YouSaid · the spoken record

Nqakula

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44
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2007-11-28
most recent
2008-12-11
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2
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un-security-council

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  1. “The Facilitation team will then scale down its operations and the African Union Special Task Force will begin its withdrawal, to be completed by the end of March 2009. The Facilitation will then close its operations at the end of March. The Facilitator will report to the Regional Peace Initiative as soon as all of the elements of the mandate have been finalized in the New Year.”

    2008-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6037 (2008) · source

  2. “The exercise culminated in the signing of the Magaliesberg Communique, which underscored that the successful and earliest conclusion of the peace process in Burundi was primarily the responsibility of the Government of Burundi and the Palipehutu-FNL. The Communique was signed on 10 June this year. In the face of more difficulties after the Magaliesberg meeting, the Facilitation arranged a meeting in Ngozi, Burundi, where the two parties once more made commitments. The Facilitator of the Burundi peace process has been instructed by the Regional Peace Initiative fully to implement the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement by 31 December. The period from January 2009 will be used as a mop-up phase.”

    2008-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6037 (2008) · source

  3. “The period following the return to Burundi of the leadership of the Palipehutu- FNL did not resolve all the problems revolving around the implementation of the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement. The Facilitation's Political Directorate had to intervene just before the arrival in Burundi of Mr. Agathon Rwasa, the Palipehutu-FNL's leader, when war broke out again between the Government forces and the Palipehutu-FNL. The intervention was in the form of a joint declaration between the two parties, foreswearing violence. No major attacks have happened since then. The situation continues to be calm in that country. In the face of more dilly-dallying, the Facilitation took the two parties to South Africa for confidence- building.”

    2008-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6037 (2008) · source

  4. “The completion of the implementation of the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement has taken a long time, given that the Agreement was signed in September 2006. Various attempts have been made to resolve whatever problems have arisen in the course of the process. A number of meetings have been held to resolve the problems and, on a number of occasions, binding documents have been signed to consolidate those agreements. But every step forward has been accompanied by new demands and retrogression. One of the major breakthroughs was recorded when the leadership of the Palipehutu-FNL went back to Burundi to help implement the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement and push forward the peace process. The breakthrough did not open all the doors that we thought it would.”

    2008-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6037 (2008) · source

  5. “The summit agreed that the name Palipehutu militates against the letter and spirit of the Burundi Constitution which stipulates that political parties in Burundi must be open to all Burundians and have to reflect a national image and in no way shall advocate violence, exclusion or any kind of hatred, especially regarding ethnic, regional, religious or gender belonging. Palipehutu-FNL was instructed, therefore, to change its name. It is currently informing its members about that decision. The first group of Palipehutu-FNL combatants will report to the assembly areas on Friday, 12 December, for the start of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process. That exercise will have to be completed by 31 December, in keeping with the decision of the summit.”

    2008-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6037 (2008) · source

  6. “President Pierre Nkurunziza, the Head of State of Burundi, had already committed himself in the past to implementing both of 08-64243 those demands. He said, though, that he wanted to release detainees into the assembly areas when those areas were up and running. He has offered the Palipehutu-FNL 33 positions for their senior members in the State institutions. The Palipehutu-FNL was told by the parties at the Summit that it needed to apply to register as a political party in Burundi in order to participate in the social, economic and political life of the country, but that it could not do so under its current name. The name Palipehutu means the Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People.”

    2008-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6037 (2008) · source

  7. “The summit of the heads of State and Government of the Great Lakes region, sitting on the same day, also rejected the Palipehutu-FNL demand on the basis that the Burundi army was an institution that had been established in keeping with the law of the country, based on the Arusha negotiations. The Palipehutu-FNL nonetheless continued to argue for an arrangement that would be defined by what they called a forces technical agreement. The arrangement was designed to produce a new army. Although an effort was made in the beginning to create a system to find common ground, the work ground to a halt. Two matters the Palipehutu-FNL had raised that the parties at the summit agreed to were the release of political and war prisoners by the Burundi Government and the appointment to the organs of the State of the leaders of the Palipehutu-FNL.”

    2008-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6037 (2008) · source

  8. “The summit finalized the four outstanding matters with respect to the implementation of the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement. Those questions were always threatening to scuttle the peace process and, on a number of occasions, led to a stalemate. The Palipehutu-FNL had been demanding certain concessions from the Government regarding the integration of their combatants into the armed forces of Burundi. In the beginning, the Palipehutu-FNL agitated for the disbanding of the Burundi army, whereupon a new defence force would be created for the country through the amalgamation of chosen troops from the current army and combatants of the Palipehutu-FNL. That demand was shot down by the leadership of the Regional Peace Initiative when it was first raised, before the signing of the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement on 7 September 2006.”

    2008-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6037 (2008) · source

  9. “We believe this time around that a significant step forward has been taken to resolve the matter of the Palipehutu-FNL - the only group in Burundi that has stayed out of the democratization 08-64243 process in that country. The Facilitator of the Burundi peace process submitted a report in October to the leaders of the regional initiative of the Process, chaired by Uganda. That report formed the basis of the discussions of the summit of the heads of State and Government of the Great Lakes region, held in Bujumbura, Burundi, on 4 December. The Government of Burundi and the Palipehutu-FNL, as has been the practice right through the process, were represented at the summit, as were the African Union and the Secretary-General, through his Executive Representative.”

    2008-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6037 (2008) · source

  10. “When I briefed the Council last year, our report was an expression of hope that we were on the verge of completing the various steps of the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement between the Government of Burundi and the Parti pour la Liberation du Peuple Hutu-Forces Nationales de Liberation (Palipehutu- FNL), but the Burundi peace process, from the Arusha negotiations to the Dar-es-Salaam peace process, has always had its ups and downs. It is, of course, in the nature of negotiations that many hiccups and bumps are experienced as such processes unfold. The Burundi negotiations were particularly difficult given the deep distrust between the negotiating parties.”

    2008-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6037 (2008) · source

  11. “Mr. Nqakula: Allow me at the outset to express my deep appreciation to you, Mr. President, for having invited me to the Security Council in order to interact with the members here. I bid a good afternoon to all the members of the Security Council and the executive representative of the Secretary-General. Today is the second time that I have had the singular honour to brief the Security Council on the work we are doing in Burundi with respect to the search for durable peace in that country.”

    2008-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6037 (2008) · source

  12. “In future, we shall rely a great deal on the Peacebuilding Commission, as the nations of the world define a process that must take Burundi away from a past that has seen many of that country's 16 nationals massacred, to a position where everyone in Burundi will derive the much needed benefits from the political settlement that is beginning to develop. We ourselves, who respect democracy and are particularly keen to help countries emerging from conflict, will also take up cudgels on behalf of those who want to build peace in Burundi.”

    2007-11-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5786 (2007) · source

  13. “As I indicated in my initial statement, when we went to the camps where the people who have left their bases are, we found many children. It is our plea that the international community assist us in dealing with the issue of those children. For our part, we will do whatever is necessary to ensure that a process under the aegis of the Security Council is indeed begun, so that we can deal with that question. In addition, some people who have left their bases are ill, and we have not been able to attend to all their medical requirements. Sooner rather than later, the international community should come in, so that it can assist with that problem as well. But we will leave this Chamber confident that the nations of the world are going to assist us in finalizing what is essentially only an initial step towards the rebuilding of Burundi.”

    2007-11-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5786 (2007) · source

  14. “At that time it was indicated the kind of role we would continue to play with respect to the consolidation of peace in Burundi. We also wish to make a strong call for continued assistance in applying pressure to the leadership of the PALIPEHUTU-FNL, not to define themselves as out of this process, but to take their rightful position to lead the process towards its finalization. It is therefore our plea to all the nations of the world that they must speak with one voice on this issue. If we did that, there would be no recourse for the PALIPEHUTU-FNL leadership. That might, therefore, put pressure on the peace process, which can still easily be derailed. Let me return once again to an issue that worries us greatly.”

    2007-11-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5786 (2007) · source

  15. “Here, I want, once again, to call upon the nations of the world to help us finalize that programme, to help us deal with the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process, as the President of the Council has said, and to help us deal with the political situation inside the country in order for us to create the necessary atmosphere for political engagement there on a level political playing fields. We will do our part, as I have already indicated, on the basis of the role that we were given. We will not only negotiate peace on the basis of the defined Ceasefire Agreement, but will also act on the basis of advice and guidance from the political principles that were negotiated and signed on 18 June 2006 by the two parties.”

    2007-11-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5786 (2007) · source

  16. “We would like to be part and parcel of any effort, particularly the work of the Peacebuilding Commission, that is designed to ensure that the country as a whole continues in a position where, in the end, programmes will be in place for the development of Burundi. In other words, the people of Burundi will be able to enjoy the fruits of the democracy that they helped to usher into their country. There are several things, therefore, that we will do. When considerations are made with respect to the way forward, we urge that we continue to be invited to participate in any discussions to enable us to share our own experiences with regard to the work we have been able to do in Burundi. We appreciate the fact that all have assured us that the Security Council will also do whatever is necessary to support our Initiative.”

    2007-11-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5786 (2007) · source

  17. “Secondly, we shall do whatever is necessary to help the Government of Burundi to overcome the various political challenges that it faces, by respectfully submitting to it whatever suggestions we may have as facilitators. This we shall do on the authority granted us through the negotiations process when, as we were defining the political principles of engagement, it was first indicated that we - as the Regional Initiative and the African Union and, of course, through the facilitation - would continue to be guarantors of the process for the search for peace in Burundi until that had been achieved. What that means to us is that our function will obviously not end with the finalization of the facilitation process. That accords with the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement.”

    2007-11-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5786 (2007) · source

  18. “Mr. Nqakula: I too would like to record my appreciation and the appreciation of the African Union and the Regional Initiative for the very constructive observations and remarks that have been made by members of the Council, and also to express appreciation for the suggestions, as well as for the promises of support to our facilitation efforts. We appreciate the fact that there is an all-round understanding by all of us of the need to complete this process and thereby lay a foundation for conditions of peace to prevail in Burundi. I once more wish to indicate our desire to ensure that, in the first instance, the facilitation process between the PALIPEHUTU- FNL and the Government of Burundi continues and is successful in its efforts.”

    2007-11-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5786 (2007) · source

  19. “Surely it must be our responsibility to take all of those children away from those conditions, so that, in keeping with the protocols of the United Nations, they can be raised outside of conflict. I still want to appeal to the members of the international community to take up the invitation that I extended to them to go into these camps we are now running, so that they can see for themselves who is there - in the first instance, to establish who all those people are, and, secondly, to look at the children who were forced to take up arms. Once more, I would like to reiterate our appreciation for having been given this space to share the experiences that we have had in trying to assist the people of Burundi to overcome the difficulties they are facing so that they can all participate in the rebuilding of their country.”

    2007-11-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5786 (2007) · source

  20. “What we are pleading for is assistance from the international community and for assistance from the United Nations and its various structures. We want them to assist us, first, to oversee the process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of the 2,700 people who have already made themselves available for that process; and secondly, to help us to continue to put pressure on the leadership of the PALIPEHUTU-FNL to take up their positions with respect to the implementation of the ceasefire agreement in all its dimensions, so that in the end, the facilitation programme is successfully completed. One of the things we saw when we went to the camp in Randa to interact with the PALIPEHUTU-FNL people there was a lot of child soldiers. That is why we invited the international community to, among other things, go to that camp to see.”

    2007-11-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5786 (2007) · source

  21. “When the leadership of the PALIPEHUTU-FNL is back on the ground in Burundi, they will also be able to field their own political representatives to the Directorate. Of course, the Government will also be invited to send representatives to the Political Directorate. We believe that the Political Directorate will be able to resolve some of the political problems that have arisen with respect to matters relevant to the search for peace in Burundi. Finally, I want to return to my plea, and that plea represents the wishes of the African Union, those of the Regional Initiative and of course those of the three countries that are leading that initiative, Uganda, Tanzania and South Africa, as the facilitation countries.”

    2007-11-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5786 (2007) · source

  22. “We have assembled a team of people that we have defined as the Political Directorate to oversee the political fulfilment of the stipulations of the ceasefire agreement and to advise the facilitation on other political steps that need to be taken for the finalization of this process. If the international community helps us, then indeed there is a lot that we will be able to achieve for ourselves. The Political Directorate is convened by Ambassador Mamabolo, whom I introduced earlier; serving on it also are the two ambassadors from South Africa and Burundi, respectively, the Executive Representative of the United Nations Secretary- General, Mr. Mahmoud, and the representative of the African Union, Mr. Ba.”

    2007-11-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5786 (2007) · source

  23. “In a way therefore, the PALIPEHUTU-FNL were admitting to the fact that a split existed and that it had resulted from some of those combatants leaving their positions. Our third humble argument maintains that if the PALIPEHUTU-FNL are indeed convinced that it is true that those combatants are not their members, they would have invited the international community to meet their members wherever they are, and ask them if there have been any people who have left. They would have done that, but they are not doing so because they themselves know the answer and we know it too, because we are active on the ground. We have received information and we have checked that information. We are certain that the great majority, if not 100 per cent, of the people at the assembly areas are members of the PALIPEHUTU-FNL.”

    2007-11-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5786 (2007) · source

  24. “In a subsequent engagement with the media, they said that they had checked with the leadership of the PALIPEHUTU-FNL, and that the leadership, based both in Tanzania and in Kenya, had denied that the people who had come forward were their members. In my other life I was a journalist, and I asked them if they had asked the pertinent question - which is pertinent indeed: whether the PALIPEHUTU- FNL had actually seen those people and, therefore, would be able to say that they were not former PALIPEHUTU-FNL. That is the first point. The second point is that the PALIPEHUTU-FNL leadership had issued a number of press statements attacking the facilitation process, insinuating that we had engineered a split in the FNL. That split had, of course, manifested itself in the departure of some of the combatants from their positions.”

    2007-11-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5786 (2007) · source

  25. “Secondly, we as South Africans are the only ones at the moment providing food supplies to those PALIPEHUTU-FNL who have come out. We want the international community to help us to sort out the issue of the registration and reintegration of people who have already made themselves available. When we addressed the international community after leaving Rwanda regarding those people that we had put into the assembly areas, we suggested that they go to Rwanda to observe the people who are there, interact with them and ask them questions in order to determine whether they are indeed PALIPEHUTU-FNL members or not.”

    2007-11-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5786 (2007) · source

  26. “The meeting is to occur in Tanzania on Friday and Saturday and will be a continuation of our efforts to keep the leadership of the PALIPEHUTU-FNL in the loop, and to continue to ask them to participate in the process that in the end must result in the finalization of the programme of reintegration of members of the PALIPEHUTU-FNL. There will also be a meeting between Mr. Rwasa and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Tanzania. I will meet, as Facilitator, with Mr. Rwasa thereafter. We believe that if we are assisted by the international community, there are a number of things that we can do together to get the process finalized. At this time we are acting to finalize this programme on a deadline set by the African Union for 31 December. We are working very hard to meet that deadline.”

    2007-11-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5786 (2007) · source

  27. “And we thought, in our humble logic, that it was better for us to take in those people into the assembly areas in order to protect them and to prevent them from participating in any atrocities. We did this based on instructions received from the leadership of the regional initiative; but it was our responsibility to do this. We have heard that the reason the international community did not want to be part of this was because of the absence of the leadership of the PALIPEHUTU- FNL in those processes. Of course, we have been interacting with the PALIPEHUTU-FNL all the time, including by organizing a meeting that should have taken place last Sunday, but had to be postponed until Friday. This will be a two-day interaction between some leaders from the Government and the leaders of the PALIPEHUTU-FNL.”

    2007-11-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5786 (2007) · source

  28. “For our part and in our humble logic, we thought that it was necessary for us to take in those people, protect them against attack and of course ensure that they themselves did not go into Burundi to commit atrocities. That was our simple logic with respect to the matter because we did not know of any alternative for that situation. Of course, we as Africans are still grappling with one of the blemishes on our conscience. When we allowed the situation to develop in Rwanda; when we 07-61659 did not, as Africans, make an early entry into that situation, it finally culminated in the atrocities that occurred in Rwanda. Therefore, we are not going to allow any possibility of an outbreak of violence in Burundi.”

    2007-11-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5786 (2007) · source

  29. “We are aware, as has been indicated by the figures I gave, of subsequent attacks on those people by the remaining PALIPEHUTU-FNL. Those attacks, therefore, would continue to occur, and a situation might arise in which those dissidents would be fighting with the remaining PALIPEHUTU-FNL. Within that context, which also would at some point obviously involve the general population, a situation would arise where the army of Burundi would also have to intervene. In other words, if we had not intervened as we did, we would have allowed a situation which would catapult the country into an orgy of violence and undermine efforts to reach a durable peace in Burundi.”

    2007-11-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5786 (2007) · source

  30. “But we picked up from discussions at various levels that one of the matters they were raising was that we cannot be certain that the people who are professing themselves to be members of the PELIPEHUTU-FNL are indeed members. However, I want to explain to the members of the Council what our own attitude has been with respect to that. If you have a figure of 2,700 people, some of whom are armed, who would be roaming the countryside in Burundi, you would potentially be faced with a problem in which those people would seek sustenance through food supplies, and therefore go to the villages to get that food. We can speculate that they will not be getting that food in any civil manner. In some instances they would, therefore, be forcing and even harassing and intimidating the villagers to give them food.”

    2007-11-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5786 (2007) · source

  31. “In our interactions with them, they have indicated that about 800 members of the PALIPEHUTU-FNL, who did not abandon their positions, remain outside those areas. The way we read the situation, therefore, is that the great majority of FNL combatants have indeed abandoned their positions and are asking to be put into the process that must eventually lead to their reintegration into the political, social and economic life of Burundi. After we saw some of those people in the assembly area at Randa, we addressed the international community to explain what had happened. Of course, it has become clear to us that the international community was reluctant to be part of this process. We were not told why the international community was reluctant.”

    2007-11-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5786 (2007) · source

  32. “They also said to us that the desired process for that was for us - after all that had been finalized - to go to the bases of the PALIPEHUTU- FNL and lead those combatants into the assembly areas, thereby providing them with protection so that they would not be attacked as they moved towards the assembly areas. But the leadership said that nonetheless there were now people who wanted to become part of the process and that it was our responsibility to create those assembly areas and to put them into the assembly areas - thereby to start the process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. Of course, what we are talking about here is 2,700 of those combatants, who have made themselves available for this process.”

    2007-11-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5786 (2007) · source

  33. “What they said to us was that we should not forget the stipulations of the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement. Among other things, the Agreement states: that the African Union shall establish a special task force for the protection of the leadership and combatants of the PALIPEHUTU- FNL, including their movement towards the assembly areas; that the JVMM. shall, in conjunction with the United Nations, address the issue of command structures and modalities for inner and outer perimeter security of the assembly areas; and that the JVMM. and joint liaison teams shall assist in the processes of registration and verification of the combatants in the assembly areas.”

    2007-11-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5786 (2007) · source

  34. “Those areas include Rukoro and the Kibira forest, as well as bases in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 3 Because there was unhappiness that some people were abandoning their positions, some FNL elements chased them out. On 6 September, 21 of those people were killed in Buterere. On 1 November, nine were beheaded in Rugazi. On 10 November, three leaders of those groups were also killed in central Bujumbura. We are of course aware of the fact that others have been killed right inside PALIPEHUTU-FNL camps, having indicated that they wanted to abandon their positions, or having been suspected of wanting to do so. As the facilitation, we therefore needed to consider what to do in the circumstances, and we therefore approached the leadership of the regional initiative for guidance.”

    2007-11-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5786 (2007) · source

  35. “The last point of agreement was that the leadership of PALIPEHUTU-FNL needed to go back into Burundi, so that they could be part and parcel of the decisions that would be taken, as well as of the implementation of those decisions, thus giving proper guidance of the finalization of the programme of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR). But of course, a split occurred in the PELIPEHUTU-FNL. That split saw a number of combatants abandoning their positions and attempting to make themselves available to the facilitation for inclusion into the programme of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. They did that in August 2007. But the move they took was not accepted by those who remained in their positions at FNL bases in a number of areas.”

    2007-11-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5786 (2007) · source

  36. “Secondly, both agreed that there was a need to reactivate immediately the Joint Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (JVMM), which is the only vehicle available for the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement. They also agreed to the expeditious implementation of the release of political prisoners and prisoners of war, using a system that they hammered out, which included the following elements. First, the FNL would immediately provide a list of its prisoners and a joint commission would be established, together with Burundi's Ministry of Justice, to screen the FNL list, after which the prisoners would be released. They also agreed that there should be direct communications between the two leaders, so that they could unblock whatever problems might arise in the process of implementation of the decisions.”

    2007-11-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5786 (2007) · source

  37. “We also influenced him to agree to a meeting, which to us was very important, to try to remove whatever obstacles still existed with regard to the 07-61659 problems that arose as a consequence of the mistrust between the two sides involved in the conflict: to actually attend a meeting where he would meet with the Chairperson of the PALIPEHUTU-FNL on a one- to-one basis. That meeting took place on 17 June 2007 under the aegis and direction of President Kikwete of Tanzania. That meeting looked at certain matters, and certain decisions were arrived at as a consequence of the discussions that took place between the two. Those decisions included the following. First, both President Nkurunziza and Mr. Rwasa recommitted themselves to the implementation of the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement.”

    2007-11-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5786 (2007) · source

  38. “Therefore, we are happy that, in the end, he was indeed able to deal with that situation and was commended by the leaders of both the Front pour la democratie au Burundi (FRODEBU) and the Union pour le progres national (UPRONA). We also discussed with him the possible release of Mr. Hussein Radjabu. We believe that he is having a real look at that particular situation. Our argument was that it is only when his own party is united that he will be in a position to give proper political direction to developments inside Burundi, both with respect to the political climate in the country and as a contribution towards the finalization of the agreements made between his Government and the PALIPEHUTU-FNL.”

    2007-11-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5786 (2007) · source

  39. “President Nkurunziza was also engaged in a standoff with the political opposition. Further compounding the problem were disagreements within the ruling party itself. The upshot of that was the detention of Mr. Hussein Radjabu, former President of the ruling party. Members of the Security Council will be aware that some changes have recently occurred. And, although we are not going to claim a monopoly on the decisions finally made, we did provide input with respect to those changes. We were thus involved in a number of engagements with the President of Burundi, attempting to argue for a new approach to the political situation inside the country, which was becoming heated. To that extent, we advised him that it would be better for him to engage with the political opposition so as to mediate the stalemate that had occurred.”

    2007-11-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5786 (2007) · source

  40. “Once they were satisfied that conditions would indeed be conducive to their return to the country, we took them back to Tanzania. 07-61659 We established the Joint Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (JVMM) in October that year, although the PALIPEHUTU-FNL boycotted the launch of that structure. Although the FNL subsequently joined the Joint Verification and Monitoring Mechanism, they were erratic in their attendance of meetings. They later withdrew from the JVMM. The situation in Burundi itself also militated against the finalization of the facilitation programme. The political landscape had been poisoned by a number of very bad judgement calls on the part of the Government and the leadership of the ruling Conseil national pour la defense de la democratic (CNDD)- Forces pour la defense de la democratie (FDD).”

    2007-11-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5786 (2007) · source

  41. “But, for their part, the PALIPEHUTU-FNL were also deeply suspicious of the Government and felt that it would not deliver on its side of the Agreement. However, notwithstanding those suspicions, we put in place our own preparations for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process. We also provided the PALIPEHUTU-FNL with funds so that they could go and deal with their combatants in order to fully explain the ramifications of the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement. In the middle of September, we took some of the leaders of the FNL into Burundi, so that they could assess the lay of the land, so to speak, with respect to the politics of the country and could also assess the security situation within the country.”

    2007-11-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5786 (2007) · source

  42. “At this point, there are some PALIPEHUTU-FNL combatants who are ready to submit to the process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. We represent the regional initiative of the African Union and serve as the initiative's facilitators, but we need help in order to start and complete that process. I have spoken about problems that arose within the context of the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement. It is now my intention to indicate what those problems have been. First, the greatest problem was that the Ceasefire Agreement did not dispel the suspicions and mistrust that had characterized the earlier negotiation process. The Government of Burundi did not believe that the PALIPEHUTU-FNL would honour the Agreement.”

    2007-11-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5786 (2007) · source

  43. “The first issue that I would like to address is that of the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement, which was signed between the Government of Burundi, headed by President Pierre Nkurunziza, and the Parti pour la liberation du peuple hutu (PALIPEHUTU)-Forces nationales de liberation (FNL), the last rebel movement to remain outside the democratization processes within Burundi, led by Chairman Agathon Rwasa. The Agreement was signed on 7 September last year. Within 72 hours of the signing of the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement, we had hoped to see the finalization of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process, but that process could not be finalized. Some problems had apparently emerged.”

    2007-11-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5786 (2007) · source

  44. “Mr. Nqakula: Good morning to all members of the Council. The first thing I would like to do is to introduce the team that is accompanying me, represented as it is by my Deputy, the Honourable Kingsley Mamabolo, who is the South African Special Envoy to the Great Lakes Region. I also have with me Mr. Adonia Ayebare, who is a representative of Uganda in this Chamber and also a member of our Regional Technical Committee and the facilitation team. I want to thank you, Mr. President, and the other members of the Security Council for the rare opportunity that you have given us to address the Council on the matter before us: the search for durable peace in Burundi.”

    2007-11-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5786 (2007) · source