YouSaid · the spoken record

Nebenzia/Ms. Evstigneeva

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74
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2020-10-13
most recent
2023-04-19
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8
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un-security-council

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  1. There are no more names inscribed on the list of speakers. I now invite Council members to informal consultations to continue our discussion on the subject. The meeting rose at 12.05 p.m.

    2023-04-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9307 (2023) · source

  2. We call for intensifying the efforts to achieve the full implementation of the fundamental Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework Agreement for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Great Lakes Region of 2013, and we welcome the commitment of the African Union to revitalizing it. For our part, we reaffirm our readiness to support the stabilization of the Great Lakes area by encouraging dialogue and constructive cooperation among the States of the region. We look forward to working together with the relevant United Nations bodies and their representatives. In conclusion, we want to emphasize that Russia fully supports the activities of Special Envoy Huang Xia to promote an inter-State dialogue with a view to reducing tensions in that part of Africa. I now resume my functions as President of the Council.

    2023-04-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9307 (2023) · source

  3. Dialogue and effective confidence-building measures are essential, along with the consolidation of the efforts of the States in the region, as well as their awareness of their common responsibility, and their practical interest, where stabilizing the situation in the Great Lakes region is concerned, an area where various interests are closely intertwined. Peaceful and sustainable development, mutually beneficial cooperation and a focus on the collective resolution of long-standing problems — including those related to the illegal exploitation of natural resources as one of the key factors fuelling armed conflict — will benefit all the countries of the Great Lakes basin.

    2023-04-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9307 (2023) · source

  4. In accordance with resolution 2666 (2022), we await the Secretary-General’s proposals on the reconfiguration of the Mission by July, in the light of the ongoing consultations with Kinshasa. In order to increase the effectiveness of efforts to protect the civilian population, we look forward to greater coordination between the Congolese armed forces and MONUSCO, as well as the regional and national bodies involved in resolving the conflict. We note the significant role played by United Nations agencies in alleviating the humanitarian consequences of the crisis. It is clear that it will not be possible to achieve a lasting normalization of the situation in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Great Lakes region by military means alone.

    2023-04-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9307 (2023) · source

  5. We support the efforts of MONUSCO and its leadership. We consider the presence of Blue Helmets in the conflict zone to be an important stabilizing factor. The recent protests against the Mission’s presence are cause for concern. Attacks on peacekeepers are unacceptable. It is important that to ensure not only that MONUSCO carries out informational outreach activities with the local population regarding the objectives of its presence and the content of its mandate but also that it listens to the views of the public and the authorities, which will enable it to do its work more effectively. We believe firmly that MONUSCO’s withdrawal plan must be implemented based on the reality on the ground and without the imposition of artificial timelines.

    2023-04-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9307 (2023) · source

  6. Speaking more generally, we believe it is important to continue to integrate synergistic efforts and initiatives for regional cooperation in order to achieve meaningful results. We hope that the understandings reached at the twentieth extraordinary summit of Heads of State and Government of the EAC in early February in Bujumbura, as well as at the meeting between members of the EAC and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, held on the margins of the thirty-sixth Summit of Heads of State and Government of the African Union in Addis Ababa in mid-February, will help implement the Luanda road map and facilitate the withdrawal of the M-23 from the occupied areas. We expect the Angolan contingent to play a constructive role in that by supporting the ad hoc verification mechanism.

    2023-04-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9307 (2023) · source

  7. Members of the Security Council visited Kinshasa and Goma on a field mission from 9 to 12 March, where they saw first-hand how difficult the humanitarian situation is in the eastern provinces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. We believe it is important to continue to seek a diplomatic solution to the conflict, including within the framework of the Luanda and Nairobi negotiation formats. We believe that the priority should be to achieve a cessation of hostilities and a comprehensive and inclusive dialogue. In that regard, we hope that the regional leaders will succeed in taking further steps to create the conditions for advancing the inter-Congolese negotiation process and restoring good-neighbourly relations between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda.

    2023-04-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9307 (2023) · source

  8. We note that by virtue of the fact that the Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo, the United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) and the regional force of the East African Community (EAC) have been forced to focus their efforts on dealing with the M-23 problem, other illegal armed groups have been taking advantage of the situation by expanding their illegal activities, attacking civilians, exploiting natural resources with impunity and strengthening their positions in the east of the country. In general, as has already been said today, natural resources are one of the most important factors in the instability in the Great Lakes region. The worsening security situation significantly complicates matters in the region, increasing ordinary people’s suffering.

    2023-04-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9307 (2023) · source

  9. I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of the Russian Federation. We thank Special Envoy Huang Xia and Mr. Ivan Šimonović, Permanent Representative of Croatia to the United Nations and Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission, for their briefings. We welcome the participation of the representatives of Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda in today’s meeting. The situation in the Great Lakes region mainly hinges on the situation in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. We are particularly concerned about the continuing clashes between the Congolese Government forces and the Mouvement du 23 mars (M-23) group in North Kivu province, as well as the tensions between Kinshasa and Kigali.

    2023-04-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9307 (2023) · source

  10. I thank Mr. Šimonović for his briefing. I shall now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements.

    2023-04-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9307 (2023) · source

  11. I wish to draw the attention of Council members to document S/2023/237, which contains the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region. I now give the floor to Mr. Huang Xia.

    2023-04-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9307 (2023) · source

  12. In accordance with rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representatives of Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda to participate in this meeting. In accordance with rule 39 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite the following briefers to participate in this meeting: Mr. Huang Xia, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region; and His Excellency Mr. Ivan Šimonović, Permanent Representative of Croatia to the United Nations, in his capacity as Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda.

    2023-04-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9307 (2023) · source

  13. I think I will spare Council members from making a second statement in my capacity as the representative of the Russian Federation, because I think we said all we wanted in our earlier statement made in our national capacity. (spoke in Russian) There are no more names inscribed on the list of speakers. I now invite Council members to informal consultations to continue our discussion on the subject. The meeting rose at 4.30 p.m.

    2023-04-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9305 (2023) · source

  14. Together with China, we have repeatedly proposed concrete initiatives aimed at finding mutually acceptable solutions and resolving the situation on the Korean peninsula, while taking into account the interests of all sides. Our proposals remain on the table, and we stand ready for a substantive discussion. We are convinced that the majority of Council members are also interested in jointly developing forward-looking solutions. We call on the few countries blocking that process to reconsider their approach and start working to that end. However, that would require a fundamental change in their approach, on which, regrettably, we pin but little hope. I now resume my functions as President of the Council. I give the floor to the representative of the Republic of Korea.

    2023-04-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9305 (2023) · source

  15. Coupled with the promotion by the United States of its unilateral security doctrine in the Asia-Pacific region and its desire to create more divisions in the region, the accelerated militarization of North-East Asia is assuming a clearly destructive character. Particularly telling was the establishment of the AUKUS partnership — among Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States — whose plans raise serious concerns, including in the context of compliance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In conclusion, we would like to stress that repeating the same positions in the Security Council month after month, which is not then followed by concrete results, can undermine the Council’s authority.

    2023-04-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9305 (2023) · source

  16. However, in practice, the picture is quite different — threatening military exercises that simulate strikes against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, further illegitimate unilateral sanctions, with no regard for the humanitarian situation in North Korea, and politicized statements in the Security Council Chamber. We repeatedly underscore that the situation in the region is a vicious circle. We believe that the sharp increase in military activity in North- East Asia has been caused by the irresponsible goals of Washington and its allies to enhance sanctions-based and forceful pressure on Pyongyang as part of the so- called extended deterrence strategy. That raises the question about the goals that Washington and its allies pursue.

    2023-04-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9305 (2023) · source

  17. We can deliver effectively on our responsibility to respond to threats to peace and security only when we see and understand the full picture of developments in a particular region. The representatives of some States who spoke at length today about the importance of upholding Security Council resolutions on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea always forget that those resolutions also envisage a movement towards a political-diplomatic solution, which does not imply declarative statements, but rather specific, practical steps that should demonstrate genuine commitment to resuming dialogue and mutually acceptable ways to resolve the situation. It is our firm conviction that all discussions in the Security Council must be results-oriented.

    2023-04-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9305 (2023) · source

  18. However, some of the countries that request such discussions, first and foremost the United States, are direct participants in the most recent escalation. We have not heard anything new today. Once again, we are offered a one-sided version of events, in which the guilty parties have been selected in advance and the expected response to the situation must be the same as that of Washington. Russia’s position on the matter is well known. We oppose any military activity that might jeopardize the security of the Korean peninsula and the States of North- East Asia. We have repeatedly stated that the Security Council should consider the situation on the Korean peninsula in a comprehensive manner.

    2023-04-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9305 (2023) · source

  19. I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of the Russian Federation. We thank Assistant Secretary-General Khaled Khiari for his briefing. Since the beginning of this year, the Security Council has convened five times on the issue of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, in various formats and upon the request of some States. As a responsible Council President, Russia accommodated the request of some delegations for another meeting on the matter. However, in our national capacity, we strongly oppose the trend to mainstream such Council meetings for the purpose of propaganda and exerting pressure. Some Council members say their desire to discuss the situation is motivated by serious concerns about recent developments on the Korean peninsula. Indeed, the situation is very tense.

    2023-04-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9305 (2023) · source

  20. I thank Mr. Khiari for his briefing. I shall now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements.

    2023-04-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9305 (2023) · source

  21. In accordance with rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representative of the Republic of Korea to participate in this meeting. In accordance with rule 39 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite Mr. Khaled Khiari, Assistant Secretary-General for the Middle East, Asia and the Pacific in the Departments of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Peace Operations, to participate in this meeting. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. I give the floor to Mr. Khiari.

    2023-04-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9305 (2023) · source

  22. There are no more names on the list. I will now adjourn the meeting so that the Council can continue its discussion on the subject in closed consultations. The meeting rose at 11.45 a.m.

    2022-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8975 (2022) · source

  23. We note the progress in rebuilding trust and settling existing disputes between Baghdad and Erbil. Further improvement in their relations will help Iraq to strengthen its security. Resolving current ethnic and sectarian issues will enable the country’s economic potential to be effectively harnessed for the benefit of the entire Iraqi population. In conclusion, I would like to underscore that Iraq must not become an arena for regional confrontation. For our part, we highly appreciate Baghdad’s commitment to building good-neighbourly relations, as well as the diplomatic potential for regional de-escalation, on the basis of resolution 598 (1987) and the Russian concept of collective security. I now resume my functions as President of the Security Council. I now give the floor to the representative of Iraq.

    2022-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8975 (2022) · source

  24. In that context, we commend the work of the Baghdad Quadripartite Information Centre, involving the militaries of Russia, Iraq, Iran and Syria. We believe that the mechanism plays an important role in coordinating counter-terrorism measures in Iraq and Syria. We will continue to support Iraq in building the capacity of its law enforcement bodies, first and foremost by promoting bilateral military and technical cooperation. Nonetheless, we believe that it is crucial for all parties involved in combating terrorism in Iraq to respect the sovereignty of the Iraqi State and coordinate their actions with the authorities in Baghdad. We reiterate that any illegitimate military presence in Iraq is unacceptable. Foreign military formations can be deployed only upon the consent of local authorities or based on a relevant Security Council resolution.

    2022-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8975 (2022) · source

  25. We trust that the parties elected to the Parliament will agree, in a timely manner, on a candidate for President and on the composition of a new Government that should enjoy the support of all major political factions and ethnic and faith-based groups. We support the stabilization of Iraq, including through the maintenance of security and legal order. In that regard, we note with concern the ongoing heightened terrorist threat. Despite Iraq’s success in the area of counter-terrorism, the security situation remains fragile due to, inter alia, the increase in clandestine terrorist activity. We are convinced that the only way to effectively counter the threat is through the broadest-based coordination of counter- terrorism efforts.

    2022-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8975 (2022) · source

  26. We are concerned about the ongoing instability in Iraq, which is exacerbated by the complex socioeconomic situation, along with the spread of the coronavirus disease. We hope that Iraq’s spare resources, which it will have now that all compensation payments have been made, will have a positive impact on the well- being of the Iraqi society. In turn, the international community must support Baghdad as it drafts a package of comprehensive measures aimed at rebuilding the country’s socioeconomic and humanitarian sectors. We welcome the endorsement late last year of the results of elections to the Iraqi Council of Representatives, held in October 2021.

    2022-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8975 (2022) · source

  27. I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of the Russian Federation. We thank Special Representative of the Secretary-General Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert for her comprehensive briefing on the situation in Iraq. We note the role and the contribution of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) in ensuring stabilization in the country. We welcome the fact that the Government of Iraq has implemented its international obligations to compensate all claimants for the losses and damage suffered as a result of the events of 1990. In that regard, we welcome the final report of the Governing Council of the United Nations Compensation Commission for Iraq (see S/2022/104, annex) and the adoption of resolution 2621 (2022), which concluded its mandate.

    2022-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8975 (2022) · source

  28. I thank Ms. Hennis-Plasschaert for her briefing. I now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements.

    2022-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8975 (2022) · source

  29. In accordance with rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representative of Iraq to participate in this meeting. In accordance with rule 39 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite Ms. Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, to participate in this meeting. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. I wish to draw the attention of Council members to document S/2022/100, which contains the thirty-third report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 2107 (2013), and to document S/2022/103, which contains the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2576 (2021). I now give the floor to Ms.

    2022-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8975 (2022) · source

  30. The country was plunged into a state of chaos under a long-term foreign occupation. To date, many families of dead Iraqis have received no compensation and no one has been held accountable for the indiscriminate and disproportionate use of force, while the fabled WMDs in Iraq ultimately proved to be non-existent. To summarize, I would like to reaffirm our consistent approach regarding the inadmissibility of double standards and unilateral coercive measures insofar as such trends undermine the norms and institutions of international law. I now resume my functions as President of the Council. I give the floor to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq.

    2022-02-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8972 (2022) · source

  31. International restrictive measures should reflect the situation on the ground and be designed to facilitate a political settlement and subject to regular oversight, review and modification until they are fully lifted. We should not forget that the 2003 invasion of Iraq by the United States and a number of their allies was carried out under the pretext of the need to destroy what turned out to be non-existent weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), without a mandate from the Security Council and in violation of international law. As a result of the war that was unleashed with the use of blatant disinformation, the ousting of an inconvenient regime and the seizure of natural resources ended in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of peaceful citizens and led millions to become refugees or internally displaced.

    2022-02-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8972 (2022) · source

  32. We believe that the resources that are now available will make a tangible contribution to improving the socioeconomic situation of Iraqi society, which has endured the humanitarian consequences of sanctions pressure since the outbreak of the crisis in the Persian Gulf in 1990. Those sanctions, which should have served to facilitate a political settlement, ultimately morphed into a collective punishment of an entirely innocent people. In the context of the dissolution of the mandate of the UNCC, it is our duty to learn the relevant lessons and arrive at a shared understanding of the language of sanctions. Sanctions, as one of the strongest and harshest responses to threats to peace and security, should be imposed only in the most exceptional circumstances.

    2022-02-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8972 (2022) · source

  33. It took more than 30 years to arrive at today’s meeting and during that time, the Middle East has undergone enormous changes. However, Iraq and its nearest neighbours, first and foremost among them Kuwait, have steadfastly and consistently pursued dialogue with the aim of strengthening the prospects for long-term and robust peace and security in the region. Today’s meeting is the result of that approach. Like other members of the Security Council, the Russian Federation welcomes Baghdad’s tireless efforts to honour its international obligations by duly paying the claimants who were awarded compensation. That specific, responsible approach enable payments to be made in full early last month and Iraq is now no longer under the obligation to transfer a percentage of its petroleum export revenues to the Compensation Commission.

    2022-02-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8972 (2022) · source

  34. I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of the Russian Federation. I would like to welcome the participation in today’s meeting of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq, Mr. Fuad Mohammad Hussein, as well as the Permanent Representative of Kuwait to the United Nations, Mr. Mansour Alotaibi. I also want to express our gratitude to Mr. Michael Gaffey, President of the Governing Council of the United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC), for his report (S/2022/104, annex). Today we are bearing witness to a historic event, a special Security Council meeting to mark the dissolution of the United Nations Compensation Commission on Iraq and the adoption of resolution 2621 (2022).

    2022-02-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8972 (2022) · source

  35. The draft resolution received 15 votes in favour. The draft resolution has been adopted unanimously as resolution 2621 (2022). I now give the floor to Mr. Gaffey.

    2022-02-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8972 (2022) · source

  36. I wish to draw the attention of Council members to document S/2022/104, which contains the text of a letter dated 10 February 2022 from the President of the Governing Council of the United Nations Compensation Commission addressed to the President of the Security Council. The Council is ready to proceed to the vote on the draft resolution before it. I shall put the draft resolution to the vote now. A vote was taken by show of hands. In favour: Albania, Brazil, China, France, Gabon, Ghana, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

    2022-02-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8972 (2022) · source

  37. In accordance with rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representatives of Iraq and Kuwait to participate in this meeting. On behalf of the Council, I welcome His Excellency Mr. Fuad Mohammad Hussein, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq. In accordance with rule 39 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite His Excellency Mr. Michael Gaffey, President of the Governing Council of the United Nations Compensation Commission, to participate in this meeting. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. Members of the Council have before them document S/2022/136, which contains the text of a draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

    2022-02-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8972 (2022) · source

  38. There are no more names inscribed on the list of speakers. I will now adjourn the meeting so that the Council can continue its discussion on the subject in closed consultations. The meeting rose at 12.40 p.m.

    2022-02-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8971 (2022) · source

  39. Why do they not demand from each other the results of investigations into the air strike in Kabul that killed seven children, or air strikes in Iraq, Hajin and Baghouz, in which 80 people were killed, but nobody was punished for these crimes? Was no one responsible? Why are those questions not raised on a regular basis? I would also like to note that this is Mr. Ndiaye’s final briefing to the Security Council in his current capacity. I thank him for his briefing and to wish him every success in the future, whatever his chosen endeavours. I now resume my functions as President of the Council. I give the floor to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Francophonie and Central Africans Abroad of the Central African Republic.

    2022-02-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8971 (2022) · source

  40. A number of countries represented at the Security Council table have for a number of years provided so- called military assistance to African States — and not only African States. Then, a few years later, they simply abandoned those countries to their fate. That was the case in Afghanistan, and today we will also discuss a range of other African issues. Thereafter, it seems that suddenly everybody is guilty except those countries that were there for several years. Colleagues in the Security Council today have repeated, one after another, unverified information about cases of violations of human rights and other crimes.

    2022-02-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8971 (2022) · source

  41. In the light of recent international events, including in Africa, we are struck by the level of hypocrisy in the statements of some of our colleagues. While stressing the sovereign right of countries to select partners for cooperation and alliances, in other cases, if the partners do not suit our Western colleagues, they become hysterical, claiming that the sovereign State in question does not have a right to cooperate with such partners. In one case, when regional organizations support Western decisions or policies, that is good. In other cases, as with the Central African Republic, the assessments of regional organizations are ignored and their position on lifting the arms embargo is not taken into account.

    2022-02-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8971 (2022) · source

  42. With the knowledge of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013), we have repeatedly supplied the Central African Republic with military products. In addition, some 94 citizens of the Central African Republic are being trained in our military academies. There are also Russian instructors working in the country. The campaign to discredit them is bewildering to us, to say the least. We repeat that specialists from Russia are present in the Central African Republic on the basis of a request from the legally elected Central African authorities. Russia strictly complies with all the restrictions introduced by the Security Council with regard to the Central African Republic. Today we have once again heard accusations against Russian specialists.

    2022-02-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8971 (2022) · source

  43. It is they who bear the major responsibility for the fate of the country and for protecting civilians. In that regard, there is a need to continue to strengthen the capacity of the Central Africans themselves. That task is being impeded by the arms embargo. The Security Council sanctions regime must therefore be adapted in timely fashion to the situation on the ground. Russia has consistently advocated a relaxation of the arms embargo until such time as it is fully lifted. Resolution 2588 (2021) adopted on 29 July 2021, at the request of Bangui, makes provisions for additional easing of the sanctions regime. There is a need to take further steps in the direction of the official authorities. Our country is helping Bangui to strengthen its military capacity.

    2022-02-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8971 (2022) · source

  44. We are convinced that the full implementation of the peacekeeping mission’s mandate will be possible only with trust-based dialogue and mutual understanding with the authorities of the country of deployment. We hope, therefore, that the planned changes to the leadership of MINUSCA will have a positive effect on the relations between the Mission and Bangui. We abstained in the voting on 12 November 2021 on resolution 2605 (2021), on the extension of MINUSCA’s mandate. In so doing, we sent a signal to its leadership about the need to overcome the shortcomings in its work, first and foremost establishing the proper cooperation with the authorities in Bangui. At the same time, we must also realize that MINUSCA cannot and should not replace the efforts of the national authorities.

    2022-02-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8971 (2022) · source

  45. We believe that without effective support for the leaders of the country in strengthening the military capacity of the national armed forces, it may take a long time to overcome the domestic crisis. We are convinced that the presence of a well-armed and well-trained army and law enforcement is an important condition for long- term stability in the Central African Republic. Considering the functions that peacekeepers carry out, including in combating illegal armed groups as part of their civilian protection measures, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) should be an important element in guaranteeing security in the country. We advocate closer cooperation between MINUSCA and Bangui and with bilateral partners on the ground.

    2022-02-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8971 (2022) · source

  46. Those priorities include the cessation of military activity, the dissolution of illegal armed groups, the implementation of programmes for the demobilization, disarmament and reintegration of militants, security sector reform, the strengthening of national borders and gradual progress on the political process. We note that the illegal armed group Coalition des patriotes pour le changement and its various splinter groups have not ruled out continuing the armed struggle or their plans to seize power by force. We are also concerned by the high-tech weapons in their possession. In those conditions, we think it important to help strengthen the capacity of the legally elected authorities.

    2022-02-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8971 (2022) · source

  47. We welcome the active involvement of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region and the Economic Community of Central African States in the efforts being undertaken by the United Nations and Bangui’s foreign partners to stabilize the situation in the country. We believe that any mediation initiatives in the format of subregional organizations must be agreed with the Government of the Central African Republic. We believe it important to be guided by the priorities outlined by the President of the Central African Republic at the Security Council meeting held on 18 October 2021 (see S/PV.8882).

    2022-02-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8971 (2022) · source

  48. The judicial system is getting back to work, and the number of law enforcement officials deployed around the country is increasing. There are also preparations for municipal elections in September 2022. We are convinced that the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic of 6 February 2019 is the base document for achieving lasting peace and security. We note the efforts of the authorities to carry out the President’s initiative to organize the republican dialogue. It is important that the authorities are committed to the principle of inclusivity when implementing the road map on actualizing the political agreement, which was developed with regional assistance.

    2022-02-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8971 (2022) · source

  49. I shall now make a statement in my capacity as representative of the Russian Federation. We thank Mr. Mankeur Ndiaye, Mr. João Samuel Caholo and Mr. Bertino Matias Matondo for their briefings. We welcome the participation of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Central African Republic, Ms. Sylvie Valérie Baipo Temon. We are closely monitoring developments in the Central African Republic. We believe that there has been success overall in stabilizing the situation in the Central African Republic and in limiting the military potential of illegal armed groups. We therefore welcome the announcement by President Touadera on 15 October 2021 of a ceasefire regime. State authority is gradually being strengthened in the region.

    2022-02-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8971 (2022) · source

  50. I thank Mr. Caholo for his briefing. I shall now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements.

    2022-02-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8971 (2022) · source