YouSaid · the spoken record

Pak

lines on the record: 51
first: 1993-05-11
most recent: 1993-05-11
sittings or episodes: 1
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“Therefore, the United States should not demand that we "revoke" our measure of withdrawal. Instead, it should publicly apologize to us for creating the situation which compelled us to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The south Korean side betrayed the agreement. with us, participated in the nuclear war exercise against its nation, and tried to impair the supreme interests of the nation by leaving the issue - which should be solved within the framework of the nation - to the outside. As a result, the south Korean Side is not entitled to talk about the "cancellation" of our measure. Before concluding, I should like to recommend to those representatives that have charged us with the issue of our withdrawal and "non-compliance" that they behave in an independent spirit and with contemplation.”
1993-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3212 (1993) · source
“We believe that this is part of the plot by the United States to create doubts about the nuclear activities of these countries. Today our country is in a confrontational state with a United States military force of 40,000, with a constant nuclear threat against us. No other countries in any part of the world are under a United States nuclear threat as our country is. Some countries are demanding that we "revoke" our measure of withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, in collaboration with the United States. Since this measure of withdrawal constitutes a sovereign right decisively exercised for self-defence, no country is entitled to trample upon this right of ours. In particular, the United States is the culprit that has imposed a nuclear threat against us and has manipulated the IAEA inspection.”
1993-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3212 (1993) · source
“Our withdrawal from the NPT is intended to safeguard the supreme interest of our country and its people and at the same time represent the aspirations of third-world countries to establish an international order based on independence and to oppose domination and subjugation, The nuclear threat of the United States against us and its attempts to enforce a "special inspection" today may be applied to other countries tomorrow. The Western media have not made a big issue of Japan, which has recently openly been stockpiling plutonium. Instead, they are loudly alleging that such countries as Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Eqypt, India, Iran, Libya, Pakistan and Syria either possess nuclear weapons or are attempting to acquire them.”
1993-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3212 (1993) · source
“We did not accept the IAEA proposal for access to the two sites, considering that this proposal by some officials of the secretariat was not in line with the Statutes and safeguards agreement but an unjustifiable demand based on "espionage satellite photos", which it is forbidden to use in an inspection, and this, if allowed, could set a precedent. As I mentioned earlier, if we who have made efforts to faithfully comply with the safeguards agreement are branded as in "non-compliance", if the creation of "inconsistency" by counting mistakes and the utilization of "espionage satellite photos" in inspections are recognized as justifiable, then we could not but be doubtful of such an international order. We were compelled to withdraw from the NPT under paragraph 1, Article 10 of the Treaty for self-defence.”
1993-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3212 (1993) · source
“According to the present safeguards system, the IAEA has no right to use "intelligence information" and "espionage satellite photos" provided by a third party in its inspection work. However, at the secretariat meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors in January this year created suspicion over our military sites, connecting them with nuclear-related facilities through a slide show of "espionage satellite photos" provided by the United States, and as a result, the resolution on special inspection was adopted. The United States is a belligerent party to our country and is the culprit that has fabricated and distributed "espionage satellite photos".”
1993-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3212 (1993) · source
“The grounds for the "special inspection" that some officials of the secretariat of the IAEA came up with consisted of so-called "non-compliance with the safeguards agreement". That "non-compliance", according to them, is that we do not recognize the "inconsistency in principle" and that we do not agree with the demands of the IAEA for access to the two sites. That being the case, who originated them? They were originated by the United States and some officials of the IAEA secretariat as a result of the manipulation of the United States. The "inconsistency in principle", as was made clear in consultation with us, was originated by the IAEA's "principled mistakes in counting", and the "two sites" were originated by "espionage satellite photos" provided by the United States.”
1993-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3212 (1993) · source
“The resumption of this exercise, openly declared by the United States and the south Korean side this year, posed a new threat to the security of our country and the nation. At the same time, the United States manipulated the inspection of our country by the IAEA. As is already known, the United States forced the Director General of the IAEA to undertake "special inspection" and "surprise inspection", fabricated the "espionage satellite photos" with the aim of opening up our military sites and distributed them systematically to the secretariat of the IAEA and satellite States of the United States. It even conducted the analysis of the samples by receiving the results of the inspections.”
1993-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3212 (1993) · source
“Despite this, an abnormal situation was created by the IAEA that branded us, who had faithfully complied with the safeguards agreement, as in "non-compliance", and it adopted at its Board of Governors meeting an unjustifiable resolution transferring the so-called nuclear problem of our country to the United Nations. A behind-the-scenes plot exists, that demands clarification. It is related to manoeuvres by the United States and south Korean side aimed at opening up our conventional military bases with a view to stifling the socialist system of our country. The United States and south Korean side, unable to open our military sites through the meetings of the North-South Joint Committee on Nuclear Control, declared the resumption of the "Team Spirit" joint military exercise as a way of pressuring us.”
1993-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3212 (1993) · source
“We saw to it that the general provisions of the subsidiary arrangements became effective: we agreed on the subsidiary arrangements on three facilities; and we held final-stage discussions of the subsidiary arrangements at other facilities. In addition, we showed facilities and other nuclear-related facilities under construction to the IAEA inspection team and enabled it to visit npuspicious sites" loudly advertised by the Western media in the past. As for our displaying a highly cooperative spirit, even the Director General of the IAEA himself mentioned it on several occasions.”
1993-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3212 (1993) · source
“After the entry into force of the safeguards agreement, we made the utmost effort to faithfully comply with the agreement. It is already well known to the world that we submitted an initial report on our inventory of nuclear material to the secretariat of the TAEA far in advance of schedule and, up until 19 February 1993, submitted to six rounds of ad hoc inspections in good faith. During this period, we handed over hundreds of documents on accounts and operation records to the IAEA inspection team and assisted in the work of sealing 80 locations, installing observation equipment at six locations and sampling 90 pieces.”
1993-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3212 (1993) · source
“Belatedly, however, during the period from September 1991 to January 1992, the United States and the south Korean side made some positive statements and showed some positive signs, including "withdrawal of nuclear weapons", a 'declaration on the absence of nuclear weapons" the "suspension of the 'Team Spirit' military exercise", im response to our demand. We trusted these positive signs by the United States and south Korean side and signed the safeguards agreement on 30 January 1992, The Supreme People's Assembly of my country approved the safeguards agreement on 9 April last year on the condition that none of the depositary States of the NPT deploy nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula and threaten us with nuclear weapons.”
1993-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3212 (1993) · source
“Our country's accession to the NPT on 12 December 1985 was intended, with the help of this Treaty, to remove the nuclear threat against our country and to turn the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone. However, the danger of nuclear war continued to exist on the Korean peninsula, and a tense military situation still prevailed there. Under such circumstances, we could not conclude the safeguards agreement to the NPT, Therefore, we demanded that the United States and the south Korean side create conditions and an environment on the Korean peninsula suitable to concluding a safequards agreement.”
1993-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3212 (1993) · source
“I consider it necessary to clearly state our stand once again concerning the accusations made against us by the representatives of the United States and south Korea over the issues of our withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and our so-called "non-compliance" with the safeguards agreement. Our decision to withdraw from the NPT was a self-defence measure taken in connection with the extraordinary situation created by the United States, a nuclear State, against us and with an unjustifiable resolution by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as a result of manipulation by the United States, threatening the supreme interest of our country.”
1993-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3212 (1993) · source
“Adoption of a draft resolution encroaching upon our sovereignty with the help of the strong-arm tactics of the United States would only serve to aggravate the situation on the Korean peninsula, leading to unpredictable events. Recently, we responded positively to overtures by the United States with respect to holding high-level talks; there has been working-level contact in that regard. At this time. we cannot but have doubts concerning the intentions of the United States, which has introduced the present draft resolution. Under these circumstances, the proper act would be for the United States to withdraw the draft resolution. Finally, I would like to express my hope that the Security Council will act in accordance with its mission.”
1993-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3212 (1993) · source
“be discussed by the Security Council; even it it is discussed, it cannot be solved without comprehensively resolving nuclear problem of the Korean peninsula. The nuclear issue of the Korean peninsula can be resolved only through negotiations between our country and the United States. This is because the nuclear issue of the Korean peninsula began with the deployment of United States nuclear weapons in south Korea; it was created also by means of the "suspicious sites" fabricated by the United States. The United States is a belligerent party vis-a-vis our country. History shows us that pressures and sanctions applied against one party at the request of a belligerent party do not solve the problem but, on the contrary, help aggravate the disputes and finally cause armed conflicts.”
1993-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3212 (1993) · source
“My delegation considers that if the Security Council wants to contribute to peace and security on the Korean peninsula in conformity with its mission, it should not put pressure on us but should seek ways of solving fairly the nuclear problem of the Korean peninsula and should take measures that would actually be helpful. I hope the Security Council will not follow in its own footsteps of mistakes in dealing with the Korean question; I hope it will rather act in conformity with the requirements of the present situation and international justice. If the Security Council adopts an unjustifiable draft resolution putting pressure on my country and ignoring the principle of equity, we will be compelled to take corresponding effective measures in self-defence. We do not speak empty words. Our so-called nuclear problem is not an issue to.”
1993-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3212 (1993) · source
“The very convening of the Security Council blocks the efforts towards dialogue, at a time when there are positive signs regarding the efforts towards negotiations to solve our so-called "nuclear problem" and the nuclear question of the Korean peninsula. If the Security Council adopts the draft resolution introduced by the United States demanding forcible inspections of our military installations, this would be tantamount to encroachment on the sovereignty of my country and, furthermore, would result in heightened tension in the situation on the Korean peninsula and would pose a threat to the peace and security of the world. If the Security Council permits the strong-arm tactics of a nuclear Power, the non-nuclear-weapon States and the small countries of the third world will no longer trust the present Security Council.”
1993-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3212 (1993) · source
“The Security Council is trying to adopt a draft resolution encroaching upon our sovereignty, when an agreement was made to hold negotiations between my country and IAEA, when negotiations are in the offing between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States. This action permits the strong-arm tactics of a nuclear Power and ignores the requirements of the Charter of the United Nations, the statute of the IAEA and the norms of international law, that disputes should be resolved through dialogue and negotiations. Article 33 of Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations stipulates that the parties to any dispute the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security shall seek a solution by negotiation.”
1993-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3212 (1993) · source
“The Security Council should not deviate from international justice and principle of equity. The Security Council should not allow the application of a double standard that condones the acts of the injurer, which is trying to threaten with nuclear weapons and disarm my country, while making an issue about my country, which is the victim. If the Security Council intends to consider the implementation of NPT and safeguards agreement impartially, it should discuss without fail the acts of the United States and some officials of the IAEA secretariat who obey it, actions which encroach on the sovereignty of a State party to the Treaty by abusing the statute of the IAEA and the safeguards agreement.”
1993-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3212 (1993) · source
“The IAEA is conniving at a violation of the Treaty by the United States without saying a word. And the IAEA is not taking any action against Japan, which is now hastening to enter the ranks of nuclear Powers by stockpiling more plutonium than necessary, or against south Korea, which is feverishly accelerating the development of nuclear weapons under the United States nuclear umbrella. If the double standard employed by some officials of the secretariat is tolerated, the nuclear Powers will not hesitate at will to make a mockery of the fate of non-nuclear-weapon States and to encroach on their sovereignty. Today they are threatening our sovereignty by applying a double Standard to my country, but tomorrow another non-nuclear-weapon State will be the target.”
1993-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3212 (1993) · source
“Some officials of the IAEA secretariat are gravely violating the sovereignty of a State party to the Treaty - a non-nuclear-weapon State - by applying a double standard at the behest of the United States. Its application of a double standard to my country attains the highest perfection in terms of its injustice. The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea joined the Treaty in accordance with the ideal and purpose of withdrawing United States nuclear weapons from south Korea and of removing the nuclear threat to us. It is none other than the (nited States that continues to modernize its nuclear arsenals, increase the nuclear threat to our country - a non-nuclear-weapon State - and help South Africa and Israel in their nuclear armament in contravention of the fundamental ideal and purpose of the Treaty.”
1993-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3212 (1993) · source
“The United Nations should not discuss our "non-compliance" with the safeguards agreement. The ringleader of "non-compliance" with the safeguards agreement is not the Democratic People's Republic of Korea but the United States and some officials of the secretariat of the IAEA. Some officials of the IAEA secretariat intentionally invented this "inconsistency" under manipulation by the United States. The United Nations should give an impetus to the IAEA secretariat so it can implement the safeguards agreement in accordance with the terms of the agreement and the Agency statute. The United Nations should prevent international scientific and technical organizations from becoming involved in carrying out the policy of the big Powers.”
1993-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3212 (1993) · source
“Although Agency scientists called for negotiations with us, admitting that "inconsistencies in principle" were due to mistakes in their calculations, the Director General blocked even negotiations. The "suspicious sites" suggested by the Director General are conventional military bases that have nothing to do with nuclear facilities. The United Nations has no right to debate our country's withdrawal from the NPT. Signing, accession to, termination of and withdrawal from the Treaty are legal actions within the sovereign rights of an independent State, and no one is entitled to interfere in these. There are no international norms that allow sanctions with regard to the signing and withdrawal from the Treaty. The signing and withdrawal on the part of a sovereign State in accordance with the relevant Treaty are recognized to be lawful.”
1993-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3212 (1993) · source
“The United States labelled our rejection of the inspection of "suspicious sites" as "non-compliance" with the safeguards agreement with the aim of imposing collective sanctions on us. It was an intentional act by the Director General of the Agency when he said that he could not provide verification, since the inspection by the Agency was in its initial stage. In his report to the IAEA Board of Governors and in meetings with officials of our country, the Director General said that IAEA's inspection of our country was in its initial stage and would take a long time. The Agency did not even conclude its inspection of our nuclear materials and nuclear facilities. Only subsidiary rulings on three facilities were | made; those on four other facilities are yet to be made.”
1993-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3212 (1993) · source
“The "inconsistency in principle" and "suspicious sites" are made up by the United States, a belligerent party to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. It has been proved that the "inconsistency in principle" was caused by a mistake in the calculating methods of the Agency and that the "suspicious sites" are based on satellite information provided by the United States. We have faithfully implemented the safeguards agreement. It is in conformity with the safeguards agreement and the Statute of the Agency that we rejected the Agency's request to inspect "suspicious sites" that are not related to nuclear activities. There is no legal ground for the United Nations to deal with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's withdrawal from the NPT.”
1993-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3212 (1993) · source
“Some officials of the IAEA secretariat, under the directive of the United States, attempted to inspect our military facilities with fabricated intelligence and satellite information. The refusal to allow the inspection forced by the belligerent State and based on the intelligence and satellite information is a sovereign State's proper right to self-defence, and it can therefore never be regarded as non-compliance with the safeguards agreement. Fifthly, the United Nations should not argue about our "non-compliance" with the safeguards agreements. The resolution adopted at the meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors on the charge of "non-compliance" with the safeguards agreements is an unjustifiable one which distorted the facts, under the manipulation of the United States.”
1993-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3212 (1993) · source
“The Agency is given the right to special inspection only when agreement is reached between us and IAEA, according to Articles 73 and 77 of the safeguards agreement. The special inspection under the safequards agreement can be conducted only when the belief arises, in the process of inspecting the declared nuclear materials and nuclear facilities, that nuclear materials exist in certain places. There is by no means a stipulation that all the objects which the Agency finds suspicious should be open for special inspection. The United States, a belligerent party vis-a-vis the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, cooked up the delusive information, as well as satellite information, with regard to our nuclear activities and transmitted it to the IAEA secretariat and other countries in order to stifle our socialist system.”
1993-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3212 (1993) · source
“In his report submitted in December 1991 to the Board of Governors, the Director General requested the right to use intelligence and satellite information provided by the third country in its inspection process, while admitting the Agency's right for inspection in accordance with the safequards agreement was not a legal ground for special inspection. At that time many non--nuclear-weapon States rejected the Director General's suggestion lest the Agency fall prey to the super-Power. At the joint hearing of the United States Congress held on 22 July 1992, the Director General deplored that "the Agency is unable to exercise the right of special inspection stipulated in the safeguards agreement", and that "the Agency has no leyal foundation and means to implement special inspection".”
1993-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3212 (1993) · source
“The Japanese Central Report reported in June 1992 that the United States Assistant Secretary of Defense who attended the high-level talks between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States said, "North Korea moved its nuclear-weapon facilities into the underground" and "North Korea attempted to disguise the nuclear-weapon development project". This facilitated IAEA's "special inspection" and "surprise inspection". Fourthly, our refusal to allow the Agency's unlawful inspection of the "suspicious locations" is nothing but a sovereign State's full exercise of a fair right, and it can never be considered non-compliance with the safeguards agreement. The safeguards agreement and the IAEA Statute do not stipulate that all sites which the Agency finds suspicious should be open to inspection.”
1993-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3212 (1993) · source
“Under this directive of the United States, the Director General attempted to designate inspectors whose countries have no diplomatic relations with our country, even after he had been notified of our position that we would not accept such IAEA officials as members of the inspection team. The Washington Post disclosed on 13 January 1993 that "some U.S. officials argued north Korea has hidden radioactive waste produced at the Nyongbyon nuclear reactor". This became a signal urging the inspection of the two "suspicious locations".”
1993-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3212 (1993) · source
“The United States was informed of our nuclear plan by the Agency's Director General, who called for a joint hearing of the United States Congress, held on 22 July 1992, which forced him to conduct a "special inspection" and a "surprise inspection". The United States cooked up the delusive information with regard to our nuclear activities and offered it te IAEA. The IAEA Director General took this intelligence information as a good excuse for a "special inspection" call at the meeting of the Board of Governors held in February 1993. The United States Central Intelligence Agency stated in 1992 that "the United States must include its trustworthy persons in the 'special inspection' group".”
1993-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3212 (1993) · source
“Administration is now in the process of close analysis of information on the inspections of north Korea obtained from the IAEA." The same broadcasting corporation reported on 8 November 1992 that IABA was known to be planning to send a high-level delegation to Pyongyang immediately after the fourth ad hoc inspection. The Director General informed us of his intention to send a negotiating mission to our country on 16 November, eight days after the report. The information on the replacement date for the reactor core should belong only to us and IAEA. The Washington Post reported on 13 January 1993 that the "IAEA information director disclosed in the telephone interview that north Korea indicated the reactor core is to be replaced in mid-1993, and accordingly, the Agency is waiting for it". The United States manipulated the IAEA inspection.”
1993-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3212 (1993) · source
“In my view, the DPRK may just as well inform them of the contents of its initial report as much as it sees fit, in order to bring earlier the improvement of the DPRK's relations with the United States and Japan", On 10 June 1992, a high-ranking IAEA official called an informal meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors. That official briefed them on his visit to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and on the course of the first ad hoc inspection and disclosed the details of the capability of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's nuclear facilities. On 13 November 1992, south Korea's Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation declared that the "U.S.”
1993-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3212 (1993) · source
“Thirdly, some officials of the IAEA Secretariat derailed from the function of officials of the international organization and became servants of the United States. Some officials of the IAEA secretariat systematically turned over the information on the inspection results to hostile forces, including the United States. On 6 May 1992, the IAEA Director General told the representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in Vienna that, "in accordance with its Statute, IABA cannot disclose to the third parties the contents of the DPRK's initial report.”
1993-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3212 (1993) · source
“The "inconsistencies in principle" and the two "suspicious locations" revealed the unreasonable inspection activities of the Director General and some officials of the Agency Secretariat. Some officials of the Agency Secretariat, including the Director General, discarded the principle of impartiality and became servants implementing the policy of the United States. Although they fully understood that the intelligence or satellite information could not be used in the inspection, they did not hesitate to act like servants, saying that the satellite and intelligence information was "reliable" as it was provided by the United States. By doing so they blocked the way to clearing up the "inconsistencies in principle".”
1993-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3212 (1993) · source
“The "inconsistencies in principle" and the two "suspicious locations" are the motives for the "special inspection" faked by some officials of the Agency Secretariat, including the Director General, under the directives of the United States. The "inconsistencies in principle" and the two "suspicious locations" are matters of different characteristics, apart from the safeguards agreement. The Agency experts admitted that the "inconsistencies in principle" arose from the miscalculation and agreed to clarify the matter at the future negotiations, and that the two "suspicious locations" were fabricated on the basis of the false satellite information provided by the United States, a belligerent party vis-a-vis the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.”
1993-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3212 (1993) · source
“The resolution adopted at the meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors held on 1 April 1993 characterized our refusal of the inspection of the "two locations" as "non-compliance" with the safeguards agreement. This is absolutely unjustifiable. The "two locations" are not related to nuclear activities. The Agency's Director General has doubts about these two locations, on the ground that they are "nuclear facilities" according to the satellite information provided by the United States. This "intelligence information" and "satellite information" is fabricated, and it is impermissible to use it in the inspection.”
1993-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3212 (1993) · source
“At the bilateral talks held in Pyongyang from 20 to 22 January 1993, the IAEA delegation, led by the director of the foreign relations department, insisted on visiting those locations, saying that "there is reliable evidence from intelligence information and satellite photos that the locations are related to nuclear materials", while recognizing that the Agency had no legal ground to use any intelligence or satellite information provided by a third country. Those remarks of the IAEA officials proved that the IAEA takes the directives of the United States as its law or regulations, instead of the safeguards agreement, the IAEA statute, resolutions of the Board of Governors, and so forth.”
1993-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3212 (1993) · source
“The two inspectors authorized by the Director General visited these locations twice - even with monitoring devices - claiming that they "asked to see them again so that other people would not need to see them again". However, they misused the visit to confirm the correctness of the intelligence information provided by the United States. On 22 December 1992 the IAEA Director General again asked for permission to "visit", drill and take samples at the already-visited military installation and another military installation.”
1993-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3212 (1993) · source
“Since all such attempts proved to be unsuccessful, it resumed the "Team Spirit" joint military exercises to threaten us. With a view to achieving its aim of opening our military sites, the United States cooked up delusive "intelligence information" and "satellite photos" which falsified our military sites as being nuclear-related, and then turned the "information" and "photos" over to the IAEA and its followers. In September 1992 the IAEA Director General demanded access to the two "suspicious locations". Out of respect for his position as Director General we allowed the IAEA inspectors authorized by him to visit the two "suspicious locations" on 12 and 14 September. One location was a civilian object and the other was a military one.”
1993-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3212 (1993) · source
“At the talks, the IAEA Secretariat admitted its mistakes in the calculation and proposed that another negotiation be held. The sixth ad hoc inspection team flew back to Vienna on 8 February; it did not even have time to do the promised recalculation. At the meeting of the Board of Governors of the IAEA held on 9 February 1993, the Director General demanded a "special inspection" of our two "suspicious locations", under the pretext of the "inconsistencies in principle" - in accordance with the scenario already worked out, The inspection of "suspicious locations" is part of United States manoeuvring aimed at opening our military sites. The United States attempted to abuse the north-south nuclear control subcommittee for its purpose of opening our military sites. It tried again through the IAEA inspection.”
1993-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3212 (1993) · source
“The first of the "inconsistencies in principle" was that the composition and quantity of plutonium we declared to the IAEA did not correspond to what had been calculated by the IAEA. The second of the "inconsistencies in principle" was that the isotopic composition of plutonium did not correspond to that of the liquid waste. During the negotiations with the fourth, fifth and sixth ad hoc inspection teams and at the talks with the IAEA Secretariat in Vienna in December 1992 and February 1993, we elucidated, in a scientific and technological way, the mistakes in calculation made by the IAEA on the composition and quantity of plutonium, and explained that the difference in the composition of plutonium and liquid waste arose when the solution from the basic plutonium-extraction experiment in 1975 was put together in the waste tank.”
1993-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3212 (1993) · source
“The fourth ad hoc inspectiion team, which visited our country from 2 to 14 November 1992, attempted to threaten us, saying that "more nuclear materials should be declared", that this would be "the last chance to modify the initial report" and that "a tragic consequence would follow if the chance were passed up". However, after having become acquainted with the conditions of the Nyongbyon nuclear facilities and having held consultations with the operators, they admitted that most of their views had been based on a hasty conclusion. The sixth ad hoc inspection team visited our country from 26 January to 6 February 1993 and claimed that they found two "inconsistencies in principle".”
1993-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3212 (1993) · source
“We exerted made sincere efforts, in cooperation with the inspectors, during their six rounds of visits to our country from May 1992 to February 1993. The head of the IAEA inspection team repeatedly thanked our operators for their active cooperation, which was explicitly mentioned in the reports submitted by the Director General to the IAEA Board of Governors. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea, since the safeguards agreement came into effect, has sincerely discharged its obligation under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and the six rounds of inspections have proved that its nuclear activities have a solely peaceful purpose. The United States and some officials of the IAEA Secretariat fabricated the "inconsistencies in principle".”
1993-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3212 (1993) · source
“The Democratic People's Republic of Korea, after signing the safeguards agreement on 30 January 1992 - which went into force on 10 April 1992 - provided the IAEA with an initial report on nuclear materials subject to the safeguards and on the design information of its nuclear facilities on 4 May 1992, far in advance of the set time, which had been the end of May. With a view to bringing into the open all its nuclear activities, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea even provid2d the IAEA with lists of those nuclear facilities exempt from the safeguards and of its scientific research institutes. We invited the IAEA delegation, led by its Director General, to come from 11 to 16 May 1992 and we showed the nuclear facilities which the IAEA | delegation requested to see, and all other projects which the Agency found suspicious.”
1993-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3212 (1993) · source
“The United States resumed the suspended "Team Spirit" joint military exercises while we allowed IAEA inspections, thereby increasing the nuclear threat against us. Such American nuclear threats against us constitute a flagrant violation of the NPT as well as of resolution 255 (1968), adopted by the Security Council on 19 June 1968. Secondly, the United States and its followers fabricated the "inconsistencies in principle". We have in good faith discharged our obligations under the safeguards agreement.”
1993-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3212 (1993) · source
“As clearly noted in the statement of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea issued on 12 March, we declared that we were unavoidably withdrawing from the NPT because of an abnormal situation in which the United States, those forces hostile to us and some officials of the IABA secretariat are abusing the NPT so as to stifle our socialist system. The major reason that forced us to withdraw from the NPT was the fact that the United States kept increasing nuclear threats against us and manipulated some officials of the IAEA secretariat to open our military bases and disarm us. Firstly, the United States has escalated its nuclear threat against us while maintaining its nuclear weapons deployed in south Korea, contrary to the fact that we joined the NPT and have since fulfilled our obligations under the NPT in good faith.”
1993-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3212 (1993) · source
“Though the adoption of this draft resolution by the Security Council is forced by the demand of the nuclear super-Power, it will be rejected absolutely, since it is unreasonable and in contravention of paragraph 4, Article 2, Chapter I of the United Nations Charter and of paragraph 4d, Article 3 of the IAEA Statute, which call for respect of the sovereignty of the member States. As to our withdrawal from the NPT, it is a self-defence measure based on a State's right to withdraw from the Treaty in the exercise of its national sovereignty, in case a State party to the Treaty decides that its supreme interests are threatened.”
1993-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3212 (1993) · source
“Our refusal to allow the special inspection of military installations unrelated to nuclear activities that was demanded by the United States and some IAEA Secretariat officials cannot be regarded as so-called "non-compliance" with the safeguards agreement. The delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is therefore opposed to discussion of the so-called "nuclear problem" at the United Nations Security Council, The draft resolution introduced by the United States is aimed at infringing upon the sovereignty of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, a State Member of the United Nations, and at stifling its socialist system.”
1993-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3212 (1993) · source
“I hope that my request, contained in document S/25747, will be considered as a formal agenda item, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the United Nations Charter and the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea's withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the problems in implementing the safeguards agreement cannot be considered to wreck world peace and threaten the security of other countries. No legal or technical grounds can be found to discuss the so-called "nuclear problem" at the United Nations Security Council. The withdrawal of our country from the NPT was based on our full right under the Treaty, a right that belongs to every sovereign Member State.”
1993-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3212 (1993) · source