YouSaid · the spoken record

Owen

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17
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1992-11-13
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1992-11-13
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1
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un-security-council

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  1. “We would never have got a aegotiated no~fly agreement without President Bush being ready to enforce it, and perhaps the uncertainty about the new President-elect's position over the use of force in this region may give cause for thought to those who seem bent on continued aggression, To the sceptic - and it is not hard to be one, given the litany of broken pledges - the overriding question is how the international comnunity makes any of these fine words and principles stick in the absence of superior military force on the ground or in the air. Our answer as Co-Chairmen is, we know, an unspectacular one - but nevertheless it is a true one. The principles of the international community will stick through steady, persistent pressure applied day in end day out to any intransigent party that fails to negotiate constructively.”

    1992-11-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3134 (1992) · source

  2. “The Secretary-General has highlighted the case for preventive diplomacy. Belgrade will not accept a United Nations pesce-keeping deployment in Kosovo but in Skopje there is a readiness to contemplate such a deployment. It is also vital that we learn a lesson from Bosnia and Her -*qovina and not disavow the use of external force.”

    1992-11-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3134 (1992) · source

  3. “How could we expect countries from the former Soviet Union in such circunstances not to sell their surplus of sophisticated arms to the Yugoslav army in Belgrade? It would not be long before they then reached the Bosnian Serbs. So whiie I can respect - and do respect - the motivation of those who ecqua for the lifting of the embargo, I hope they will understand why 1 believe it would have a profoundly adverse effect on our chances of obtaining a cessation of hostilities and a constitutional settlement. This Councii must not ignore either the Gry tisdsr that iies around ia Kosovo, which could ignite at. any time and take the present conflict out of the confines of the former Yugoslavia and across international boundaries to Albania and through Macedonia to Bulgaria .ad beyond.”

    1992-11-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3134 (1992) · source

  4. “I have already admitted that sanctions are a blunt instrument, but al1 previous experience shows that prohibiting arms sales tends to dampen conflict while pushing erms sales deepens conflict. Quite apart 'rom the danger of feeding the flames, there is another and even more powerful argument against a selective lifting of the embargo. Any importation of heavy arms, the main source of a continuing imbalance, would require transshipment through Croatian roads and ports to Bosnia and Herzegovina. That would require at the very least the de facto lifting of the embargo on Croatia, It is impossible, for example, to believe that we could hold a no-fly ban while allowing arms tc be flown in for the Bosnia and Herzegovina Government forces.”

    1992-11-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3134 (1992) · source

  5. “But two factors cannot be ignored ~ the ethnic map of Bosnis and Herzegovina hefcre the forced cleansing began, and secondly, the need for the proviuces to be economically viabie if there is to be, as All the partiss accep Bighly decentralised form of goverument. I know that there are some in this Council, desperately worried about the ever-increasing loss of life, who are searching for more dramatic solutions. Some want massive outside military intervention, even though there is no sign of avy significant military Power being ready to act. Others argue for the lifting of the arms embargo from the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina cn the grounds it has an unfair impact on their predominantly Muslim fighting forces.”

    1992-11-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3134 (1992) · source

  6. “We have taken that risk with our eyes open. The parties to the cease-fire know, too, because of the publication of ouc draft Constitution, the political framework for a settlement on which we are working. It needs to be said quite clearly, here in the Security Council, that the present Bosnian Serb front line has to be rolled back and that there is no way in which the international comaunity can accept General Mladic's phitosophy that might is right and that what they have they hold. We must Gemilitarize Ssrajevo and free blockadsd towns, and do so urgently. There wiil be many different maps discussed between the parties in the weeks and months ahead. Painful compromises will no doubt have to be made in delineating the provinces of a new Bosnia and Herzegovina.”

    1992-11-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3134 (1992) · source

  7. “As winter begius to bire ther: can t> little Goubt that the scale of the horrendous human'tarian crisis thal ws face iu Bosnia an' Herzegovina will be considsrebly eased if there is >> cessation of hostilities. We could, for example, contemplate flying aid in directly to Banja Luka, Tusla and Cazin airfields - shortening the convoy route and building up stocks urgently before deep snows block or make the mountain roads unusable. Much will depend therefore on how local military leaders react. A series of meetings are now planned to agree on installing hot lines and making other arrangements to bolster the Sarajevo agreement. One such meeting is taking piace today in Mostar. Of course, a cease-fire has its political dangers. The Rosnian and Serb front-line, established by force, risks becoming frozen into de facto political boundaries.”

    1992-11-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3134 (1992) · source

  8. “Lest anyone think this is just pie-in-the-sky posturing it is worth pointing out that as yet none of the parties has sought to challesige these provisions. Sadly, for some, however, their silence Goss not isan acceptance or even acquiescence. As I speak today it is not clear yet whether the cease-fire, ne, stiated by military leaders in the sixth meeting of the Mixed Military Working Group in Sarajevo under United Nations chairmanship, 1s going to hold. Wirely, everyone is wary of engendering a nood of false optimism. *fter the rece.d of so many cease-fires collapsing, #<<@ can only hops ard uso any ill for intense negotiating in the knowledge tha' the military commnders ure alroady preparing their offensive pians.”

    1992-11-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3134 (1992) · source

  9. “It is vital that today's draft resolution, which blocks the gaping holes in the current oil embargo, whether on the Danube, the Romanian, Bulgarian and Macedonian border, or on the Montenegrin coast on the Adriatic where oil is coming in by tankers, be passed. A vital aspect of our constitutional proposals, for which there has been too little attention, is the powerful interlocking mechanisms for the reversal of ethnic cluansing. People who wish to return to their homes or land will be able to call on an ombudsman for help in negotiating with local authorities and, if need be, heip in going to court. Realistically, that process will take a decade and more to complete. Yet documents signed under duress taking away people's homes and land will become null and void.”

    1992-11-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3134 (1992) · source

  10. “Unfortunately, many of their leaders still appear to want a single geographical contiguous Bosnian Serbian province. They still espouse the objective of Greater Serbia. They want to link those parts of Croatia where the Serbs are in the majority with a Serb-controlled part of Bosnia, and in turn link this with the Republic of Serbia. It will not be easy to pressurize thas te ahaundan thie drese. The bey Iles, ante 4: elite, but in the hearts and miads of millious of decent Serbs who do not support either the methods or the philosophy of the political and military leaders who purport to speak in their name. Sanctions are a blunt instrument which hit the innocent often harder than the guilty. They are, however, the only peaceful weapon the world has.”

    1992-11-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3134 (1992) · source

  11. “It is easy to forget in all the publicity about the war in Bosnia and Hersegovina that of the 22,000 people in UNPROFOR nearly 15,000 are deployed in Croatia keeping an uneasy peace in the four United Nations protected areas. Our constitutional proposals for Bosnia and Herzegovina make clear there is not going to be a crude division of Bosnia and Herzegovina into three separate provinces, because such an arrangement would simply endorse ethnic cleansing, The Bosnian Muslims and the Bosnian Croats fully accept this, as they also accept the vast bulk of our constitutional proposals. The Sosrian Serbs initially gave a public impression that our Coustitution was totally unacceptable and that they were boycotting the Conference. This is not the case. They are participating and are putting forward counter proposals.”

    1992-11-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3134 (1992) · source

  12. “Our work as Co-Chairmen is made immeasurably easier because of the harmonious working relationships that wore established from dav one. If peace Gepenes on effort, then the immense activity all those associated with the Conference have generated ever the last 10 weeks deserves to be successful. We have brought the opposing parties together in a by and large constructive dialogue in two main areas - the politicians over the future Constitution and the military, cover a cessation of hostilities. We have also tried to bring closer together the politicians in Belgrade and Zagreb, well exemplified by the two meetings we have held together with President Cosic and President Tudjman.”

    1992-11-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3134 (1992) · source

  13. “It is evident also in that the European Community member States are providi ig over 11,000 of the personne] of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and in that our national contingents are covering their own costs. They work, however, under tho authority of the United Nations and are dependent on key United Nations personnel for ensuring an effective and integrated United Nations command. T would like to put on record my thanks, and that of the European Community, to the Secretary-General and, through him, to all those working for the United Nations in the former Yugoslavia, to the European Comnunity monitors and to the servers from the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), who risk their lives in probably the most difficult peace-keeping and humanitarian operaticn the United Nations has ever undertaken.”

    1992-11-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3134 (1992) · source

  14. “This joint effort by the European Community and the United Nations builds on the existing provision in Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter which provides for rwgional agencies to work in partnership with the Security Council. In this way the United Nations can harness the special commitments and concerns of a region. This is evident already in the considerable financial response of the European Community and its member States to the various appeals issued by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Children's Furd (UNICEF) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).”

    1992-11-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3134 (1992) · source

  15. “After the break-up of the Soviet Union, instead of moving towards a civilized, cultivated, democratic Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, our continent would become engulfed in endless fights over the many territorial claims and ethnic disputes that have still to be resolved. The Geneva process - a conference in continuous session, day and sometimes night, including weekends ~ started when Mr. Vance and I both flew into Geneva for the first Steering Committee meeting on 3 September. We were charged with forging tegether the European Community's previous Conference on Yugoslavia and the increasing activity of the United Nations and its apecialisse ageauciss in the former Yugoslavia. Henceforth neaceuak ine. peace-keeping and preventive diplomacy were to be run tegether.”

    1992-11-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3134 (1992) · source

  16. “The odious practice of "ethnic cleansing" that we are witnessing in tha former Yugoslavia ig not something therefore which any European can ignore, merely passing by on the other side. a Europe knows that, were this flagrant "ethnic cleansing" to be tolerated, were ali its perpetrators to be allowed to escape without being brought to justice, and were ite victims not to be helped to return to their homes and land, then we Europeans would pay a terrible price, The Islamic world, rightly, would accuse us of racism against the Hosnian Muslims and hold it against us for centuries to come.”

    1992-11-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3134 (1992) · source

  17. “Lord OWEN: It is a great pleasure to be back, speaking to the Council after an absence of over 13 years, particularly since I am sitiving next to the representative of Zimbabwe, a country whose independence I used to champion in this very Council Chamber. Mot for the first or the last time, I completely agree with every word that has just been spoken by Cyrus Vance. The fundamental question for us is: How can we as Co-Chairmen and you as menbers of the Council implement the principles and objectives agreed at the London Conference at the end of August? European history is, sadly. no stranger to conflict or to ethnic disputes. Memories of the Holocaust are still with us.”

    1992-11-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3134 (1992) · source