YouSaid · the spoken record

Pahad

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78
first
1992-07-16
most recent
2018-04-26
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4
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un-security-council

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  1. “As indicated in the Accra III Agreement, it is possible to override the constitutional provisions with regard to article 35, provided that exceptional circumstances in cote d'Ivoire make it physically impossible to hold a referendum. The AU mediation believes that it is necessary to get the collective View of the Ivorian political leadership to arrive at an optimal position for the finalization of the article 35 matter, in both the immediate and the long-term interests of Cote d'Ivoire. The AU mediation is therefore taking the necessary steps in this regard. We believe also that the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process should start as soon as the regroupment or assembly sites have been prepared, to enable them to receive members of the National Armed Forces of Cote d'Ivoire (FANCI) and the Forces nouvelles.”

    2005-03-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5152 (2005) · source

  2. “The constitutional text of article 35 agreed at Linas-Marcoussis, relating to the matter of eligibility for the presidency, has been adopted by the National Assembly by a majority than is even larger than that prescribed by the Constitution of Cote d'Ivoire. However, the process of amending the Ivorian Constitution in that regard has not been finalized. In that respect, we must make the observation that the Ivorian Constitution requires that all amendments on matters affecting the election of the President of the Republic be approved by referendum. No provision exists in the Ivorian Constitution that would exclude article 35 from this stricture.”

    2005-03-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5152 (2005) · source

  3. “Apart from anything else, all of this confirmed the importance of the follow-up mechanisms provided for in the Linas-Marcoussis and Accra III Agreements, and the obvious need for the AU mediation to work together with those mechanisms. With the Council's permission, we will now proceed to speak of the progress and problems we have experienced with regard to the implementation of the road map - copies of which we believe have been distributed to each member of the Security Council. But, first, we would like to draw the attention of the Security Council to some principled conclusions. In general, the AU mediation believes that significant progress has been made with regard to the adoption of the legislation prescribed by the Linas- Marcoussis Agreement. We will report further on this issue.”

    2005-03-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5152 (2005) · source

  4. “As the Security Council is aware, President Mbeki asked representatives of various institutions to join his delegation when he visited Cote d'Ivoire last December. Accordingly, his delegation included representatives of the Secretary- General, the AU, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the European Union, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The road map to which we have referred was drawn up by that delegation jointly, rather than by the AU mediation on its own. The AU mediation was pleased that the important institutions we have just mentioned were able to take joint ownership of the programme of action that emerged from a five-day process of detailed consultations with the Ivorian parties.”

    2005-03-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5152 (2005) · source

  5. “In that regard, we sincerely hope that the United Nations and all those interested in the future of Cote d'Ivoire will not allow for an unbalanced approach to the short-, medium- and long-term interests of the Ivorian people. We believe that the Security Council is in possession of the reports that the AU mediation has submitted to the Chairperson of the AU, especially the third report of 9 December 2004, which goes into greater detail about some of the points I have been making. Our road map is attached to the report. We continue to pursue that road map with the Ivorian parties as the only available route towards the settlement of the Ivorian crisis. We would also like to take advantage of this opportunity to thank all those who contributed to the elaboration of the road map.”

    2005-03-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5152 (2005) · source

  6. “All of this means that the understandable concern to address immediate issues, which might be symptoms of more fundamental problems, should not lead to short-term solutions that would then make it more difficult to arrive at solutions addressing the more long-term, and therefore more fundamental, problems of Ivorian society. Both the African Union and the United Nations have an obligation to pursue efforts to resolve the Ivorian crisis with sober minds and to resist the temptation to arrive at short-term solutions that disguise the real problems and therefore create the basis for an even more intractable crisis in future. The African Union mediation is preoccupied with all these considerations and is working on the basis of the interconnection between the short- and long-term interests of the Ivorian people.”

    2005-03-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5152 (2005) · source

  7. “As has happened in many other countries elsewhere in the world, in conditions of relative economic hardship, xenophobic tensions arise. In Cote d'lvoire, this has found expression in the ,,, concept of "ivoirite . As the Security Council knows, arriving at a fundamental and long-term solution of the Ivorian crisis requires that Cote d'Ivoire successfully address a whole range of matters, including issues that bear on nationality, political rights, the land question and coexistence in a multicultural, multi-ethnic and multi- religious society.”

    2005-03-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5152 (2005) · source

  8. “We appreciate the fact that the Security Council is fully conscious of the factors that led to the Ivorian crisis, including factors we have not mentioned. Nevertheless, we must emphasize the distinguishing feature of contemporary C6te d'Ivoire - that it is home to many African national groups, some of which originate from neighbouring countries. Pervasive poverty makes it inevitable that the struggle for access to economic resources and opportunities must be a distinct feature of African politics. The liberal policies implemented by C6te d'Ivoire since independence, combined with regional developments during the colonial period, resulted in the emergence of a cosmopolitan population in Cote d'Ivoire. Consequently, a significant proportion of that population, of different generations, originates from neighbouring countries.”

    2005-03-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5152 (2005) · source

  9. “It is therefore vitally important that we operate on the basis of the principle and practice of inclusion rather than that of exclusion. This is especially important given that the ideology and practice of exclusion lie at the very heart of the Ivorian crisis. Accordingly, that crisis cannot be solved on the basis of the exclusion or marginalization of any of the players that Cote d'Ivoire needs to arrive at a lasting settlement. Needless to say, that does not mean that any of those players has a right wilfully to obstruct or block progress towards such a settlement. It is therefore centrally important that the Security Council and the African Union have the possibility of imposing effective sanctions against any of those players who might act wilfully to deny the people of Cote d'Ivoire their right to peace, democracy and development.”

    2005-03-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5152 (2005) · source

  10. “As the Security Council knows - and as is normal in any situation of protracted conflict, such as that in Cote d'Ivoire - deep-seated mistrust among the Ivorian leaders continues to hamper the advance towards the resolution of the Ivorian crisis. We therefore consider it of cardinal importance that, despite the differences among them, Ivorian leaders are at least united behind the three fundamental propositions we have mentioned, without which it would be impossible to arrive at a peaceful and negotiated solution of the Ivorian crisis. We would also like to emphasize this point because it is clear that the peace settlement in Cote d'Ivoire requires the cooperation and involvement of all the Ivorian leaders.”

    2005-03-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5152 (2005) · source

  11. “It concluded, first, that, as mandated, it should seek a solution of the Ivorian crisis within the framework of the Linas- Marcoussis and the Accra II and III Agreements; secondly, that it should work out a road map with specific time frames, indicating a variety of steps that would have to be taken to put the Ivorian peace process back on course; and thirdly, that all the Ivorian parties should agree to those propositions and thus commit themselves to a peaceful and negotiated resolution of the Ivorian crisis. It is our View - and we wish to confirm this to the Security Council - that the continuing efforts of the mediation are based on the acceptance of these fundamental propositions by all the Ivorian parties.”

    2005-03-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5152 (2005) · source

  12. “That sense of urgency continues to inform the activities of the AU mediation, especially given the need to hold the next presidential elections as planned in October this year, and the fact of the deteriorating socio-economic situation in Cote d'Ivoire. After considering the interventions that had been made since 2002 to resolve the Ivorian crisis, and having engaged the entire spectrum of the Ivorian political leadership in discussion, the AU mediation arrived at the following conclusions.”

    2005-03-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5152 (2005) · source

  13. “There was shooting outside the Hotel Ivoire. It was in the light of all of those developments immediately preceding and following the November events, and of the fact that the peace process in cote d'Ivoire seemed to have reached a cul-de-sac, that the Chairperson of the African Union (AU), President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, asked President Mbeki of South Africa to act as the mediator of the AU to expedite the Ivorian peace process within the context of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement. Understanding the urgency of the matter, President Mbeki acted immediately in response to the request of the AU Chairperson. Accordingly, he visited Abidjan on 9 November 2004, even as the city was in the grip of a serious security crisis following the events of 4 to 6 November.”

    2005-03-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5152 (2005) · source

  14. “Following the expression of those legitimate concerns, the situation in Cote d'Ivoire seemed to move even further away from a resolution of the crisis addressed during the Accra meeting and the implementation of the Accra III Agreement. This was caused by the unacceptable attacks carried out by the Ivorian Air Force against the Forces nouvelles from 4 to 6 November 2004, which included the apparently accidental bombing of the positions of Licorne and the death of a number of French soldiers. French soldiers, in turn, destroyed some military planes belonging to the Ivorian forces. We were faced with a situation in which "young patriots" were out in the streets in their thousands, and foreigners were being evacuated from Cote d'Ivoire. The airport in Abidjan was closed down. Business premises were destroyed and some houses were attacked.”

    2005-03-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5152 (2005) · source

  15. “The United Nations subsequently joined ECOWAS in that process, after the Security Council set up the United Nations Mission in Cote d'Ivoire (MINUCI) in May 2003, which was subsequently replaced by UNOCI as from 4 April 2004. Concerned that by July 2004 none of these various interventions had produced any satisfactory result, the Secretary-General, Mr. Annan, acting in cooperation with the then Chairperson of ECOWAS, President Kufuor, convened a meeting in Accra at the end of that month. On 19 October 2004, two and a half months after Accra III, the Secretary-General expressed serious concern about the failure of the Ivorian parties to meet the deadlines contained in the Accra III Agreement. ECOWAS echoed this statement a few days later, stating that it "fully shares the views expressed by the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan".”

    2005-03-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5152 (2005) · source

  16. “That resulted in the boycott of the parliamentary elections by the RDR. Furthermore, they were characterized by low voter participation. The situation worsened radically when a coup d'etat was attempted in September 2002, which resulted in the division of the country into two parts, with the south being controlled by the Government and the north by the rebel forces, the Forces nouvelles. In January 2003, the various political forces of Cote d'Ivoire, including the Government, concluded an agreement at Linas-Marcoussis, France, which spelled out various steps intended to end the Ivorian crisis. Prior to that, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) had also been involved in sustained efforts to help resolve the problems of Cote d'Ivoire, a State member of that Economic Community.”

    2005-03-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5152 (2005) · source

  17. “As a result, the current President of C6te d'Ivoire and leader of the Front populaire ivoirien (FPI) decided not to contest those presidential elections. That combination of circumstances meant that a significant section of the Ivorian population had reservations about the legitimacy of the Government formed after the 1995 elections. That initiated a political crisis that led to the 25 December 1999 coup d'etat - the first in that country's history as an independent country. The presidential and parliamentary elections of 2000 did not resolve the crisis but, arguably, served to further entrench it. That was because, among other things, the elections excluded Alassane Ouattara and former President Henri Bedie, leader of the Democratic Party of cote d'Ivoire-African Democratic Rally (PDCI- RDA), from the presidential elections.”

    2005-03-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5152 (2005) · source

  18. “We thank Brazil, which holds the presidency of the Security Council, for having convened this important meeting to consider the situation in Cote d'Ivoire. We would also like to thank the Secretary- General for his fourth progress report on the United Nations Operation in cote d'Ivoire. The report identifies progress, as well as some concerns. The concerns expressed are inevitable in any conflict situation and must be looked at in the context of the overall efforts and progress made. We should recall that the current crisis in C6te d'Ivoire began a decade ago when the leader of one of the Ivorian political parties, former Prime Minister Alassane Ouattara of the Rally of the Republicans (RDR), was prohibited from standing as a candidate during the 1995 presidential elections.”

    2005-03-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5152 (2005) · source

  19. “Its intervention is significant and important. We think that it is vital that the international community begin to play a much more active role in the monitoring of the situation in South Africa. We think it is absolutely vital that the representative of the Secretary-General arrive as soon as possible in that country, for in the final analysis, this body, which has been seized of the situation in South Africa since 1946, has a duty and an obligation to all humanity to bring to an end, once and for all, this crime against humanity.”

    1992-07-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3096 (1992) · source

  20. “All other issues can be negotiated and are subsidiary to that, which means, and I repeat again, that we cannot find acceptable power-sharing arrangements to be enshrined in any new constitution. In my closing remarks, let me say this: We are either on the threshold of fundamental change in South Africa or we are on the brink of an abyss. If£ the violence persists in our country and if we are unable to reduce this unacceptably high level of violence, we shall sink into the abyss. But if we can bring this violence to an end, if we can bring about a situation in which we can have free political activity in our country, then I think we will cross the Rubicon into a new South Africa. It is in this context that the United Nations - the General Assembly and the Security Council - would need to consider intervention.”

    1992-07-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3096 (1992) · source

  21. “Therefore, if we penetrate beneath this dense bush of verbiage and remove the obfuscation around CODESA and the negotiating process, we will come clearly to understand that what Separates us from the National Party regime is the fact that we want a democratic South Africa in which the people will not only have the right to choose their own Government but certainly have the right to reject it ina subsequent election, We think that if the international community is to intervene on this question, then the intervention has to be in the direction of giving to South Africa what every other democratic society enjoys: I repeat, the right of a people to elect its own Government and, equally, the right of the people to reject that Government. This is the issue that separates us in CODESA.”

    1992-07-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3096 (1992) · source

  22. “We cannot conceive of a continuation of the negotiation process in CODESA until we can get a clear and unambiguous statement from the National Party regime that they are prepared to accept a constitution which gives the right to the people of South Africa to decide who should govern them, with no qualifications entrenched in a future constitution of power-sharing arrangements.”

    1992-07-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3096 (1992) · source

  23. “Incidentally, the influence of the South African Communist party is not as Sinister as it is made out to be. After all, it was our delegation that proposed the name CODESA and it seems to me the rest of the people accepted the name. This brings me to the question of negotiations. I think we need to reiterate what our objective has been. The objective of the ANC-led alliance in the negotiation process has been to seek the transfer of power from a white majority regime into the hands of the people. It is not to seek the transfer of power into the hands of the ANC or anybody else. That, I think, is the first critical element that we need to look at. Therefore, it is the people of South Africa that must decide who should govern them. This to us, if you like, is the nub of the breakdown in CODESA.”

    1992-07-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3096 (1992) · source

  24. “There have also been in the course of this morning's discussion a number of comments made about mass action. It would seem to us that mass struggles are a central element of a democratic society, so long as those mass actions are peaceful and within the law. But, quite clearly, the law itself should not be an ass. However, in reviewing the context in which mass action and mass struggles occur in South Africa, we need to take into account that the balance of forces in South Africa can be defined as, on the one hand, having a national party regime which controls all of the instruments of oppression and all of the State institutions, while, on the other hand, the democratic forces have only the one power, the potential power of the masses of our people. It is in this context, I think, that we also need to view the mass struggle.”

    1992-07-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3096 (1992) · source

  25. “These actions have resulted in the death and mutilation of thousands of persons, as well as the destruction of property. The violence in South Africa is not, as I think some people are Saying, black-on-black violence. It emanates from a corrupt, discredited system. Presumably, one would not Speak about what is happening in the old Yugoslavia as Slav-on-Slav violence, or white-on-white violence. It is a matter of grave concern that the South African regime continues to allocate R5 billion for covert operations in a context in which it claims that it seeks a negotiated solution. Quite clearly, this vast sum of money could be better utilized to help deal with the appalling and outrageous leveis of poverty, hunger and malnutrition stalking our country.”

    1992-07-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3096 (1992) · source

  26. “In seeking to find explanations and solutions to this unacceptably high level of violence, we need to start from the premise that the violence could have been significantly reduced, if not avoided, if the South African police and the South African Defence Force had fulfilled their obligations to the citizens of our country, irrespective of their political and ideological positions and affiliations. There is sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the security forces have not only failed in their duties and obligations but Piayed an active part in the fomenting and escalation of violence. It is clear to us that the involvement of those security forces, both individually anda collectively, has been to further the violence by taking political sides.”

    1992-07-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3096 (1992) · source

  27. “To somebody who has been here in New York over the past few days witnessing the Democratic Party convention, it is of course acceptable that in the hurly-burly of politics candidates in the primaries in the Democratic Party would tend to tear each other from limb to limb, but it is unfortunate that a representative should use such an important meeting as today's to invoke old hairy and hoary anti-Communist shibboleths; one would have thought that at this present time we would be beyond that type of politicking. But since he seems to be rather badly informed, may I use this opportunity merely to inform him and his delegation that the South African Community Party has no secret members. Over the past few years our country has been wracked by violence.”

    1992-07-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3096 (1992) · source

  28. “Mr. PAHAD: Allow me to thank you, Sir, and through you the Government of India, for the opportunity to address this important meeting of the Security Council. At the outset, on behalf of the South African Communist Party (SACP), I wish to express our regret at the tone and content of some of the contributions made this morning. Those who are part of the present system cannot, I suppose, but be expected to speak in the way they did. It does, however, also demonstrate that the governing structures in South Africa are not only the central Government: the Bantustan system is still very much with us.”

    1992-07-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3096 (1992) · source