially the demolished city of Vukovar, and the division of responsibility between the military and civilian components of the new transitional implementation mechanism. In this regard, we must keep in mind that the mandate of the United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia (UNCRO) expires in nine days. My Government has made it clear that UNCRO's mandate cannot be extended, not because we do not trust the United Nations, but because the Organization could not fulfil its two mandates while operating under Chapter VI of the Charter.”

    1995-11-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3595 (1995) · source

  6. “We emphasize this point, given the discussion and the questions brought up by the members of the Council following the briefing last Friday by the Co-Chairman of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY), Mr. Thorvald Stoltenberg. The Basic Agreement did not need to be more specific when the Erdut Principles were so clear. For example, the Erdut Principles leave no ambiguities about the structure of the transitional authority and the new police force. They eliminate the legal and security vacuum in the occupied Vukovar region by reinstating Croatian law, social and utility services, and border controls throughout the region. They call for the timely return of all displaced persons and refugees to their homes prior to local elections in the region.”

    1995-11-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3595 (1995) · source

  7. “The Basic Agreement was among the first accords achieved in Dayton, and set the pace for the later accords that completed the so-called package arrangement for the region as a whole. That resolution is needed to establish the necessary technical framework for defining the new implementation force for Croatia. The force should be established as quickly as possible. It should have an active mandate under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, with clearly defined military and civilian roles, as called for in the Erdut Basic Agreement and the preceding Erdut Principles. The Council has both of these documents at its disposal, and can consult both as it begins its consideration of the issue. The two documents, both of which are equally valid, will eliminate any misunderstandings or lack of information.”

    1995-11-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3595 (1995) · source

  8. “The best way to eliminate this risk is for the Council to act immediately and endorse the existing succession and asset distribution agreement proposed by the European Union and the Russian Federation. Further, Croatia hopes that the draft resolution lifting the embargo will achieve its goal of maintaining a balance of power in the region, and not become a source of new instability. In that regard, Croatia calls for prudent use of the draft resolution, within a broader framework of collective security arrangements in Europe. My delegation especially welcomes the imminent adoption of the third draft resolution related to the Dayton accords - the draft resolution that endorses the Basic Agreement on the Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium, and reaffirms that these areas are integral parts of Croatia.”

    1995-11-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3595 (1995) · source

  9. “The sanctions regime was a just and necessary mechanism to have those leaders accept responsibility for the ills they brought upon other people and their own ethnic kin in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Regarding paragraphs 5 and 6 of that draft resolution, it is Croatia's understanding that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) would be prevented from transferring and using common funds of all successor States of the dissolved Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia until an agreement on succession and distribution of common assets has been reached among all successor States and approved by the Council. Any unfreezing and misuse of funds by Governments and international financial institutions could potentially nullify the succession negotiations, and worst of all, the whole peace process.”

    1995-11-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3595 (1995) · source

  10. “Furthermore, often unprecedented scrutiny and outlandish criticisms of Croatia, especially by some delegations in this Chamber, should come to an end. Clearly, over the past four years Croatia has played a substantially constructive role in the region. It has provided solutions - not problems. For instance, its strategic and humanitarian assistance to the politically supported but effectively abandoned Bosnian Muslim community, has regrettably never been acknowledged by this Chamber. My Government supports the draft resolutions now before us. It hopes that the draft resolution on sanctions relief will send a message to the Serbian people that the world is not against them, as they have been told by their leaders.”

    1995-11-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3595 (1995) · source

  11. “Who can dispute the fact that only four months ago the Bihac safe area was on the verge of being overrun, that Europe was about to be faced with another 200,000 Bosnian refugees, and that the moral conscience of the world was about to be shaken by a possible repeat of the Srebrenica massacre in Bihac? The balance of power established by the Croatian Army should secure peace and stability in the region for a long time to come, but only if NATO and the international community now fulfil their promises and commitments to both Bosnia and Herzegovina and to Croatia. The problems in both countries will need to be addressed with the same instruments and with equal vigour. The occupied Vukovar region of Croatia should be no more and no less important than the occupied parts in Bosnia if we are to have just and lasting peace in the region.”

    1995-11-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3595 (1995) · source

  12. “About 125,000 non-Serb Croatian citizens, who have been "ethnically cleansed" in a most brutal way in the occupied Vukovar region since 1991, would never forgive us if they were still displaced or refugees one year from now - if those commitments had been made in vain. Croatia's compromises for peace, when it clearly could have chosen another option, demonstrate once more its long-standing commitment to a policy based on peaceful resolution of the conflict. Almost four years of utmost patience under less than promising circumstances, prior to our recent short but credible appliance of force, also demonstrate our commitment to peace. I must also add that precisely these short but credible actions by Croatia made the Dayton accords possible.”

    1995-11-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3595 (1995) · source

  13. “Thanks to the leadership of the United States and the efforts of the European Union and the Russian Federation, we have now finally been able to achieve both a negotiated settlement and an implementation force that promises stability but also envisages remedies for the horrible crimes of a sort recorded only during the darkest days of history. The Dayton accords were a compromise for all parties, but we firmly believe that Croatia made the largest compromise. We have foregone two days of war for one year of patience. The Dayton accords have offered us many promises and commitments. We believe that they were made with the parties' full intention of carrying them out.”

    1995-11-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3595 (1995) · source

  14. “All of this was achieved because the Council' s sanctions regime against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) fulfilled its intentions, because the joint Croatian/Bosnian offensives and later the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intervention created new realities on the ground, and thereafter, because of the new leadership role assumed by the United States. My Government has always called for a peaceful and negotiated settlement of this kind for the region as a whole. In fact, we have for years argued that NATO is the only institution that can impose peace in the region and provide a lasting and stable environment that will render belligerence expendable and reconciliation and economic reconstruction profitable.”

    1995-11-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3595 (1995) · source

  15. “Allow me to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency for the month of November and to express our gratitude for your understanding and cooperation regarding the circumstances related to one of the draft resolutions before us. I should also like to extend my congratulations to the delegation of Nigeria for the exemplary way in which it guided the work of the Council during the month of October. Croatia warmly welcomes the Dayton accords that were initialled yesterday. They become valid pending expected mutual recognition among all successor States of the former Yugoslavia next month. We firmly believe that with these accords, and imminent mutual recognition, we have overcome the biggest policy obstacle to a lasting and just peace in the region once and for all.”

    1995-11-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3595 (1995) · source

  16. “The Belgrade occupation of this territory of Croatia could not be more evident, and any premature easing of the sanctions regime without resolving this problem first may leave my Government with no other option than a military one. My Government will also look to UNCRO to assist Croatia in resolving the problem of the Vukovar region peacefully. UNCRO's implementation of its mandate, which also calls for control of the international borders of Croatia that are not under control of the Croatian Government, will go a long way to achieving this critical objective of the peace process. As UNCRO redefines its role in the reintegrated areas of Croatia, my Government would welcome a redeployment of some of its excess resources to the international border in the Vukovar region.”

    1995-08-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3563 (1995) · source

  17. “The new negotiations should be based on the principle of mutual recognition among all successor States of the former Yugoslavia, on the Contact Group plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina and on the linkage of the sanctions regime against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to its role in the implementation of a negotiated settlement for the Serbian minority in Croatia. This linkage will be especially important in respect of a successful resolution to the problem of the remaining occupied territory in Croatia - the Vukovar region, or the former Sector East. My Government has no present military plans for this region and will invest all possible resources to resolve the problem peacefully.”

    1995-08-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3563 (1995) · source

  18. “Moreover, their eleventh-hour promises did not in any way correspond to their actions on the ground. For confirmation, we do not have to look any further than the situation in Bihac. The offensive on Bihac stopped, and the siege was ended, only when the Croatian Army and police forces became engaged in the area. My Government fully supports the new initiative by the United States to find ways to restart the negotiating process in a timely manner, and would support a new conference along the lines suggested by the President of the Russian Federation, His Excellency Mr. Boris Yeltsin, if it were carefully prepared and if the President of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, His Excellency Mr. Alija Izetbegovic, were also to attend.”

    1995-08-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3563 (1995) · source

  19. “Croatia's security actions can be seen not as following the logic of war, but as establishing a solid foundation for a just peace. The new balance in the region will rejuvenate the peace process in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. We must recall that prior to Croatia's action the peace process in the region was deadlocked for months. The Bosnian Serb leadership had rejected the Contact Group plan, and the Croatian Serb leadership refused to negotiate at all. The latter's eleventh-hour transformation, despite some claims to the contrary, was neither genuine nor real. After four years of their stalling and refusal to accept a single non-Serb displaced person back into their territories, we should not have had any illusions about the intentions of the Knin leaders.”

    1995-08-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3563 (1995) · source

  20. “Clearly, the Serbs from the so-called Krajina are victims of their own leadership's folly. Nevertheless, my Government - in the words of my Prime Minister at the meeting with the local leaders from the reintegrated territories on Tuesday - "would repeat appeals to civilians who have fled to return." Many will eventually return, but only when they are able to overcome the tragedy of their leaders and beliefs. Croatia will welcome them. They and the international community should know that twice as many Serbs live in Croatia as the number who fled from the so-called Krajina region. Most Serbs would not be manipulated by the Belgrade-inspired propaganda. As a result, today they live in the homes that their families lived in for centuries, enjoying peace and paying the price of war, in the same way as all other citizens of Croatia.”

    1995-08-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3563 (1995) · source

  21. “The Council should also recall that immediately after our security action began in the Western Slavonia region in early May the former so-called president, Milan Martic, of the so-called Krajina issued such evacuation orders and asked for United Nations assistance in transporting all Serbs from that region. This exodus is a tragedy because of the Serbian policy seeking a nation-exclusive State. These and many other Serbs have been misled by their leaders, by their opinion- makers and by their Church into believing that Serbs cannot live with Croats or with Muslims or, for that matter, with almost anyone else. This manufactured belief is the real tragedy, and there is nothing that my Government or the international community can do to change it and make them stay at this time.”

    1995-08-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3563 (1995) · source

  22. “The exodus of ethnic Serbs from one region of Croatia cannot be compared to the earlier Serbian ethnic cleansing of non-Serbs from the same region, nor to the present expulsion of non-Serbs from Srebrenica and Zepa. The exodus of Serbs from this region of Croatia is a tragedy, but not of Croatia's making. My Government has made numerous appeals to the ethnic Serb citizens of Croatia to stay and offered them amnesty, resources and protection to do so, while their own leadership, it is becoming increasingly evident, was ordering them to leave. The former Croatian Serb leader Milan Babic suggested as much in an interview with Radio Belgrade on Tuesday. The self-proclaimed authorities in Knin may have decided on mass evacuation in order to provoke international outrage against Croatia and a military response from Belgrade, Babic suggested.”

    1995-08-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3563 (1995) · source

  23. “My delegation joins my Foreign Minister in expressing our sincere condolences to the families of the three soldiers from the Kingdom of Denmark and the Czech Republic, which will for ever be affected by those losses. In this regard, I must emphasize that my Government has accepted its part of the responsibility for these and other casualties amongst the United Nations personnel, and has already taken appropriate measures to remedy the costs of individual indiscretions and criminal acts against the peace-keepers. The same measures will be taken against the individuals who have acted against innocent civilians and their property. Along with these remedies, my Government has already taken various measures and programmes to normalize life in the reintegrated areas and to limit the humanitarian consequences of the Serb exodus from Croatia.”

    1995-08-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3563 (1995) · source

  24. “Therefore, my delegation regrets that the Council did not accept my delegation's amendment that would have acknowledged that the siege of Bihac had been successfully lifted. This security action was undertaken with the utmost regard for limiting collateral damage and protecting civilians and United Nations personnel on the ground. The extremely short duration of a security action of this magnitude only confirms that we were very successful on all of these counts. The operation was not perfectly free of wrongdoing, however. But, clearly, no one can expect an operation that includes some 150,000 troops on both sides to be completely free of collateral damage. Nevertheless, the Croatian Government deeply regrets the loss of innocent civilian lives and the loss of the lives of three UNCRO peace-keepers.”

    1995-08-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3563 (1995) · source

  25. “Any such comparison, therefore, not only breeds ill will in Croatia's public opinion but also calls into question well-established practice of international law and norms of international behaviour. The operation against Knin, which lasted one day, cannot be equated with the shelling and complete destruction of Vukovar, which lasted four months, nor with the siege of Sarajevo, which has gone on more than three years. Who can seriously condemn Croatia's short and professional action, which in its second day ended the siege of Bihac, a siege that lasted more than three years and would have continued for who knows how much longer without our action? The siege of Bihac was a major concern for the Council. It has been resolved at minimal cost to the international community and to the civilian population in the area.”

    1995-08-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3563 (1995) · source

  26. “My Government's action was carried out mostly on its internationally recognized territory and in part of the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina at the express request of that Government. Establishing sovereignty and security on its own territory and coming to the aid of a friendly Government is fully consistent with the Charter of the United Nations and is a hallmark of international relations and behaviour. The earlier actions by Belgrade and its proxies were foreign aggression, pure and simple, against a legally declared and, later, internationally recognized Member State. This fact has been recognized in various documents, and most precisely in General Assembly resolution 49/43.”

    1995-08-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3563 (1995) · source

  27. “This action was successfully completed on Monday, in 84 hours. I should just like to add in this regard that most of the remaining pockets of resistance surrendered yesterday, with the assistance and mediation of the United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia (UNCRO). The relevant authorities have commenced giving access to the reintegrated areas to UNCRO, humanitarian organizations and media, consistent with reasonable security precautions. My Government's security operations in the so-called Krajina region of Croatia cannot be equated with earlier actions by Belgrade and its proxies in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia. Nevertheless, some are still tempted to find such convenient, but legally and morally corrupt, comparisons.”

    1995-08-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3563 (1995) · source

  28. “Allow me to congratulate you, Mr. President, on Indonesia's assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for this month and to assure you of my delegation's full cooperation on the many important issues currently before the Council. I should also like to extend my congratulations to the delegation of Honduras on the exemplary way in which it coordinated the work of the Council during the month of July. After four years of the utmost patience and restraint, the Republic of Croatia accurately concluded that the least costly solution for both Croatia and the international community to end Croatia's agony and the international community's humanitarian concerns in Bosnia and Herzegovina would require a limited but credible use of force that would end the siege of Bihac and restore order in adjacent occupied territories of Croatia.”

    1995-08-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3563 (1995) · source