YouSaid · the spoken record

Nyakyi

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33
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1992-07-15
most recent
1993-07-15
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2
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un-security-council

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  1. “We agree with the Foreign Minister of Zimbabwe that the measures contemplated by the Council in paragraph 12 of the draft resolution should have been imposed forthwith instead of being postponed to 15 September, as Proposed. We trust that this is not an empty threat and hope that all concerned, and especially those with influence over UNITA, will use it to ensure that the message gets home. Allow me to conclude with a word of appreciation to our Secretary-General and to his present and previous Special Representatives, as well as to the Secretariat staff involved, for their untiring efforts to find peace for Angola. It is heartening to note that the frustrations of the conflict have not diminished their commitment and determination to succeed.”

    1993-07-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3254 (1993) · source

  2. “Therefore, it is important in planning for the next phase of United Nations involvement in Angola that this lesson be kept in mind. In this connection, my delegation would like to express the hope that it will not be long before the interim arrangements recommended in paragraph 18, which we support, are replaced by a full-fledged United Nations peace-keeping operation with adequate human and financial resources. We welcome and support the thrust of the draft resolution before the Council, and particularly the Council's readiness indicated in paragraph 12 to impose sanctions on UNITA if it persists in its defiance of the numerous calls by the Security Council that it honour its obligations under the Bicesse Accords.”

    1993-07-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3254 (1993) · source

  3. “Tanzania and many other countries have argued all along for a much larger United Nations presence in Angola than is provided for under UNAVEM II. We did so in the belief that the mission for peace in the complex situation of Angola required substantial resources far beyond those made available to UNAVEM I. We are heartened to note from paragraph 8 that when conditions are right the Secretary-General intends to recommend to the Security Council an enlarged United Nations peace-keeping presence in Angola. We believe, and we think that many people would agree, that had UNAVEM II had more people on the ground than it had in the run-up to the September elections, many of the problems that the international community now has to contend with could have been averted.”

    1993-07-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3254 (1993) · source

  4. “We are confident that the United States will now be able to play a more effective role as an impartial observer in the peace process. We urge the Security Council to use the momentum created by the action of the United States to initiate appropriate measures to prevent Savimbi and UNITA from persisting in their intransigence, which has denied the people of Angola a chance of lasting peace after more than 15 years of fratricidal war. My delegation welcomes the Secretary-General's coupling of his recommendation in paragraph 18 of a further extension of the mandate of UNAVEM II with his assurance in paragraph 17 that there can be no question of the United Nations abandoning Angola at this critical juncture.”

    1993-07-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3254 (1993) · source

  5. “It is now for them to reverse the situation by ensuring that, this time, Savimbi and UNITA do not get away with their duplicity. We look to them also to lead the international community in providing all necessary assistance to the Government of Angola to enable it to defend the people of Angola and to safeguard the unity and territorial integrity of its country. The most hopeful development in the Angolan conflict since the resumption of hostilities has been the action taken by the United States Government to recognize the Government of Angola and to establish diplomatic relations with it. We applaud that deciion because it sends a very clear signal to Savimbi and UNITA that no civilized member of the international community will continue to tolerate their attempts to win by the bullet what they failed to win in a free and fair ballot.”

    1993-07-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3254 (1993) · source

  6. “Now that it is clear that the world community has been too trusting about UNITA's declarations of peaceful intentions - and no one could have said it more eloquently than the Secretary General did in paragraph 4 of the report before the Council in document $/26060 - the international community owes it to itself and to the long-suffering people of Angola to take prompt and effective action now to halc and reverse the situation. The three observer States to the Angolan peace effort bear a particular responsibility for ensuring compliance with the Bicesse Accords and subsequent measures to implement those agreements. They more than anyone else encouraged the Angolan Government to play by the rules, and the Government of Angola put its trust and faith in their good intentions.”

    1993-07-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3254 (1993) · source

  7. “What more can one ask the Angolan Government and the United Nations to do to convince UNITA that no sacrifice has been too high for peace in Angola? We are where we are in Angola because one party has been negotiating in good faith while the other has been pursuing a double agenda. As I have already stated, all this has been happening under the gaze of the international community. Because it played by the rules umpired by the international community, the Government of Angola now finds itself under intolerable pressure, at the negotiating table and on the battlefield.”

    1993-07-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3254 (1993) · source

  8. “That is the inescapable conclusion one reaches from a close study of the portion of the May report that states: "The fundamental concept on which the negotiations were based, and which flowed from the earlier attempts at negotiating a settlement, was that the Government would show political flexibility, facilitating a much larger role for UNITA in government structures in return for military withdrawals by UNITA." (S/25840, para. 14) In plain language, this means that in the interest of peace the world community has been willing to exert pressure on the Government of Angola to concede more to UNITA than is warranted by its support from the people of Angola as demonstrated by the results of the United Nations-supervised elections.”

    1993-07-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3254 (1993) · source

  9. “It got away with dragging its feet on the way to the first meeting in Addis Ababa and with its refusal to go to the second meeting in Addis Ababa. In Abidjan it secured concession after concession, yet it got away with causing the collapse of the talks. One thing is very clear from the Secretary General's reports: UNITA has not been negotiating in good faith. There is no question but that, all along, UNITA's strategy has been one of buying time by stringing the international community along. All along, the international community and the Angolan Government have bent over backwards in the interest of a peaceful settlement of the tragic conflict. They have not merely exerted their best endeavours, but in the interest of peace they have also been willing to grant UNITA more concessions than it deserves.”

    1993-07-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3254 (1993) · source

  10. “The strategy of the international community - of using persuasion and dialogue to secure compliance with the decisions of the Security Council - quite clearly prompted by its desire to promote a peaceful settlement, appears to have been abused by Savimbi and UNITA at every stage. They believed that they could flout the will of the international community and get away with it. UNITA cheated on its obligation under the Bicesse Accords to demobilize its troops and confine them to designated areas. That this happened under the gaze of the international community is much to be regretted. The ease with which UNITA got away with such a serious violation of the Accords encouraged it to persist in its intransigence and prevarication. Thus, it did not heed the call for its troops to rejoin the integrated army and other joint structures.”

    1993-07-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3254 (1993) · source

  11. “An even more relevant question is: For how long is the international community going to continue to treat Savimbi and UNITA as spoilt children who are entitled to get everything they ask for? The painful and troubled history of the Angolan conflict is well known to the members of the Council, so it is not necessary for anyone to use the Council's time to recount it. We are concerned here with the present phase of the conflict, which has its roots in the refusal by Savimbi and UNITA to accept and respect the results of the September 1992 elections, which the United Nations and many other observers certified as free and fair.”

    1993-07-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3254 (1993) · source

  12. “daily from the consequences of a war which was estimated at the time to have claimed over 400,000 lives. My delegation pays tribute to the Secretary-General, his staff and the United Nations system for their tireless efforts to mobilize humanitarian assistance for the victims of the tragic conflict. We are appalled by the callousness that UNITA continues to show towards the suffering of the Angolan people by reneging on its commitments to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance. The Security Council must show Savimbi and UNITA that they cannot continue to disregard their obligations under international humanitarian law and expect to get away with it. The question must be asked: For how long will the international community continue to accept the suffering of the Angolan people as the inevitable outcome of an internal conflict?”

    1993-07-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3254 (1993) · source

  13. “The recent escalation clearly points to a strategy to overrun the whole country. In consequence, the suffering of the people from the combined effects of the war and the drought - as evidenced by the destruction of the country's infrastructure, its agriculture and its marketing and distribution networks - has also escalated. The figure of 2 million Angolans suffering from the effects of the war, mainly hunger and disease, revealed in the two reports, should provoke the anger and outrage of the international community. This is almost a quarter of the population of Angola and is a measure of the amount of suffering Savimbi has imposed on the people of Angola. As virtually all previous speakers have observed, an even more graphic statistic in the May report is the estimated 1,000 Angolans dying.”

    1993-07-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3254 (1993) · source

  14. “Rightly, the Secretary-General's previous Special Representative found the request unacceptable. The May report reveals that UNITA's behaviour was the same during the Abidjan talks, which also collapsed in total failure on 21 May after six weeks of painstaking negotiations. While the Government of Angola was able to accommodate UNITA at every stage of the negotiations, UNITA made fresh demands at every stage. In the end, Mr. Savimbi vetoed the Abidjan Protocol by going back on an area already agreed upon by his delegation in the negotiations on the Memorandum of Understanding. While UNITA has been buying time at the negotiating table, in the country it has been spreading death and destruction. According to the Secretary-General's May report and other sources, UNITA then controlled about 75 per cent of the country.”

    1993-07-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3254 (1993) · source

  15. “What comes out very clearly from both reports is that it is UNITA, and especially its leader, Savimbi, that has posed problems for the negotiation effort at every stage. UNITA agreed to the Addis Ababa talks of 27 to 30 January 1993 after strenuous efforts and a great deal of pressure had been brought to bear on the organization. It was UNITA's unacceptable demands at the talks which prevented the reaching of agreement on a cease-fire. The second Addis Ababa meeting, scheduled first for 10 February and then for 26 February 1993, failed to take place because UNITA advanced all sorts of reasons which the whole world knew to be unacceptable excuses. When it ran out of further excuses, UNITA sought the indefinite postponement of the second Addis Ababa meeting.”

    1993-07-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3254 (1993) · source

  16. “In the view of the Secretary-General the situation "has continued to deteriorate dangerously as fighting has intensified and as the mistrust which has inhibited meaningful political accommodation has deepened". (S/26060, para.3) Who is responsible for this deterioration is also clear from paragraph 4 of the report, which refers to UNITA's repeated efforts to capture additional territory, its siege of several provincial capitals, its attack on Caxito and its seizure of the mineral-producing towns of Soyo and Cafunfo in an obvious effort to paralyse the economy and further destabilize the country. The Secretary-General is right in concluding that these efforts and acts call into serious question UNITA's declaration about peaceful intentions.”

    1993-07-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3254 (1993) · source

  17. “Independence in 1975 was followed by a cruel and destructive civil war, resulting in hundreds of thousands of dead, many mor2 maimed for life, massive numbers of refugees and internally displaced people and massive destruction of the country. That is why the whole world welcomed with great relief and hope the Bicesse Accords as offering the people of Angola an opportunity for much-needed peace and security. Unfortunately, the Security Council is meeting today, for the second time in six weeks, because the Bicesse Accords are in shreds. The current report (S/26060) of the Secretary-General, just like the May report (S/25840), makes very depressing reading. It reveals a deteriorating political and military situation.”

    1993-07-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3254 (1993) · source

  18. “I am grateful for the opportunity to address the Security Council. I should like to begin by extending to you, Sir, my delegation's congratulations on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for the month of July. We are confident that under your able leadership, which we have already seen over the last two weeks, the Council will succeed in discharging the heavy responsibilities for international peace and security entrusted to it. At the same time, I should like to join in the expressions of appreciation extended to Ambassador Juan Antonio Yafez Barnuevo of Spain for the excellent leadership he provided the Council during the month of June. For over 30 years the people of Angola have known no peace. For over 10 years they fought a bitter anti-colonial war.”

    1993-07-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3254 (1993) · source

  19. “Now the Security Council has an opportunity to repair the omission in a way that helps not only to stem the tide of violence in the country, but also to restore the confidence and trust of the oppressed in the negotiating process. These, I believe, are the objectives of the draft resolution before the Council initiated by the African countries. I join previous speakers in urging the Council to adopt it.”

    1992-07-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3095 (1992) · source

  20. “In this connection, I would like to use this opportunity to reaffirm the determination of the Intergovernmental Group to Monitor the Supply and Shipping of Oil and Petroleum Products to South Africa, which I have the henour to Chair, to continue vigorously to pursue its mandate as reaffirmed by the forty-sizth session of the General Assembly. On behalf of the Intergovernmental Group, I urge members of the Council and the world community as a whole to continue to extend their support and cooperation to the Group. Boipatong also painfully reminded the international community that, in regard to the violence, it had for too long relied too much on the regime's investigative machinery. Although the world community never fully endorsed it, its acquiescence in it bestowed a credibility never deserved.”

    1992-07-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3095 (1992) · source

  21. “Feeling secure from the pressure of sanctions and isolation, the Pretoria authorities now feel emboldened not only to ignore their undertaking to take steps to end the violence but also to drag their feet at the negotiating table. None of this surprises those delegations, like mine, which have continued to campaign for the maintenance of sanctions. The first responsibility of this Council, therefore, must be to reaffirm the need for continued pressure on the regime. Existing sanctions must be maintained.”

    1992-07-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3095 (1992) · source

  22. “Specifically, it must implement the measures it has promised to undertake to end the violence, such as the closure of the single-sex hostels and the banning of the carrying of the so-called cultural weapons. It must bring to justice security personnel involved in violence and vigorously investigate all criminal activities. It must suspend from duty all security personnel implicated in criminal conduct. It must disband all security units and South African Defense Force detachments engaged in covert operations, such as Battalion 32, and others comprised of foreign nationals. Boipatong taught the international community a number of painful lessons which must be kept in mind in planning an appropriate response to the crisis. One of them is that some members of the world community were in too much of a hurry to lift sanctions.”

    1992-07-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3095 (1992) · source

  23. “As a writer in the New York Times asserted in an article in the issue of Thursday, 9 July 1992, the debate on involvement or non-involvement of the Government in the violence, whether directly or indirectly, is no longer relevant. Holding that the Government must be held accountable, the writer argues: "In any other State in the world and as a product of the basic terms of the social contract, a Government is charged with providing bodily security for its citizens." As the liberation movements, the PAC and the ANC, have made clear in their statements, what the Government must do to end the violence is clear. In a nutshell, it must put an end to the complicity of its security forces in undercover activities.”

    1992-07-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3095 (1992) · source

  24. “The Government has failed to take sufficiently firm steps to prevent criminal conduct by members of the security forces and the police and to ensure that the guilty are promptiy and adequately punished." Sometimes Pretoria's attempt to cover up its criminal conduct gives it away. Recently the Minister of Police sought a court injunction to prevent the Weekly Mail from publishing a report on the existence of a highly clandestine police network in the Southern Transvaal region. If, as the leaders of the liberation movements have warned, the regime had nothing to hide, why did it seek to prevent publication of the report? Even if it was not involved, through complicity, in the violence plaguing the country, Pretoria cannot run away from its responsibility to end it.”

    1992-07-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3095 (1992) · source

  25. “Those members of the international community who have formed the habit of casting doubt on the claims of the liberation movements cannot ignore the findings of the Government-appointed Goldstone Commission which states in paragraph 2.3.7 that: "A history over some years of State complicity in undercover activities which include criminal conduct ... and well-documented criminal conduct by individual members of the South African Police and the Kwazulu Police exacerbate the perception of so many South Africans that the Government or its agencies are active parties responsible for the violence.”

    1992-07-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3095 (1992) · source

  26. “In a paper entitled, "South Africa: Evidence of 'Third Force' Destabilization Mounts", published in May 1992, the South African Research and Documentation Centre, provides detailed evidence of numerous acts of police complicity in acts of violence committed by the Inkatha Freedom Party supporters, such as recruiting people, providing training and arms, providing escorts, turning a blind eye to Inkatha violence, and the like. An article by Christopher Wren in the New York Times issue of Wednesday, 12 June 1991, based on the revelations of a retired South African Army Major, Nico Basson, corroborates what has been revealed in the Centre's paper. In these circumstances the regime can have no interest in stopping the violence.”

    1992-07-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3095 (1992) · source

  27. “Five years of unremitting violence leading to the loss of more than 11,000 lives and the massive evidence gathered by various sources, including human rights, church and lawyers groups, leave no doubt about the sinister hand of the regime's security forces, including the police and the army in the violence plaguing the country. The involvement has taken the form of planning, funding, training and directing logistical support and even direct participation in attacks and other acts of violence.”

    1992-07-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3095 (1992) · source

  28. “For over five years innocent lives have been perishing in South Africa at the rate of 15 a day, according to records maintained by representatives of the victims of the violence. According to most estimates, the death toll today stands at over 11,000 people. In no other country would such a heavy toll in lives over such a long period of time be accepted as inevitable. There was a time when the world community may have entertained genuine doubts about the complicity of the Pretoria authorities in the violence afflicting the country. Now there can be no excuse for exonerating the regime from responsibility for the violence. Only the naive and Pretoria's supporters and their friends accept its characterization of the strife as black-on-black violence.”

    1992-07-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3095 (1992) · source

  29. “The outrage evoked by the regime's brutality gave birth to the world-wide anti-apartheid movement and the wide range of sanctions for which it campaigned. Such was the case also after the Soweto massacre of 1976. The horror provoked by the regime's murderous and repressive acts persuaded even its allies to join in supporting Security Council resolution 418 (1977) imposing an arms embargo - the first and only Chapter VII measure against Pretoria. Security Council resolutions 473 (1980), 554 (1984) and 556 (1984) were all adopted in response to massive repression and brutality following violence in the country. "Yet deaths resulting from violence are a daily occurrence in South Africa. The current phase of violence in the country goes back to 1986.”

    1992-07-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3095 (1992) · source

  30. “The people of South Africa need a negotiated Constitution for a post-apartheid South Africa. But no one has a right to ask them to negotiate with a gun pointed at their heads. It is fitting that the Council should be meeting in an emergency session to consider the grave problem of violence in South Africa. The immediate reason for its convening is the Boipatong massacre of 17 June which shocked the conscience of the international community. Boipatong left more than 40 people dead. Although the outside world has come to accept violence as an endemic problem in South Africa, its scale of perpetration is seldom appreciated. It is only after its perpetration on a massive scale, such as Boipatong, that the world community takes note and responds. Such was the case after the massacre of 69 peaceful protesters in Sharpeville in 1960.”

    1992-07-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3095 (1992) · source

  31. “But before they can enjoy those rights, including their inalienable right to self-determination, they must first secure and assert their foremost fundamental right - the right to life. At a time when the pre-eminent preoccupation of the world, particularly of the major Powers, is the promotion of human rights, for the world to look at the carnage going on in South Africa as helpless spectators is an indictment of the new world order. Those who cannot bring themselves to assert the most fundamental human right for the innocent people in South Africa's townships forfeit their right to assert it for people anywhere else around the world. 'The best Constitution in the world is no good for the dead. Nor is it of much use to the living who continue to live in conditions of perpetual terror and fear for their lives.”

    1992-07-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3095 (1992) · source

  32. “This meeting is about the tragic violence in South Africa. It is about who bears responsibility fer it. It is about what the Pretoria authorities should do to put a speedy end to it. It is about what the international community should do to help bring this about. It is not about the resumption of negotiations. In the face of the carnage going on inside South Africa and the immense suffering it has imposed on the majority black population, to put priority on negotiations at this time is not only insensitive in the extreme; it is putting the cart before the horse. The whole purpose of negotiations is to secure the restoration to the majority people of South Africa of their fundamental freedom and rights.”

    1992-07-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3095 (1992) · source

  33. “I thank you, Sir, for the opportunity to address the Security Council. In doing so, EF should like at the outset to extend to you my delegation's congratulations on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for the month of duly. For the African delegations, and the suffering people of South Africa in particular, it is a happy coincidence that you are presiding over the Council's affairs during this debate on violence in South Africa, which is a matter of the gravest concern to our continent and to the world. We are confident that you will bring your great experience and much admired diplomatic skills to bear on the Council's deliberations. At the same time, I join in the expressions of appreciation to your predecessor, Ambassador Paul Noterdaeme of Belgium, for the guidance which he provided to the Council in June.”

    1992-07-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3095 (1992) · source