YouSaid · the spoken record

Oñate-Laborde

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24

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2023-02-07

most recent

2023-02-07

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1

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un-security-council

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1. “Finally, I would say that the IIT must once again conclude that the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic is the responsibility solely of the armed forces of the Syrian Arab Republic. Finally, I wish to express my most sincere condolences to the victims of the earthquake in the Syrian Arab Republic and in Türkiye.”

   2023-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9255 (2023) · source

2. “The IIT further assessed that several of the fatalities were exposed to chlorine while seeking to escape from the shelter in the basement to upper floors. At location 4, the absence of severe symptoms and fatalities, compared to those at location 2 and in the surrounding area, can be explained by the fact that the relevant building was not inhabited at the time, and that the bulb of the cylinder found at location 4 did not rupture, unlike the one at location 2. I rely on my report, which was distributed to the Security Council. I am sure that those who are interested will find in it the answers to what happened. I would like to conclude by thanking you, Madam President, and those who were willing to listen to this report.”

   2023-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9255 (2023) · source

3. “The IIT obtained and reviewed two sets of data and visual representations of the gas-dispersion modelling independently elaborated based on several parameters, including locations of the crater, prevailing weather conditions, as well as variations in the filling capacity of the cylinder and of the dispersion rate of the gas. The two independent gas dispersion models considered by the IIT indicate that the accounts of the witnesses on the rapidity at which the symptoms began are indeed reliable, and that those persons were affected by chlorine gas used as a weapon in particular. Those who died in the building at location 2 did so because of exposure to the chlorine gas released rapidly from the rooftop.”

   2023-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9255 (2023) · source

4. “The IIT consulted several specialists and requested an independent toxicologist not involved in previous assessments of the incident to make their own evaluation of the reported symptoms. The IIT provided the expert with anonymized accounts and data from 55 individuals interviewed by either the FFM or the IIT, including affected persons and others who were present at the scene or otherwise involved in the rescue operations in the hours after the incident. Furthermore, while the symptoms of the victims are consistent with chlorine exposure, the IIT considered it useful to assess possible chlorine-gas dispersion from the cylinder found at location 2, the one on the rooftop, where most fatalities were reported.”

   2023-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9255 (2023) · source

5. “It would have been extremely difficult, if not impossible, to mimic the spread of gas such as chlorine gas. Laborious staging operations would have had to be performed, according to a detailed plan, in order to produce the exact concentration gradient and pattern observed in the results at two different locations. Moreover, all that would have had to be done in the middle of combat. The IIT was therefore not able to identify any evidence, including from open-source information or from the Syrian Arab Republic or other State parties that would corroborate that any of the staging actions were performed at either location. In its analysis, the IIT also considered in detail the symptoms of the affected persons.”

   2023-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9255 (2023) · source

6. “For both occasions, the assessment of the analytical data of 17 samples reveals the presence of chlorine-gas markers, whose formation and specific position at both sites can be explained solely by the release of a high concentration of chlorine gas from the cylinders. Those allow the IIT to rule out the hypothesis that the incident may have been staged using household bleach products or pesticides or that no chemical event may have taken place at all. At the two sites, identical chemical fingerprints were identified in conifer wood present in the basement of location 2 and at the base of location 4 as a result of exposure to chlorine gas. Additionally, the staging scenario finds no support in the chemical data, considered in its totality, nor in the pattern of how the relative levels of the chlorinated chemicals are distributed.”

   2023-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9255 (2023) · source

7. “Then, in addition to assessing the analytical data supporting the FFM report, as relating to both locations, the IIT also undertook the analysis of two supplementary samples and electrical copper wire from location 2 and a piece of concrete collected by a third party at location 2 in Douma, on 8 April. For that item, the IIT was able to reconstruct the chain of custody between the date it was collected and the date it was first received and analysed by an OPCW-designated lab. In the light of the analytical results obtained and presented in detail in the report, the IIT has reasonable grounds to believe that chlorine gas was used at both relevant locations in Douma and that the cylinders were the origin of the chlorine gas released at both locations.”

   2023-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9255 (2023) · source

8. “It must be recalled that, during its visit to the sites, the FFM collected and obtained 49 samples from location 2 and 20 samples from location 4, including dry and wet wipes of surfaces, concrete debris, wood, fabric, plastic material, paint flakes, metal and biomedical samples from victims. A subset of those samples were sent out for analysis to two OPCW-designated laboratories. Considering the FFM’s analytical findings, the IIT focused specifically on the anthropogenic subset of the identified chlorinated organic chemicals — that is to say, on chemicals that are not naturally present in the environment. The fact that there are no natural sources of those chlorinated chemicals means that their presence can be due only to chemical events involving reactive chlorine.”

   2023-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9255 (2023) · source

9. “After the investigation, the FFM was able to determine in its report that there were reasonable grounds that the use of a toxic chemical as a weapon took place on 7 April 2018 in Douma. The FFM further concluded that the toxic chemical contained reactive chlorine and was likely molecular chlorine. The FFM also assessed that it was possible that two yellow industrial cylinders found at the two sites of alleged use were the source of the substances containing reactive chlorine. The IIT undertook several steps to clarify and deepen its understanding of the findings of the FFM.”

   2023-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9255 (2023) · source

10. “On the evening of 7 April, as the barrage of large-scale conventional shelling continued, reports of a chemical attack on two locations in Douma started circulating in the media. Dozens of casualties were reported by medical staff on the ground. The IIT did not obtain any information indicating that military targets had been placed in proximity to either location. A few hours after the attack, on the morning of 8 April 2018, Jaysh Al-Islam negotiated its surrender with the Russian mediators. After the attack, Syrian forces, supported by Russian military police, regained control of Douma. The OPCW Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) was then allowed to visit the sites on 21 and 25 April.”

    2023-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9255 (2023) · source

11. “The temporary suspension of air operations coincided with negotiations taking place between Jaysh Al-Islam and representatives of the Syrian Arab Republic, mediated by a representative of the Russian Ministry of Defence. Negotiations continued through early April, yielding no results. Simultaneously, on 28 March, pro-Government media reported that the Syrian forces were mobilizing around Douma and preparing a major assault should the negotiations with the Jaysh Al-Islam fail. As of that day, according to United Nations sources, 70,000 people remained besieged in the enclave. On 6 April, negotiations between Jaysh Al-Islam and the Russian Federation broke down. Amid reports of shelling on Damascus suburbs from the Jaysh Al-Islam position, intense air strikes on Douma resumed after a 10-day break.”

    2023-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9255 (2023) · source

12. “According to the information obtained, on 13 February 2018, the Tiger Forces began to arrive in the opposition-controlled enclave of eastern Ghouta, which had been besieged by the Armed Forces of the Syrian Arab Republic since April 2013 in what has been described as one of the longest sieges in modern history. The Tiger Forces’ deployment to the area was corroborated through images and videos posted on accounts linked to both the Syrian Arab Army and to the Tiger Forces. On 18 February, Syrian Arab Republic forces, alongside the Tiger Forces and other Syrian and foreign militias supported by Russian Federation forces, launched a full-scale air and ground assault to recapture eastern Ghouta. Aircraft activity originating from Dumayr airbase continued until 23 March, followed by a 10-day lull.”

    2023-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9255 (2023) · source

13. “In order to explore those two scenarios and assess their validity, the IIT considered the views of the Syrian Arab Republic and the Russian Federation, both of which stated that the incident had been staged by terrorist armed groups with the support of Western States in order to forge accusations against the Syrian army. In its report, the IIT started by examining the general situation in eastern Ghouta at the time of the incident. Regarding the military activities in Douma in early 2018, and with respect to the offensive referred to as Operation Damascus Steel, the IIT made its assessment based on accounts by witnesses and experts, flight observation data, satellite imagery and open source information, as well as through consultations with several external entities and experts.”

    2023-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9255 (2023) · source

14. “On 15 February 2022, the permanent representation of the Russian Federation responded via note verbale to the Technical Secretariat, reiterating its determination that decision C-SS-4/DEC.3 had been adopted ultra vires and that paragraph 7 of article VII of the Convention was therefore not applicable to any activities carried out by the Technical Secretariat in connection with the decision. No further elaborations or supporting evidence were provided. In preparing its investigations, the IIT built up a plan. In that plan, it considered various hypotheses as to how the incident might have occurred before proceeding to develop concrete scenarios based on the information available. There were two scenarios — one was that the incident was staged, and the other was that it involved the use of barrel bombs dropped from above.”

    2023-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9255 (2023) · source

15. “The information presented by the Russian Federation in notes verbales to the Technical Secretariat and other official communications and statements — for example, to the Security Council, the OPCW Executive Council and the OPCW Conference of States Parties — was also taken into account by the IIT in the course of its investigation. On 28 January 2022, the Technical Secretariat addressed a note verbale to the permanent representation of the Russian Federation to the OPCW, requesting any concrete information that would potentially be relevant in establishing the origin of the chemical weapons used in Douma on 7 April 2018 or useful in identifying the perpetrators, including information related to actors that might have had the capabilities to develop such weapons.”

    2023-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9255 (2023) · source

16. “Of course, despite the lack of engagement, the ITT did not draw any inferences from that lack of cooperation for the purposes of its substantive conclusions. The IIT took specific note of positions previously expressed by the Syrian Arab Republic on the incident in Douma, including information submitted in some of its notes verbales to the Technical Secretariat in 2018 in the aftermath of the incident, in 2019 and in 2021. The information presented by the Syrian Arab Republic was therefore considered by the IIT when analysing possible scenarios concerning the use of chemical weapons in Douma on 7 April 2018. That information and its validity are discussed in various sections of the report. The IIT also took into due consideration the position expressed at several stages by the Russian Federation on the incident in Douma.”

    2023-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9255 (2023) · source

17. “Recognizing the role that the information from the Syrian Arab Republic could also play, the IIT engaged in several good-faith attempts to allow the Syrian Arab Republic to discharge its obligations, under paragraph 7 of article VII of the Chemical Weapons Convention and pursuant to Security Council resolution 2118 (2013), to cooperate fully with the OPCW Technical Secretariat by providing information to the IIT. The IIT made extraordinary efforts to allow the authorities of the Syrian Arab Republic to discharge its obligations to cooperate and provide information and any other input it deemed relevant to the IIT’s work. The Syrian Arab Republic decided not to reply to the Technical Secretariat’s request.”

    2023-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9255 (2023) · source

18. “Regarding the States parties, the IIT expected them to provide access to relevant information and locations, consistent with paragraph 7 of article VII of the Convention — nothing more, nothing less. In the past few months the IIT held several bilateral meetings with States parties and other entities. It reviewed more than 19,000 files, amounting to more than 1.86 terabytes; obtained and assessed statements from 66 witnesses, five of them women; requested and obtained analysis results and additional data for 70 samples related to the investigation; and engaged in consultations with 10 different experts.”

    2023-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9255 (2023) · source

19. “In carrying out those activities, the IIT relied on the same methods and procedures it had applied during the investigations described in its previous reports, including with regard to obtaining and securing information, its information and case management systems and the degree of certainty applied to the identification of perpetrators. As with some previous investigations, the collection of information in respect of the Douma incident involved reaching out to States parties, international and non-governmental organizations and individuals, as well as several internationally reputable forensic institutes, experts and other relevant entities. Since the IIT is not judicially empowered to compel the submission of information and materials, it relied once again on the voluntary cooperation of all States parties.”

    2023-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9255 (2023) · source

20. “It assessed statements previously provided by witnesses and conducted interviews itself with persons of interest. It obtained videos, documents and other materials from various sources. It requested analytical data underlying the FFM report, including data mining for specific chemicals from OPCW-designated laboratories, as well as new analysis and technical assessments from a number of forensic institutes and specialists. It also requested and analysed satellite imagery, collected information from open sources and consulted with several experts.”

    2023-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9255 (2023) · source

21. “The second cylinder hit the roof of a three-storey residential building, at the time uninhabited, and is the one referred to as location 4 in the report. It broke into the apartment below. The cylinder ruptured only partially and started to slowly release chlorine, mildly affecting those who first arrived at the scene. The conclusions reached by the IIT are based on the degree of certainty of reasonable grounds to believe, which is the standard of proof consistently adopted by international fact-finding bodies and commissions of inquiry. In particular, the IIT conducted the following activities. It analysed information received from the Fact-Finding Mission (FFM). It requested information from the States parties, including the Syrian Arab Republic, and upon receipt, reviewed that information.”

    2023-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9255 (2023) · source

22. “on 7 April 2018, during a major military offensive aimed at regaining control of the city of Douma, at least one Mi-8 or Mi-17 helicopter of the Syrian Arab Air Force, departing from the Dumayr airbase and operating under the control of the Tiger Forces, dropped two yellow cylinders, which hit two residential buildings in the central area of the city. One cylinder hit the rooftop floor of a three-storey residential building, the one referred to in the report as location 2, without fully penetrating the roof. It ruptured and rapidly released toxic gas — chlorine — in very high concentrations, which rapidly dispersed within the building, killing 43 named individuals, among them nine young boys and 10 young girls, and affecting dozens more.”

    2023-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9255 (2023) · source

23. “Those two essential activities in the fight against impunity belong to the policymaking organs of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and to judicial entities. In its third report, the IIT presents its findings on the investigation of one of the many incidents that have taken place in the Syrian Arab Republic related to the use of chemical weapons. We are dealing with the incident that took place in the town of Douma, in the vicinity of Damascus, on 7 April 2018. The incident was investigated and analysed by the IIT in the period between January 2021 and December 2022. On the basis of all of the information obtained, to which I will refer in a moment, and its analysis, the IIT concludes that there are reasonable grounds to believe that between 7.10 p.m. and 7.40 p.m.”

    2023-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9255 (2023) · source

24. “Mr. Oñate-Laborde: I thank the Security Council for this opportunity to present to it some key elements contained in the third report of the Investigation and Identification Team (IIT). I would like to start by mentioning that the mandate of the IIT is to establish the facts related to perpetrators of the use of chemical weapons by identifying all information that is potentially relevant to the origin of those weapons. It is important to keep in mind, as was mentioned by the Director-General, that the IIT is not a judicial body. It does not have the authority to assign individual criminal responsibility. The IIT also does not have the authority to make final findings of non-compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention.”

    2023-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9255 (2023) · source