YouSaid · the spoken record

Nebenzia/Mr. Polyanskiy

lines on the record: 145
first: 2018-06-13
most recent: 2023-04-26
sittings or episodes: 10
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“We will now provide concrete and strictly factual examples of how the Western States are violating the obligations they undertook earlier in the context of Ukraine. For a long time now Russia has been drawing attention to the fact that the flood of weapons being supplied to the Kyiv regime would end up on the black market and in the hands of organized crime and terrorist groups. And that is now confirmed by the facts. The weapons supplied by Western countries are now surfacing in various European States and adding to the arsenals of organized crime, as European police representatives have admitted. Arms supplied by the West to Ukraine are making their way around the world and have already fallen into the hands of insurgents, especially in Africa, as we have all heard about in statements by African leaders.”
2023-04-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9301 (2023) · source
“We have already noted that the accusations about supplies of such equipment to Russia in contravention of Security Council resolutions are baseless, unlike the specific cases of violations of existing agreements by Western States. Neither Kyiv nor its sponsors have presented proof of their accusations beyond arguments of the “highly likely” variety, just as none of the specialized bodies created in support of the relevant Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea have been able to confirm the unfounded opinions we have heard expressed today. And yet a number of Western States continue to make them, as we have seen today. Washington and its satellites have clearly been unable to come up with any other ways to conceal their role in provoking and fuelling the crisis in Ukraine.”
2023-04-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9301 (2023) · source
“I shall now make a further statement in my capacity as the representative of the Russian Federation. I feel obliged to respond to the remarks today by certain representatives in which they directed unfounded accusations at Russia. The purpose of today’s debate is not to discuss the situation in Ukraine and the danger of the continuing flood of weapons there. We have had that discussion regularly and have provided the relevant facts. Today we had hoped for a depoliticized, substantive discussion between the members of the Council and other Member States about the concrete risks created by violations of international agreements regulating the supply of military equipment. Obviously those risks exist, and it is certainly not our fault that Western States’ policy on the Ukrainian crisis clearly demonstrates that.”
2023-04-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9301 (2023) · source
“We hope that today’s open debate will allow Member States to talk about threats to various regions of the world and share their own experiences, ideas and initiatives when it comes to how to curb those risks. I now resume my functions as President of the Council.”
2023-04-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9301 (2023) · source
“At the same time, baseless accusations that any given State is allegedly providing arms to Russia in violation of the relevant Security Council resolutions have not been supported by any evidence, and we have repeatedly officially refuted them. Another less visible but very serious risk of irresponsible behaviour in relation to the transfer of arms is the “fusion” of national Governments and their military-industrial complexes. Of course, curbing this is of no interest to the military-industrial complexes of Western countries, and their Governments have taken on analogous positions. The failure to strengthen oversight on arms control leads to many other very serious consequences for international peace and security.”
2023-04-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9301 (2023) · source
“We recall that signatories of the Arms Trade Treaty as well as EU countries have assumed obligations to prevent the use of weapons that are supplied by them to undermine global peace and stability, violate international humanitarian law, commit acts of violence, escalate armed conflict and facilitate repression, genocide and so on. When weapons are provided to a regime that, for many years, has been using and continues to use them to fire on civilians and civilian infrastructure, one cannot talk about these obligations being complied with. This contempt for one’s own obligations, setting aside the moral part of the question, creates a significant risk that the unchecked provision of weapons will take place in other conflict zones, notwithstanding the likelihood of further escalation.”
2023-04-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9301 (2023) · source
“It is no coincidence that the requirement of including end-user certificates as part of all deliveries of military goods has become a universally acknowledged international practice. Ignoring that leads to the fact that the weapons supplied often end up on the black markets and fall into the hands of organized crime. Another very dangerous consequence of the unchecked supply of weapons is the risk that they will end up in the hands of terrorists, particularly when we are talking about especially sensitive weapons, for example, portable air-defence systems or anti-tank systems, which pose massive risks for international civil aviation and rail transport.”
2023-04-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9301 (2023) · source
“The United States and its allies are putting pressure on third countries, demanding that they violate such agreements with Russia and other States in the interest of increasing weapon supplies to Kyiv. On 30 November, United States Secretary of State Blinken clearly announced that they would resume production of Soviet-designed weapons systems at facilities in Eastern European States, whereas inter-State agreements with those countries stipulate obligations not to supply such weapons without the written consent of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics — or of Russia, as its successor. Therefore, such actions are a direct violation of the fundamental international norms in the area of conventional arms control, regardless of the purpose.”
2023-04-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9301 (2023) · source
“First of all, among such risks, we would point to the erosion of international law in the area of supply of military goods. Violations of bilateral agreements, including bans on third-country re-exports or production without the permission of the country supplying the weapons or technology, run counter to fundamental practices in the area of supply of military goods. Covert weapons deliveries to a given region through a third country further distort the picture of arms flows throughout the world and decrease transparency in that area. Unfortunately, Western countries are not only not trying to combat such violations, but they are even encouraging them.”
2023-04-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9301 (2023) · source
“However, the crisis they themselves provoked in Ukraine was a clear illustration of the insincerity of their statements in support of international efforts to combat the uncontrolled spread of military goods. Russia has repeatedly convened meetings of the Security Council regarding the dangerous consequences of pumping the Kyiv regime with weapons, which clearly illustrates the risks of violating the obligations assumed in the area of control over military goods. We note that, regardless of the attitudes of certain countries as to what is happening in Ukraine, those risks are quite real and applicable to any other region or State. It is the duty of the Security Council to respond and discuss, including jointly with other Member States, potential measures to curb those risks.”
2023-04-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9301 (2023) · source
“The world has already faced the consequences of such irresponsible policies many times. A number of States, guided by their geopolitical ambitions, have throughout the years carried out large-scale deliveries of weapons and ammunition to various regions around the world, including the Middle and Near East, the Balkans and North Africa. Subsequently, faced with the bitter experience of the radicalization of so-called “opposition forces” they supported and the subsequent uncontrolled spread of military equipment around the world, Western countries have consistently promoted the concept of “responsible behaviour” and strengthening control over arms trade.”
2023-04-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9301 (2023) · source
“In the absence of appropriate agreements, it is often impossible to trace the chain of transfer of military goods — and thereby establish control over them — and countries and entire regions end up flooded with illegal weapons, which leads to an increase in violence and crime. At the same time, we believe that the Security Council, which deals with issues of control over the supply of military goods within the framework of its mandate, should not duplicate the functions of the General Assembly, where discussions of relevant global measures are being held. However, the Council is obliged to respond to threats to international peace and security that arise when individual countries violate their obligations previously assumed in relation to the supply of military weapons and violate already concluded agreements.”
2023-04-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9301 (2023) · source
“As for the international Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), we must once again note that the standards it sets are significantly lower than Russian’s standards. The ATT does not include a direct ban on the unlicensed production and transfer of weapons to non-State actors, or provisions regulating the procedure for the re-exporting of military goods only with the consent of the original exporting State. At the same time, we continue to monitor the implementation of the Treaty and consider it important that its signatories fulfil the legal obligations they undertook. During discussions at specialized platforms, we consistently point out that the fight against the uncontrolled proliferation of military goods must remain the focus of attention of all Member States.”
2023-04-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9301 (2023) · source
“We consistently propose a number of specific measures that could contribute to the practical implementation of joint efforts to curb the illegal circulation of small arms and light weapons, namely, putting in place a universal ban on the transfer of all types of small arms and light weapons to entities not authorized by the Governments of recipient States; ensuring strict regulation and direct control by States in the territory under their jurisdiction over brokering activities related to the export of weapons and setting a maximum limit on the number of such brokers; introducing a strict ban on the re-export or subsequent transfers of imported small arms and light weapons without the written consent of the State that originally exported them — that is, making end-user certificates a required condition in exporting weapons — and preventing the production of small arms and light weapons under expired licenses or without a license from the country that owns the technology for its production.”
2023-04-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9301 (2023) · source
“The Russian Federation is also making an active contribution to the work of existing United Nations international mechanisms. In particular, we consider the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms as a universal tool for increasing transparency. We regularly transfer relevant data to the Register, while the importance of providing such information is enshrined in Russian national legislation. We believe that ensuring the universalization of the Register is the main task in achieving its goals — that is to say, increasing the number of countries that regularly submit annual national reports on the export and import of weapons. We also pay special attention to the implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects.”
2023-04-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9301 (2023) · source
“We are consistently strengthening our relevant national legislation and are prepared to share our own experience in that area. We support relevant initiatives in Africa, Latin America and other regions where people know at first-hand about the devastating consequences of the illegal diversion of weapons. We note the adoption by certain regional groupings of specific commitments in this area, in particular the European Union (EU) common position, which in 2008 established the basic rules for members of the EU on control over the export of military technologies and equipment. The latter was adopted in the framework of section V of the 1992 Treaty on European Union and was approved by a relevant decision of the European Council. It is therefore mandatory for all EU member States when it comes to their positions and actions.”
2023-04-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9301 (2023) · source
“I thank Mrs. Nakamitsu for her briefing. I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of the Russian Federation. Questions concerning control over the supply of conventional arms and military equipment have recently taken on particular relevance. Risks associated with their uncontrolled spread and their falling into the hands of criminals and terrorists by way of the black market are growing exponentially. We consider today’s debate a good opportunity to discuss with a wide range of Member States the existing regional and international agreements in this area, as well as the threats posed by violations thereof. The Russian Federation gives priority attention to issues regarding control over supply of military equipment.”
2023-04-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9301 (2023) · source
“I wish to draw the attention of Council members to document S/2023/243, which contains the text of a letter dated 3 April 2023 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, transmitting a concept note on the item under consideration. I now give the floor to Mrs. Nakamitsu.”
2023-04-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9301 (2023) · source
“In accordance with rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representatives of Belarus, India, Indonesia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Lebanon, Mexico, Pakistan, Poland and South Africa participate in this meeting. On behalf of the Council, I welcome His Excellency Mr. Yury Ambrazevich, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belarus. Inaccordancewithrule 39 ofthe Council’sprovisional rules of procedure, I invite Mrs. Izumi Nakamitsu, Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, to participate in this meeting. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda.”
2023-04-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9301 (2023) · source
“I would like to take this opportunity to pay tribute, on behalf of the Council, to His Excellency Mr. Pedro Comissário Afonso, Permanent Representative of Mozambique, for his service as President of the Security Council for the month of March. I am sure I speak for all members of the Council in expressing our deep appreciation to Ambassador Afonso and his team for the great diplomatic skill with which they conducted the Council’s business last month. Adoption of the agenda The agenda was adopted. Threats to international peace and security Risks stemming from violations of the agreements regulating the export of weapons and military equipment Letter dated 3 April 2023 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2023/243)”
2023-04-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9301 (2023) · source
“Before we start our meeting, I would like to wish a happy Easter to all those colleagues who celebrated in recent days. Expression of thanks to the outgoing President”
2023-04-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9301 (2023) · source
“On our part, we support the efforts of specialized international agencies, particularly the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). In that connection, we draw attention to the Agency’s appeals to the international community accumulate the much-needed funds so that it can continue to render comprehensive humanitarian assistance to Palestine refugees in the Middle East. Russia continues to provide constant financial support to UNRWA through an annual voluntary contribution to its budget. I now resume my functions as President of the Council. I give the floor to the Permanent Observer of the Observer State of Palestine.”
2022-02-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8973 (2022) · source
“We reiterate the importance of holding a ministerial Quartet meeting and ensuring that that mechanism works closely with Palestinians, Israelis and key regional stakeholders. In that connection, we would like to draw attention to another important point. Conditions for resolving a conflict and making collective efforts are never ideal. If they were, there would be no conflict. However, if no action is taken because the environment is not yet conducive, then there will be no progress. We therefore call upon all stakeholders to be receptive to our initiatives. We also highlight the importance of providing comprehensive humanitarian assistance to those in need in the occupied Palestinian territories and Gaza, as well as to Palestinian refugees in neighbouring Arab States.”
2022-02-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8973 (2022) · source
“Our proposal to convene another intra-Palestinian meeting in Moscow as soon as the participants are able to agree on general approaches and to reflect them in a relevant document remains on the table. Moreover, we continue to collaborate with Palestinians and Israelis, as well as international and regional stakeholders, including in the framework of the Middle East Quartet — currently the only internationally recognized format to support the Middle East peace process that has been endorsed by Council resolutions. We intend to continue working actively with our partners in the Quartet in an effort to enhance the effectiveness of the work of this mediation mechanism by defining collective steps to advance the implementation of the two-State solution endorsed by the United Nations.”
2022-02-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8973 (2022) · source
“In that context, the primary tasks are achieving lasting stabilization, eschewing provocations and unilateral steps that create irreversible facts on the ground, and restoring political prospects for revitalizing the peace process on the universally recognized international legal basis for the Middle East peace process. We are convinced that that is possible only through direct negotiations between the parties. Another key prerequisite for breaking this deadlock is overcoming intra-Palestinian divisions. We welcome the efforts of Arab countries, in particular Egypt and Algeria, aimed at fostering dialogue between Palestine’s main political forces.”
2022-02-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8973 (2022) · source
“Other growing concerns are the reported recent sharp rise in settler attacks and the disproportionate use of force by the Israeli military against Palestinians, which has led to numerous civilian casualties. A clear illustration of that is a high-profile eviction and house demolition of a Palestinian family that took place in January in the Sheikh Jarrah neighbourhood of East Jerusalem. That incident led to a wave of protests on the streets of Palestine. Moreover, we are concerned about Tel Aviv’s announced plans to expand settlement activity in the occupied Golan Heights, which directly contradicts the provisions of the 1949 Geneva Convention. We stress Russia’s unchanging position — we do not recognize Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights, which are an integral part of Syria.”
2022-02-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8973 (2022) · source
“I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of the Russian Federation. We thank Tor Wennesland for his comprehensive briefing on the situation in the Middle East in the context of the Middle East peace process. From the Special Coordinator’s briefing, it is clear that the stagnation and de facto stalemate of Palestinian- Israeli dialogue is leading to a spike in violence in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Against that backdrop, settlement construction and expansion continues, as does the confiscation of land, the forced eviction of Palestinians, the demolition of houses, arbitrary arrests and detentions and attempts to change the historical status quo of the Al-Aqsa Mosque complex.”
2022-02-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8973 (2022) · source
“I thank Mr. Wennesland for his briefing. I shall now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements.”
2022-02-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8973 (2022) · source
“In accordance with rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representative of Israel to participate in this meeting. I propose that the Council invite the Permanent Observer of the Observer State of Palestine to the United Nations, to participate in the meeting, in accordance with the provisional rules of procedure and the previous practice in this regard. In accordance with rule 39 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite Mr. Tor Wennesland, Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, to participate in this meeting. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. I now give the floor to Mr. Wennesland.”
2022-02-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8973 (2022) · source
“All of the statements that I have heard today have suggested that. Once again, this is a remark in my national capacity as representative of Russia. I would ask the representative of France to abstain from making recommendations on what I can include in my national statement and what not. Responding to the representative of Estonia, in my national capacity, I should say that we will with great pleasure participate in a meeting with Director General Arias when he next comes to an open briefing of the Security Council, which I hope will happen as soon as next month. I now resume my functions as President of the Council. I give the floor to the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic.”
2020-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8764 (2020) · source
“Before I give the floor to our next speaker, I would like to make two comments. First, in my capacity as President of the Security Council, in response to the comment made by the representative of France that I had exceeded my authority as President, I recall that not only did I not exceed my authority as President; I did not even make full use of it. Had I fully availed myself of my rights, without any prejudice to the rules of procedure, there would have been a different result in the voting on the question at hand. I shall now speak in my national capacity. By this vote we brought disgrace upon ourselves. For the first time in the Security Council, we have voted on the presence of a briefer. This tells us something about the fear among certain members of hearing the truth and their lack of confidence.”
2020-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8764 (2020) · source
“Once again, and not for the first time today, the presidency has been admonished. I will not comment on that in my capacity as President but as the representative of my country in my right of reply at the end of the meeting.”
2020-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8764 (2020) · source
“I did not randomly ask whether the representative of Germany wished to speak on a point of order. If he would like to make an additional statement then I can give him the floor at the end of the meeting, but if he wishes to speak on a point of order, I am obliged to give him the floor immediately. For next time, I inform the German representative that if he wishes to say something or make a comment on what I have to say, then I can give him the floor and he is free to do so, but it must be done in accordance with the proper procedures.”
2020-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8764 (2020) · source
“Before I give the floor to the representative of Viet Nam, I would like to once again recall that the question that the representative of Germany referred to was not about the person who held the post of United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mr. Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, but rather about the item being considered by the Security Council. That item did not go through because it did not receive enough votes. He therefore cannot tell us that we blocked a briefer who was supposed to speak to the Council. It was an agenda item, not a speaker. Those are two different things. The question is whether someone tried to block the agenda item today, concerning the implementation of resolution 2118 (2013). Does the representative of Germany wish to speak on a point of order?”
2020-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8764 (2020) · source
“On the invitation to Director General Arias, which we talked about today — and now I am speaking in my national capacity — it was we who put up that proposal. I hope that when it is proposed that he deliver a briefing at our next regular open meeting on the Syrian chemical issue, the representative of the United Kingdom will not put that question to a vote.”
2020-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8764 (2020) · source
“Since the representative of the United Kingdom addressed some of his comments not to Russia but to me personally as the President of the Security Council, I feel compelled to comment on them, as follows. I was not the person who proposed that we vote on the briefer. It was the United Kingdom that proposed that we put this question to a vote, which, as President of the Security Council, I did. In his position, I would have thanked the presidency for putting this question to the vote using the wording that he proposed, even though I am absolutely convinced that the argument about what form the question should be put to the vote in was absolutely legitimate. He knows very well that if we had put it to the vote in a different form, he would not have won the vote.”
2020-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8764 (2020) · source
“Now the time has clearly come to speak openly. There must be no more delays. We propose that we agree today to invite Mr. Arias to the next meeting on the Syrian chemical file. We look forward to hearing his comprehensive answers to all the issues raised earlier by Mr. Henderson, Mr. Maté and Mr. Postol and today by Mr. Bustani and member States. I now resume my functions as President of the Council.”
2020-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8764 (2020) · source
“If it has slipped, it nevertheless still has the opportunity to repair itself. Like all responsible members of the OPCW, we want to restore its good name so that it can continue to fulfil its mandate under the CWC. We know very well what our colleagues are going to say. We have heard all that on many occasions. I will speak frankly: all this looks bleak and unconvincing. Russia remains interested in impartial investigations, but we will oppose disinformation and blatant lies. In conclusion, let me make one more point. When Western representatives disputed today, and previously, the appropriateness of Mr. Bustani’s participation in this meeting, they stated that it would have been more logical to invite the current Director General, Mr. Arias. We have never objected to such a scenario. We insisted only on the open format of the briefing.”
2020-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8764 (2020) · source
“We have seen that before in the case of the Skripal incident, where unanswered questions still hang in the air. We see that happening again today with regard to the supposed poisoning of Mr. Navalny, which allegedly took place in Russia. For some reason, at Western countries’ first call for technical assistance, the OPCW Technical Secretariat readily hurries to “investigate” along the lines of political conclusions drawn made about the existence of some “irrefutable evidence”. Nevertheless, we invited OPCW inspectors to Russia to establish the details of what had happened, since we really have nothing to hide. Allegations that Russia is trying to undermine the authority of the OPCW are absolutely unsubstantiated. As Mr. Bustani pointed out in his statement, that organization has already achieved greatness.”
2020-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8764 (2020) · source
“We cannot but note that, in his letter transmitting the report, the Secretary-General used the language of the aforementioned biased and unrealistic decision of the OPCW Executive Council that it is imperative “to hold accountable all those who have used chemical weapons” and that it allegedly requires the unity of the Council to uphold this “urgent obligation” (S/2020/961). It is not easy to surprise us anymore. Unfortunately, everything that is marked “done by the OPCW” is immediately associated with some sort of falsification and manipulation. Let us be frank: the Technical Secretariat is increasingly becoming a tool that the West uses to put information and political pressure on undesirable countries. The Technical Secretariat’s involvement in anti-Russian campaigns also supports such a conclusion.”
2020-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8764 (2020) · source
“Henderson during the Arria Formula video-teleconference meeting, the guidance of the Technical Secretariat instructs the Declaration Assessment Team to keep those issues open. With such an approach, no matter how the Syrians justify themselves, that part of the file will not be closed. I would also like to recall that, according to the same expert, at the initial stage of joining the CWC, many possessor States encountered similar problems when submitting their declarations, but, in their cases, those were interpreted as minor drawbacks that did not undermine the integrity of the declaration. All that indicates the Technical Secretariat’s biased stance towards Damascus.”
2020-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8764 (2020) · source
“Against that backdrop, the findings of the Fact-Finding Mission were not a revelation. The Mission could not of course determine the fact that chemical weapons had been used by opposition groups. The Technical Secretariat could have spared efforts pretending that an investigation was under way. Instead, it could have made known that finding right away and, for that matter, admitted that it would not even consider that the Syrian opposition could have been responsible for the use of chemical weapons. The most recent report of the Director General builds on those practices. For example, members should look at the paragraphs that dwell on outstanding issues with regard to the initial declaration. As we learned from former OPCW inspector Mr.”
2020-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8764 (2020) · source
“With regard to the most recent reports of the Fact-Finding Mission on the incidents in Aleppo in November 2018 and in Saraqib, Idlib in August 2016, which the Technical Secretariat prepared only after our many insistent calls for them over more than a year, we and the Syrian authorities have been bombarded with requests for new information. There always appears to be something that is lacking, some unsurmountable issue for the Technical Secretariat, samples that have gone missing, and so on. At some point, we grew tired of trying to prove that we had turned over all the material. Why was the investigation of these incidents so difficult and why did it take so long? Was it not because there were allegations that it was the opposition, not the Syrian army, who were using chemical weapons?”
2020-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8764 (2020) · source
“There would have been no reason for the Syrian Government to use chemical weapons and draw fire upon itself. Nonetheless this dubious report was the basis for the incriminatory decision of the OPCW Executive Council, which, in its July session, received an impossible number of votes. The conditions required of the Syrian Arab Republic simply could not be fulfilled. It would have meant declaring the existence of chemical weapons and facilities connected with them, when they simply do not exist, because all weapons had already been removed and destroyed, and no inspection since 2013 has been able to establish the contrary.”
2020-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8764 (2020) · source
“Since spring we have had to discuss the report of the Investigation and Identification Team on the incidents in Ltamenah in March 2017. This is a politically biased, unreliable and technically unconvincing report. The detailed criticism and arguments we voiced previously on this report were published in an official document of the Security Council in June (S/2020/565, annex). However, what this report sets forth in terms of analysis of the military situation in Ltamenah and Hama in March and April 2017 shows that there was hypothetically no need for any chemical weapons to be used by the Syrian Government’s forces. During that period, the Syrian army had successfully moved into the Hama province and brought up to 70 per cent of the territory back under its control.”
2020-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8764 (2020) · source
“We are also still waiting for the Technical Secretariat to provide clarification on the machinations around the Fact-Finding Mission’s report on the events in Douma in April 2018, as well as an answer from the Director General on how he plans to combat the violations that have come to light. There is evidence also from Ian Henderson, who was an eyewitness, that what we are talking about was a direct forgery. The initial report, which said that the incident was not connected with the use of chemical weapons, was replaced with one that makes the West more comfortable, and the authors of the first, objective version were persecuted by the leadership of the OPCW. New examples are coming to light virtually every month.”
2020-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8764 (2020) · source
“Their arguments were not new and came back once again to the dubious “highly likely”, “everybody knows this is how it is” or “there is no other rational explanation”, and so on. The time when we could afford to have this technical discussion of the latest report of the Director General on the implementation of resolution 2118 (2013) is over. Today there is a critical mass of questions for the Technical Secretariat of the OPCW and evidence of machinations and skulduggery in its reports. They are ignoring our protest about the report of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria on Khan Shaykhun in April 2017, despite the fact that there is much evidence that it was staged.”
2020-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8764 (2020) · source
“We therefore encourage all of the participants in the discussion to send us the texts of their statements by the end of the day on 6 October. Thanks to the briefers in the Arria Formula meeting on 28 September, we had an open conversation on the basis of facts and real evidence, and not on bare slogans. Unfortunately, not all members of the Security Council were ready for this. Some of them, evidently not finding any counterarguments, tried simply to suppress our experts, accusing them of bias or a lack of competence. However, they did not have any basis for doing that. Each of the experts we invited were ready to defend their positions, argue the facts and their interpretation of those facts, but our Western colleagues were not even ready for that.”
2020-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8764 (2020) · source
“We advocate a maximally open and honest conversation that will allow us to formulate an objective picture of what is happening in this context. Before this meeting, on 28 September we held an Arria Formula meeting with members of the Security Council on the Syrian chemical dossier involving authoritative independent experts Ian Henderson, Theodore Postol and Aaron Maté. As it turned out, that meeting drew a great deal of interest from those who are following the subject. Since then, we have continued to receive positive messages and thanks for the interesting briefings, from which those listening were able to receive much new information. We are planning to publish the statements of the participants and disseminate the material.”
2020-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8764 (2020) · source
“Unfortunately, the organization is becoming a conduit for the selfish interests of certain countries. We cannot allow this to happen to the Syrian issue within the United Nations. The United Nations should not indulge unfairness and aggression. We ask that it not act blindly and mechanically on this initiative, and we would like to draw the Secretary-General’s attention to this point. What is at stake is the authority of the United Nations, the Security Council and the Secretary-General himself. Today, on the initiative of the Russian Federation, the Council is holding its second open meeting on the Syrian chemical dossier. Our objective as President of the Council is to have a discussion on this very complicated and extremely politicized subject and bring it out of the impasse that it has been in for some time.”
2020-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8764 (2020) · source