YouSaid · the spoken record

Ngowe

lines on the record: 141
first: 1995-04-21
most recent: 1996-08-30
sittings or episodes: 23
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“It must be made clear to them that they will be held personally accountable for violations of international humanitarian law and human rights. In conclusion, I wish to congratulate Ms. Ruth Perry on her assumption of the chairmanship of the Council of State. Ms. Perry assumes the onerous tasks of guiding government business at a crucial moment in the history of the Liberian peace process. She has the full support and best wishes of Botswana as she nurtures the very delicate process of turning despair into hope.”
1996-08-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3694 (1996) · source
“The cease-fire, the disengagement and the demobilization of the combatants, the return and resettlement of refugees and displaced persons and the electoral process are the major phases of the Abuja peace Agreement which need the support and close involvement of the United Nations system. The United Nations will also help bludgeon the Liberian faction leaders to implement in full and on time the commitments and obligations they undertook under the Abuja peace Agreement. The faction leaders must not be allowed to hold the whole nation hostage to their desire to rule at all costs. The Liberian faction leaders must not be allowed to frustrate the efforts of the international community to resolve the political crisis in Liberia. They must not be allowed to realize their objective of forcing the United Nations out of Liberia.”
1996-08-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3694 (1996) · source
“It is important for the faction leaders to realize that they cannot escape responsibility for the actions of the combatants they unleashed on the citizens of Liberia, on their property and on equipment belonging to the international community. We therefore look forward to the report of the Secretary-General on this matter. Botswana fully supports the extension of the mandate of the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) for a further period of three months. The States of the subregion deserve the strong support of the United Nations. It is important that the United Nations should continue to play an active role in the resolution of the political crisis in Liberia. The United Nations has an important contribution to make in the implementation of the Abuja Agreement.”
1996-08-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3694 (1996) · source
“The humanitarian situation in Liberia requires the continued attention of the international community. Humanitarian organizations have been at the forefront of the efforts to deliver much-needed assistance to the people of Liberia, sometimes at great risk to the personal safety of their personnel. The Council is therefore right to make a clear and unequivocal demand that the faction leaders strictly respect the status of personnel of the humanitarian organizations. The wanton looting of equipment belonging to United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations dealt a severe blow to the work of the humanitarian community. This is an intolerable pattern of behaviour which the Security Council cannot condone. It must stop. It is only right that the Council insist on the return of all stolen property.”
1996-08-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3694 (1996) · source
“Significant adjustments have been made to the mandate of the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to enable the subregional peace-keeping force to meet any challenges and obstacles it may encounter in the implementation of the revised schedule. Moreover, several States of the subregion have stated their readiness to contribute additional troops to strengthen the operational capability of ECOMOG. ECOWAS has thus responded constructively and creatively to the suggestions made by some members of the international community to stay the course. It is only fair that the international community should respond appropriately to the needs of ECOMOG to enable it to deploy its troops in accordance with the revised schedule.”
1996-08-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3694 (1996) · source
“The active participation and contribution of the organizations of civil society at the Abuja Summit is an important development in articulating the voices of the disenfranchised people of Liberia. They represent the hopes and aspirations of the silent majority that we have been calling on the international community not to abandon, and it is time the faction leaders paid close attention to what they have to say. The commitment and determination of the member States of ECOWAS to resolve the crisis in Liberia is beyond reproach. The revised schedule for the implementation of the Abuja peace Agreement is a demonstration of the importance ECOWAS attaches to the peace process in Liberia.”
1996-08-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3694 (1996) · source
“The recent Summit meeting of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was an important milestone in the search for peace in Liberia. The outcome of the meeting reflects the unity of purpose of the States of the subregion and their resolve to help Liberians find a permanent political solution to the crisis which has bedevilled their country for far too long. Botswana commends ECOWAS member States for the monumental work they have done to give Liberia yet another chance to settle its political problems, even after several such chances were in the past squandered by the faction leaders. We particularly welcome the decision of the Heads of State of ECOWAS to impose measures on those leaders who obstruct the peace process.”
1996-08-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3694 (1996) · source
“What should come out of this meeting must be a clear statement of principle which should include the following elements: first, strong support for the neighbouring States in their efforts to find a lasting and peaceful solution which can guarantee security and democracy for all the people of Burundi; secondly, the demand that all Burundi's political parties and factions abandon violence and engage in a comprehensive dialogue under the auspices of the Mwanza peace process, being facilitated by Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, within 60 days; thirdly, imposing an arms embargo on all Burundi's factions, including those outside the country; and, lastly, declaring its readiness to impose further measures specifically targeted at those leaders who obstruct the peace process.”
1996-08-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3692 (1996) · source
“The Council has encouraged all of Burundi's political parties to engage in dialogue aimed at establishing a permanent political settlement. It has supported the efforts of Mwalimu Julius Nyerere and has encouraged him to continue to assist the Burundians to find common ground. The regime in Burundi removed the Government from power at a time when these efforts were nearing fruition. There can be no doubt, therefore, that the time has come for the Council to act decisively.”
1996-08-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3692 (1996) · source
“The Security Council and the international community should focus attention on the objective of the boycott instead. The boycott, like sanctions, is intended to modify the behaviour of those who have usurped state power in Burundi. It is clear that the neighbouring States have made a painful but deliberate decision. The boycott is a double-edged sword. It hurts the interests of those for whom it is intended as much as those of the States imposing it. The boycott, however, seemed to be the only option open to the regional leaders. The Security Council has been seized of the situation in Burundi for a considerable period of time now. It has adopted several resolutions and presidential statements, stating clearly what should be done to resolve the political stalemate in that country.”
1996-08-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3692 (1996) · source
“It is in view of this possibility that the countries of the region want an early solution to the Burundi crisis, as any further exacerbation of the present situation would have far-reaching consequences on the peace, stability and development of the Great Lakes region. My delegation is fully aware of and sensitive to the humanitarian needs of the people of Burundi. We strongly support the efforts which have been made by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in consultation with the neighbouring States and the Secretary-General of the OAU, to open humanitarian corridors. We encourage them to continue their efforts in this direction so that humanitarian goods can continue to reach all the people in Burundi. The focus of this debate, however, should not be on the effects of the boycott of Burundi by its neighbours.”
1996-08-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3692 (1996) · source
“A day may come when the opposing forces which are mushrooming all over the place may become strong enough to challenge the Army, and the consequences of such an eventuality on the ordinary men and women on the street are too ghastly to contemplate. Peace and security for one and all in Burundi lie in political dialogue and not in the balance of military power. Burundi has already produced approximately 200,000 refugees; 120,000 are in Zaire; 94,000 are in the United Republic of Tanzania. The large number of refugees imposes economic and environmental pressures on the host countries. The actions of the military leaders postponed the day when these people could return to their communes and brought to the fore the real possibility of an increase in the number of refugees.”
1996-08-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3692 (1996) · source
“It is for this reason that we had hoped the Mwanza peace process and the Arusha initiative would be given a chance to come up with an amicably acceptable solution which could lead to the fulfilment of the aspirations of the majority, while guaranteeing the protection of the minority. The coup reversed all the gains that had been made in Mwanza and Arusha. It is in this context that the anger and frustration of the regional leaders must be understood. The Burundi Army must also understand, and should be under no illusion to the contrary, that it cannot for ever enjoy the monopoly of the use of fire power.”
1996-08-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3692 (1996) · source
“The Burundi Army appears to become paranoid and fearful of any leader who proposes any changes to its composition and structure. Unfortunately, this culture of fear which pervades the army is tearing asunder the whole Burundi body politic. The people of Burundi are engaged in a brutal tug-of-war in which one section of society lives in perpetual fear of extermination and the other section is in eternal fear of subjection. And the Burundi Army does not seem to enjoy the trust and confidence of all sections of Burundian society. In these circumstances, it is clear that left alone the people of Burundi are unlikely to find a lasting solution to their problems.”
1996-08-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3692 (1996) · source
“There is no denying the horrendous and merciless killings and massacres in Bururi, Gitega, Muramvya and Bugendana. These were despicable acts of human barbarity. They are as unacceptable and unjustified as the coup, but they did not trigger the coup. If the killings prompted this coup, what prompted the coup attempt which led to the assassination of President Ndadaye? Why did the coup leaders not wait for the outcome of the Mwanza peace process and the Arusha initiative, which were clearly addressing the same issues of peace and security and national dialogue. The answers to these questions cannot be found among the reasons for the coup which have been advanced by the regime. The real answers lie in the composition and structure of the Burundi Army.”
1996-08-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3692 (1996) · source
“The time of coups and army rule in Africa must be relegated to the junk heap of history, and military leaders must not be encouraged to assume power illegally because they are considered benevolent or moderate democrats. They have ample time to practise those attributes in the barracks. We have already stated that there can be no justification for the overthrow of a legitimate Government. We have also indicated that anyone can find plausible reasons to explain or defend their actions. The military regime in Burundi has made strenuous efforts to justify the coup on the grounds of possible genocide. The legitimate Government was ostensibly overthrown in order to restore peace and security in the country and organize a national debate.”
1996-08-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3692 (1996) · source
“In 1994 an attempt was made to unseat the Government of the Kingdom of Lesotho, which had assumed office after internationally observed multi-party elections. Southern African States made it abundantly clear to the coup leaders that their actions were unacceptable and the status quo ante was restored. This is therefore the second time in the history of coups in Africa that a group of African States has drawn a line in the sand and told the coup leaders that political illegality is unacceptable. This time the regional leaders have decided to back up their words by boycotting the military regime in Bujumbura. The actions of the neighbouring States deserve the commendation of the international community.”
1996-08-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3692 (1996) · source
“The OAU Central Organ of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, meeting in Addis Ababa on 5 August 1996, issued a communique supporting the conclusions of the second Arusha regional summit. Botswana strongly supports the neighbouring States in their determination to bring about a comprehensive political settlement in Burundi. We are therefore gratified by the decision of the European Union to also lend its support to the efforts of the regional leaders and the OAU. It is our hope that a similar message of support will emerge from this debate. This is not the first time that African States have reacted this way to a coup d 'etat. It is not as if the coup leaders in Burundi were being singled out for punishment because they happen to be Burundians.”
1996-08-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3692 (1996) · source
“The coup ridiculed all the efforts aimed at bringing about a comprehensive political dialogue. It defied the decision of the assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), which met in Yaounde in July and, among other things, endorsed the Mwanza peace process and the Arusha initiative. The message from Africa regarding the Burundi coup has been loud and clear: the military regime should not be allowed time to consolidate power and give itself an undue mandate to rule Burundi against the wishes of the majority of its people. The neighbouring States have spoken with one voice and have acted in a cohesive fashion.”
1996-08-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3692 (1996) · source
“It was equally regrettable that the coup was not greeted with outright condemnation by all Members of the United Nations as a reprehensible overthrow of legitimate authority, as some delegations, including my own, would have preferred. A coup d'e'tat is an illegal assumption of state power, and political illegality must not be tolerated, irrespective of the credentials of the leader of the military regime. The coup d 'etat in Burundi, a country whose people have experienced indescribable bloodbaths and untold suffering in its recent history, especially shattered the hope of the international community, which had been pinned on the success of the Mwanza peace process and the Arusha initiative. History will record that Mr. Buyoya and company not only ousted the Government of Burundi; they have also derailed a promising peace process.”
1996-08-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3692 (1996) · source
“The recent military usurpation of power from the democratically elected Government in Burundi completed what the Burundi Army had intended to do as far back as 1993. Several reasons, some contradictory, others self-serving, have been advanced to justify this coup. I believe that it is not difficult to find reasons to defend one's actions, however illegitimate or illegal. But that is beside the point. What is at issue, and a matter of profound regret, is that today some of the elected representatives of the people of Burundi, including President Ntibantunganya, have had to seek refuge in the embassies of Western democracies because of the undemocratic action of the Burundi Army.”
1996-08-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3692 (1996) · source
“We hope the Government of the Sudan will respond positively to the demands of those resolutions and that the draft resolution on which we are about to vote will be the last to be adopted by the Council on this question.”
1996-08-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3690 (1996) · source
“We trust that this time our brothers in the Sudan will fully comply with those resolutions and thus avoid a situation in which the Security Council might be pushed into taking certain actions to ensure compliance with its resolutions. The draft resolution before the Council specifies possible measures that may be imposed against the Sudan in case of continued lack of compliance with prior resolutions. It definitely gives the Sudan ample time to implement the resolutions of the Council. It would be most unfortunate indeed if at the end of the 90-day grace period the Council were to find itself with no option but to impose the measures foreseen in the present draft resolution. I wish to conclude by once again imploring the Government of Sudan to comply fully with the demands of resolutions 1044 (1996) and 1054 (1996).”
1996-08-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3690 (1996) · source
“During the meeting at which resolution 1054 (1996) was adopted, on 26 April 1996, my delegation expressed the hope and the belief that the Government of the Sudan would comply fully with the demands of resolution 1044 (1996). We expressed confidence in the ability of the Sudan to avoid an escalation of the situation by facilitating the handover of the three suspects to Ethiopia for prosecution. Let me reiterate once again that, as an African country, Botswana harbours no ill feelings or intentions towards the brotherly people of the Sudan. Reason, however, dictates that the suspects who made an attempt on the life of President Mubarak of Egypt must be brought to justice in accordance with the demands of resolutions 1044 (1996) and 1054 (1996).”
1996-08-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3690 (1996) · source
“There is no doubt that war has always been a living reality in the history of human civilization and existence. It is a fact that there have always been rules and regulations governing the conduct of those who made war an industry, even in medieval times. It is therefore even more compelling for us, in the last few years of the twentieth century, to curb, prohibit and ultimately rid the world of these tools of war which inflict permanent pain on the human conscience.”
1996-08-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3689 (1996) · source
“It goes without saying, therefore, that there is a need to develop an advanced mine-clearance capability and technology, and the United Nations system has an important coordinating role to play in this area, for the good of all humanity. It is a firmly held view of my delegation that the scourge of land-mines will always be with us even if we develop the best mine-clearance technology. The ultimate solution to the menace presented by land-mines lies in the complete prohibition of the production and use of these horrendous devices of war. Mine-producing countries should be urged not only to halt the production of existing models, but also to halt the development of so- called alternatives, such as remotely delivered and self- destructive mines.”
1996-08-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3689 (1996) · source
“This would indeed facilitate the speed with which demining could be carried out in any United Nations peace-keeping operation and thus afford the peace-keeping mission an opportunity to carry out its mandate more effectively. All this presupposes the existence of a standardized mine-clearance technology. My delegation deeply appreciates the contributions of those countries that have always been ready to provide assistance in the field of demining technology. It is clear, however, that the demining exercise is not often carried out with the anticipated speed or the desired result, due to the lack of adequate capacity and the diversity of mine-clearance technologies.”
1996-08-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3689 (1996) · source
“While it may seem an exercise in futility to expect the warring parties to remember their obligations to faithfully mark and map their minefields, there is at present no alternative but to insist that they should do so without fail so that the process of demining can be performed with ease during a peace-keeping mission. The international community should not abandon the search for the most practical ways of dealing with land-mines, including considering instituting appropriate measures under international humanitarian law to ensure such compliance. Such measures could also act as a deterrent against the laying of mines if there were clear penalties for non- adherence to the applicable rules.”
1996-08-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3689 (1996) · source
“My delegation believes that because land-mines always exacerbate the already adverse humanitarian situation in any conflict, demining should always be given top priority in every peace-keeping operation. It is important that the demobilization of the combatants and the promotion of national reconciliation should go hand in hand with demining in order to facilitate the early return of civilians to their homes and to productive lives. Military rules and procedures dictate that belligerents should mark and map their minefields. Experience has, however, shown that this never happens, and where some limited effort has been made to this end, the maps have not proved accurate enough to be of any meaningful use or assistance in the demining exercise.”
1996-08-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3689 (1996) · source
“Thirdly, it is not in the long-term interests of any side in a conflict to lay mines, because, much as the psychology of war obviously dictates inflicting maximum destruction on the enemy by whatever means available, land-mines are too costly to live with after war, in both human and material terms. The warring parties must therefore always appreciate that they will still have a country to share and must live together as neighbours at the end of conflict, and that land-mines do not allow the wounds of war to heal easily and quickly. Fourthly, and most importantly for today's debate, when a cease-fire has been established or a decision has been reached to establish a peace-keeping mission, the mandate of such an operation must automatically include demining at the top of its agenda, as has already been done in some cases.”
1996-08-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3689 (1996) · source
“Obviously, this deeply frustrates the hopes and aspirations of civilian populations that want nothing but the rebuilding of their shattered lives in a peaceful atmosphere free from the deleterious effects of war. It is evident from these comments that land-mines are a menace to human life during and long after conflict situations. The international community must find effective ways of preventing conflicts, as they result in the laying of the diabolical land-mines. Where a conflict erupts, every effort must first be made to raise awareness about land-mines, and all mine-producing and mine- exporting countries should restrict the sale of these weapons to the belligerents. Secondly, the response to a conflict that proves not amenable to preventive measures must be an automatic land-mine embargo.”
1996-08-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3689 (1996) · source
“The United Nations is always faced with the task of facilitating the return and resettlement of refugees and displaced persons in every peace-keeping operation. Land- mines are, however, an impediment to this process. Travelling by road to return home becomes a nightmare because of the omnipresence of land-mines. The resumption of economic activity for subsistence purposes becomes a perilous exercise. The land cannot be tilled because it is already planted with these invisible death traps. In short, all economic activity literally comes to a standstill as the roads and pathways to cities, villages, fields and watering points become impassable due to land-mines. This is the harsh reality that innocent victims of armed conflicts have to contend with long after the torturous ordeal of war has supposedly come to an end.”
1996-08-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3689 (1996) · source
“My delegation is grateful to you, Mr. President, for the timely initiative you have taken in choosing this very important subject for our orientation debate today. Anti-personnel mines are the scourge of human society in most, if not all, conflict situations. They are a cowardly and indiscriminate instrument of war. They mercilessly kill and main their victims without warning and without determining whether they are friendly or enemy forces, unsuspecting civilian population or United Nations peace-keepers. Moreover, land-mines remain hidden and ready to claim new victims long after war has ended. Thus, land-mines have a long-lasting and traumatic psychological impact on whole populations.”
1996-08-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3689 (1996) · source
“It is our hope that the parties will take serious note of paragraph 4 of the draft resolution, which expresses the intention of the Council to review the future commitment of the United Nations in Tajikistan at the end of the next mandate period, should the prospects for a lasting peace not have improved. This is in line with the Secretary-General's statement, in paragraph 29 of his report, that if the prospects for a comprehensive peace settlement have not improved by the next review period, the Council will have to consider alternative options for the future of UNMOT, including the possibility of its withdrawal. Finally, my delegation wishes to welcome the new Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Tajikistan, Mr. Merrem. We wish him every success in his new job.”
1996-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3673 (1996) · source
“UNMOT is doing a good job under very trying conditions, but we do not believe that now is the time to withdraw the Mission, as this would be likely to aggravate the situation in Tajikistan and adversely affect the peace and stability of the whole region. The resolution, however, rightly puts the parties on notice, in very clear language, that the extension of UNMOT's mandate is contingent upon the respect by the parties for the Tehran Agreement, an effective cease-fire and progress in the peace talks. The parties must understand that UNMOT's mandate cannot be extended indefinitely. Its extension depends on the cooperation of the parties themselves and on their demonstrable commitment to work towards the political settlement of their differences.”
1996-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3673 (1996) · source
“The delegation of Botswana is deeply troubled by the large-scale fighting in Tajikistan. The parties are clearly unwilling to meet the conditions set out in the resolutions of the Security Council. It is regrettable that the situation in Tajikistan remains what it was six months ago, when the Council last reviewed the mandate of the United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT). In other words, there has been no meaningful progress in the inter-Tajik peace talks, despite the stated intentions of the parties to resolve their differences through political dialogue. It is disturbing indeed that the hostilities are reported to have reached new levels of intensity since the civil war ended in 1992. My delegation will vote in favour of the draft resolution before us.”
1996-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3673 (1996) · source
“Iraq has in the recent past declared its readiness to work and cooperate fully with the Special Commission in addressing outstanding issues on biological, chemical and missile weapons programmes without let or hindrance. We welcomed this Iraqi decision and foresight. The present Iraqi actions, however, create a deficit between Iraq's declared intentions and the translation of those intentions into concrete action on the ground. It is the wish and hope of my delegation that Iraq can cooperate with UNSCOM, so that the relevant resolutions of the Security Council can be speedily implemented, thus making it possible for the Security Council to assume its responsibilities under their appropriate provisions. It is for all these reasons that my delegation voted in favour of the resolution we have just adopted.”
1996-06-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3672 (1996) · source
“and to allow the inspection teams immediate and unrestricted access to all sites designated for inspection. We do not believe compliance with Security Council resolutions necessarily violates the sovereign rights and national security interests of Iraq. To the contrary, there is merit in Iraq's cooperating with UNSCOM. and, by so doing, complying with Security Council resolutions, in that UNSCOM. would speedily complete its work and thus pave the way for the modification and ultimate lifting of the sanctions regime. An overly sensitive position on sovereignty and national security is not in the long-term interests of Iraq, according to this reasoning.”
1996-06-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3672 (1996) · source
“While on previous occasions the teams were ultimately allowed access to those sites, the difference is that for the first time, Iraq has not only flatly denied access to the sites in question, but it has also insisted that no inspections would be allowed to take place at any facilities Iraq may consider sensitive to its security and sovereign concerns. This Iraqi disposition towards UNSCOM. calls into question the commitment of the Government of Iraq to the full implementation of Security Council resolutions. My delegation fully appreciates the sovereign and national security concerns of the Government of Iraq, but it is equally important that Iraq should comply with the resolutions of the Security Council. My delegation would therefore like to appeal to the Government of Iraq to cooperate with UNSCOM.”
1996-06-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3672 (1996) · source
“Let me first of all convey to you, Sir, the congratulations of my delegation on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council this month. I wish you every success in your work. I also wish to thank Ambassador Qin Huasun of China for the excellent manner in which he guided the work of the Council last month. My delegation regrets the decision of the Government of Iraq to deny United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) inspection teams access to two Republican Guard facilities in Baghdad that UNSCOM. had designated for inspection. This is not completely new. Iraq has in the past denied UNSCOM. inspection teams access to certain sites and facilities on the grounds of their sensitivity in terms of the national security, sovereignty and pride of Iraq.”
1996-06-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3672 (1996) · source
“We are confident that the Secretary-General will review the strength and composition of the Force at reasonable intervals and advise the Council, as appropriate, if and when the situation in the region would warrant the adjustment of the mandate of the mission.”
1996-05-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3670 (1996) · source
“Our preference is that a United Nations peace-keeping mission should do its job and depart at the earliest opportunity, but we are not convinced that now is the time to leave in the case of UNPREDEP. We believe UNPREDEP still has a role to play in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and it should therefore remain in that country with the current force strength and composition so that it can continue the good work it has been doing in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. We are not oblivious of the financial crisis with which the United Nations is faced. It is therefore important that every effort should be made to use the scarce resources in the most rational manner.”
1996-05-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3670 (1996) · source
“The mandate of UNPREDEP should be extended so that it coincides, to the extent possible, with the end of the mandate of the Implementation Force (IFOR), to which it is closely linked. At that stage, it would be much clearer whether or not the peace process in the former Yugoslavia would continue to hold. If the situation were to be stable enough and the peace process appeared irreversible, the people of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia would be more confident about the future, and the mandate of UNPREDEP could then be adjusted and ultimately terminated. We are the last to advocate the permanent stationing of United Nations forces in any country.”
1996-05-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3670 (1996) · source
“The peace that has been engendered through the Dayton arrangements has not yet reached the stage of irreversibility. In other words, the security of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is intertwined with stability in the rest of the former Yugoslavia. As the Secretary-General rightly points out in his report, peace and stability within the borders of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia are still very much dependent on developments in the rest of the former Yugoslavia. Thus, the people of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia still have legitimate concerns about threats to the security of their country and would really feel abandoned by the international community if the mandate of UNPREDEP were to be altered at this stage.”
1996-05-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3670 (1996) · source
“The United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) has played a pivotal role in preventing the spread of the war into the southern region of the Balkans. UNPREDEP has thus been a major success as the first United Nations experiment in preventive diplomacy and it has contributed in no small measure to the stabilization of the international political situation in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The recent positive political developments in the Balkans have minimized threats to the security of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Under normal circumstances, UNPREDEP would be winding up its mandate in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. We are, however, addressing the future of the mandate of a peace-keeping operation in a very volatile region.”
1996-05-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3670 (1996) · source
“According to a BBC report this morning, ECOMOG should have succeeded in deploying its forces throughout Monrovia by the end of this week. This would be a great achievement towards gaining the support of the international community. It is time the international community fully recognized the important role being played by ECOMOG in Liberia and gave it all the support it needs. Failure to support the efforts of ECOMOG in Liberia could result in a catastrophe of unimaginable proportions, and we do not believe this is the path the international community would like Liberia to follow.”
1996-05-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3667 (1996) · source
“We are fully aware that the situation in Liberia does not lend itself to easy solutions. The resumption of hostilities in that country on 6 April put the clock back several months. The situation in Liberia is, however, far from hopeless. It requires only that all concerned do their part. In this respect, we are aware of the efforts of the Organization of African Unity in the search for a solution to the crisis in Liberia. The situation in Liberia calls for a creative collective response by the international community. The United Nations, the European Union and the Organization of African Unity should intensify their cooperation to find practical ways to bring the crisis in Liberia to an end. ECOMOG is so far the only vehicle we have in the field for the attainment of that goal.”
1996-05-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3667 (1996) · source
“The events of the past few weeks have clearly shown not only that ECOMOG needs the financial and logistical resources to carry out its mandate, but also that its troop strength needs to be substantially increased to enable it to serve as a credible deterrent to the marauding factional fighters. It is important that concerted efforts be made to assist ECOMOG to become a robust peace-keeping force capable of defending itself and the civilian population as necessary. The provision of sufficient resources would enable more West African States and other countries in the region and beyond to participate in the peace-keeping efforts in Liberia. It is obvious that under the present circumstances, African States cannot sustain their troops in Liberia for any reasonable length of time.”
1996-05-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3667 (1996) · source
“The United Nations remains the premier organization for the maintenance of international peace and security, and in this regard, it is clear that the withdrawal of ECOMOG from Liberia would lead to the immediate reassumption by the United Nations of its responsibilities in that country. My delegation looked forward to the results of the meeting of the ECOWAS Committee of Nine, which was held on 7 and 8 May 1996. The decisions made at that meeting have the full support of my delegation, and we call upon the faction leaders to implement them expeditiously. In this regard, we wish to reiterate our appeal to the international community to render assistance to ECOMOG so that it can carry out its tasks more effectively.”
1996-05-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3667 (1996) · source
“ECOMOG'S failure would have far-reaching implications for future cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations in peace-keeping operations. In this connection, it is worth noting that there are already questions about what would happen in post-ECOMOG peace-keeping in Liberia; that is, what would happen in Liberia should ECOMOG fail. This thought is probably born out of the fact that the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) has no independent existence; it is in Liberia because ECOMOG is there. It is, however, important to recognize that the regional arrangement in Liberia is no substitute for the responsibilities of the United Nations.”
1996-05-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3667 (1996) · source