YouSaid · the spoken record

Onanga-Anyanga

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279
first
2013-01-24
most recent
2023-10-12
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18
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un-security-council

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  1. The exception is the agreement on oil, under which South Sudan has so far paid the Sudan approximately $2.4 billion of the $3.02 billion transitional financial arrangement agreed in 2012. On 7 October, South Sudan said it intended to ask Khartoum at the end of October for an extension of the December 2019 deadline to complete the payment of the arrangement. It is also worth noting that the delegation led by Prime Minister Hamdok met its South Sudanese counterparts in the areas of foreign affairs, the interior, trade and industry, and energy and mining to discuss pending issues. In a joint statement, the two Foreign Ministers noted that the operationalization of the agreements required sustainable peace in both countries, hence the commitment by each Government to support peace in the other's country.

    2019-10-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8644 (2019) · source

  2. Furthermore, police chiefs from the two countries met in August to explore cooperation, information exchange and related matters. Consistent with his vision for peace and reform in the Sudan, Prime Minister Hamdok stated that he wanted to use his first visit to repair the damage caused by the former regime and restore the traditional ties among what he sees as one people living in two States. In his view, that was the first step towards finding a mutually agreed solution to the disputed border areas and Abyei. In that spirit, President Kiir and Prime Minister Hamdok discussed border crossing points and agreed that the opening of six corridors would be considered soon. The list of pending issues between Khartoum and Juba is long, as most of the commitments signed in 2012 have yet to be implemented.

    2019-10-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8644 (2019) · source

  3. In another expression of the involvement of the Sudan and South Sudan in each other's peace processes, General Hemetti's September visit also allowed South Sudan's First Vice-President designate, Riek Machar, to travel to Juba for a long-awaited face-to-face meeting with President Kiir. That was repeated on 19 October, when the Government of the Sudan again facilitated Mr. Machar's travel to Juba for a meeting with President Kiir and the Security Council delegation. Prime Minister Hamdok's visit to Juba in September, his first visit outside of the Sudan after his nomination, was devoted to bilateral relations. Discussions between he and President Kiir focused on the peace processes in both countries, trade, oil, border issues and the free movement of people. In July, the two sides discussed technical and financial issues relating to oil.

    2019-10-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8644 (2019) · source

  4. On 21 October, the Sovereign Council signed an initial agreement renewing the cessation of hostilities and opening humanitarian access from within and outside the Sudan to areas held by armed groups. That marks significant progress, as previous peace negotiations between the parties had consistently stumbled on the issue of humanitarian access roads to those areas. Talks between the Council and the SPLM-North and Abdul Aziz Al-Hilu to reach a similar agreement have so far been fruitless. However, both parties have committed to continuing negotiations in November, when the next phase of talks is expected to resume. The next round of negotiations is expected to focus, among other things, on a permanent ceasefire, the delivery of humanitarian assistance, the opening of political space and the return of refugees.

    2019-10-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8644 (2019) · source

  5. With those agreements in hand, General Hemetti also engaged with SPLM-N leader Abdul Aziz Al-Hilu, who made a gesture of good faith by renewing the SPLM- North unilateral ceasefire for another three months and expressing his readiness to join future rounds of negotiation in Juba. So far, the Sudanese opposition appears comfortable with President Kiir facilitating the negotiations with Khartoum. Nevertheless, several other countries have expressed an interest in hosting coming phases of the negotiations and some Sudanese stakeholders have asked that Juba consult with other neighbouring countries as they pursue their own mediation efforts. As agreed in the Juba Declaration, the Sudanese Government launched substantive talks with the Sudanese armed movements on 14 October, which are expected to continue until 14 December.

    2019-10-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8644 (2019) · source

  6. Both held meetings with Sudanese armed groups in Juba in addition to their formal calls on President Kiir. In the course ofAugust and September, Juba hosted talks with and between the armed movements from Darfur and the two areas. The talks resulted in the Darfuri armed groups, except the Sudan Liberation Army, led by Abdul Wahid Al-Nur, and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N), under Malik Agar, uniting under the new umbrella of the Sudanese Revolutionary Front. The South Sudanese mediation initiative culminated in the signing, on 11 September, of the Juba Declaration on Confidence-building Measures and preparations for negotiations between the Sudanese armed movements and the Sudanese Sovereign Council.

    2019-10-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8644 (2019) · source

  7. Eager to open a new chapter in relations and to secure peace across the Sudan, the new transitional leadership in Khartoum encouraged President Kiir Mayardit to intensify his mediation efforts between the Government in Khartoum and Sudanese armed groups. President Kiir readily accepted the invitation and has since dedicated considerable effort to advancing this noble cause. With this new partnership in place, the past five months have seen a flurry of high-level visits between Khartoum and Juba. In July, General Burhan and his deputy on the Transitional Military Council, General Mohamed Hamdam Dagalo, also known as Hemetti, visited Juba. Two months later, General Hemetti, this time as Deputy Chair of the Sovereign Council, and the new Prime Minister, Abdalla Hamdok, paid separate visits to South Sudan.

    2019-10-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8644 (2019) · source

  8. Mr. Onanga-Anyanga: I thank you, Sir, for this opportunity to brief the Security Council on progress in the implementation of resolution 2046 (2012) concerning outstanding bilateral issues between the Sudan and South Sudan and the conflict in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states. Before proceeding further, allow me to congratulate members of the Council upon their recent visit to the region. In our previous reports to the Council over the past year, we drew the Council's attention to the improved relationship between the Sudan and South Sudan. The change of Government in the Sudan earlier this year provided new impetus for this positive trend.

    2019-10-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8644 (2019) · source

  9. In closing, I wish to state that the political transition in the Sudan may offer an opportunity to redefine the relations between the centre and its peripheries in a way that puts an end to discrimination based on ethnicity, religion and territorial belonging. Building on the unilateral cessation of hostilities declared by both the Sudanese authorities and SPLM-North, and in close coordination with AUHIP, we will encourage the parties to engage on the resolution of the conflicts in the Sudan on the basis of a new political dispensation.

    2019-04-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8519 (2019) · source

  10. That means that three key contentious issues still need to be addressed by future negotiations between SPLM-North and the new Sudanese authorities, including on whether SPLM- North can claim the right to self-determination in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states, the extent to which the application of Islamic law can be suspended in those areas, and the possibility for SPLM-North to keep its armed forces in a post-conflict setting. While the place of Islamic law in the Sudanese political system may be revisited in the ongoing political transition, the readiness of the new authorities in Khartoum to depart from the position of their predecessors regarding self- determination and the unity of the armed forces remains to be seen.

    2019-04-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8519 (2019) · source

  11. SPLM-North stated that it was not willing to engage Government officials on this issue unless Khartoum accepted its precondition to hold the constitutional dialogue outside the Sudan, a request that was rejected by the then Government of the Sudan. SPLM-North reiterated that a negotiation process on the two Areas should start with political talks followed by security arrangements and, finally, by a permanent ceasefire. The leader of SPLM-North is still claiming that the people represented by his organization are entitled to the terms of the comprehensive Peace Agreement negotiated for the South, a non-starter for the previous Government of the Sudan.

    2019-04-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8519 (2019) · source

  12. From 9 to 12 December, the AUHIP convened a meeting among the signatories of the 2016 road map agreement. While the AUHIP initially planned to discuss with the signatories the possible participation of the opposition parties in the constitution-drafting process and the elections expected to take place in 2020, this did not materialize. Three signatories to the road map - namely, the National Umma Party, the Justice and Equality Movement and the Sudan Liberation Movement-Minni Minnawi - insisted on the participation of non-signatories in the meeting, on the grounds that they represent the Sudan Call alliance rather than their respective organizations. The SPLM-North delegation refused to meet with the Government of the Sudan to discuss the Movement's possible participation in the constitutional dialogue.

    2019-04-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8519 (2019) · source

  13. Immediately after the ouster of President Bashir, the Transitional Military Council declared an indefinite unilateral ceasefire across all of the Sudan, which was reciprocated by the SPLM-North in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states until 31 July. The Transitional Military Council also called on armed groups to join the political transition. The signatories to the Declaration of Freedom and Change, which include the political forces behind the protest movement, have stressed that the resolution of conflicts in the Sudan should be a priority of the transitional Government once it is established. In the reporting period, despite the AUHIP's efforts, there has been no progress on the resolution of the conflict in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states.

    2019-04-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8519 (2019) · source

  14. In the next few weeks, I intend to encourage the authorities in Khartoum and Juba to build on the gains achieved and take a fresh look at the Abyei issue, with a focus on the implementation of temporary arrangements for the administration of Abyei and engagement on its final status. Let me now turn to the conflict in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states and the process led by the African Union High-level Implementation Panel (AUHIP). While the SPLM-North issued, in December 2018, a statement supporting the protest movement, its leadership remains cautious about the military takeover and what it perceives as a Khartoum-centric process. Yet the political transition in the Sudan may offer an opportunity to build new institutions that are better equipped to address the root causes of the Sudanese conflicts.

    2019-04-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8519 (2019) · source

  15. South Sudan's petroleum Minister announced that the upheavals in the Sudan had not affected his country's oil sector. The Sudan and South Sudan have continued to engage on bilateral security issues, though with little substantive progress to report. This is reflected in the progress on the final status of Abyei. Both countries have, rather, focused on other bilateral issues they consider more pressing. We have a de facto status quo situation. In the absence of a joint Administration and the lack of progress on Abyei's final status, the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) remains central to the prevention and resolution of intercommunal conflicts and the reduction of tensions over Abyei.

    2019-04-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8519 (2019) · source

  16. The Sudan should continue to provide support for the implementation of the revitalized Peace Agreement, and South Sudan should continue to play a constructive role in the resolution of the conflicts in the Sudan. The notable mutual gains achieved in the reporting period include the intensification of bilateral cooperation in the oil sector after the Sudan helped South Sudan to resume oil production in its southern oilfields in the greater Upper Nile region. This has resulted in increased oil production. In the same vein, the two countries have agreed on the Sudan assisting South Sudan in resuming oil production in the northern oilfields of the same region. Production, which is expected to come onstream at the end of April, is projected to ensure an additional 70,000 barrels per day.

    2019-04-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8519 (2019) · source

  17. Since then, Juba has hosted meetings of the SPLM-North, initially to help unify the different factions of the movement. Following the outbreak of unrest in the Sudan last December, talks between the factions were suspended and no date has been set for their resumption. With the ouster of President Al-Bashir, there is concern that the absence of one of the principal guarantors of the revitalized peace agreement on South Sudan may have a negative impact on its implementation. There also seem to be concerns that the peace efforts in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states may be affected. Taking into consideration these concerns, both countries should be encouraged to stay the course.

    2019-04-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8519 (2019) · source

  18. The current situation in the Sudan does not preclude a consolidation of the recent improvement of bilateral relations between the Sudan and South Sudan. However, the new authorities in the Sudan may need some time to resume active engagement in such bilateral relations, including concerning the border, the Two Areas and Abyei. The gains in the relations between the Sudan and South Sudan should not be lost. During the reporting period, those gains were enabled notably by the Government of the Sudan in facilitating the signing and subsequent implementation of the Revitalized Agreement in South Sudan in September 2018. In return, President Kiir accepted President Al-Bashir's request to assist in the resolution ofthe conflict between the Government of the Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-North).

    2019-04-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8519 (2019) · source

  19. (Spoke in English) Both the Sudan and South Sudan are at a crossroads, with critical political processes under way. They face the challenges surrounding the effective implementation of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan and the uncertainties of the delicate political transformations occurring in the Sudan. Indeed, since the briefing by my predecessor in October 2018, the Sudan has witnessed dramatic changes following the demonstrations that started in December 2018. The protests culminated in the removal of President Al-Bashir on 11 April. The Sudan is now reflecting, as the Sudanese stakeholders still need to agree on transitional and institutional arrangements.

    2019-04-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8519 (2019) · source

  20. Allow me to congratulate you, Sir, on your excellent presidency of the Council during the month of April. I would like to thank you for the opportunity to brief the Security Council, for the first time, on the implementation of resolution 2046 (2012), on the outstanding issues between South Sudan and the Sudan, on the one hand, and in the states of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile, on the other hand. I would like to begin by thanking the national authorities and representatives of the States in the Horn of Africa for their warm welcome. I am also grateful to the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, with whom I intend to continue the strategic partnership between our two institutions with the full support of the Security Council and all stakeholders in the region, particularly the Gulf and Red Sea States.

    2019-04-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8519 (2019) · source

  21. The unified political support of the Council, the countries of the region and the international community will remain critical to the successful implementation of the 6 February peace agreement. Never before has the support of the international community and the region been so vital for the Government and the people of the Central African Republic. I have no doubt that, as they do their part, taking full ownership of the peace process, they can continue to count on the Security Council's unflagging backing.

    2019-02-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8467 (2019) · source

  22. Too many peacekeepers have paid the ultimate sacrifice for peace to begin to take root in the Central African Republic. These peacekeepers gave their lives to help assist, protect and comfort the Central African people and support the country's young democratic institutions when they were under threat. Let us not doubt the value of their sacrifice, the criticality of our presence or the value of our contribution. Today, as the shadow of violence begins to lift, the people of the Central African Republic are growing more confident in their ability to bend the arc of their volatile history in a new direction. By turning their grievances into a powerful transformative force, they have new reason to hope for a brighter future.

    2019-02-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8467 (2019) · source

  23. I welcome the joint initiative of the United Nations and the African Union to hold a meeting of the International Support Group on the Central African Republic as soon as tomorrow, because time is running out and we will have to remain engaged and to act quickly and in a concerted manner. Finally, our faith remains strong that the Council will provide the necessary political support for the agreement and continue to support both the Government and democratic institutions of the Central African Republic and the work of MINUSCA, in particular its new Head, my successor, Mr. Mankeur Ndiaye, whom I fraternally greet and wish every success in his noble mission. (spoke in English) Allow me to conclude with a few words to commemorate our fallen heroes.

    2019-02-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8467 (2019) · source

  24. In that regard, the recent visit to Bangui by the Chair of the Central African Republic configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission, Ambassador Omar Hilale, accompanied by Assistant Secretary- General Bintou Keita and Under-Secretary-General Oscar Fernandez-Taranco, was most timely. I thank them very much and have no doubt that the analyses and recommendations they will make will be a major contribution to the indispensable effort to realign the targeted assistance that will be needed urgently to facilitate the implementation of the agreement and, more broadly, accelerate the recovery of the country through the realization of its strategic plan, the National Strategy for Recovery and Peace Consolidation.

    2019-02-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8467 (2019) · source

  25. I urge the parties to always favour dialogue in order to sustain the new political and social consensus promoted by the 6 February agreement. It will also be incumbent on the parties to promote national ownership of the peace accord through strategic communications to raise awareness of the content and scope of that important agreement, because what is at stake is the future of the entire Central African nation, which is entitled to believe that the agreement heralds the dawn ofa new era. The role of the guarantors, especially the neighbouring countries and the region, and that of the facilitators will be decisive for the full realization of the agreement. The support of all partners will be equally essential.

    2019-02-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8467 (2019) · source

  26. I solemnly appeal to all parties to scrupulously honour all the commitments made under the agreement. I urge them not to betray their word and the trust placed in them by the Central African people and all those who supported them in the peace process. Less than two years before the next elections, whose organization will require substantial support to consolidate the entrenchment of democracy, the country has a real opportunity to turn its back on its painful history once and for all. I express the hope that, faced with differences that are inevitable in the process of implementing any peace agreement, the highest interests of the Central African people and their legitimate aspiration to live in peace will always be safeguarded in order to guarantee strict compliance with the agreement.

    2019-02-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8467 (2019) · source

  27. While we rightly welcome the fact that our multifaceted efforts have allowed this important political advance in the Central African Republic, we must remain clear-eyed and vigilant because the situation is still serious. The unbearable situation of displaced people and refugees - a reflection of the precarious humanitarian situation - the scenes of senseless violence and the numerous victims remind us painfully of that fact. All of us know - the Central Africans surely better than anyone - that through the signing of the agreement the country has taken just one step. It is a necessary and decisive step, certainly, but only one step. The hardest remains indeed to come. The real test will be in the full and good faith implementation of the agreement.

    2019-02-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8467 (2019) · source

  28. It was a great privilege for my team and me to contribute, alongside them, to the success of the dialogue among Central Africans. I would also like to acknowledge the role of the countries of the region, which, in the framework of the panel of facilitators of the African Initiative for Peace and Reconciliation - to whom I pay a well-deserved tribute - have made an important contribution to the preparatory phase of the dialogue. Lastly, let me commend the contribution of the Government and the people of the Sudan for their investment and the generous welcome they offered to all participants. My thanks also go to all the other partners, near and far, who played a discrete but decisive role towards the successful conclusion of the peace talks.

    2019-02-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8467 (2019) · source

  29. This success, however, is also the culmination of a long process led by the African Initiative for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic and supported by the United Nations. In that regard, I commend the commitment of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, Mr. Moussa Faki Mahamat, to the cause of peace in Africa and in the Central African Republic in particular. I reiterate my gratitude and congratulations to the African Union Commissioner Peace and Security, Ambassador Smai'l Chergui - who is here with us today - for having deftly and resolutely facilitated the Khartoum dialogue, in close collaboration with the Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations, Jean- Pierre Lacroix, testifying to the fruitful and fruitful strategic partnership between the African Union and the United Nations.

    2019-02-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8467 (2019) · source

  30. Importantly, the 6 February agreement reinforces the Secretary-General's vision of the primacy of politics that must underpin any peace operation. In that spirit, the 6 February agreement clearly expresses the desire of Central Africans to renew their social contract, to reaffirm their deep desire to live together and in peace in their rich diversity, to ease tensions and to create the conditions for their country's recovery on more solid bases - a country where the use of violence as an instrument of conquest or the preservation of power will be banned forever. Thus, the success of the 6 February political accord is first and foremost the expression of a deep desire of the Central African nation to regain control of its destiny in equity, justice and reconciliation and with due compensation to the victims.

    2019-02-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8467 (2019) · source

  31. Secondly, the Central African Government and the armed groups - the signatory parties - have, by undertaking concrete commitments, called on their fellow citizens, the region and the world to bear witness. In addition, the implementation ofthese commitments will be supervised by a certain number of inclusive monitoring mechanisms involving all forces in the country, including civil society, political parties, parliamentarians, women's organizations and young people, as well as representatives of religious denominations. Their deliberations will focus on security, political and legal issues at the national, prefectural and local levels. Presidential decrees establishing these mechanisms have already been published. The agreement also reflects the African Union's commitment to silencing the guns on the African continent.

    2019-02-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8467 (2019) · source

  32. Those multifaceted, joint efforts of the Government, MINUSCA and all partners in the Central African Republic have paved the way for a gradual return to a certain normalcy. The Government and the people of the Central African Republic, thanks to the commitment of President Touadera, signed on 6 February a peace agreement that, with the tireless support ofthe Security Council, could mark a turning point in the history of the country. although the dangers remain numerous. I stress that the agreement differs in several respects from the previous agreements signed in the Central African Republic. First, it reaffirms from the outset the commitment of the signatory parties to fundamental principles, especially those derived from the country's Constitution, and it was sought and signed by a legitimate Government.

    2019-02-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8467 (2019) · source

  33. After a difficult transition that was crowned by the return to constitutional order, new legitimate and democratic institutions have been in place since 30 March 2016. Together we have patiently contributed day after day to creating the conditions for the gradual strengthening of State authority, facilitated the launching of the national disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme and supported security sector reform through support for the administration of justice, the fight against impunity and the progressive deployment of State security agents in the 16 prefectures, and defence and internal security forces. At the local level, peace and reconciliation agreements have helped to reduce the level of violence, while territorial integrity and republican institutions have been preserved and strengthened at the national level.

    2019-02-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8467 (2019) · source

  34. Divided parties came to Khartoum from all corners of the Central African Republic on 21 and 22 January for negotiations that promised to be difficult; the sons and daughters of that country, torn by years of fratricidal conflicts, came together on 6 February, two weeks later, to sign in Bangui the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic, marking their determination to collectively meet the challenges of their common destiny. The path that Central Africans have taken, not only during the Khartoum talks but at greater length over the past five years, thanks to the invaluable support of the Security Council, was not easy. The signing on 6 February of the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation was the culmination of a long process.

    2019-02-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8467 (2019) · source

  35. Before the Council is the report ofthe Secretary-General on the situation in the Central African Republic (S/2019/147), which I have the privilege to introduce today for the last time in my capacity as Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Central African Republic. I would like at the outset to express my deep gratitude to Secretary-General Antonio Guterres for the confidence he has placed in me, and to all the members of the Security Council for their invaluable support throughout my tenure at the head of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA). I come here today with mixed feelings - the optimism and satisfaction of a duty accomplished mixed with a certain apprehension.

    2019-02-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8467 (2019) · source

  36. Nonetheless, the steps we have collectively taken so far to help stabilize the country give hope for the future. While the current situation remains unpredictable and precarious, I believe that the progress that has been achieved in various areas and the foundations that have been laid are essential ingredients that can help bring about sustainable peace in the Central African Republic. We must redouble our efforts to ensure that the remaining challenges are addressed fully and in a timely manner. We must do everything possible to ensure that the peace process succeeds. We owe it to the people ofthe Central African Republic, who have suffered far too long.

    2018-10-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8378 (2018) · source

  37. To that end, we must help authorities develop an integrated transitional justice strategy that responds to the needs and expectations of communities that have deeply suffered as a result of the conflict. Finally, the Mission must redouble its efforts to enable the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the 2.9 million people currently in need of assistance and protection, more than half of whom are children. Achieving that objective and improving the overall implementation of the mandate will greatly depend on the Council's decision to enhance the force's mobility and flexibility so as to allow us to overcome the prevailing operational and logistical challenges. The people of the Central African Republic are aware that the road ahead will be difficult.

    2018-10-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8378 (2018) · source

  38. The upcoming elections represent an important opportunity in this regard and for building a culture of inclusion. I again request the Council's support in mandating the Mission to aid the Government through the election period, and request its advocacy among Member States to ensure that we have the resources to take on this task and succeed. Thirdly, we must continue to support the Government in the fight against impunity and the restoration of the rule of law through the operationalization of the Special Criminal Court and support for judicial actors and in the regions. We must also advance the national reconciliation programme, including by ensuring that the rights of victims are respected, in particular the rights of those hundreds of thousands of Central Africans who have been displaced by the conflict.

    2018-10-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8378 (2018) · source

  39. These forces have a multiplier effect on the communities in which they are deployed. Partners have already provided exemplary support to the security sector reform process, and this has yielded remarkable progress. However, short- and mid-term needs are significant, and we must sustain and even expand this support to enable the country to meet its ambitious yet vital security priorities. I seek the Council's support to ensure that MINUSCA will have the appropriate mandate and resources to take on this task and succeed, as requested by the Secretary- General in his letter to the Council in May (S/2018/463). Secondly, we must work hand in hand with the Central Africans to promote a culture of democracy, in which power is taken through the ballot box and not the bullet.

    2018-10-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8378 (2018) · source

  40. This includes helping the Government in the long term to regain control of mining sites from armed groups, as failure to resolve this issue will jeopardize the outcomes of any peace agreement. That also includes helping the State to rebuild and strengthen its key institutions, particularly its national security apparatus, so that it can better protect the country, its people and democratic institutions. Working closely with partners, the Mission must expand its support to the re-operationalization of national defence and security forces, in close coordination with the European Union Military Training Mission in the Central African Republic, the European Union delegation in the Central African Republic, and other bilateral partners, such as France, Russia and the United States.

    2018-10-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8378 (2018) · source

  41. Finally, if the peace process is to succeed, it will require the unified political support of the members of the Council, the countries of the region and the international community at large. We must have a shared vision and ensure that our engagements with the Central African Republic are both well coordinated and coherent. The success ofthe peace process, though necessary, will not be sufficient on its own. If the outcomes are to be sustainable and if transformation is to take hold, MINUSCA should also support the Central African Republic in a number of critical areas. First, we must strengthen the rule of law and eliminate ungoverned spaces in the country.

    2018-10-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8378 (2018) · source

  42. Although the agreed dialogue framework does not allow for the direct participation of civil society actors, it will be critical to find innovative ways to ensure that the voices of the people are heard, especially those of women and youth. Their engagement in the follow-up mechanism will also be essential moving forward. Thirdly, we must put in place security conditions conducive to the dialogue and the enforcement of its outcomes. Our engagement must be backed by credible, effective and sustained pressure, including military, when and where needed. I therefore ask for the support of the Council in ensuring that deployed troops are properly trained and equipped to meet this task and the challenging operational environment we are facing daily.

    2018-10-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8378 (2018) · source

  43. We in the international community must work with the Government of the Central African Republic to ensure that this peace process is people-centred and does not fail. We must be patient, we must be realistic and we must put in place the critical conditions that will give the African Initiative the greatest chance to succeed. First, we must ensure that the parties enter into negotiations in good faith and with a true commitment to the dialogue and its outcomes. This means that parties must be willing to make some challenging compromises, which will require vision and leadership on the part of all. It will also require an inclusive follow- up mechanism to ensure that parties adhere to and fully implement the agreement reached. Secondly, the peace agreement must have the buy- in of the Central African people.

    2018-10-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8378 (2018) · source

  44. I am pleased to inform the Council that, as a follow- up to the conclusions of the high-level ministerial meeting on the Central African Republic, held in New York on 27 September, I have been participating in the African Initiative panel of facilitators as a full member. In this new capacity, I have held a series of strategic meetings and consultations within the panel and with the Government in preparation for the launch of the dialogue between the Government and the armed groups. The Mission is henceforth strengthening its substantive and mediation support to the Initiative. The path towards peace and reconciliation will not be an easy one, as demonstrated by the many peace processes that have come before in the Central African Republic, and faltered.

    2018-10-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8378 (2018) · source

  45. Together with the Central Africans, we must now help move the country from a phase of containment to one of transformation, in which the dividends of peace can be felt by all communities and all citizens. The recommendations of the independent comprehensive review led by Mr. Juan Gabriel Valdes, endorsed by the Secretary-General and recently presented to the troop- and police-contributing countries by Under-Secretary-General Lacroix, identify some critical next steps for the Mission. In the context of mandate renewal, helping the African Initiative to succeed must indeed be the Mission's main focus.

    2018-10-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8378 (2018) · source

  46. MINUSCA, the United Nations country team, the European Union, the World Bank, France and other partners are collaborating with the Government in the planning and implementation of projects under the Plan, which will strengthen peace, security and reconciliation, basic services, infrastructure and economic development. Other key bilateral partners, such as China and the United States, are also making necessary investments in the aforementioned areas. (spoke in English) This progress that we have made together makes me hopeful that we have laid the foundations needed to build sustainable peace. Like the foundations of a house, they yield no dividends on their own, but a house without foundations will certainly collapse.

    2018-10-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8378 (2018) · source

  47. Most importantly, a peace process has been seriously initiated under the auspices of the African Initiative for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic, which is the sole basis for peace and reconciliation in the Central African Republic. My friend and brother, the Special Representative of the President of the African Union Commission, Moussa Nebie, and Chair of the panel of facilitators, will speak of that shortly. Beyond the work of MINUSCA, the country has made progress in implementing the National Recovery and Peacebuilding Plan, with the support of the Mission and partners. I am pleased to announce that the rate of fundamental distribution has increased since the beginning of the year and that nearly half of the $2.2 billion pledged by donors has been disbursed.

    2018-10-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8378 (2018) · source

  48. The national security and defence forces have also been deployed, and the justice and reconciliation processes are beginning to take shape. I am pleased to inform the Council that yesterday, 22 October, the inaugural session of the Special Criminal Court was held. That is an important step in the country's commitment against impunity. In the area of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, half a dozen armed groups have committed to participate in the national programme and the Government will begin the disarmament of some of these groups in the west of the country before the end of the year.

    2018-10-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8378 (2018) · source

  49. Thanks to the hard work of the United Nations and the international community in support of the Government of the Central African Republic, the overall security situation has been brought under control, democratic elections have been held, and the country has returned to constitutional order. State authority is being restored in Bangui and beyond. The Mission prevents atrocities on a daily basis and continues to preserve the territorial integrity of the State. Security has considerably improved in several prefectures, thanks, in particular, to support stemming from local peace agreements. The prefects and sub-prefects have been redeployed throughout the country, as have civil servants from the Ministries of Education, Health, Agriculture and Livestock, Water, and Public Health.

    2018-10-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8378 (2018) · source

  50. 1 would like to express my deep gratitude to the troops for their work in the service of peacekeeping, and we pay a solemn and heartfelt tribute to those who have sacrificed their lives. Clearly, our work is not yet done. The country still faces many challenges. The drivers of the conflict remain, and attacks on civilians persist, leading to massive population displacements. Half of the country continues to need humanitarian assistance, and the provision of such assistance is becoming increasingly difficult, due in part to violent attacks against peacekeepers and humanitarian workers. The State is not in a position to overcome these challenges on its own. Nevertheless, although the crisis persists, there is reason for hope.

    2018-10-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8378 (2018) · source