YouSaid · the spoken record

Pankin

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279
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2010-05-12
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2014-11-24
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44
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un-security-council

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  1. For now, I should like to say that any external activity by the Committee at this extremely sensitive stage of the negotiation process on the Iranian nuclear programme seems to us not to be very timely, especially given that this involves such a difficult matter as arms smuggling, where the accusations against the Iranian side are based largely on circumstantial evidence. With regard to the final report, we would once again note that the experts should be very careful in their conclusions and assessments. Any information not supported by concrete facts with regard to possible violations of the sanctions regime could have a negative impact on the conduct of the negotiations between the group of six and Iran and the latter's cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, and should not be included in the report.

    2014-06-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7211 (2014) · source

  2. I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the represenatative of the Russian Federation. We are grateful to Ambassador Gary Quinlan for his briefing on the work of the Committee he leads. During the reporting period, the experts submitted a final report (S/2014/394, annex) and three reports of incidents. We would should like to share our preliminary impressions thereon. With regard to the incident reports, the Russian delegation has already expressed its position at the Committee's meetings. With regard to our position on the conclusions and the proposal to develop an implementation note with regard to the incident concerning the interdiction in the Red Sea of the vessel Klos C, we will make those views known later following a thorough review of the documents.

    2014-06-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7211 (2014) · source

  3. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. At this meeting, the Council will hear a briefing by Ambassador Gary Quinlan, Permanent Representative of Australia, in his capacity as Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006). I now give the floor to Ambassador Quinlan.

    2014-06-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7211 (2014) · source

  4. In conclusion, we must note that the current events in South Sudan are just the latest sad result of the fanciful scheming of Juba's main partners, who have sought to hide the truth and cover up for their stooges.

    2014-05-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7168 (2014) · source

  5. The latest tragic events have again called into question the effectiveness of the leadership of the United Nations Mission to South Sudan. Despite a budget of almost $1 billion, a large contingent and robust mandate, it has proven unable to fully guarantee the protection of civilians, even on the grounds of its own compounds, which, incidentally, are not designed to host tens of thousands of civilians for long periods. The scheduled mandate review and increase in the maximum force strength should be geared specifically towards improving the performance of its activities and implementing the tasks mandated to it by the Security Council.

    2014-05-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7168 (2014) · source

  6. The international community, represented inter alia by the Council, must duly support those efforts in a timely fashion. With regard to the recent and growing calls for the adoption of targeted Security Council sanctions against so-called saboteurs ofthe peace process in South Sudan, this is an issue that should be addressed extremely warily and cautiously. This subject needs to be fully fleshed out, taking into account both internal and regional factors. Our extensive collective experience shows that sanctions are far from a panacea and never have been an effective instrument for achieving political settlements to conflicts. What they can do, however, is undermine the spirit of cooperation. Moreover, it is important to canvass the opinions of leading regional actors on such an initiative.

    2014-05-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7168 (2014) · source

  7. We are particularly concerned at reports of an impending humanitarian catastrophe in South Sudan. The number ofpeople displaced by violence now exceeds 1.2 million. Approximately 5 million people require humanitarian assistance, and the number is growing rapidly. The genuine threat of mass starvation in the country looms large. We agree that the path towards addressing the grave humanitarian and human rights situation lies in a political settlement of the armed conflict. The leaders of both warring parties must finally set aside their own ambitions and begin seeking a solution to the crisis through peaceful means by implementing the agreement of 23 January. We strongly welcome the vigorous efforts of international partners, especially the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, seeking a negotiated solution and ceasefire.

    2014-05-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7168 (2014) · source

  8. Dieng will push the parties towards practical implementation of their stated intentions to prevent such crimes in the future and to bring tojustice all ofthose responsible. We trust that next week's report from the United Nations Mission to South Sudan (UNMISS) on the human rights situation there will be substantive and make a genuine contribution to tackling challenges with regards to establishing the truth and combating the deep-rooted culture of impunity that reigns in the country. We welcome the activities of the African Union commission of inquiry on South Sudan, which should effectively complement United Nations efforts in this area, including with the development of recommendations for addressing the root causes of the conflict and fostering a process of national reconciliation.

    2014-05-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7168 (2014) · source

  9. Mr. Pankin (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We are grateful to Ms. Pillay and Mr. Dieng for their briefings on the findings of their visit to crisis- torn South Sudan. We share their profound concern at the mass violations of human rights and the norms of international humanitarian law by both parties to the conflict, including the monstrous killing of civilians on ethnic grounds. This is particularly troubling in the light of the diverse character of the young society of South Sudan. Among the most glaring examples of the clashes between these two camps were the crimes perpetrated in Bentiu and Bor, which could amount to war crimes. We hope that the visit by Ms. Pillay and Mr.

    2014-05-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7168 (2014) · source

  10. Moreover, in May of that year, an American company acquired oil in such an unlawful manner. The State Department of the United States, in a statement on 20 June 2011, supported those unlawful actions. The genie was let out of the bottle, and certain Libyan groups seemed to take a liking to that. If it worked three years ago, why not try today? Therefore, unfortunately not for the first time, we are having to use emergency measures to deal with problems that were created with the connivance and even support of a number of Member States, including some represented at this table. Secondly, we assume that resolution 2146 (2014) will not affect the regime established by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, including the general principle of the exclusive jurisdiction of a flag State over its vessels on the open seas.

    2014-03-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7142 (2014) · source

  11. Mr. Pankin (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): The Russian Federation found it possible to support resolution 2146 (2014), which was prepared by the United States, given the seriousness of the problem faced by Libya's central Government and its appeal to the Security Council. We agree that the illegal export of Libyan oil threatens to further jeopardize the country's stability, which already suffers from internal strife. At the same time, we would like to highlight two points. First, it is no secret to anyone that the situation that the resolution aims at did not arise yesterday, or even when the groups active in the eastern part of Libya expressed ambitions. It predates that. I would like to recall that the first delivery of oil from the eastern part of the country made without central Government authority took place in April 2011.

    2014-03-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7142 (2014) · source

  12. For our part, we shall continue our active efforts for the stabilization of the situation in Afghanistan, both bilaterally and by participating in large-scale regional projects aimed at ensuring the sustainable economic development of the country and of the Central Asia region. We have consistently and respectfully supported the efforts of the Afghan Government in establishing conditions conducive to long-term stabilization in the country and in the region on the basis of the friendly partnership that has traditionally existed between Russia and Afghanistan. That is in line with the national interests of our countries and contributes to a stable and multisectoral development of the whole region.

    2013-12-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7085 (2013) · source

  13. At the same time, we think it unjustified that sometimes excessive emphasis is placed on the Istanbul Process. Its added value has not yet been proven. Participation in working group meetings is often low, and a number of States have demonstrated slight interest in its proceedings. Achieving significant results in stabilizing Afghanistan is possible only through our collective efforts. If we want to achieve maximum results with our outside partners, we need to coordinate our efforts. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan has provided invaluable assistance. Its role will only increase with ISAF's withdrawal.

    2013-12-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7085 (2013) · source

  14. The story of the Qatar office, which the Taliban supposedly temporarily closed without even waiting for its requests to be met, is just another demonstration of that. Taking that into account, we believe that demonstrating flexibility with regard to easing the Security Council's sanctions regime with respect to the Taliban is possible only ifthe Taliban take steps towards compromise. We share the view on the need to activate and strengthen the role of regional cooperation by assisting with Afghanistan's revival as a peaceful, independent and economically flourishing State. We are convinced that the most optimal platform for synchronizing regional efforts to provide assistance to Afghanistan is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, in which almost every country in the region is represented, including Afghanistan.

    2013-12-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7085 (2013) · source

  15. Russia fully supports the efforts of the Afghan Government in the progress it is making in the national reconciliation process, including through dialogue between the High Peace Council and representatives of the armed opposition, under the leading role of Kabul, and on the basis of the well-known triad of principles: laying down arms, recognizing the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and decisively cutting ties with Al-Qaida and other terrorist organizations. At the same time, it is obvious that, as the international contingents withdraw from Afghanistan and with progress in establishing the Afghan National Security Forces, the motivation for the armed opposition to come to an agreement will diminish.

    2013-12-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7085 (2013) · source

  16. The time has come to look, in an unbiased manner, at the formats for possible cooperation between NATO and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), first and foremost in counter-narcotics and 10st opportunities, all the more so given that the CSTO has solid experience in stemming drug flows on the perimeter of the northern border of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.

    2013-12-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7085 (2013) · source

  17. There is a horrifying statistic i the number of drug addicts in Afghanistan is more than 1 million, which is almost 3 per cent of the Afghan population. Moreover, according to the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, of that total 300,000 are children. The issue, which is a threat to peace and stability not only in Afghanistan but in the region and the whole world, requires collective efforts and the participation of all players. The problem cannot be ignored by saying that the ISAF mandate has no counter-narcotics element.

    2013-12-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7085 (2013) · source

  18. All of those issues require detailed and self-critical reporting from NATO to the Security Council at the end of next year. For our part, we stand ready to continue interacting with NATO in Afghanistan after 2014, with the understanding that the new alliance mission will have an appropriate international legal base in the format of a Security Council resolution. Without that, the practical agreements existing in Afghanistan today would legally collapse. We feel that after completing the task of stabilization, foreign contingents will no longer need to be present in the country. We have no doubt that the rise in the influence of fighters both facilitates and has brought about the 50 per cent increase in the production of opiates this year.

    2013-12-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7085 (2013) · source

  19. We do not conceal the fact that we are extremely concerned at the situation that may arise in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the bordering region of Central Asia after the withdrawal of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). In that regard, we can ask a reasonable question. How appropriate is it to hasten the transfer of responsibility for security in the country from the international military presence to the Afghan military, and making that all follow an artificially imposed withdrawal timeline? How long will the coalition forces cope with the tasks mandated by the Security Council for stabilization and the preparation of an effective and viable Afghan security and law enforcement force and armed forces?

    2013-12-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7085 (2013) · source

  20. We do not suscribe to such well-meaning approaches, all the more so since during the 2014 presidential elections - whose successful holding we sincerely wish for the friendly Afghan people - fighters intend to demonstrate all their destructive capacity. We are particularly concerned about the rise in terrorist activities in the three north-eastern Afghan provinces of Badakhshan, Takhar and Kunduz. In October alone they grew by 30 per cent. The number of militants from the Taliban and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan in those provinces rose to 5,000 individuals. Yet just around three to five years ago northern Afghanistan was far more calm and prosperous.

    2013-12-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7085 (2013) · source

  21. However, unfortunately, we would note that, once again, the report does not touch upon the true nature of the threat emanating from the Taliban/Al-Qaida, since neither organization is mentioned, as is also the case with regard to other terrorist armed groups whose aggressive activities in the country led to an increase in the number of Afghan civilian and military deaths. The acuteness of that problem is illustrated by the attacks by the opposition in the spring, including the seizing ofa number of areas in the country, including parts of Kabul. Every now and then it seems as though there is a certain element of self- serving reassurance in NATO's decision to withdraw its military presence from Afghanistan.

    2013-12-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7085 (2013) · source

  22. Mr. Pankin (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We are grateful to Mr. Jan Kubis for his briefing on the situation in Afghanistan and for presenting the report of the Secretary-General (S/2013/721). We also thank Mr. Zahir Tanin, Permanent Representative of Afghanistan, for his detailed statement. We are pleased to note that, in comparison with previous reports, the one under consideration today is more appropriate and objective in its evaluation of trends in the situation in Afghanistan, which continues to be of some concern.

    2013-12-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7085 (2013) · source

  23. It is important that the collective efforts of the Yemenis and the world community bear fruit. Despite the challenges, the country has been able to avoid sliding into full-scale confrontation. Overall, civil peace has been upheld in areas of ethnic and religious diversity. Yemen has provided an example of how domestic crises can be overcome through the National Dialogue and diplomacy with reasonable outside assistance. For its part, Russia will continue to provide the Yemeni people the assistance they need in the political transformation process and in addressing the critical economic, social and humanitarian challenges.

    2013-09-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7037 (2013) · source

  24. One cannot say that the political process and comprehensive reforms have been successful while Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula and the affiliated Ansar al-Sharia are operating in the country and efforts to sabotage infrastructure sites and attacks against Government representatives continue. We are disturbed by the spate of attacks perpetrated by terrorists against military and police in the province of Shabwa on 21 September. All such manifestations and threats must be fought relentlessly. In conclusion, we commend the efforts of the Secretary- General andhis SpecialAdviser, Mr. Benomar, in seeking compromises between representatives from across the Yemeni political spectrum. We also thank the humanitarian agencies of the United Nations system for their assistance in addressing the complex social and economic challenges of the country.

    2013-09-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7037 (2013) · source

  25. We support President Mansour's efforts to bring about broad reform of Yemeni society. We call on all Yemenis to assist in these efforts and to do their utmost to prevent any recurrence of civil confrontation. Together with political assistance, measures need to be taken to provide the country with effective social and economic assistance. The priorities should be determined by the Yemeni Government itself based on the priority requirements of the reform agenda. Interference in internal affairs is unacceptable and the primary responsibility for improving the socioeconomic situation in the country lies with the Yemenis themselves.

    2013-09-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7037 (2013) · source

  26. Mr. Pankin (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank Mr. Jamal Benomar, Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Yemen, for his briefing, as well as Mr. Abdul Latif Bin Rashid Al Zayani, Secretary General of the Gulf Cooperation Council, and Mr. Abubaker A. Al-Qirbi, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Yemen, for their statements. The process of political settlement in Yemen is in a crucial phase. The National Dialogue Conference is close to completion and is meant to lay the basis for addressing the country's political, social and economic challenges. It is a lengthy and difficult process, but it is important that it is being carried out by the Yemenis themselves through substantive negotiations and consensus-building. On balance, it is adhering to the timetable set forth in the implementation mechanism of the Riyadh agreements.

    2013-09-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7037 (2013) · source

  27. We are certain that the practical implementation of the comprehensive approach proposed by Russia to enhance national controls over transfers of small arms and light weapons would make it possible to strengthen the security of individual countries and regions that face the difficult consequences of the use of ilicit small arms and light weapons. In light of all this, the Russian Federation will abstain in the voting on the draft resolution.

    2013-09-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7036 (2013) · source

  28. It provides for a broad complex range of meaures that States must adopt at the global, regional and national levels in order to fight illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons and to prevent them from falling into the illicit hands of terrorist organizations, organized crime and States that are subject to sanctions of the Security Council. The support of the members of the Security Council for the implementation of the Programme of Action is extremely useful in strenghtening its authority. The potential of the Programme has not yet been exhausted. Much remains to be done to implement it, above all at the national and regional levels.

    2013-09-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7036 (2013) · source

  29. Among other similar measures is a ban on the unauthorized re-export of weapons, enhanced State control over the end use of supplied weapons, controls over the activities of arms brokers, and preventing the transfer of weapons and piracy - that is, activities without appropriate licensing. These measures are not financially costly and do not require additional financial support. We believe that the draft resolution could have focused greater attention on the limitations of the United Nations Programme of Action on the Prevention and the Eradication of the Illicit Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects. That is only existing global document in the area of fighting the illicit traffic in small arms and light weapons.

    2013-09-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7036 (2013) · source

  30. Depending on the region or the relation to the Government of the country on whose territories militias are operating, they may be seen as terrorist or extremists, while others, similar in most respects, are provided with weapons to carry out their so-calledjust struggle. This sounds as if there were bad terrorists and extremists and good ones, which in our view is something unacceptable. Banning the delivery of small arms and light weapons to non-authorized State structures is one way to counter the uncontrolled disssemination of weapons, which Russia has for many years consistently advanced in many multilateral formats, including when drafting the recently Arms Trade Treaty.

    2013-09-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7036 (2013) · source

  31. This lacuna must be removed as soon as possible We are certain that a universal ban on the delivery of small arms and light weapons to non-State actors would shut off one of the channels through which weapons are illicitly trafficked and as a result would be in the interest of the national security of essentially any State. The negotiating process on the draft text for the international Arms Trade Treaty demonstrated that the Russian approach to non-State actors is supported by a considerable number of States. It was opposed only by those countries that believe that it is justified to arm non-State militias, rebel movements and groups that use violent force to seize power under the banner of fighting totalitarian regimes, tyranny, and so on.

    2013-09-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7036 (2013) · source

  32. The black and grey markets for small and light weapons fuel terrorists, extremists, illegal militias, organized and street crime, and varying kinds of conflicts. Therefore, any document devoted to this subject must address such a critical aspect as preventing the illicit traficking of small arms and light weapons. It is far easier to prevent the flow of weapons into the wrong hands and much more complex to later take them out of those bands. In advancing our proposal, we took into account the current lack of any universal agreement establishing a ban on the transfer of small arms and light weapons to non-State actors.

    2013-09-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7036 (2013) · source

  33. We believe that the root of the problem of small arms and light weapons is illicit trafficking. Russia has consistently advocated the adoption of measures aimed at preventing illicit weapons trafficking. In this context, ofparticular importance is the issue of imposing universal prohibitions on the transfer of small arms and light weapons to non-State actors and unauthorized State recipients and users. Weapons in the hands of illegal militias most frequently become instruments for the violation of the fundamental human rights and the source of suffering for the civilian population. A salient example of that is the recent events in Mali, where weapons were used that had initially been transferred to Libyan groups for humanitarian reasons.

    2013-09-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7036 (2013) · source

  34. Mr. Pankin (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): At the outset, let me express our condolences to the Government and people of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan with respect to the heavy human loss arising from the destructive earthquake in the province of Beluchistan. We ask the representative of Pakistan to convey our condolences and our support to the bereaved families and we wish the victims a speedy recovery. We thank the Australian presidency for bringing to the consideration of the Security Council the important topic as small arms and light weapons. However, we cannot support the draft resolution prepared on this subject since it lacks an important and urgent provision advanced by Russia on the unacceptable nature of the supply of small arms and light weapons to non-State actors.

    2013-09-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7036 (2013) · source

  35. However, we are convinced that the collective and effective nature of steps on the part of the international community to address and resolve problems related to the Iranian nuclear problem are undermined by unilateral sanctions, many of which are extraterritorial in nature. That is categorically unacceptable under international law. Our country will continue to make every effort to achieve progress in resolving the situation concerning Iran's nuclear programme.

    2013-09-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7028 (2013) · source

  36. We would also like to point out that statements by representatives of the new Iranian Administration are in line with the well-known Russian view concerning a settlement of the problem, namely, that a final decision can be arrived at only through a recognition of the unconditional right of Iran to develop a civilian nuclear programme, including the right to enrich uranium. Of course, that should precede the resolution of all outstanding problems with regard to Iranian nuclear activities, under reliable and comprehensive IAIA controls, and the lifting of any sanctions against Iran. We see no alternative to a diplomatic and political settlement. Efforts to that end should be made in a phased manner, based on the principle of reciprocity and in line with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

    2013-09-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7028 (2013) · source

  37. However, we continue to believe that the Panel should carry out its work under the guidance of the Committee while fully respecting the working methods and carrying out its investigations based solely on reliable and verifiable information. We welcome statements by the new President of Iran, Mr. Hassan Rouhani, concerning Tehran's willingness to show greater openness with regard to its nuclear programme. We hope that those intensions will be in evidence during the forthcoming round of regular discussions between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), slated for 27 September. It is necessary that a new round of dialogue under the 3+3 format of international mediation take place as soon as possible. The groundwork has already been laid for the first negotiations under that framework.

    2013-09-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7028 (2013) · source

  38. Mr. Pankin (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We would like to thank the delegation of Argentina for its successful presidency of the Security Council last month. We are also grateful to Ambassador Quinlan for his briefing on the work of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006). We thank him and the entire Australian delegation for their skilful chairmanship of that Council body. It is important that the Committee continue to act in an impartial and objective manner, in the interest of a diplomatic political settlement to the situation regarding the Iranian nuclear programme. The Panel of Experts provides the Committee with useful support.

    2013-09-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7028 (2013) · source

  39. We are convinced that a key role in that process must be played by Member States themselves. In that connection, we would emphasize the need to bolster cooperation among United Nations humanitarian bodies and Member States, which would increase trust in the United Nations humanitarian system as the most effective mechanism for assisting Governments in tackling the consequences of emergency situations.

    2013-08-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7019 (2013) · source

  40. The international community has repeatedly underscored that the allocation of military resources to humanitarian-aid- provision operations should be a method of last resort, when the use of civilian manpower or resources is not possible and human lives are at stake. In our View, the inappropriate use of military resources runs counter to the principle of the independence of humanitarian aid from economic, political and military objectives. We support the activities of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs as a central coordination mechanism for international humanitarian assistance. We note the efforts undertaken, including steps towards reform to increase the effectiveness and timeliness of the provision of humanitarian assistance to those in need.

    2013-08-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7019 (2013) · source

  41. The primary task is, rightly, choosing the simplest, most practical, achievable and suitable means and routes for the provision of aid, as these may differ in each case. Furthermore, the international community and all humanitarian partners, including United Nations system entities and specialized non-governmental organizations, must uphold the sovereignty of States receiving assistance. We once again stress that the general coordination of such operations, including the allocation of funds, the identification of transport routes and the selection of partners, is the exclusive prerogative of host States. On the issue of ensuring access, we wish to call attention to the problem of the use of armed forces for the transport of humanitarian assistance.

    2013-08-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7019 (2013) · source

  42. Governments must play a leading role in initiating and coordinating international aid, and ensuring safe and unfettered access for humanitarian staff to civilians in need, in particular in the context of armed conflict, is one of the key challenges in humanitarian response operations. The successful implementation of such operations requires unstinting compliance by all participants in humanitarian activities with the guiding principles of emergency humanitarian assistance set out in annex to General Assembly resolution 46/182. Ensuring the physical presence of foreign humanitarian personnel in disaster situations is just one aspect of the problem of access and not an end in and of itself.

    2013-08-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7019 (2013) · source

  43. It is clear that the importance of humanitarian aspects is growing, in particular with respect to a comprehensive strategy for crisis prevention as well as in the post-conflict phase. Work in that area must be based on the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and basic humanitarian principles, and its effectiveness will depend to a large extent on the level of coordination with the efforts of the international community in the area of political settlements. In that context, one of the core principles is that of upholding State sovereignty. The Russian Federation attaches great importance to the creation of conditions conducive to the appropriate and timely provision of humanitarian assistance to those in need.

    2013-08-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7019 (2013) · source

  44. Protecting civilians is one aspect of the activities ofpeacekeeping missions, and is to be carried out in connection with specific mandates defined by the Council for each operation. The fundamental task of peacekeepers is to provide assistance to the peace process. To ensure the optimal use of peacekeeping resources, there is an imperative need to devise clear protection-of-civilians strategies for peacekeeping operations with related mandates and to train peacekeepers in that area. Ensuring the protection of civilians requires the system-wide coordination of measures, at the international, regional and national levels. Furthermore, it must be borne in mind that one of the components of that challenge is the issue of the provision of humanitarian aid.

    2013-08-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7019 (2013) · source

  45. We call for a thorough investigation of all the relevant incidents and the punishment of perpetrators. The protection of civilians is the responsibility of the Governments of the States parties to a conflict. The activities of the international community should seek to assist national efforts in that regard. The adoption of response measures to ensure the protection of civilians by the use of force are only possible with the approval of the Security Council and with unwavering compliance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. Attempts to manipulate mandates approved by the Security Council are unacceptable. It is not always right to rely on strengthened mandates to provide peacekeepers the right to use force or intimidate.

    2013-08-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7019 (2013) · source

  46. We are convinced that, in order to remedy the situation, selective and unilateral approaches to violations of international humanitarian law must be set aside, and strict adherence to human rights standards and the implementation of the relevant decisions of the Security Council are necessary. We firmly condemn targeted attacks on civilians, as well as casualties as a result of the indiscriminate or disproportionate use of force. Such actions are flagrant violations of international humanitarian law. There is no justification for armed groups to attack peaceful civilians, carry out terror attacks or take hostages. We underscore the responsibility of all parties for ensuring the safety of civilians and strict compliance with norms of international humanitarian law.

    2013-08-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7019 (2013) · source

  47. Mr. Pankin (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank Argentina for hosting today's debate, which is taking place during World Humanitarian Day as we mark the deaths of those killed 10 years ago in a tragic attack against United Nations headquarters in Baghdad. We thank the Secretary-General, the heads of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross for their statements. Today's agenda item is extremely relevant given the difficulties in protecting civilians in a number of hot spots.

    2013-08-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7019 (2013) · source

  48. In conclusion, I wish the people of Afghanistan every success and express our full support for the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan in its efforts to fulfil its mandate at this most difficult time.

    2013-06-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6983 (2013) · source

  49. In the interests of effectively removing the drug threat from Afghanistan, we would favour the establishment of dialogue on this matter in the format of the CSTO and NATO. It is our view that the Istanbul process on Afghanistan is a good platform for dialogue. At the same time, we have the impression that the process is evolving slower than previously planned and that a number of participants have become entrenched in their positions. We should therefore like to see increasingly dynamic progress in established formats, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. We intend to promote the active participation of observer countries, including Afghanistan, in its practical work, particularly in discussions on countering such regional threats as drugs, terrorism and extremism.

    2013-06-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6983 (2013) · source

  50. We remain seriously concerned over the illegal manufacture, trade and transfer of drugs from Afghanistan, which pose a threat to peace and stability. Not only does the Afghan drug threat affect countries of the region, but tens ofthousands ofpeople die every year from Afghan heroin or opium in Europe and the United States. Moreover, the illegal manufacture of and trade in these drugs lead to other crimes, including terrorism, corruption and money-laundering. In this context, we attach priority importance to the implementation of the decisions of the third ministerial conference of the Paris Pact on preventing the spread of Afghan narcotics. An important measure in that regard would be the agreed inclusion of drug traffickers on the Security Council's sanctions lists.

    2013-06-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6983 (2013) · source