YouSaid · the spoken record

Pedersen

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597
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2012-10-15
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2023-12-21
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un-security-council

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  1. That is the way to stem the tide of violence and fast-deteriorating socioeconomic and humanitarian situations and move towards a negotiated political settlement that could enable the Syrians to realize their legitimate aspirations and, indeed, restore Syria’s sovereignty, unity, independence and territorial integrity in line with resolution 2254 (2015).

    2023-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9517 (2023) · source

  2. In 2024 there is therefore a clear need to refocus on the political process called for eight years ago in resolution 2254 (2015). The year ahead must see a new momentum injected into the search for compromise for a political path forward. I appeal for all to act in a manner that enables the Constitutional Committee to resume, at least initially in Geneva, and for reciprocal, verifiable and parallel confidence-building measures to be agreed and implemented. Equally, I remind all members that these entry points cannot in themselves resolve the conflict. We must look to engage across a comprehensive set of issues of concern to relevant parties with new energy and new thinking and lay the ground for a realistic and comprehensive multilateral approach that is inclusive of all actors and all the issues at the heart of the conflict.

    2023-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9517 (2023) · source

  3. Women’s Advisory Board members also engaged with members of the Mediterranean Women Mediators Network and examined ways to reinforce women’s political role across various contexts in Syria and the region. As 2023 draws to a close, it seems no coincidence that renewed violence and popular frustrations, including protests, peaked later in the year. That took place at the same time as raised political hopes on different sides were unmet following various diplomatic moves, and momentum began to fade. That should remind us that the status quo is unsustainable, and it is unacceptable and that this conflict cannot be left unattended. It also shows that partial approaches are unlikely to address the depths of Syrians’ despair or contain the conflict sustainably.

    2023-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9517 (2023) · source

  4. In the eight years since the establishment of the Civil Society Support Room, significant progress has been made in Syrian civil society of many kinds and perspectives increasingly working together. They are acting as a source of advice and inspiration and supporting grass-roots peacebuilding and humanitarian relief and advocacy. I was extremely pleased to have an extensive exchange in a virtual town hall format with over 130 Civil Society Support Room participants from all parts of Syria, whether currently based inside Syria, in neighbouring countries or in the wider diaspora. I was equally pleased to engage with the Syrian Women’s Advisory Board this month. They remain very concerned by the potential for violence spiralling in the region and the relative lack of focus on Syria.

    2023-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9517 (2023) · source

  5. But in the meantime, we should come together to enable the reconvening of the Constitutional Committee in Geneva. Let me also remind the Council that proposals for step-for-step confidence-building measures are on the table. Such measures would benefit all Syrians and give important political impetus to the political process. Engagement, coordination and information-sharing is needed to move from ambiguous signalling to real confidence-building via coordinated, reciprocal and verifiable actions. There are concrete moves that could be made if we work in that way. My good offices are ongoing with the Syrian parties, regional players and international stakeholders in that regard. A credible political process equally depends on the participation of the widest spectrum of Syrians.

    2023-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9517 (2023) · source

  6. Despite the non-Syrian nature of the issue, I have exerted every effort to facilitate a solution, and I have appreciated the efforts of others, too. However, I can confirm from my wide consultations that there is no venue in the region that is both on offer and attracts consensus. Indeed, there is no sign that that will change anytime soon. In these circumstances, I have been appealing to all that we should find a pragmatic way forward. Let us all respect the Syrian-led, Syrian-owned, United Nations- facilitated nature of the Constitutional Committee. The commitments made by the Syrian parties when they agreed to launch the Committee — namely, to a continuous process in Geneva — should guide the way forward. Yes, we can continue to explore alternative consensus locations.

    2023-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9517 (2023) · source

  7. I had occasion to review the state of the political process and to stress the importance of moving the process forward when I met with the Syrian Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs in Geneva, and with the President of the Syrian Negotiation Commission in Doha. I carried similar messages to key stakeholders this month, meeting with senior Russian, American, Iranian, Arab, European and Japanese officials. I reminded all that international cooperation is essential to get the Syrian political process back on track. The blockage of the Constitutional Committee for a year and a half — largely over what should be a secondary issue, namely, the venue — has sent the wrong signal and has been a setback.

    2023-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9517 (2023) · source

  8. Likewise, the core concerns that displaced persons continue to cite — namely, livelihoods on the one hand and protection issues on the other — mean that refugees and internally displaced persons have not yet seen forthcoming conditions for their safe, dignified and voluntary return. Nevertheless, channels of dialogue continue, as we and our humanitarian colleagues continue to assess the Syrian Government’s announcements. The challenges on the ground are symptoms of a conflict that no one actor or existing group of actors can solve alone. Those challenges cannot be sustainably addressed without a political process that makes genuine progress towards a political solution addressing the issues contained in resolution 2254 (2015).

    2023-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9517 (2023) · source

  9. Let me issue here a strong appeal to donors to fund all pillars of the United Nations response. Following the expiry of the Council’s cross-border resolution (resolution 2672 (2023)), we must continue also to seek solutions to ensure the continued delivery of cross- border and cross-line humanitarian assistance. Meanwhile, the economy is in increasingly dire straits owing to a wide range of factors that I have outlined many times before to the Council. We are now seeing critical infrastructure, including electricity, under major strain. It is vital to ensure that any adverse effects of sanctions on ordinary Syrians be avoided and mitigated, including through continuous and active efforts by sanctioning States to counter overcompliance.

    2023-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9517 (2023) · source

  10. Any major escalation would have devastating consequences for a deeply fragile situation, where de facto authorities and the presence and actions of foreign armies are key features of the landscape. We need to see sustained de-escalation in and on Syria towards a nationwide ceasefire and a cooperative approach to countering Security Council-listed terrorist groups. We need all actors to operate in full compliance with international humanitarian law to ensure the protection of civilians and civilian infrastructure. The socioeconomic conditions in Syria are also unsustainable and on the brink. Funding is dwindling, while humanitarian needs are higher than ever — even threatening food security. We will hear more from the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs on that.

    2023-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9517 (2023) · source

  11. There have been continuing attacks by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant in the north-east and central desert region. The intensification of clashes between the Jordanian army and smugglers on the Syrian-Jordanian border involved several official announcements by Jordan about incidents on the border that led to several casualties among members of the Jordanian border guard forces. Ongoing assassinations and other security incidents also occurred as part of continued instability in the south-west. There is an urgent need for maximum restraint by all actors, both Syrian and non-Syrian. No one should delude themselves that the worrisome new normal of ongoing escalation is in any way sustainable.

    2023-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9517 (2023) · source

  12. Pro-government air strikes intensified, as did front-line clashes, with very serious incidents of shelling by government forces on Idlib. Intensified shelling was also carried out by listed terrorist group Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham and armed opposition forces, including on Nubl and Al-Zahraa in Aleppo. There were further drone attacks on government areas attributed to Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham or other actors based in Idlib, which the Government says it intercepted. Turkish drone strikes took place amid intense artillery exchanges between Turkish and armed opposition forces on one side and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) on the other. There has been a continued trend of attacks by some Arab tribes on SDF positions in Deir ez-Zor and now reports of government shelling on SDF positions as well.

    2023-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9517 (2023) · source

  13. We have seen multiple air strikes, attributed to Israel, across Syria. The Syrian Government reported that Israeli air strikes rendered Damascus and Aleppo airports non-operational. Currently, only Latakia airport is functional, affecting both civilian air traffic and United Nations humanitarian operations. We have seen multiple reports of missiles launched from southern Syria over the occupied Syrian Golan towards Israel, and of Israel Defence Forces fire, and near-daily attacks on United States positions in north-east Syria. And in parallel, violence in all theatres of Syria continues and is even escalating once again in some respects, with alarming reports of civilian casualties. In just the past few weeks, we have seen escalating violence in north-west Syria.

    2023-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9517 (2023) · source

  14. Mr. Pedersen: The year 2023 has been another very difficult year for Syria, one that saw devastating earthquakes, humanitarian needs reaching new highs, the economy plummeting to new lows and the worst violence in three years. The year also saw new diplomatic openings, but they did not lead to tangible changes on the ground for the lives of Syrians. In short, this has been another tragic year for Syrian civilians, who were killed, injured, displaced, detained and abducted in alarming numbers and who saw no tangible moves towards a better future. Instead, on top of everything else, Syrians now face the danger of regional spillover, adding further fuel to the fire. These past weeks have seen a reintensification of spillover effects from the developments in the occupied Palestinian territory and Israel.

    2023-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9517 (2023) · source

  15. That is the only way to de-escalate the current violence and protect the possibility of a political process to implement resolution 2254 (2015). Complacency cannot be the answer. If it is, then I fear the already fraying status quo may fully collapse, bringing untold misery to Syrian civilians and radiating further instability across the region, which is already at breaking point. We must de-escalate, and do so now for the sake of Syria.

    2023-10-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9459 (2023) · source

  16. Decisions that are out of Syrian hands cannot be allowed to drag Syria into another war. Thirdly, we need all actors to operate in full compliance with international humanitarian law, including the protection of civilians and civilian infrastructure and by strictly upholding the principles of distinction and proportionality. Fourthly, we need all key international actors to keep channels open and cooperate, despite the rising tensions on multiple fronts. I will make every effort to contribute to promoting that. I will continue to prioritize contacts with Astana, Arab and Western players, both individually and collectively, and I will work to foster joint efforts towards de-escalation and advancing the political process.

    2023-10-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9459 (2023) · source

  17. I also continue to engage a wide range of Syrians, including through the Civil Society Support Room and the Women’s Advisory Board, with whom I met last week and who once again demonstrated the importance of women’s full and effective participation in the political process. However, today, right now, I have four immediate messages for the Council. First, we need urgent de-escalation within Syria. We urgently need to work to reinstate calm towards a nationwide ceasefire, alongside a cooperative approach to countering Security Council-listed terrorist groups in line with international law. Secondly, we need all actors — Syrian and non-Syrian — to exercise maximum restraint. It is particularly indefensible that Syria seems to be treated as a free-for-all space in which different actors can settle their scores with one another with impunity.

    2023-10-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9459 (2023) · source

  18. Regrettably, months of intensive efforts have still not yielded consensus on the venue for resuming the Constitutional Committee, or on its substance. Nonetheless, my consultations continue. Proposals to advance step-by-step confidence-building measures are on the table. The recent regional developments have temporarily slowed down consultations on those matters, but we need to come back to them without delay. Indeed, I continue to work with the same commitment as always to advance those and all other aspects of the political process to implement resolution 2254 (2015). I have been engaging, and will continue to engage, with the Syrian Government and the Syrian Negotiations Commission.

    2023-10-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9459 (2023) · source

  19. We are now seeing the hard reality that, without real engagement or progress towards a political solution of the Syrian conflict, any stability is only wafer-thin — when it breaks apart, it can unleash mass forces of violence and instability. There is a real and growing danger of that in Syria. The only antidote would be an immediate de-escalation to stem the tide of violence and to refocus on a credible political process that charts a path forward within a framework that fully respects and restores Syria’s sovereignty, unity, independence and territorial integrity, enabling the Syrian people to realize their legitimate aspirations in line with resolution 2254 (2015). I fear complacency has set in about the lack of such a process today.

    2023-10-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9459 (2023) · source

  20. There is no meaningful movement on the file of detained, disappeared and missing persons. Refugees do not see conditions for their safe, dignified and voluntary return emerging — in fact, they are witnessing quite the opposite, with the re-emergence of extensive hostilities. I should mention that a recent Syrian Government statement on refugees contained elements that need further exploration. Popular frustration clearly remains heightened, with protests in As-Suwayda ongoing now for more than two months. Syria, the Syrian people and the wider region are in no position to endure new explosions of violent conflict in Syria, whether caused by internal or external dynamics.

    2023-10-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9459 (2023) · source

  21. Meanwhile, the Security Council-listed terrorist group Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant remains active and continues its attacks on forces, particularly in Deir ez-Zor, Raqqa and the central desert region in Homs governorate. That is what the Syrian civilian population has endured in the past month alone. Let me remind members that all of the other sources of pain and instability on which I have consistently briefed remain unchanged and as acute as ever. The Syrian economy remains in a dire and worsening state. Critical infrastructure remains degraded and destroyed. The humanitarian situation is alarming, as members will hear from the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs shortly. Reports continue of arbitrary arrests, of torture and deaths in custody.

    2023-10-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9459 (2023) · source

  22. It has caused the displacement of more than 120,000 civilians at its height and significant damage to critical services and infrastructure, including health facilities, schools and camps. Hundreds of civilians have reportedly been injured, with dozens killed, among them women and children, as well as aid workers. Following a terrorist attack on Turkish Government facilities in Ankara, the north-east has seen one of the largest escalations in years, with reports of Turkish strikes, the destruction of civilian infrastructure and reports of casualties, including civilians. The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) claimed that they subsequently killed Turkish soldiers inside Syrian territory, with reports of SDF strikes on civilian areas too.

    2023-10-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9459 (2023) · source

  23. I deeply deplore the fact that the violence has already left civilians dead, maimed and displaced in higher numbers than at any point since 2020. There has been a significant intensification of attacks on Government-controlled areas. That includes a deadly attack on the graduation ceremony of a military academy in Homs, which remains unclaimed but that the Government has attributed to terrorist organizations, as well as further attacks in subsequent days. It also includes reports of rocket attacks throughout October from Security Council-listed Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham. Hundreds were reportedly injured, and many dozens killed, among them civilians, including women and children. Pro-Government bombardment in the north-west has escalated to levels echoing those at the height of the conflict before 2020.

    2023-10-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9459 (2023) · source

  24. The Syrian Government says that some of its soldiers were killed or injured in the strikes, as were civilian workers in the strikes on the airports. Meanwhile, the United States says that its forces have faced multiple attacks by groups that it claims are backed by Iran, including on Syrian territory. Last week, the United States carried out strikes on facilities in Syria that it claims are used by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and groups that it backs. Further exchanges were reported again this morning. With the wider region at its most dangerous and tense in a very long time, fuel is being added to a tinderbox that was already beginning to ignite. Even before the regional developments, Syria was seeing the worst surge in violence in more than three years.

    2023-10-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9459 (2023) · source

  25. I say that because, on top of the violence emanating from the Syrian conflict itself, the Syrian people now face a terrifying prospect of a potential wider escalation, given the alarming developments in Israel and the occupied Palestinian territory and the region. Spillover into Syria is not just a risk; it has already begun. Air strikes attributed to Israel hit Aleppo and Damascus airports several times during the reporting period, temporarily halting the United Nations Humanitarian Air Service, which operates from those airports and services Syria’s humanitarian programmes. In addition, Israel says it has responded with artillery, mortar and air strikes towards what it said were a number of launches from Syria towards Israel on the occupied Syrian Golan, with further exchanges again this morning.

    2023-10-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9459 (2023) · source

  26. Mr. Pedersen: Since March 2020, the Syrian conflict has been in a kind of strategic stalemate, characterized by static front lines, persistent violence and sporadic escalations, with de facto authorities entrenching their control and five foreign armies present and active. However, I have long warned that this status quo leaves Syria at the risk of drifting into deeper and prolonged fragmentation, and that it involves escalation risks of the most frightening kind. My warnings have grown louder this year as we have seen growing instability and violence, exacerbated by the lack of a meaningful political process. Today I am sounding the alarm that the situation is now at its most dangerous for a long time.

    2023-10-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9459 (2023) · source

  27. It is time to act together, determined that the Syrian people see a change in their lives and a ray of hope for the future.

    2023-09-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9426 (2023) · source

  28. It would see the deepened engagement of Syrian civil society. The key circles of international effort would align priorities behind this way forward. Let me appeal to all to put aside any blocking or conditioning of this or that aspect of the United Nations effort and to provide strong support for the strategy I have outlined. In that way, we would arrest Syria’s downward slide, see incremental progress and build some trust and confidence. In doing so, we would set the scene for what is ultimately needed and what resolution 2254 (2015) calls for: a fundamental attempt at conflict resolution that respects and restores the sovereignty, unity, independence and territorial integrity of Syria and enables the Syrian people to achieve their legitimate aspirations.

    2023-09-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9426 (2023) · source

  29. There is a path forward for Syria, and I appeal to all to engage. But let me issue a stark warning. If that path is not taken, the alternative is not a grim but containable status quo; it is not a miraculous change for the better from the perspective of this or that Syrian party; it is rather a future of deterioration across humanitarian, security and institutional fronts, with significant implications for all. That is a recipe for disaster for the Syrian people and the region. And it runs contrary to the common interests of the international community for stability and progress in Syria. The way forward would see genuine confidence-building via mutual and reciprocal steps — step-for-step — while addressing protection and livelihood concerns. It would see a gradual deepening of a Syrian-owned and -led constitutional dialogue.

    2023-09-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9426 (2023) · source

  30. With regard to the Constitutional Committee, the Syrian parties have informed me that they would like to see the Constitutional Committee reconvened. The Astana format and the Arab contact group, as well as the Western capitals, all tell me that they support its resumption facilitated by the United Nations. I believe that a way forward is possible, and I will continue in that regard to stress and seek to enhance the Syrian ownership and leadership of the process, divorced of any foreign interference or external agendas. I will also seek to ensure the substantive nature of the sessions. I am continuing my consultations with the aim of issuing invitations so that we can resume the work before the end of the year. We will, of course, keep the Middle Third apprised of concrete developments.

    2023-09-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9426 (2023) · source

  31. But moving on them and actually achieving them would be a start to addressing core issues of concern to Syrians today and move us along the path of resolution 2254 (2015). There are also mechanisms and pathways that can help us move forward if they are utilized. As all know, I have been working with all parties and coordinating closely in particular with the Arab ministerial contact group on Syria to seek urgent progress on steps for steps. There are clear ideas on the table. There is an invitation to genuine engagement and to concrete discussions. This opportunity should be seized. For that to work, each side should engage with precision. We would need to coordinate reciprocal steps, and there needs to be verification.

    2023-09-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9426 (2023) · source

  32. They would put behind them any attempts to avoid dialogue with others and would be putting forward proposals designed to gain some support across the divide that exists today in Syria. At the very least, they would be working continuously and expeditiously and exploring the making of a future together. And, while all of that was being worked on, we in the United Nations would be engaging continuously with Syrian civil society, men, women and youth from within and outside Syria, on the full range of their issues, concerns and priorities and connecting them with others and the process. Progress on those fronts is not yet the political solution that Syrians need and deserve.

    2023-09-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9426 (2023) · source

  33. Meanwhile, the various de facto arrangements for calm could be embedded in a broader nationwide and sustainable ceasefire and a common approach to supporting the efforts to combat Security Council-listed terrorist groups still active in Syria. In parallel, the Syrian parties could be engaged in a process of a Syrian-led and Syrian-owned political dialogue facilitated by the United Nations, working seriously in the Constitutional Committee. They would be recommending and reacting to concrete proposals, working through the Constitution, chapter by chapter, and identifying the makings of a future social contract for all the citizens of a deeply divided country.

    2023-09-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9426 (2023) · source

  34. Syrians who have fled and fear conscription would have their concerns addressed. Syrians abroad could find more ways to access the consular services they need. Power cuts could become fewer and less prolonged, and clean water made more available. Patients could access medicines that are currently unavailable. Farmers could import more supplies needed to become self-sufficient once again. Those devastated by the earthquake could access the supplies needed for recovery. Payments for legitimate humanitarian activity could flow into Syria more easily. In short, if Syrians were to see protection concerns meaningfully addressed, donors, including those in the region, could in parallel step forward with more support and States imposing sanctions could take measures to facilitate that.

    2023-09-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9426 (2023) · source

  35. That could help us move towards a safe, calm and neutral environment that begins to create conditions that arrest further displacement; that opens up towards the safe, dignified and voluntary return of internally displaced persons and refugees; that sees real measures to address the protection and livelihood concerns of Syrian civilians; and that creates some level of trust and confidence. That will require serious commitments to be implemented to begin to address the concerns of Syrian civilians within and outside the country. Those who have been arbitrarily detained could be released, with steps taken to ensure that anyone in detention is treated in line with their right to due process. More Syrians could access their property or the birth, marriage and death certificates and other documents that they desperately need.

    2023-09-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9426 (2023) · source

  36. Beyond that, we must focus urgently on political movement to change the dynamics that I have just described in quite some detail. Doing that requires a shift in our mindset, which I know is a big ask. But, as the Secretary-General told the General Assembly last week, politics is compromise; diplomacy is compromise; effective leadership is compromise. The Syrian parties and all key international actors need to entertain compromise in a more fundamental way than many have done do to date. If they do, it will be possible to act in parallel and urgently reverse negative economic, security and political trends and relaunch a Syrian-led and -owned political process, as called for in resolution 2254 (2015). But to do that we will need concrete moves with contributions from all sides — step for step.

    2023-09-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9426 (2023) · source

  37. Meanwhile — and as we will later hear more on this from the representative of the Office for the Coordination for Humanitarian Affairs — I take note of the resumption of United Nations humanitarian deliveries from Türkiye into north-west Syria through the Bab Al-Hawa crossing. All modalities, including cross-line, must be utilized. Resources are desperately needed too for all pillars, including enhancing early recovery in the humanitarian response plan and for refugees and host countries. We also need to ensure that any adverse effects of sanctions on ordinary Syrians are avoided and mitigated, including through the full use of existing humanitarian exemptions and efforts by States imposing sanctions to counter overcompliance.

    2023-09-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9426 (2023) · source

  38. It should be no surprise that there are new manifestations of popular frustration in Syria. For well over a month, protests have continued in Al-Suwayda governorate, with participants citing economic, social and political grievances and demands. In video footage, we have seen many placards calling for the implementation of resolution 2254 (2015). Let me stress the need to respect the right to peaceful protest in all areas of Syria and the need for protests to remain peaceful. Let me also stress the need for an end to all violence against civilians, for full respect of international human rights and international humanitarian law and for work towards a nationwide ceasefire.

    2023-09-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9426 (2023) · source

  39. This has included some two weeks of armed clashes between Arab tribes and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Deir ez-Zor; armed opposition groups attempting to advance into SDF-held territory, prompting further clashes and exchanges of fire between the SDF and the armed opposition and Türkiye, as well as Turkish and pro-Government airstrikes; Security-Council listed terrorist group Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham conducting multiple cross-line raids in north-west Syria, with an allied group seeking to take and hold territory from the Government, challenging the March 2020 Russian-Turkish ceasefire lines; a dramatic escalation of pro-government shelling and airstrikes on north-west Syria; further reports of Israeli airstrikes; further reports of Jordanian airstrikes; further security incidents in the south-west; reports of infighting among pro-government forces in the north- east and among armed opposition groups and within Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham in the north-west; and further reports of Da’esh attacks.

    2023-09-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9426 (2023) · source

  40. Half the population is food- insecure, and more than 600,000 children under five are stunted. Doctors and nurses earn less than $20 per month — not enough to cover even transport. Many essential health-care workers are leaving the country. Whole sectors are in danger of being hollowed out. Meanwhile, instead of conditions being created for the displaced to return voluntarily and in safety and dignity, civilians continue to be killed and injured by violence, and tens of thousands were displaced last month. Indeed, we have seen in this period some of the most serious threats to the relative calm that has prevailed since 2020.

    2023-09-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9426 (2023) · source

  41. Gaps of political will, the distance between substantive positions of the parties, deep distrust and the challenging international climate all play a part in the deadlock. The suffering and the sense of hopelessness among Syrians are deepening. We cannot simply accept the status quo, because it will get worse and worse — it could well unravel, and this will lead to new challenges. We need the political process to start to deliver on the ground and to deliver hope. We see this when we turn to the alarming trends on the ground. Let me just remind the Council: after a dozen years of conflict, corruption and mismanagement, external economic shocks, illicit drug trafficking and sanctions have collectively seen the Syrian economy go into a free fall. This year, the Syrian pound halved in value, while food prices doubled.

    2023-09-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9426 (2023) · source

  42. Mr. Pedersen: I have engaged in several weeks of intensive diplomacy on the subject of the Syrian Arab Republic in Geneva, Beirut, Damascus and New York, meeting with the Syrian Government and the Syrian Negotiations Commission several times, and all key international actors. In parallel, my Deputy Special Envoy Najat Rochdi, and our team, have been engaging with Syrians widely, through the Women’s Advisory Board, which recently met in Rome, through consultations with Civil Society Support Room participants in Istanbul, and through holding virtual engagements with actors on the ground, including from Deir ez-Zor and As-Suwayda. As the Secretary-General told the General Assembly, the Syrian Arab Republic is in ruins, and peace remains remote. Tragically, a comprehensive solution of the Syrian conflict remains elusive.

    2023-09-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9426 (2023) · source

  43. As international attention and funding for Syria wane, the situation will become even more unsustainable. The only path out of this is a political process that involves the Syrian parties themselves, in line with resolution 2254 (2015).

    2023-08-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9403 (2023) · source

  44. Existing members of the Women’s Advisory Board have provided sound advice, and I remain extremely grateful for their efforts. It is deeply troubling that, for over a year, the intra-Syrian political process has been in deep freeze. A political process is the right of the Syrian people — they are entitled to chart their own destiny. And a political process is a necessity. Syria is a country and people remain divided. There is no military victory on the horizon for any one actor, and the terrible effects of conflict continue to cascade across the region. We are all paying a heavy price for the conflict — first and foremost the Syrian people, most of whom have lost close to everything in this past decade, but also the region and the international community at large.

    2023-08-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9403 (2023) · source

  45. On previous occasions, they also relayed the risks of persecution and harassment and extortion that they face in their struggle to seek information about their loved ones. Syrians have the right to be provided full and transparent information about the fate and whereabouts of the detained and missing. We will continue to consult widely on that and other issues with Syrian civil society and Syrian women, including through the Civil Society Support Room and the Women’s Advisory Board, to ensure that their legitimate aspirations are understood and ultimately met. I am also pleased to report to the Council that the process of seeking new members for the Syrian Women’s Advisory Board through a process of rotation has begun, and we look forward to concluding this process in the coming months.

    2023-08-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9403 (2023) · source

  46. Earlier this month, I had the pleasure of having an in-depth exchange with the Truth and Justice Charter representatives, who have been among the key drivers towards the General Assembly’s decision to create the Independent Institution on Missing Persons in the Syrian Arab Republic (resolution 77/301). For those families and victims, the decision is a bittersweet milestone. It underlines the momentous scale of the problem: tens of thousands of men, women and children are detained or missing, with ongoing abductions and arbitrary detentions still happening across the country. They told me how families continue to learn about their loved ones’ deaths in custody only when civil registry records are updated, after having waited years with hopes of seeing their loved ones return.

    2023-08-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9403 (2023) · source

  47. That was also an issue highlighted when the Arab contact group met last week. It remains to be seen whether the Syrian Government is ready to do more to address the very real and continuing protection concerns. And for their part, donors could do more to address the concerns all Syrians have about basic services and livelihoods. A step-for-step dynamic in that regard could begin to change realities on the ground for all Syrians, including the displaced, and build confidence and political space for a broader set of issues related to resolution 2254 (2015). The close coordination of the Syrian authorities with the United Nations would be a cornerstone in that regard.

    2023-08-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9403 (2023) · source

  48. Of course, I will continue to work with Arab players, the Astana players and the Western players too — all of whom have contributions to make towards supporting a Syrian-owned and Syrian-led political process. It is a simple fact of Syria that no one actor or group of actors can determine the outcome of the conflict or bring about the kind of steps needed for a political solution to emerge. A political solution will be possible only with steps from a broad range of different players and genuine verification too. The political process must be much more than just the Constitutional Committee, as Council members well know. I have long sought to bring about movement incrementally towards a safe, calm and neutral environment in Syria — something that obviously overlaps heavily with the question of refugees and the internally displaced.

    2023-08-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9403 (2023) · source

  49. That is one of a number of alternative venues that has been suggested for the Constitutional Committee. Let me stress that I continue to seek to facilitate consensus to overcome the issues that have prevented the Constitutional Committee from meeting in Geneva and to ensure that it resumes and makes credible progress. Earlier today, I spoke with the Syrian Foreign Minister, as well as with the head of the Syrian Negotiations Commission, and I look forward to continuing those discussions. I also look forward to briefing the middle third civil society participants on any consensus that may emerge. Let me just add that I continue to welcome enhanced attention from the region on Syria. In the past few days, I have spoken with the Foreign Ministers of Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia and had contact with senior Turkish officials.

    2023-08-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9403 (2023) · source

  50. But — and I emphasize this — I strongly believe that the status quo is untenable and that there are things that can be done to advance the implementation of resolution 2254 (2015). I welcome the fact that reconvening the Constitutional Committee is a clear point of consensus among many key actors. It is important that the Committee resume, continue, deepen and gradually build some trust and move forward on substance — a first move of many. I and my team are fully engaged in the effort to unblock the impasse and find a way forward on substance and working methods. During the reporting period, the Arab contact group met in Cairo with the Syrian Foreign Minister and expressed its aspiration to see the next meeting of the Constitutional Committee in the Sultanate of Oman with United Nations facilitation before the end of the year.

    2023-08-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9403 (2023) · source