YouSaid · the spoken record
Nambiar
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- 300
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- 2002-07-10
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- 2006-07-21
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- un-security-council
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“They have also shown that, far from effectively addressing genuine proliferation concerns, export controls on sensitive technology and materials have often served to deny those technologies to responsible nations which play the game by the rules. India has taken note of the observation of the sponsors that the draft resolution does not prescribe adherence to treaties to which we are not a State party. For our part, we shall not accept any interpretation of the draft resolution that imposes obligations arising from treaties that India has not signed or ratified, consistent with the fundamental principles of international law and the law of treaties.”
2004-04-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4950 (2004) · source
“They should be based on a balance of obligations to ensure universal adherence, which is the true test of legitimacy and credibility. To our mind, export controls are not an issue on which the Security Council should prescribe norms. There is tension between ad hoc arrangements on harmonizing export controls among a select few countries on the one hand, and measures being put forward by the Council, intended for universal application, on the other hand. The flip side of export controls is indiscriminate technology denial to States with legitimate socio-economic needs. Recent cases have thrown the spotlight once again on the inadequacies of the current regime.”
2004-04-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4950 (2004) · source
“Exhaustive and excessive reporting obligations resulting from resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1373 (2001) have led to repetitive reporting exercises and burdensome bureaucratic structures without commensurate results on the ground. As it returns to the theme of non-proliferation after a gap of more than 12 years since 1992, the Council's credentials are not helped by its track record. Exclusive focus on non-proliferation does disservice to the essential principle of the mutually reinforcing linkage between disarmament and non-proliferation, recognized since the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. International treaties or agreements in this field should be multilaterally negotiated, not imposed.”
2004-04-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4950 (2004) · source
“We are concerned that the exercise of legislative functions by the Council, combined with recourse to Chapter VII mandates, could disrupt the balance of power between the General Assembly and the Security Council, as enshrined in the Charter. The issue goes beyond a mere legal consideration of the Council's allocated powers under the Charter. The credibility and even respect that the Security Council can garner depend on its actions being the product of internal cohesion and universal acceptability. Although resolutions such as resolution 1373 (2001) were adopted unanimously, the limitations in their implementation underscore the need for caution on the Security Council being used as a route to short- circuit the process of creating an international consensus.”
2004-04-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4950 (2004) · source
“In our view, the issue should ideally have been addressed through existing international instruments and by building on them. Our recognition of the time imperative in seeking recourse through the Security Council does not, however, obscure our more basic concerns over the increasing tendency of the Council in recent years to assume new and wider powers of legislation on behalf of the international community, with its resolutions binding on all States. In the present instance, the Council seeks to both define the non-proliferation regime and monitor its implementation. But who will monitor the monitors?”
2004-04-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4950 (2004) · source
“We perceive today's discussion as a logical continuation of the process initiated in the General Assembly. Hence the validity of the focus on non-State actors in the draft resolution under discussion. However, this in no way diminishes State accountability with respect to combating terrorism and eliminating its support infrastructure and linkages with WMD. As in the case of terrorism, States cannot be absolved of accountability on grounds that proliferation was the result of private enterprise. The sponsors of the draft resolution under discussion in the Council have stated that the intention behind their initiative is to fill a gap in the non- proliferation regime - which, if negotiated through the multilateral framework, could take years.”
2004-04-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4950 (2004) · source
“We appreciate this opportunity, in today's open meeting of the Security Council, to express our views on the vital issue of the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The threat of terror and WMD proliferation coming together is a real one and should clearly be an issue of the highest priority for the international community. As a victim of terrorism for almost two decades, India understands the danger that the transfer of such weapons of mass destruction could entail. It is that realization that prompted India to pilot draft resolutions on measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, adopted by consensus by the General Assembly at its last two sessions (General Assembly resolutions 57/83 and 58/48).”
2004-04-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4950 (2004) · source
“We believe that the need of the hour in West Asia is moderation and restraint so as to enable peace negotiations to restart at the earliest. The violence must be halted, and Israelis and Palestinians must work together in a viable negotiating process aimed at a just, lasting and comprehensive settlement based on the road map set out by the Quartet. We have reiterated several times in the past that the Quartet road map provides the only existing way forward for the attainment of the vision of two States, Israel and Palestine, living side by side within secure and recognized boundaries, based on Security Council resolutions 242 (1967), 338 (1973), 1397 (2002) and 1515 (2003).”
2004-04-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4945 (2004) · source
“I thank you, Mr. President, for scheduling this open debate of the Security Council on the situation in the Middle East at such short notice. The targeted killing of Hamas leader Abdel Aziz Al-Rantisi is unjustified and unacceptable and cannot be condoned under any circumstances. Such action, following closely on the killing of the Hamas spiritual leader, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, can lead only to the further destabilization of the already fragile situation in the region and an escalation of the cycle of violence and counter-violence. As is known to all, India has consistently opposed all acts of terrorism, including cross-border terrorism. There can be no justification for terrorism in any form or from any source.”
2004-04-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4945 (2004) · source
“The underlying principle remains our desire to see Afghanistan emerge as strong, united, independent and prosperous. We wish to see full consolidation of authority by the central Government. Our efforts in reconstruction and other sectors would continue to be directed towards these ends. The Berlin conference has correctly been referred to as a milestone in Afghanistan's peace process. Its success lay in galvanizing international support for Afghanistan's political, electoral, economic and financial evolution into an independent, responsible and contributing member of the international community. It is therefore all the more important that the expressions of support made at Berlin be given practical dimension in the critical months ahead.”
2004-04-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4941 (2004) · source
“Our commitment of one million tons of wheat aid has been operationalized and about one million Afghan school children have been receiving a package of 100 grams of biscuits every day since the programme began in November 2002. We are told this has contributed to the back-to-school programme. We have also attempted to encourage trade and investment activity that would lead to enhanced income generation in Afghanistan. In the coming period, we expect to focus more on infrastructure projects, such as work on the Zaranj-Delaram road, the Salma Dam Project in the Province of Herat, and the construction of a new parliament building and of the double circuit transmission line from Put-e-Khumri to Kabul. India's programme of economic assistance in Afghanistan is guided by Afghan priorities and ownership. Our relations are bilateral and direct.”
2004-04-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4941 (2004) · source
“In view of our historical ties of friendship and cooperation with Afghanistan and the Afghan people, India has made a substantial contribution to Afghanistan's reconstruction effort. Despite our constraints and the fact that we are not a traditional donor, our present commitment adds up to $284 million, including 1 million tons of wheat aid. With the implementation of a number of planned projects, India's financial commitments for Afghanistan's reconstruction would amount to around $400 million. In partnership with the Afghan Government, India has undertaken projects in a number of sectors. We also have an extensive programme to rebuild Afghanistan's institutional capacity. Our projects have reached out to people in virtually all parts of the country.”
2004-04-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4941 (2004) · source
“However, long-term stabilization of the country requires the building up of national security institutions led by Afghans and entrenched in Afghanistan's ground realities. Unfortunately, this process has not moved so far at the desired pace. India remains ready to contribute to rebuilding Afghan security institutions, in whichever way possible, in coordination with our Afghan and international partners. The steady rise in drug production and trafficking is a matter of serious concern. Apart from undermining the process of political and economic reconstruction in Afghanistan, this has dangerous repercussions for the region and beyond. The international community must act quickly to curb opium cultivation by providing Afghan farmers with economically viable and sustainable alternatives.”
2004-04-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4941 (2004) · source
“Incidents of violence reported in other parts of Afghanistan are also a matter of concern. However, it is our expectation that the political process will subsume these local pressures and interests. The success of the Constitutional Loya Jirga is a significant indicator in this direction. Leaders, with diverse interests, from all parts of the country, participated in the Constitutional Loya Jirga; they became part of it and ensured that it did not fail. A democratic political process in Afghanistan would absorb in its fold the varying interests, as indeed happens in all democracies throughout the world. We agree that continued international presence is essential to discourage the resurgence of negative forces.”
2004-04-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4941 (2004) · source
“Consideration of these recent reports of the United Nations Secretariat brings to mind a number of relevant questions. Is it the United Nations view that these groups no longer represent a threat to Afghanistan or are these reports and briefings in the Council the product of some kind of compromise? Or, did the absence of any reference to these organizations imply that the work of the Security Council 1267 Committee concerning the Taliban and Al Qaeda had achieved closure, at least in Afghanistan? It will not be incorrect to say that the steady dilution of reporting on Afghanistan over the past year or so has not always been fully consistent with the position on the ground. In our view, the reports of the United Nations Secretariat must be objective, far more discerning and reflective of ground realities.”
2004-04-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4941 (2004) · source
“"Attacks by extremist elements on aid agencies, both national and international, and on government officials continue to occur, predominantly in the southern provinces". (S/2004/230, para. 6) Despite the continuing threat assessment, the Secretary-General's latest report and the statement of the Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, in his briefing to the Council on 24 March, made scant reference to security threats by Taliban or Al Qaeda terrorists, preferring to attribute such actions to "extremists". As the general membership is not privy to closed discussions between the Council and the Secretariat, we would like to understand the reasons for such downplaying of threats to Afghanistan from terrorist groups, particularly in the south and the south- east of the country.”
2004-04-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4941 (2004) · source
“The assassination of the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees international staff member Bettina Goislard in November last year and attacks against United Nations agencies led the Secretary-General to report to the Council on 30 December 2003 that "Attacks on international and national staff of the assistance community and officials of the central Government" had placed "much of the south and south-east of the country effectively off limits to the United Nations, the assistance community and central Government officials ..." (S/2003/1212, paras. 6 and 7). In his current report of 19 March 2004, the Secretary-General states: "Insecurity in the country continues to follow a well-known pattern and has shown no signs of significant improvement".”
2004-04-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4941 (2004) · source
“President, concluded that the three main sources of insecurity in Afghanistan were terrorism, factional fighting and drug production and trafficking. Under the subheading "Terrorism", the report also noted that "In the provinces of the south, south-east and east, insecurity is greatly exacerbated by terrorist attacks from suspected members of the Taliban and Al Qaeda, and supporters of Gulbudin Hekmatyar." (S/2003/1074, para. 22) Unfortunately, the situation is no different today. Continuing terrorist attacks by regrouped Taliban and Al Qaeda elements constitute the primary source of insecurity in Afghanistan. These attacks are also aimed at obstructing delivery of reconstruction assistance.”
2004-04-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4941 (2004) · source
“Realism also demands a degree of flexibility in dealing with situations. The Berlin declaration of 1 April highlighted the common resolve of the international community to defeat terrorists who undermine security and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. To objective observers of the situation in Afghanistan, it is evident that the peace and stabilization process there remains fragile. The biggest threat to stability in Afghanistan continues to emanate from terrorism, as currently manifested in the incidents of violence in the country, particularly in south and south-east Afghanistan. Therefore, defeat of the forces of terrorism and demolition of the infrastructure of terrorism must necessarily be the first priority. The report of the Council's mission to Afghanistan in October and November 2003 (S/2003/1074) led by you, Mr.”
2004-04-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4941 (2004) · source
“We welcome the announcement by President Karzai to hold the presidential and parliamentary elections simultaneously in September this year. After decades of conflict and destruction, it will take time and patience for a fully functioning democracy to take root in Afghanistan. Until then it has to be nurtured carefully. Consolidation and extension of central authority requires a broad-based governmental process, and the country must be free from outside interference. The international community's approach to Afghanistan has to be realistic and must take into account the complexities and difficulties on the ground. Forward movement in the electoral exercise in Afghanistan would depend much upon progress in voter registration. A balance between speed and stability is essential for the success of the political process.”
2004-04-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4941 (2004) · source
“More important, it provided an opportunity to plan further consolidation of these gains by facilitating elections, strengthening security and political institutions and providing the requisite base for Afghanistan's reconstruction and development. India, as a participant of the Berlin conference, welcomes its results and congratulates the four co-chairs - the United Nations, Afghanistan, Germany and Japan - for their role in securing this success. The successful conclusion of the Constitutional Loya Jirga and the subsequent adoption of the new Constitution were milestones in the Bonn process. We congratulate the Transitional Government, led by President Karzai, on the progress achieved since the Bonn Agreement.”
2004-04-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4941 (2004) · source
“I congratulate you, Mr. President, on Germany's assumption of the presidency of the Council for April. I also congratulate Ambassador De La Sabliere of France for his stewardship of the Council during March. It has been 10 months since we last had an opportunity in the Security Council to consider the situation in Afghanistan. This open debate takes place in the wake of the international Afghanistan conference that concluded in Berlin on 1 April. We are grateful to you, Sir, for the briefing you have just provided, and also to Under-Secretary-General Guehenno for his briefing. The Berlin conference was held at a critical juncture. It enabled the international community to take stock of the achievements since Bonn.”
2004-04-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4941 (2004) · source
“Other issues that need to be considered are the recruitment of experts on the basis of geographical representation, non-controversial credentials, objective selection, diversity of background, expertise and experience; and the avoidance of duplication and overlap in the functioning of different agencies or bodies elsewhere within the United Nations system engaged in capacity-building on counter-terrorism with that of the Executive Directorate. The overall message that India, like most other Member States, would like to convey is one of unstinting support for counter-terrorism efforts arising from the Security Council. Notwithstanding the questions that I posed, the efforts of the CTC to institute effective measures within a transparent and calibrated system will receive our firm support and cooperation.”
2004-03-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4921 (2004) · source
“How does the Council propose to ensure the accountability of the Executive Directorate and its institutionalized accessibility to and appropriate consultation with Member States on their concerns and priorities? Finally, have the financial implications of the establishment of the Executive Directorate over a period of three years and the need for its consistency with regular budgetary, administrative and financial practices been fully considered?”
2004-03-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4921 (2004) · source
“Those that may have long-term implications on the functioning of the Council and the United Nations, and that might possibly have a bearing on Member States themselves, cannot be considered the sole preserve of the Council. Although some of the questions relating to the proposal on establishing a Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate may well have been addressed and possibly answered in the course of the debate today, the following questions come to mind. What kind of a precedent are we creating by the establishment of an enhanced mechanism such as the Executive Directorate within the Security Council? Is there sufficient rationale for a separate structure within the Secretariat? How effective would a body of 20 experts be in terms of cost and performance?”
2004-03-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4921 (2004) · source
“We have seen the report of the CTC Chairman on the proposal for the revitalization of the Counter- Terrorism Committee, recently adopted by the Committee (S/2004/ 124, annex). India is fully committed, in principle, to any proposal that enables the CTC to improve its effectiveness and strengthen the fight against terrorism. The CTC's effective monitoring of Member States' compliance with the provisions of resolution 1373 (2001) is an objective that India has supported since the adoption of that resolution. At the same time, new systems require a certain amount of introspection and clear articulation before they are instituted.”
2004-03-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4921 (2004) · source
“However, continuing acts of terror in different parts of the world by Al Qaeda, the Taliban and their sympathizers, or by groups with a propensity to achieve their questionable objectives in a similar way, illustrate the continued vulnerability of the international community in this regard. The international community must persevere in its efforts to interdict and neutralize terrorist organizations and their networks through dynamic measures designed for maximum global reach. The CTC could increase its effectiveness by going beyond building legislative capacity to improving the operational and administrative capabilities of States and cooperation among States in their counter-terrorism efforts.”
2004-03-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4921 (2004) · source
“In our statement in the Security Council on 18 January 2002 (see S/PV.4453) - soon after the adoption of resolution 1373 (2001) - India recommended to the Counter-Terrorism Committee that its focus should extend to groups that are known to perpetrate terrorism; that it should be proactive in seeking views, in particular from States affected by terrorist acts; that it should not leave unchallenged or un-addressed claims of moral, political and diplomatic support for terrorism, which are clearly in contravention of resolution 1373 (2001); and that it should institute more effective measures to deny safe haven to terrorists and to seek their extradition. Undoubtedly, a lot has been achieved over the past two years.”
2004-03-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4921 (2004) · source
“The SAARC Islamabad Declaration, noting that the people of South Asia continue to face a serious threat from terrorism, condemned terrorist violence in all its forms and manifestations. It recognized that terrorism violates the fundamental values of the United Nations and the SAARC Charter and constitutes one of the most serious threats to international peace and security.”
2004-03-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4921 (2004) · source
“As a result, a large number of States have undertaken measures to create the legislative and administrative frameworks required to counter terrorism. Many are moving towards improving their operational capabilities in tackling terrorists and their networks, both in their respective countries and through global cooperation. In our own region, the seven States members of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), at its twelfth Summit, held at Islamabad in January 2004, signed the Additional Protocol to the SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism. The Additional Protocol would update the Convention in order to meet the obligations devolving in terms of resolution 1373 (2001).”
2004-03-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4921 (2004) · source
“The measures adopted have had considerable impact in restricting, curtailing and limiting the space within which terrorist groups can operate. The most important impact has been the growing perception that terrorism cannot be condoned or supported as a legitimate activity. Any justification - on diplomatic, political, religious or any other grounds - for support to terrorism remains untenable. The United Nations in general, and the Security Council in particular, have taken firm strides in the period following 11 September 2001 to create and carry forward international momentum on counter- terrorism activities through multilateral means. The Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC), under the capable leadership earlier of the United Kingdom and now of Spain, has been the focal point of such international efforts.”
2004-03-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4921 (2004) · source
“We thank you, Mr. President, for providing us with this opportunity to convey our views on recent developments in the international community's collective fight against terrorism. This debate assumes particular relevance in the context of ongoing measures to introduce significant and far-reaching changes in the structure and functioning of the Security Council's Counter- Terrorism Committee (CTC). We congratulate Ambassador Arias of Spain on his exemplary chairmanship of the Committee. India's exposure to the ravages of terrorism for over two decades, with the loss of thousands of lives, has only strengthened our resolve to fight this global menace. In the period following the attacks of 11 September 2001, the international community was galvanized to act individually and collectively against the threat of international terrorism.”
2004-03-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4921 (2004) · source
“Political engineering in the form of empowering one group at the expense of another may appear to be essential for the restoration of ethnic balance, but can come at the expense of minority interests and heighten tensions in the future. It may also affect the neutrality of the United Nations in the perception of the people of the affected country and result in long-term disharmony. The role of the United Nations in supporting national reconciliation must involve assistance through a system-wide, coherent, needs-based approach, which can result in the consolidation of security and peace, democracy, economic freedom, social order and justice. In all these areas, the United Nations should play a basically supportive role.”
2004-01-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4903Resumption1 (2004) · source
“When the United Nations or the international humanitarian community decides to intervene in a manner that seems to privilege or favour one group over another, even with the soundest of motives, these actions run the risk of foisting an outside construct on the situation. While it is difficult to make value judgements on such situations in any generalized manner, we must agree with what was stated by a scholar recently to the effect that the attempt to do good, if poorly planned and lacking in strategy, can do more harm than good. India firmly believes that national reconciliation must be a soft process of co-optation and cooperation. It cannot be thrust on an unwilling or unprepared society.”
2004-01-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4903Resumption1 (2004) · source
“Reparations are important in securing reconciliation, but need to be carefully quantified to ensure that they are not unduly at the expense of other parties to the conflict. History is replete with instances of the perceived injustice of reparations leading to further conflict. This issue continues to be relevant in our times. Unfortunately, national reconciliation can sometimes be pursued with misplaced vigour. For a community emerging out of the shadow of death and destruction, starvation and deprivation, the goal of political reconciliation comes with a psychological cost. The scars of the past do not heal as quickly as demanded by the international community as the price of its activist humanitarian interventions.”
2004-01-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4903Resumption1 (2004) · source
“In the case of Afghanistan, the imperatives of truth and justice have to be balanced by the demands of stability and order. In Cambodia, on the other hand, the urgency displayed by the international community in seeking justice from the Khmer Rouge more than two decades after their fall from power does not absolve it of the failure to seek this truth when the Khmer Rouge was in power. Here, too, we are faced with the complex and often controversial balance of the moral imperatives of a post-modern civilized society and the perceived political interests of powerful States. Amnesty is also linked to justice. Blanket amnesty, in the interest of peace, can prevent truth and justice from emerging. At the same time, the complete denial of amnesty in the interests of justice can sometimes hinder peace efforts. Here, too, balance is essential.”
2004-01-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4903Resumption1 (2004) · source
“A push in one direction to satisfy any donor country or interest group, without taking into account its impact on the other three, could lead to consequences or situations that hinder rather than assist reconciliation. A leading non-governmental organization has identified truth, justice and reparations as the three indispensable pillars of post-conflict national reconciliation. The three are also intrinsically linked. The instances of South Africa's truth and national reconciliation process, as well as Peru's Truth and Reconciliation Commission, have been held out as examples of the success of such efforts. They have enabled an outpouring of admissions and grievances, thereby providing the basis for an effective reconciliation.”
2004-01-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4903Resumption1 (2004) · source
“There are other areas where the United Nations could prove invaluable. These relate to the provision of humanitarian assistance, the protection and promotion of human rights, judicial assistance and, of late, dealing with political processes. The instrumentalities available in the United Nations system to deal with each of these areas, however, have different characteristics. Many of them have time-honoured traditions of neutrality and impartiality. We urge that caution be the watchword in dealing with the intersections of the political process, humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping operations and the promotion and protection of human rights.”
2004-01-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4903Resumption1 (2004) · source
“Extra-territorial and other threats to the sovereignty of States are further factors that seriously impinge on national capacity and self- image and divert attention from the priorities of social and economic development. We feel, therefore, that too narrow a focus on governance, without adequate attention to the challenges of social order and security, is likely to affect the consolidation of post-conflict societies. Democracy is a major area where the United Nations can assist in national reconciliation efforts. Different parts of the United Nations system have acquired experience and expertise in providing assistance in census operations, the preparation and revision of electoral rolls, the delimitation of constituencies, verification and other areas considered essential for the successful conduct of elections.”
2004-01-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4903Resumption1 (2004) · source
“It also follows that only a political form that is inclusive, tolerant of dissent and democratic can provide the required space for national reconciliation, as well as a stake for all in its future well-being. Democratic governance implies governance through the will of the citizen, exercised through independent constitutional mechanisms. It is the will of the people that defines the political institutions, the economic and social manifestos, the targets and the instruments. However, reaching targets democratically set needs resources. Resources are the crucial factor that can determine the difference between effective governance that delivers and governance, however well-meaning, that fails to meet the needs of its people.”
2004-01-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4903Resumption1 (2004) · source
“Short-sighted approaches with unrealistic timetables based on considerations of purely financial implications are not always likely to succeed. An important contribution the United Nations can make, in our View, is to ensure the centrality of the local actors in the political process. Models forced upon societies from the outside often fail. Full ownership by the political elements of society in an inclusive, rather than exclusive, process would ensure that the solutions devised do not contain the seeds of resurgence of conflict. We are convinced that, for a system of governance to work in post-conflict societies, it must respect the dynamic of the community in its plurality.”
2004-01-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4903Resumption1 (2004) · source
“Before involving itself in a particular situation, the United Nations will thus need to recognize that there is no uniform approach that can be adopted in all situations. Every post-conflict situation will have its distinctive characteristics, which need to be given full consideration in any reconciliation model. Where societies have traditionally enjoyed a high degree of provincial or local autonomy, it would be futile to set up highly centralized structures. In the case of large communities with mixed compositions, the distribution of power between the federal and provincial Governments would need to be worked out with great care. Any process of national reconciliation will require time and painstaking efforts.”
2004-01-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4903Resumption1 (2004) · source
“What is of paramount importance is recognizing the complexity of an exercise in national reconciliation in post-conflict situations and dealing with it from a perspective informed by sympathy and understanding rather than prescription. Although the post-conflict reconciliation theologian is likely to make a sharp distinction between in-conflict and post-conflict situations, the reality, in most cases, is far more complex. Reconciliation efforts often commence even while the conflict is taking place and persist after peace agreements are signed. On the other hand, even after the formal ending of hostilities and the signing of peace accords, conflicts continue, at times sporadically and, at other times, assuming even more virulent forms. Any involvement by the United Nations will need to take into account this reality.”
2004-01-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4903Resumption1 (2004) · source
“What should the role of the United Nations and the international community be in such a scenario? Our View is that the United Nations should play a supportive and facilitating role, without seeking to impose outside viewpoints or values on the delicate process of reconciliation under way in any war-torn society. This is not to belittle or underplay the role of the United Nations or the considerable expertise available within its system, including that available through the various funds and programmes, to deal with crises and complex situations. Nor is it an argument against the basic benchmarks of human rights values that need to be adhered to in all civilized societies.”
2004-01-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4903Resumption1 (2004) · source
“The establishment of criminal courts, truth commissions and a system of reparation for losses sustained by victims of crimes may become necessary in certain circumstances. However, it is important that the establishment of the rule of law and the dispensation of justice in post-conflict societies be fashioned in accordance with the needs and aspirations of the people in those societies. Promotion of post- conflict healing is a dynamic process. The local actors must lead the process. Externally imposed prescriptions will not necessarily work. International assistance for the establishment of a rule of law regime and dispensation of justice in post-conflict societies, therefore, should help set up credible local institutions and build up their public image and acceptance.”
2004-01-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4903Resumption1 (2004) · source
“If true reconciliation is to be achieved, there must clearly be a blend of both values. Without a willingness to look beyond the bitterness, rancour and misgivings of the past, any future reconciliation is unlikely to be realized. But, by the same token, unless there is a credible sense of justice and accountability for past actions, especially in cases where there have been grave and systematic violations, it would be equally unrealistic to expect genuine reconciliation between opposing parties. However wrenching the process may be, the various contending parties must deal with each other in order to arrive at mutual accommodation and to deal with issues of the past, including those relating to peace, justice, reparation and amnesty. Post-conflict societies also require new rigour in their judicial system.”
2004-01-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4903Resumption1 (2004) · source
“How far these processes represented an imposition on the part of outside agencies, including the United Nations, and how far they had the effect of encouraging the development of genuinely indigenous authority structures or institutions are assessments on which the judgements of the outside world vary. It is axiomatic that reconciliation within any nation must be not only home-grown but also home- nurtured. This is more than a routine expression of pro patria sentiment. There are many examples where solutions imposed from the outside have failed when those external influences disappeared. Similarly, any process that does not fully involve the participation of the local population, in all its diversity, is also unlikely to yield lasting peace. It is said that peace looks to the future and justice to the past.”
2004-01-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4903Resumption1 (2004) · source
“Though it can be argued that most intra-State conflicts invariably have external components, the concept of peace-building that arose in the early 1990s and provided the impetus for robust international action by the United Nations in many areas of the world was directed mainly to prevent, mitigate, resolve or manage such conflicts with a view to both avoiding their exacerbation, thereby positively affecting international peace and security, and to enabling broader political transitions to take place within these societies for long-term regional stability.”
2004-01-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4903Resumption1 (2004) · source
“Since the nineties, the United Nations has been involved in a variety of robust peacekeeping operations, and therefore such a search for a Charter basis is, today, only academic. For the Council to proceed from peacekeeping to peacemaking and post-conflict reconciliation is seemingly but a short step. The present debate seems to be focused on the effects of intra-State conflicts that have bedevilled the international landscape in the post-cold war period and have bred ethnic conflicts or factional struggles for military control, political power, economic resources or external patronage within States.”
2004-01-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4903Resumption1 (2004) · source
“The role of the United Nations was also significant, though of a somewhat different nature from what seems relevant to the present debate. What is the basis for the Security Council's current consideration of this subject? Ever since the crisis in the Congo in 1960, the United Nations has considered aspects of internal conflicts because of their potential implications for international peace and security, taking into account Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Charter. This Article allows the Council to consider or make a recommendation regarding a dispute or a situation of a similar nature at any stage, with perhaps the minimal requirement of an investigation under Article 34 of the Charter.”
2004-01-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4903Resumption1 (2004) · source