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Nzongola-Ntalaja

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2022-03-29
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2023-06-26
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  1. Mr. Nzongola-Ntalaja (Democratic Republic of the Congo) (spoke in French): I would like to thank Secretary-General António Guterres for his commitment to my country’s cause. I would also like to thank all the members of the Security Council, in particular the three representatives of the African continent in this organ. My delegation has taken note of the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) (S/2023/208), which was just introduced by Ms. Bintou Keita, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of MONUSCO, whom I welcome. I had an opportunity to meet with Ms. Keita yesterday, and as always she was full of excellent advice. We fully support the work she is doing in our country.

    2023-03-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9298 (2023) · source

  2. My eighth and last request is for the Council to be involved in ensuring that each country in the Great Lakes region resolve its disputes with its own combatants and/or rebels.

    2022-10-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9165 (2022) · source

  3. Fourth, I call for the Security Council to impose appropriate and more severe sanctions on the M-23 and Rwandan actors who are threatening the peace, security and stability in the Great Lakes region through their activism. Fifth, I call for support for the Nairobi process. Sixth, I call for all armed groups without exception to be required to lay down their arms and join the Disarmament, Demobilization, Community Recovery and Stabilization Programme and for the Programme to be provided with greater support. Seventh, I call on the Council to strengthen sanctions against domestic and foreign mafia networks — including their entire networks, from production and transit points to destinations — which illegally exploit the natural resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

    2022-10-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9165 (2022) · source

  4. First, I call for respect for the integrity and intangibility of the borders of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Second, I request that the Council demand an immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Rwandan and M-23 troops from the town of Bunangana and other parts of Rutshuru territory in the east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in North Kivu province. Third, I call for the Security Council to strongly condemn, via a resolution, the Republic of Rwanda for its support to the M-23 armed group. I have heard almost everyone at today’s meeting say that they deplore Rwanda’s occupation of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, but deploring it alone will not change anything. Measures must be taken so that Rwanda knows that the international community takes that seriously.

    2022-10-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9165 (2022) · source

  5. The Addis Ababa Framework Agreement prohibits the destabilization of a member country of the region by another State. Rwanda’s position is in defiance of the conclusions of the Nairobi process and the talks in Luanda and New York. With regard to the talks in New York, I am referring to the meeting that the President of France, Mr. Macron, held with President Kagame and President Tshisekedi Tshilombo during the high-level week of the General Assembly. Council members should know that the Democratic Republic of the Congo, its President and its people will defend the integrity of their territory and will not cede a single centimetre of their land. Before concluding my remarks, I would like to convey a few requests to the Council on behalf of my delegation.

    2022-10-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9165 (2022) · source

  6. In that regard, my Government would like to reassure the Council that it will continue its cooperation efforts at the subregional, regional and international levels for the effective implementation of the Framework Agreement. Finally, I would like to mention that the Democratic Republic of the Congo is upholding its commitments under the Framework Agreement. Rwanda is providing substantial support to the Mouvement du 23 mars (M-23) and, in doing so, is contributing to the deterioration of the climate of trust and continued insecurity in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. For years, that insecurity has enabled a predatory and illicit exploitation of the natural resources that abound in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, which we deplore.

    2022-10-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9165 (2022) · source

  7. It is important to stress that the success of that non-military component underscores the critical importance of the Disarmament, Demobilization, Community Recovery and Stabilization Programme, which was established by the President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. We take this opportunity to ask the Special Envoy and the Security Council to participate even more proactively alongside the Democratic Republic of the Congo in efforts to deploy substantial funding of the programme, which will contribute to changing the situation in the Great Lakes region. Furthermore, in accordance with resolution 2556 (2020), the stabilization of the Democratic Republic of the Congo also depends on the implementation of the Addis Ababa Framework Agreement.

    2022-10-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9165 (2022) · source

  8. The Contact and Coordination Group, in addition to contacts with the armed groups, will also be part of a community-based approach through contacts with opinion leaders, communities and civil society, not to mention women and young people. The stated objective is to raise awareness and obtain the support and effective involvement of all those stakeholders in the non-military efforts to bring about the surrender of the armed groups. The operational cell will also accompany efforts targeting foreign armed groups and their repatriation to their countries of origin, an objective clearly stated by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

    2022-10-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9165 (2022) · source

  9. At the end of that meeting, the senior representatives of the Heads of State of signatories to the Framework Agreement recommended accelerating the implementation of the Agreement through existing mechanisms to put an end to the insecurity in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the region. From 22 to 24 September, the fifth meeting of the Heads of Intelligence and Security Services of the Great Lakes region was held in Kampala. That meeting decided on the deployment, beginning on 5 November in Goma, of the members of the operational cell of the Contact and Coordination Group, which will be in charge of establishing and monitoring non-military measures to complement the ongoing military operations.

    2022-10-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9165 (2022) · source

  10. The appointment on 26 May of nine provincial coordinators of the Disarmament, Demobilization, Community Recovery and Stabilization Programme; the reforms of the FARDC that are under way; and the signature by the President of the ordinance-law on the military programming bill, which is focused on capacity-building, are all directed at strengthening the Addis Ababa Framework Agreement mechanism. Moreover, it is worth recalling that, under the leadership of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which has been Chair of the Regional Oversight Mechanism of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region since 24 February, several important meetings have been held. For example, in August, the thirty-first meeting of the Technical Support Committee was held in Nairobi.

    2022-10-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9165 (2022) · source

  11. I therefore believe that we should take things as they are and recognize that the aggression to which we are being subjected is real and that the Security Council must take the necessary action in that regard. The humanitarian situation in our region remains very worrisome, as Ms. Keita noted in this Chamber at the end of September (see S/PV.9142). Advocacy efforts to contain the situation must continue because at least 70 per cent of the funding needs have not yet been met. With regard to the implementation of the Addis Ababa Framework Agreement, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as mentioned in the report of the Secretary-General (S/2022/735), has honoured the six national commitments which it had undertaken.

    2022-10-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9165 (2022) · source

  12. In that regard, the Nairobi process will be fully relaunched with the aim of tackling and eliminating all armed groups. President Felix-Antoine Tshisekedi Tshilombo’s message is very clear on that subject. He spoke about it recently here in the General Assembly (see A/77/ PV.5) and has repeated it in London and elsewhere. Our most important priority is to live in peace with all our neighbours. Since he came to power, President Tshisekedi Tshilombo has done his utmost to ensure peace between us and our neighbours. In that regard, I would like to thank my colleague from Burundi for mentioning that the relations between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Burundi are excellent. We have allowed Burundi to enter the Democratic Republic of the Congo because we know that its interests are not that different from our own.

    2022-10-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9165 (2022) · source

  13. Thirdly, when Joseph Kabila was President, he authorized Rwanda to intervene in the Congo and to pursue the FDLR. The Rwandan army were in our territory. They did not eliminate the FDLR. Why is that? The reason is very simple. Rwanda is keeping the FDLR as an excuse to plunder my country’s natural resources. They are not really entering the Congo to pursue the FDLR, because their main interest is in plundering our resources. That is well known — it is in reports from the United States Treasury and other studies, as well the mapping reports of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights. All of that is well known. Regarding the armed groups, the Democratic Republic of the Congo is continuing its efforts both individually and in conjunction with all its partners to reduce the scale of the threat they pose.

    2022-10-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9165 (2022) · source

  14. As a researcher who has taught for nearly 50 years in universities, including in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, I know very well that Rwanda was in control of our entire country’s national security from May 1997 until July 1998. James Kabarebe, a Rwandan military officer, was appointed the Chief of the General Staff of the Forces armées congolaises or as it is known today, the Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo (FARDC). First, why did Mr. Kabarebe and Rwanda do nothing to eliminate the FDLR when they had power and control over the security of the entire territory of the Congo? Secondly, between 1998 and 2003, Rwanda occupied part of the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, including North Kivu. Why did they do nothing in those five years to eliminate the FDLR?

    2022-10-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9165 (2022) · source

  15. Rwanda, we should remind the Council, is one of the signatories to the Addis Ababa Framework Agreement. This unacceptable situation of aggression, which is undermining the confidence-building efforts and positive momentum that were beginning to take hold in the Great Lakes region, must stop. We ask the Council to urge Rwanda and its M-23 to leave that part of Congolese territory without delay. I would like to make an important parenthetical point. The representative of Rwanda spoke about combatants from the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) being a main cause of the conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. That makes no sense.

    2022-10-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9165 (2022) · source

  16. Claude Ibalanky, High Representative of the President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo for the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework Agreement for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region. He is also the coordinator of the Framework Agreement’s local mechanism for the Democratic Republic of the Congo. We benefited from his notes in preparing for this statement. He is also accompanied here today by his Director of the Cabinet. I would be remiss if I continued without reminding the Council that even as we are meeting here, the town of Bunangana, a beloved part of my country, is still being attacked and occupied by Rwanda, under the guise of the Mouvement du 23 mars (M-23), and that has gone on for more than four months.

    2022-10-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9165 (2022) · source

  17. Mr. Nzongola-Ntalaja (Democratic Republic of the Congo) (spoke in French): Let me take this opportunity to thank you, Sir, for your presidency of the Security Council for the month of October. I would also like to thank all the members of the Council, especially the three African members, Gabon, Ghana and Kenya, for the interest they have unfailingly shown in my country’s situation. My delegation greatly values the briefing just made by Ambassador Huang Xia, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region, and I welcome his presence in the Chamber. We also want to commend him for his commitment and sacrifice in his efforts for the Great Lakes region. I would also like to acknowledge the presence of Mr.

    2022-10-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9165 (2022) · source

  18. I want to thank the delegation of China for raising the issue in today’s meeting. The fact is that such a notification measure is not useful, is totally unfair and does not enable us to defend our country properly. Our President also requested that the clause be lifted during his address at the general debate of the seventy-sixth session of the General Assembly (see A/76/PV.3).

    2022-09-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9142 (2022) · source

  19. Sixth, I call on the Council to urge all armed groups, without exception, to lay down their weapons in order to join the Disarmament, Demobilization, Community Recovery and Stabilization Programme. I also call on the Council to provide increased support to that programme. Seventh, I call on the Council to strengthen sanctions against the mafia networks inside and outside the Democratic Republic of the Congo that illegally exploit its natural resources, including the entire supply chains from their points of transit to their destinations — namely, the multinational corporations that benefit from such illegal trafficking. Eighth, the Democratic Republic of the Congo calls on the Security Council to fully — and not partially — lift the prior notification clause required by the 1533 Sanctions Committee on the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

    2022-09-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9142 (2022) · source

  20. Third, as our President stated at the general debate of the seventy-seventh session of the General Assembly (see A/77/PV.5), the Democratic Republic of the Congo reiterates its request for the Council to take up, without any complacency, the report (see S/2022/479) of the United Nations Group of Experts on the aggression on the Democratic Republic of the Congo and to draw all the appropriate conclusions therefrom. Fourth, I call on the Council to clearly and firmly condemn the criminal aggression of the M-23 — and its backers, starting with the State of Rwanda — against the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Fifth, I call on the Council to support the Nairobi process.

    2022-09-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9142 (2022) · source

  21. We would like to take this opportunity to reiterate our appeal to donors and other funding agencies to fill the 67 per cent gap in overall funding. Before concluding my remarks, on behalf of my delegation, I would like to make the following requests to the Council: First, I call on the Council to ensure respect for the integrity and inviolability of the borders of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Second, I call on the Council to demand an immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Rwandan and M-23 troops from the city of Bunagana in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.

    2022-09-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9142 (2022) · source

  22. With regard to the Mission’s mandates, as I underscored to the Council in June (see S/PV.9081), under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, the most important element in a situation of war is the protection of civilians. It is therefore crucial for MONUSCO to work on that area. A robust offensive position is also essential. If MONUSCO is unable make its presence felt and be a deterrent on the ground, it will struggle to discharge its mission and main mandate to protect civilians. To that end, the Democratic Republic of the Congo once again calls on the Council to allocate sufficient resources to MONUSCO to update its weaponry and improve the quality of its equipment. With regard to the humanitarian situation, the greatest challenge remains raising the funds necessary to cover the immense needs.

    2022-09-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9142 (2022) · source

  23. My Government hopes, however, that its efforts will not be undermined by the concurrent announcement of the withdrawal. MONUSCO is an important partner in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s quest for peace and stability in its eastern regions, as President Tshisekedi Tshilombo reminded us in his address to the General Assembly (see A/77/PV.5). The re-evaluation of the transition plan and the gradual withdrawal of the MONUSCO force are essential. A group of experts is already being set up at the Government level to work on the transition. They will examine progress on the 18 benchmarks one by one from our national perspective. The work will then be followed up jointly with MONUSCO.

    2022-09-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9142 (2022) · source

  24. The Democratic Republic of the Congo welcomes the support from MONUSCO and the United Nations country team that it has requested for the electoral process. As far as de-escalation efforts are concerned, the Democratic Republic of the Congo has shown good faith through the good offices of the President, who has agreed to participate in the various mediation initiatives, including in Kenya, in Angola with President João Lourenço, and most recently under the auspices of President Emmanuel Macron of France. The only observation that we would make is that Bunagana remains under attack and occupation, despite President Kagame’s statements during the meeting with President Macron. Concerning anti-MONUSCO sentiment, the authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo have made efforts to calm the population.

    2022-09-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9142 (2022) · source

  25. Furthermore, to avoid friendly fire, my Government will encourage cooperation, information-sharing and so forth. In our humble opinion, cooperation is a self-evident necessity. As the report before us indicates, the political situation in my country has been mainly dominated by preparations for the holding of the 2023 elections, mediation initiatives to de-escalate tensions between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda and anti-MONUSCO protests. Concerning the elections, the revised electoral law was adopted on 29 June. The electoral calendar will soon be published by the Independent National Electoral Commission. The Government is in the process of ensuring preliminary financing for the process.

    2022-09-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9142 (2022) · source

  26. The military component of the Nairobi process, which is also being fully implemented, will address both of those issues through a resumption of joint military operations by the Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo (FARDC) and MONUSCO, as well as the regional force of the East African Community, which continues to be deployed. Concerning the regional force, my Government would like to assure the Security Council that it will cooperate with MONUSCO. The MONUSCO force is there to support the FARDC, and the regional force will not operate in the Democratic Republic of the Congo without the FARDC. For that reason, the joint command of that force will also be provided by the FARDC under the leadership of General Kaputu, and the force’s focal point is therefore the FARDC.

    2022-09-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9142 (2022) · source

  27. They include the M-23 terrorist group supported by Rwanda; the Allied Democratic Forces terrorist group; the armed forces of the Coopérative pour le développement du Congo and Zaire, in Ituri; and lastly, the Mayi-Mayi Yakutumba in South Kivu. Where foreign armed groups are concerned, there can be no possibility of discussion. My Government demands that they lay down their weapons unconditionally and return home. While we do not intend to infringe on the sovereignty of the countries concerned, the Democratic Republic of the Congo will ask the countries of origin of those negative forces to show good faith by setting up the processes and conditions necessary to absorb the fighters. The Democratic Republic of the Congo is not a way station.

    2022-09-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9142 (2022) · source

  28. The political component of the process is still ongoing. The rebel groups that have adhered to it will be processed by the Disarmament, Demobilization, Community Recovery and Stabilization Programme. The President recently appointed the regional coordinators of the Programme, who will be deployed on the ground, and the full operationalization of that vital programme will require funding. With regard to the military component of the Nairobi process, we would like to draw the attention of the Security Council to a number of negative forces that have continued to be the most resistant to the process, as Ms. Keita mentioned earlier.

    2022-09-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9142 (2022) · source

  29. Bintou Keita, Special Representative of the Secretary- General and Head of the Mission, just presented to us. I commend her on her commitment and express my Government’s deep gratitude for the work she is doing in our country. Our thanks also go to the MONUSCO troops in general, and the quick-reaction forces of the Mission’s Force Intervention Brigade and the Southern African Development Community in particular, for the sacrifices that they continue to make to achieve peace. I would now like to make a few remarks on the issues discussed in the report and the various concerns raised by Council members. There is a lot to say, but, given the time constraints, I will focus on the most critical points. The Nairobi process, which has had a technical delay, will be relaunched in the coming days.

    2022-09-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9142 (2022) · source

  30. Families have been decimated. The Congolese women and children of Bunagana are suffering under the yoke of oppression. This continuing series of aggressions is unacceptable. The Council, which is very well informed by its own Group of Experts, must stop turning a blind eye. We earnestly ask the Security Council to join the Democratic Republic of the Congo and President Félix- Antoine Tshisekedi Tshilombo in demanding loudly and clearly, in unambiguous terms, that the forces of aggression and occupation immediately leave that area of my country, Bunagana, and that they do so without preconditions or subterfuge. My delegation has taken note of the report of the Secretary-General (S/2022/709) on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), which Ms.

    2022-09-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9142 (2022) · source

  31. I would like to commend all the members of the Security Council, friends and partners who stand with the Democratic Republic of the Congo. I would also like to single out the three African countries that are members of this key organ for their commitment to and sacrifice for my country and for Africa as a whole. I would also like to welcome Mr. Emery Mudinga, Director of the Angaza Institute, based in Bukavu, for his very relevant briefing. I will say it once again — the Congo, which has remained on the Security Council’s agenda almost continuously for many years, is more than ever in need of peace in order to further its development. As we sit in this Chamber, the city of Bunagana, an integral part of my country’s eastern territory, remains under occupation by Rwanda through its control of the Mouvement du 23 mars (M-23).

    2022-09-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9142 (2022) · source

  32. Mr. Nzongola-Ntalaja (Democratic Republic of the Congo) (spoke in French): I thank the briefers — Ms. Bintou Keita, Mr. Emery Mudinga and the Ambassador of Gabon, in his capacity as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004), concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo — as well as all members of the Security Council who made statements on the situation in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. Allow me to congratulate you, Mr. President, on your country’s presidency of the Security Council in September and to thank you for convening today’s meeting on the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. I also wish to thank the Secretary-General, His Excellency Mr. António Guterres, for his commitment to my country’s cause.

    2022-09-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9142 (2022) · source

  33. That provision, now over 14 years old, has become completely obsolete. The armed groups that massacre the Congolese population every day are not even affected by that measure.

    2022-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9081 (2022) · source

  34. Fifth, we call for all armed groups, without exception, to be required lay down their arms and join the disarmament, demobilization, community recovery and stabilization programme and for greater support to the programme. Sixth, we call for more sanctions against the various internal and external mafia networks operating on our territory and their entire supply chains, from production to transit to destination. Seventh, the Democratic Republic of the Congo calls on the Security Council to totally, not partially, lift the prior notification clause required by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) contained in paragraph 5 of resolution 1807 (2008), as called for by President Félix-Antoine Tshisekedi Tshilombo from the rostrum of the United Nations General Assembly in September 2021 (see A/76/PV.3).

    2022-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9081 (2022) · source

  35. The Democratic Republic of the Congo, a full State Member of the United Nations, must have its borders and its sovereignty respected and its stability restored. Therefore, allow me, before I conclude my remarks, to make several requests to the Council on behalf of my delegation. First, we call for respect of the integrity and inviolability of the borders of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Second, we call for stronger condemnation of the criminal aggression of the M-23 and all its supporters, starting with the State of Rwanda and its President, against the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Third, we ask that the M-23 be called on to leave Congolese territory, immediately and unconditionally. Fourth, we urge support for the Nairobi process.

    2022-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9081 (2022) · source

  36. Sultani Makenga began his training in Kagame’s forces in Uganda before Rwanda was taken by Kagame’s regime. It is clear, therefore, that the group is essentially a Rwandan army militia. There may be some Congolese nationals, I have no doubt about that, in the M-23, but the group is controlled by Rwanda, and its leaders, including almost all of its commanders, are Rwandan. I must recall, with great sorrow, that several million Congolese have died in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and that, for more than 26 years now, my people have been massacred and raped in the name of the illicit and mafia-like exploitation of the mineral wealth of their soil. The Congolese people have also been following with interest the recent mobilization of the United Nations, the Security Council and the international community.

    2022-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9081 (2022) · source

  37. The Rassemblement Congolais pour la démocratie was formed in 1998. We then saw the formation of the Congrès national pour la défense du peuple, led by Mr. Laurent Nkunda. That organization was also under Rwandan control. Mr. Bosco Ntangada, who was born and raised in Rwanda, came to the Democratic Republic of the Congo with Mr. Laurent Nkunda and entered into the system led by Mr. James Kabarebe. He also became a member of the Rassemblement Congolais pour la démocratie in Goma. Shortly afterwards, he joined Mr. Laurent Nkunda in the Congrès national pour la défense du peuple and became the leader of the M-23. His right-hand man, Mr. Sultani Makenga, can be found on the list of people who were in Nairobi to negotiate and be integrated into the Congolese army. He was a general at the time but was promoted to the rank of colonel. Mr.

    2022-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9081 (2022) · source

  38. Then, when we negotiate, we are encouraged to include certain people within our army. Those people come with a self-appointed rank; one says he is a general, another that he is a colonel or a major. They are not actually given military training that justifies the rank they are given. Therefore, we have an army that has been infiltrated. How is that army supposed to be capable of truly protecting the population when its loyalties do not lie solely with our country? There are elements within our army working for another side. That is a very significant issue that must be closely examined and addressed. Returning to the note from Mr. Kalev Mutond of the National Intelligence Agency, I would be happy to make it available and share it with the Council. I will also mention a few of the names listed therein.

    2022-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9081 (2022) · source

  39. They are all Rwandan, and they were enrolled in Mr. Kagame’s army, namely, the Rwandan Patriotic Front. When the war began against the Habyarimana regime in 1990 and after Kigali, was taken, the Rassemblement Congolais pour la démocratie was formed in Goma. The Congolese people were well aware that, when Kagame took power, the Chief of Staff of the FARDC, Mr. James Kabarebe, was not Congolese, but Rwandan. His deputy, too, was Rwandan. Therefore, the fact is that Rwandans infiltrated our army. I have heard it said here that it is the primary responsibility of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to protect its own borders and its own population. We agree wholeheartedly, but who decided to integrate Rwandans within our army? It was the international community. Every time there is a small rebellion, we are told that we must negotiate.

    2022-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9081 (2022) · source

  40. The note contains a list of commanders, their equivalents and troops of the M-23 who are not eligible to be included within the ranks of the FARDC. The note states that our services have the essential duty of transmitting a list of the 78 commanders, their equivalents and soldiers, out of a total of 1,700 persons, who were ineligible for integration into the FARDC. The list was drawn up at the request of the former Minister for Defence of Uganda, Mr. Crispus Kiyongo, following a working meeting that he chaired with an M-23 delegation on 11 and 12 September 2013 in Mbarara, Uganda. What does the report tell us? Of those 78 commanders, officers of the highest ranks — generals, colonels, lieutenant colonels and majors — only one of them is a captain, while all of the others are of a higher rank. None of them are Congolese.

    2022-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9081 (2022) · source

  41. Why do the international community and the United Nations not want to associate the group with the State of Rwanda? We talk about foreign groups here in the Council, but we make no mention of their origin. We know about the Allied Democratic Forces, but we fail to mention other groups. Is the M-23 not a foreign group? Is it a group from the Democratic Republic of the Congo? The origins of the M-23 are well known. I have a note here that I can give to whomever wants to see it. It is entitled “Note to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and Head of MONUSCO” and it was written by Mr. Kalev Mutond, who was the Administrator-General of the National Intelligence Agency.

    2022-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9081 (2022) · source

  42. Allow me to summarize the situation by shedding light on one of the most important actors in the conflict — the Mouvement du 23 mars (M-23). It is clear that the resurgence of the M-23 looms large over the security situation. They were defeated by the Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo (FARDC) and the Force Intervention Brigade in 2013. The M-23 resurfaced eight years later in November 2021. As Ms. Keita just told us, today the M-23 has a better arsenal of weapons than those of MONUSCO and the FARDC. It is able to shoot down military helicopters, terrorize North Kivu province and commit other crimes in the east of the country. How do we explain the reappearance of the group after such a long absence? Who is behind the group, which had been disarmed, under the supervision of Rwanda and Uganda? I have another question.

    2022-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9081 (2022) · source

  43. Thanks to useful pre-funding from the central Government and support promised by the United Nations, it appears that a well-organized election process is possible. With regard to the security situation, there is the Nairobi process, under the leadership of Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta, as well as the African Union’s initiative to resolve the conflict between the two Presidents, Félix-Antoine Tshisekedi Tshilombo of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Paul Kagame of Rwanda, which is mediated by Angolan President João Lourenço. In that regard, I would like to underscore that any outcome depends upon the willingness of all sides, as well as pressure from the African Union and the international community, to advance the peace and security process. Given the time constraints, we cannot go into detail on the next point.

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  44. It is therefore crucial for MONUSCO to work on that area. A robust offensive position is also essential. If MONUSCO is unable make its presence felt and be a deterrent on the ground, it will struggle to discharge its mission and its civilian protection mandate. To that end, the Democratic Republic of the Congo would like to request the Security Council to allocate sufficient resources to MONUSCO to update its weaponry and helicopters and improve the quality of its equipment, in general. As underscored in the Secretary General’s report, the political situation in my country is dominated by preparations for the 2023 elections and the security situation in the east of the country. Election preparations are under control, given the commitment of the authorities of my country to improving the electoral process and system.

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  45. We thank them in particular for the sacrifices they continue to make to restore peace to the east of my country. Allow me to make a few remarks on issues mentioned in the report and the various concerns raised by members of the Council. To date, MONUSCO remains an important partner — even a crucial one — for the Democratic Republic of the Congo in its quest for peace and stability in the east of the country. In reading the report, we were pleased to note that efforts are being made within the Mission to improve its efficiency and effectiveness. With regard to its mandates, the most important element in a situation of war, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, is civilian protection. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, citizens are not convinced that MONUSCO’s highest priority is the protection of civilians.

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  46. My delegation has taken note of the Secretary General’s report on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), which is headed by Ms. Bintou Keita. I had the pleasure of discussing the report and the security situation in my country with Ms. Keita last Monday. I learned a great deal from her. I would like to congratulate her for her commitment and would like to express my Government’s deep appreciation for her excellent work in my country at this sensitive time. She can rest assured of our full cooperation to ensure success in her role. We also thank MONUSCO troops and the Mission’s leadership, in general, and all Quick Reaction Forces of the Force Intervention Brigade.

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  47. Furthermore, it was the Democratic Republic of the Congo that took the initiative to establish the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries, which is headquartered in Rwanda. That means that we intend and are willing to cooperate with our neighbours. Since President Félix-Antoine Tshisekedi Tshilombo came to power, he has attempted to foster good neighbourliness and dialogue with our neighbours. He has done his utmost to enable Rwanda to trade with the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Rwanda has resumed trade with us. Rwanda was authorized to participate in the sale of gold and other items. We have done nothing but promote cooperation with our neighbours.

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  48. That is why, 62 years later, we are facing the same situation. The resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo are being pillaged by foreign multinationals and by neighbouring countries, without the component some members have underscored today. Members pointed out that Rwanda, Burundi and the Congo should join forces to develop their countries together. We were colonized by Belgium. Since 1925, Ruanda-Urundi was part of Belgium. When I was growing up in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, I did not believe we were in another country. Our two countries were known as the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi. Some Rwandans and Burundians worked in our country and some Congolese worked in Bujumbura or Kigali. That is why I do not understand why we should be at war today.

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  49. And I want to acknowledge all the other members of the Council, friends and partners who have stood by my country’s side, some of them since we achieved independence in 1960. Earlier in today’s meeting, someone mentioned that some long-time members address only the issue of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Today the country is in mourning, as the remains of Patrice Lumumba were returned from Belgium and will be buried tomorrow. What caused his death and why were his remains not in the Democratic Republic of the Congo for more than 60 years? We know that he was the victim of a vile assassination. Why was he assassinated? It was because he was a patriot who wanted to ensure that the natural resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo were used for the good of its people, not just pillaged.

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  50. I would first of all like to congratulate you on Albania’s presidency of the Security Council for the month of June, Madam President, and to thank you for convening this meeting on the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and inviting us to participate. I would also like to thank Secretary- General António Guterres for his commitment to my country’s cause and his report (S/2022/503) on the situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the subject of our discussion today. In addition, I want to thank all the members of the Security Council, with a special mention for Ghana, Kenya and Gabon, the three representatives whose presence within the Council is a source of pride for the African continent.

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