YouSaid · the spoken record

Oumarou Namata Gazama

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15
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2021-05-18
most recent
2021-05-18
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1
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un-security-council

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  1. The goal is to successfully eliminate the scourges that now afflict our countries — plunging them into mourning and threatening international stability.

    2021-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/484 (2021) · source

  2. Efforts by the Joint Force have been quite successful in the area of military operations and relations with partners, so that today it appears to be an increasingly credible and genuine Sahelian force. However, challenges remain. As operations in the area of responsibility are constantly evolving, there is a clear need to continue the current dynamic of coordination and capacity-sharing. This is therefore an opportunity for me, if I may, to remind the Council that we must redouble efforts to mobilize material and financial resources, in accordance with the commitments made by the international community, towards the eventual establishment of the more permanent support we all hope and pray for.

    2021-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/484 (2021) · source

  3. In conclusion, with regard to the issue of overall support for the Joint Force, it is worth recalling that despite the various kinds of international support announced, whose implementation is often slow to materialize, the G-5 Sahel States continue to make considerable domestic sacrifices. It is therefore timely to recall the need to find a way to ensure a sustainable system of funding for the Joint Force. The most sustainable solution would be to establish a United Nations support office to provide logistical, operational, tactical and strategic support to the Joint Force. It would be funded by assessed and voluntary contributions alike. In short, it is clear that considerable progress has been made. The guidelines introduced have been designed to lead the Joint Force in a more realistic and pragmatic direction.

    2021-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/484 (2021) · source

  4. However, with regard to our capabilities, two points deserve special attention and it should also be recalled that the issue of sustainable funding remains a challenge. First, the Joint Force does not have its own air capability, despite the fact that the current counter-terrorism fight cannot be conducted effectively without that additional capability. Secondly, the other major shortcoming of the G-5 Sahel Joint Force is its intelligence system. Given those two capability challenges and until we are more autonomous, current imperative operational needs mean that, in addition to other important national efforts, we must continue working with operational partners present in the area. It must be stated that we remain very dependent on them.

    2021-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/484 (2021) · source

  5. Last but not least, there has been progress in the area of respect for human rights and the protection of civilians, first through the practical implementation of the standing operating procedures for internal investigations of the Joint Force of the G-5 Sahel and secondly through the establishment of the Civilian Casualties Identification, Tracking and Analysis Cell. With regard to respect for human rights and international humanitarian law, the Joint Force has advanced past the learning stage and is well established in the ownership stage. With regard to the major challenges before us, it should be noted that from a functional perspective, we can state categorically that we have reached a satisfactory position.

    2021-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/484 (2021) · source

  6. First, coordinated and/or joint operations with national and partner forces have been streamlined, which is a key part of our campaign plan. We have also met with genuine success in the areas of cooperation and coordination, at all levels. Furthermore, in addition to operational activities, we have been making progress for some time on several key fronts. The first relates to changes in posture and format, which is also a primary operational objective of our campaign plan. That objective is currently considered to be well under way. Another key achievement is the effective harmonization of activities and coordination among the various actors, which we have secured by streamlining coordinated and/or joint operations.

    2021-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/484 (2021) · source

  7. Support for equipment, services and infrastructure for the Joint Force is provided in two main ways — bilateral support provided through the national structures of the five G-5 Sahel countries and support provided directly to the Joint Force. The United States Africa Command also intervenes, very often indirectly, to assist the Joint Force with support for equipment and the provision of services. Lastly, Operation Barkhane provides purely operational support to the Joint Force of the G-5 Sahel, such as air support (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance overflights, air support, transport) and the supply of combat rations. The report of the Secretary-General (2021/442) mentions very little about the progress we have made.

    2021-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/484 (2021) · source

  8. In the area of training, the main partners of the Joint Force are the European Union (EU) Training Mission in Mali, the European Union Capacity Building Mission in the Sahel and the Human Rights and Protection Division of MINUSMA. Support for the implementation of the human rights compliance framework is provided by European Union funds, for which the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights is responsible through its office at MINUSMA. Operational logistical support is provided through a mechanism known as “additional support” based on EU funds, for which MINUSMA is responsible. Progress is being made on that front — albeit slowly — and improvement measures have been taken, in particular in line with the new provisions of resolution 2531 (2020). Such support is welcome but remains insufficient in many respects.

    2021-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/484 (2021) · source

  9. In addition to the hundreds of terrorists who have been neutralized and the disruption of much of their logistical capacity through the seizure or destruction of large quantities of materials, a further example of progress is represented by the 79 people arrested or captured in the period November 2020 to April 2021 and currently being brought to justice. That provides an idea of the considerable progress made in the area of operations. With regard to international partnership support, in addition to the national efforts made by our five member States international partnership support for the Joint Force of the G-5 Sahel covers several areas.

    2021-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/484 (2021) · source

  10. One of the main objectives of the plan is to harmonize the future operations of the Joint Force with the various efforts of the national armies and partner forces — Operation Barkhane and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). That campaign plan was also clearly aimed at changing the posture and format of the Joint Force to make it more pragmatic and effective so as to better address the deleterious security situation, in particular in the centre of the G-5 Sahel area. With regard to operations, from its inception to date the Joint Force of the G-5 Sahel has conducted 25 operations, including 11 major operations conducted from the end of 2019 to date that had very noteworthy results in the decontamination of our common space.

    2021-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/484 (2021) · source

  11. From January 2020 to date, the security situation has remained quite worrisome in view of the large number of very often violent incidents. In addition, it has been noted that intercommunal and inter-ethnic conflicts have worsened in some areas as they are often exploited by various armed groups. Turning to the operations conducted, it must be stated that after establishing the initial guidelines and the broad outlines of my operational agenda when I took office in August 2019, we set about planning and implementing operations in line with our mandate. We set guidelines on the basis of a campaign plan for the period August 2019 to August 2021.

    2021-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/484 (2021) · source

  12. Thirdly, on rare occasions, such support is also provided by Operation Barkhane, according to the provisions outlined in the reciprocal support protocol between the Joint Force and Operation Barkhane. As the Council can see, this is a complex support system, to say the least, and its sustainability remains fragile. It is a system in which the force command does not on its own provide support for its troops. It does not have full command over its units, only operational control. The Council knows, as we do, that eliminating terrorism is a long-term struggle that has put the world’s best armies to the test wherever intervention has been necessary. The situation in the Sahel, focused on and around Mali, with the numerous actors and stakeholders we all know, is a perfect illustration of that fact.

    2021-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/484 (2021) · source

  13. With an initial authorized strength of 5,000 personnel, the Joint Force has four multinational headquarters; seven battalions, each with a provost unit; and seven specialized investigation units, comprising the police component of the Joint Force. In addition, the eighth battalion of the Joint Force, from Chad, has just been deployed to the Centre Sector in the so-called tri-border area. Logistical and financial support are provided as follows. First, the G-5 Sahel countries are responsible for supporting the forces they make available to the G-5 Sahel Joint Force, through their national logistics chain. Secondly, additional logistical support is provided via the technical agreement between the G-5 Sahel, the United Nations and the European Commission.

    2021-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/484 (2021) · source

  14. However, several challenges remain to be met. To provide more information about the Joint Force, I propose to address the following points: first, the genesis and organization of the Joint Force; secondly, its work and recent progress to date; and thirdly, the road ahead and outstanding challenges. The Joint Force is one of the Sahelian structures of the common institution known as the G-5 Sahel, whose five members are Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, the Niger and Chad. The mandate of the Joint Force is given by the African Union Peace and Security Council, which is part of the African Peace and Security Architecture.

    2021-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/484 (2021) · source

  15. First of all, I would like to thank the Council for the honour of being invited to brief members on the current status of the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel (G-5 Sahel). The Joint Force was created in February 2017 to help meet the security challenges in the Sahel-Saharan strip. Over the past four years, the Joint Force has worked first on force generation and deployment and then gradually on operationalizing force capabilities, with international support, to complement the individual and collective efforts of the G-5 Sahel member States. Since year three, it has continued to work to increase its strength and operational experience. The Joint Force began its fourth mandate in November 2020 and has already made considerable progress, in particular in the areas of operations and partnerships.

    2021-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/484 (2021) · source