YouSaid · the spoken record

Perkins

lines on the record

116

first

1992-05-21

most recent

1993-01-29

sittings or episodes

19

sources

un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

1. “The United States supports the draft resolution before the Council and believes it accurately reflects the situation in Angola, clearly outlines the steps the warring parties must take and provides the United Nations with the authority and flexibility to fulfil its responsibilities. It is particularly appropriate for the Secretary-General to adapt the size and scope of UNAVEM II operations to existing political and security conditions. In supporting this draft resolution, however, we note that the Secretary-General,.UNAVEM II and concerned nations cannot impose peace where the will for peace does not exist. Lasting peace will be possible only when all Angolans, particularly the responsible leadership of the parties to the Bicesse Accords, reject the pursuit of power through violence.”

   1993-01-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3168 (1993) · source

2. “Special Representative Anstee deserves particular commendation for her tireless efforts to bring about this important step towards national reconciliation. The United States will continue to support fully the essential role of the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II) as a mutually respected and impartial arbiter in Angola. Miss Anstee and members of UNAVEM II have performed this role admirably, often under difficult and hostile conditions. Unfortunately, deteriorating security has increasingly limited the ability of UNAVEM II to travel through and monitor outlying areas.”

   1993-01-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3168 (1993) · source

3. “My delegation wishes to thank you, Mr. President, for your leadership, and also to express appreciation to Ambassador Gharekhan for his leadership during December, The United States strongly condemns the return to violence in Angola. The use of force has indeed undermined the historic accomplishments of the Angolan people in last year's elections and prolonged the violent agony of Angola and its citizens. The Government and UNITA are, more than ever, together responsible for choosing whether to seek a peaceful solution or to subject the Angolan people to continued warfare. We are encouraged by the discussions in Addis Ababa between representatives of UNITA and the Government, and we strongly urge both parties to establish a regular dialogue.”

   1993-01-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3168 (1993) · source

4. “We call on all parties to avoid unilateral actions - be they deportations or the terrorist acts of violence for which Hamas has claimed credit - that raise tensions. Such actions only complicate the task of pursuing peace. As we have stated in the past, the United States regards the phrase "all the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem," (resolution 799 (1992), para. 2) which appears in the resolution, as being merely demographically and geographically descriptive and not indicative of sovereignty.”

   1992-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3151 (1992) · source

5. “We regret that the Government of Israel took the step of going ahead with the deportations. By doing so, it plays into the hands of those whose goal is to scuttle the peace process. It also imposes an unfair burden on Lebanon. We have therefore voted in favour of the resolution, which calls on Israel to refrain from deporting any Palestinian civilians from the occupied teritories. While we have consistently condemned deportation as we do now, we cannot ignore and must equally strongly condemn the brutal murders of Israelis by Ramas which preceded these deportations and which are part of a deliberate Strategy to undermine the peace process. We are deeply troubled by the recent increase in violence in the occupied territories and by Israeli and Palestinian casualties, including the recent murder of the Israeli policeman by Hamas.”

   1992-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3151 (1992) · source

6. “The United States clearly believes that the deportation of individuals from the occupied territories is a contravention of article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention as it pertains to the treatment of inhabitants of these territories. My Government also believes charges of wrongdoing should be brought before a court of law based on evidence to be argued in a fair trial, which would afford full judicial process. As my predecessor stated before the Council last January, and as my Government has stated on several occasions since, we have repeatedly urged the Government of Israel immediately and permanently to cease deportations as a method of punishment and to comply fully with the Fourth Geneva Convention in all of the territories that it has occupied since 5 June 1967.”

   1992-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3151 (1992) · source

7. “This point is, of course, in no way contradicted, but is indeed reinforced, by General Assembly resolution 43/177. We believe in listening to all points of view, but not in a manner that requires violations of our provisional rules of procedure. In particular, the United States does not agree with the practice of the Security Council that recently appears selectively to try to enhance the prestige of those who wish to speak in the Council through a departure from the provisional rules of procedure. We consider this practice to be without legal foundation and to constitute, indeed, an abuse of our rules. For all these reasons, the United States requests that the terms of the proposed invitation be put to a vote. Of course, the United States will vote against the proposal.”

   1992-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3151 (1992) · source

8. “The United States has consistently taken the position that under the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council the only legal basis on which the Council may grant a hearing to persons speaking on behalf of non-governmental entities is rule 39. For four decades the United States has supported a generous interpretation of rule 39, and it would not have objected had this matter been appropriately raised under rule 39. We are, however, opposed to special and ad hoc departures from orderly procedure. The United States consequently opposes granting to the Palestine Liberation Organization the same rights to participate in the proceedings of the Security Council as those that would be granted if that organization were representing a Member State of the United Nations.”

   1992-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3151 (1992) · source

9. “My Government sees no justification for any departure from that practice. Further, there is nothing in resolutions adopted by the General Assembly that would warrant a change in Security Council practices. It is also clear that the General Assembly resolutions are, of course, not binding upon the Security Council. General Assembly resolution 43/177, which purported to change the designation of the PLO Mission, did so "without prejudice to the observer status and functions of the Palestine Liberation Organization within the United Nations system, in conformity with relevant United Nations resolutions and practice". That resolution does not constitute recognition of any State of Palestine. Like many other Members of the United Nations, the United States does not recognize such a State.”

   1992-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3151 (1992) · source

10. “The United States, as it normally does when this question is considered, will request a vote on the proposal before the Security Council, and the United States will vote against it on two grounds, First, we believe that the Council does not have before it a valid request to speak. Secondly, the United States maintains that the Observer of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) should be granted permission to speak only if the request complies with rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure, It is unwarranted and unwise for the Council to break with its own practice and rules in this regard. As all members of the Council are aware, it is a long-established practice that Observers do not have the right to speak in the Security Council upon their own request. Rather, a request must be made on the Observer's behalf by a Member State.”

    1992-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3151 (1992) · source

11. “Finally, I would also like to note my Government's appreciation for the energetic and highly effective efforts of the Secretary-General's Special Representative and his staff over the last few months.”

    1992-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3149 (1992) · source

12. “In this regard, we were pleased to participate in the conference that the Italian Government convened in Rome this week to identify resources for the transition to peace in Mozambique. On this occasion, I would also like to congratulate the Mozambican Government and RENAMO for the patience, dedication and political will they demonstrated in negotiating an end to their longstanding conflict. My Government. has been encouraged by the evident determination both sides have demonstrated to making the 4 October agreement work, and we urge both sides to continue to work together to iron out any disputes that may arise during the implementation process.”

    1992-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3149 (1992) · source

13. “The United States is proud to have played a part in the negotiations that led to the Peace Agreement of 4 October and that were superbly mediated by the Italian Government and the Community of Sant' Egidio. We shall continue to be involved in the peace process through our active participation in the variou: United-Nations-chaired commissions, based in Maputo, that were established under the terms of the Peace Agreement. In conjunction with other donors, we shall also provide a share of the resources required to carry out the transition to peace ~ including support for elections, repatriation of refugees, and the economic reintegration of demobilized soldiers and displaced persons.”

    1992-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3149 (1992) · source

14. “This draft resolution gives the United Nations the tools it needs to supervise the cease-fire, monitor the demobilization process and provide security for the delivery of sorely needed humanitarian assistance. I would like to put on the record two of my Sovernment's understandings of how matters will evolve pursuant to this draft resolution. First, we foresee a phased introduction of peace-keeping forces into Mozambique. Experience and logistical constraints will govern how quickly this needs to be done, but proper phasing will result in an effective and economic operation. Secondly, we hope that the regular reporting by the Secretary-General to the Security Council referred to in operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution will occur at least every three months.”

    1992-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3149 (1992) · source

15. “Mr, PERKINS (United States of America): The United States welcomes and strongly supports this draft resolution authorizing a United Nations peace-keeping operation in Mozambique. Approval of the draft resolution will be a tremendous boost to the cause of peace in this war-torn nation and will greatly facilitate international efforts to address the severe humanitarian crisis there. We would like to thank the Secretary-General and the Secretariat for the work they have put into producing this comprehensive report on the eituation in Mozambique. As the Secretary-General's report amply demonstrates, the active involvement of the United Nations is essential to the effective implementation of the Mozambique Preace Agreement of 4 October.”

    1992-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3149 (1992) · source

16. “The worid will seek solutions that can be found only by nations banding together, led by the United Nations. In these endeavours you will be able to count on the support of the United States. We must be prepared to respond - together - to solve the great moral and humanitarian challenges that lie ahead.”

    1992-12-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3145 (1992) · source

17. “The most obvious beneficiaries will be the innocent victims of anarchy and famine. Moreover, this courageous decision dy the Security Council strengthens the United Nations and affirms the ideals upon which it is based. The international community in the post-cold-war era is already being confronted with problems which are distinctly different from the threat that hung over us for the past 45 years. Thare can be no simple solution to these problems. But in the case of Somalis, and in other cases we are sure to face in the future, it is important that we send this unambiguous message: the international comrunity has the intent and will to act decisively regarding peace-keeping problems that threaten international stability. The post-cold-war world is likely to hoid other Somalias in store for us.”

    1992-12-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3145 (1992) · source

18. “The international community needs to be generous in its contributions - military, logistic and financial - to this great humanitarian enterprise, The United Nations and the world comnunity may offer advice or assistance to the Somalis as they heal the wounds from years of bitter conflict. But it is for the Somali people to decide their own future. The secure environment that we will establish - and this endeavour must and will succeed - will allow Somalis to devise their own formula for reconciliation. By acting today to provide a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian relief to the people of Somalia, the Council has once again taken an essential step to restore international peace and security. Much else remains to be done by the Somali people with the assistance of many agencies.”

    1992-12-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3145 (1992) · source

19. “The Secretary-General of the United Nations, the various specialized United Nations agencies working in Somalia, and United Nations Special Representative for Somalia Ambassador Ismat Kittani, who is now in Addis Ababa meeting with Somali representatives, have been working with tremendous dedication to provide relief to those in need. The international relief agencies and a multitude of private voluntary organizations have been at the forefront of a truly international affort to help the inhabitants of a country being ripped asunder by violence. We pay tribute to them all. We want to be at their side as partners in a humanitarian efforc. The task before the world community is challenging. Relief must be followed closely by rehabilitation and by recoastruction.”

    1992-12-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3145 (1992) · source

20. “Such a step will also entail unambiguous support of the United Nations in enabling it to confront challenges to international peace and stability. In offering to contribute to the effort authurized by this resolution, the United States has no other objective. Once deployed, our military forces will remain in Somalia no longer than is necessary. We look forward to the early transition to an effective United Nations peace-keeping force. The sooner outside military forces can develop a secure environment, the sooner the Somali people can begin to reconstruct their own society. Military intervention is no substitute for political reconciliation, and that task belongs firinly in the hands of Somalis.”

    1992-12-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3145 (1992) · source

21. “While the resolution authorizes the use of "all necessary means" (8/24880, para, 10), one point should be clear: our mission is essentially a peaceful one, and we will endorse the use of force only if and when we decide it is necessary to accomplish our objective. By acting in response to the tragic events in Somalia, the international community is also taking an important step in developing a strategy for dealing with the potential disorder and conflicts of the post-cold-war world. This step must entail unprecedented levels of cooperation amongst the international community in response to urgent humanitarian needs and to Peace-kuepiag, utilising our respective miijitary forces, sf necessary, to do so. Cooperation w'll have to occur on a case-by-case basis, given the complexity of the post-cold-war order.”

    1992-12-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3145 (1992) · source

22. “On behalf of my delegation, Y should like, Sir, to express my congratulations on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for the moath of December. You will have our fullest cooperation during this time. Also, my thanks go to Ambassador Erddes for his very wise leadership during the month of November and for the great amount of work done. The vote of the United States for the resolution before us expresses our commitment to resolving the human tragedy in Somalia - a crisis of immense, almost indescribable proportions. The measures authorized by the resolution and supported by my Government have one objective: to achieve a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian relief to the Somali people in the areas of greatest need.”

    1992-12-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3145 (1992) · source

23. “We believe this is a vitally important provision. Moreover, presidential elections must be held without prejudice to the parties of the Supreme National Council, UNTAC and the constituent assembly, as expressed by the terms of the Paris Agreements. Finally, we wish to commend the Secretary-General's Special Representative and all UNTAC elements in Cambodia for their outstanding efforts under difficult circumstances. We also express once again our appreciation to the President cf the Supreme National Council, His Royal Highness Prince Sihanouk, for his continuing efforts to resolve the aifferences among the Cambodian parties, and we ask that he continue to fulfil his essential role as we continue to work for the lasting peace his country so much deserves.”

    1992-11-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3143 (1992) · source

24. “In view of those events, it is more vital than ever that the United Nations maintain its firm commitment to implementing the Cambodian settlement and to ensuring that elections are heid on schedule in May. We want the Cambodian people to know that they can depend upon the United Nations to take the measures necessary to ensure that they will have an opportunity to determine their own future in a free and fair election. In that regard, the cut-off date of 31 January for opening areas to elcctions is of particular importance. In voting in favour of this resolution, the United States also wishes to make clear its position on the question of presidential elections. We note that the resolution stipulates that any presidential elections must be held in conjunction with constituent-assembly elections.”

    1992-11-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3143 (1992) · source

25. “Mr, PERKINS (United States of America): The United States vote in favour of this resolution reflects our growing concern over the situation in Cambodia and our determination to support fully the United Nations efforts in Cambodia. We continue to be gravely concerned by the failure of the Party of Democratic Kampuchea to carry out the provisions of relevant Security Council resolutions or to meot its solemn obligations under the Paris Agreements. We are also deeply disturbed by the apparent increase in violations of the cease-fire, by the recent surge in serious attacks against members of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), by serious violations of basic human rights and by the increase in political intimidation and violence.”

    1992-11-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3143 (1992) · source

26. “The Council may hear more such rhetoric today. Without full and unconditional iraqi complizcnce with all relevant resolutions, my Government sees no reason to lift sanctions. The Iraqi delegation now has the opportunity to provide authoritative answers and to accept unconditionally all the relevant resolutions passed by the Council. Even more important, Iraq now has the opportunity to show by its actions that it will meet its obligatioas.”

    1992-11-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3139 (1992) · source

27. “Thus the repression and human deprivation in Irag today may be even more critical than before. The Council has sought every peaceful means to redress the suffering imposed by Baghdad on the Iraqi people. For this reason, and to redress other suffering, my Government included in resolution 778 (1992) measures that permit the use of overseas Iraqi oi) assets to fund the United Nations humanitarian programmes, the Special Commission and the compensation fund that benefits victims of the Iragi invasion. As you said, Mr. President, in your opening statement, it is imperative that Irag fully comply with all relevant Security Council resolutions. The Council expects no lesa. The Council heard many Iraqi promises and allegations on 11 and 12 March, The Council has received meny contentious letters from the Iragi Government since then.”

    1992-11-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3139 (1992) · source

28. “If food is not reaching the needy in Irag, it is because the Iragi regime has diverted food imports to the military and security forces which allow Saddam Eussein to maintain his brutal dictatorship. Resolutions 706 (1991) and 712 (1991) offered iraq the opportunity to sell oi1 to finance purchases of food, medicine end humanitarian supplies. As long ago as last February, the Council deplored Iraq's decision to discontinue discussions on how to implement those resolutions. At that time, the Council noted that Iraq had chosen not to meet the essential needs of its civilian population and therefore bore full responsibility for humanitarian suffering in the country. Food shortages and other deprivations are not static factors; they are dynamic problems whose effects become serious over time.”

    1992-11-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3139 (1992) · source

29. “Resolution 587 (1991) authorized the import of goods to meet essential civilian needs, as approved by the sanctions Committee. The sanctions committee has worked long and diligently to note food shipments and to distinguish essential humanitarian needs from Iraqi attempts to violate sanctions. Since the imposition of the sanctions regime, the Committee has approved for export to Iraq over 13 million tons of food and significant quantities of medicine, including over 20 tons of antibiotics. The sanctions Committee recognizes that our dispute is not with the people of Iraq, and as a result it has approved a wide range of goods to meet essential civilian needs. Over 127,000 tons of seed and 500 agricultural tractors have also been approved to help the Iraqi people produce their own food.”

    1992-11-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3139 (1992) · source

30. “There have been no major Iraqi military operations south of the 32nd parallel since the monitoring zone was announced, nor has there bean any major increase in Iraqi forces in the South. Nevertheless, Bagdhad's repression by other means continues in the South. We and the international community deplore this. The Iraqi delegation may tell us today of human suffering brought about by economic sanctions established under resolution 661 (1990), but the Councii will recall that medical supplies have never been forbidden from import into Iraq. The ombargo on foud came to an end in April 1991 and large quantities were subsequently imported, but the Iragi regime has callovsly manipulated food distribution as au instrument of repression.”

    1992-11-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3139 (1992) · source

31. “President Bush announced Operation Southern Watch on 26 August in response to graphic proof of brutality, including the strafing of villages. Operation Southern Watch monitors the implementation of resolution 688 (1991) and deters the moat serious forms of repression by the Iraqi military suthorities. Monitoring is facilitated by a no~fly zone. As President Bush said in August, we are prepared to consider additional steps if the Iragi regime continues to violate resolution 688 (1991) or other Security Council resolutions. Operation Southern Watch has been very successful. The Iraqi regime has stopped using aircraft to attack its civilian population, particularly in and around the southern marsh areas.”

    1992-11-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3139 (1992) · source

32. “in August he spoke of deplorable health conditions, Coverament-spossored food bieckades, air attacks and artillery bombardments in the southern marshes. He also reported incidents of forced relocations and torture. Mr. van der Stoel concluded with the words, "if a full implementation of resolution 688 (1991) cannot be ensured, many thousands of innocent people are in danger of losing their lives. I express the hope that the members of the Council will keep this in mind in their cousideration of this matter." (S/PV.3105. p,. 23) Within weeks of Mr. van der Stoel's report to the Council, the United States and its coalition partners acted against Bagdhad''s repression of civilian communities in southern Iraq.”

    1992-11-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3139 (1992) · source

33. “Unfortunately, we have every reason to doubt that the Iraqi regime will respect fully the terms of the Memorandum of Understanding signed on 22 October 1992. Although the Memorandum of Understanding is now one month old, only a trickle of relief has reached those most in need of help. Over 100 security incidents affecting United Nations personnel in Iraq during a six-month period earlier this year give little cause for confidence that Bagdhad will act responsibly. Iraq's human-rights abuses are not limited to the North. Early in August, the Council heard a disturbing presentation by the Special Rapporteur of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Mr. Max van der Stoel.”

    1992-11-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3139 (1992) · source

34. “'The Council acted to confront Bagdhad's mistreatment of its innocent civilians, especially in northern Iraq. Since then, the international response, including Operation Provide Comfort and extensive humanitarian aid, has eased some of the suffering in the North. The Bagdhad regime's response has been an economic blockade of the North. The blockade has deprived the region of goods, such as food and fuei, essential to the very survival of its people. My Government has grave concerns about the risk of famine in northern Iraq this winter. The United Nations and the international community have taken it upon themselves to help people in the North, people who are entitled to far better treatment from the regime in Bagdhad.”

    1992-11-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3139 (1992) · source

35. “When the demarcation of the land boundary is completed, we expect the Iraqi regime to accept in full the Commission's work. Iraq has not fulfilled other obligations of resolution 687 (1991). 'These 4nclude repatriation of detained Kuwaiti and third-country nationals, as well as the return of Kuwaiti property. Baghdad coatinues to refuse to cooperate on these issues. The regime also continues to deny unrestricted access by the International Committee of the Red Cross to detention facilities ia Iraq. Baghdad refuses to investigate lists of missing detainees submitted by Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Nor has Iraq yet reported effectively on what tracing steps 4t is taking on individual inquiry files. The Iraqi regime's cruel treatment of its own civilian population led the Council to adopt resolution 688 (1991) on 5 April 1992.”

    1992-11-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3139 (1992) · source

36. “The Irag-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission concluded its seventh session on 16 October. This was the second successive session in which Iraq declined to participate. The Iraqi Foreign Minister's letter of 21 May 1992 was most disturbing. That perplexing message, as the President of the Council noted, recalled past Iraqi Claims to Kuwait without noting Baghdad's subsequent repudiation of those claims. I need not remind the Council that the boundary issue and indeed Iraq's challenge to Kuwaiti sovereignty reach to the very cause of the Gulf war. In response, the Council, on 26 August, adopted resolution 773 (1992), which emphasized the importance of the Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission and underscored the inviolability of the boundary.”

    1992-11-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3139 (1992) · source

37. “The letter also questioned the Special Commisaion's operation of surveillance helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft. These Iragi views raise further doubts about Iraq's readiness to comply fully with all relevant resolutions of the Security Council. We are deeply concerned about the prospects for ongoing monitoring and verification in Irag. That process is essential to the future of d4nternational security in the Gulf region. Once again, we object to, and will not countenance, an Iraqi belief that Baghdad can decide for itself what this Council intended by its resolutions. Weapons of mass destruction are but one aspect of Iraq's failure to comply with resolution 687 (1991). Even though boundary issues are not scheduled to be settled until next year, the Iragi record thus far is disappointing.”

    1992-11-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3139 (1992) · source

38. “Although some progress has been made since March, Irag has left many gaps in its declarations to the Special Commission and to the IAEA. Despite constant requests by United Nations inspectors, Iraq continues to refuse to supply the Special Commission and the IAEA with lists of foreign suppliers of equipment for its programmes with respect to weapons of mass destruction. These lists are essential; without them the Special Commission and the IAEA will not have the proper baseline for long-term monitoring and compliance. Even more worcisome is the Iraqi call stated in the Foreign Minister's letter of 28 October for the Security Council to conduct a radical review of resolutions 707 (1991) and 715 (1992), which demand that Iraq allow full access to all sites and accept a long-term monitoring regime.”

    1992-11-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3139 (1992) · source

39. “The Secretary-General's report noted that the Special Commission's plan for ongoing monitoring and verification, a plan drawn up well over a year ago, cannot go forward, The report indicates that the impasse on implementation of the plan is caused by Baghdad's refusal to take the essential steps, including the full, final ond compiete disclosure - as required by resolution 687 (1991) - of all aspects of Iragi programmes to devalop weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres, Similarly, the Director General of the IAEA reported last month (8/24722) that long-term monitoring will be effective only when Irsq provides information required by Council] resolutions.”

    1992-11-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3139 (1992) · source

40. “Despite this, we have seen iittle improvement in Iraqi cooperation since March, Irag's record is shameful and confirms the importance of the provisions of resolution 687 (1991) and resolution 715 (1991) which describe the ongoing monitoring and verification of Baghdad's compliance with resolution 687 (1991). We regret that Baghdad's performance to date indicates that the outiook for Iragi cooperation is not promising. Last month the Council received a report from the Secretary-General (8/24661) on the Special Commission's plan for monitoring Iraqi compliance with section C of resolution 687 (1991). 'That report cited major shortcomings in an Iraqi response of 27 June 1992 on future compliance verificat'on.”

    1992-11-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3139 (1992) · source

41. “The President of the Council declared on 6 July that Iraq's denial of access was a material and unacceptable breach of resolution 687 (1991), which established the cease-fire and set other conditions essential to the restoration of peace and security in the region, The Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency have provided the Council with much technical information about Iraq's weapons-of-mass-destruction programmes. At the Council's March meeting, we outlined clearly the extent of Iraq's weapons programmes. That meeting also revealed that Iraq sought to keep hidden many of its weapons-of-mass-destruction facilities.”

    1992-11-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3139 (1992) · source

42. “Irag divulges information about weapons programmes only after confronted with incontrovertible proof uncovered by the Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections. This record is not compliance. In July we witnessed an extraordinary example of Iraq's intransigence concerning its weapons of mass destruction. The Iragi regime prevented a United Nations Special Commission team from carrying out an inspection of the Agriculture Ministry in Baghdad. Resolutions 687 (1991) and 707 (1991) had given the Special Commission the unqualified right to immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to any site the Special Commigsion suspected of being related to Iraq's weapons-of-mass-destruction programme.”

    1992-11-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3139 (1992) · source

43. “Many of these resolutions were necessary because, from the first, Iraq has evaded its obligations. In a letter to the Council on 28 October 1992 the Foreign Minister of Iraq challenged the implementation of resvlution 687 (1991). The United States reje cs that challenge. if the Gulf region is tu enjoy peace and security, Irag's weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles must he permanently - and I underline the word "permanently" - eliminated. This goal requires Iraq's cooperation in two areas: first, the full and complete disclosure of {ts weapons programmes and, secondly, long-term monitoring and verification. As we said to the Council in March, an unfortunate pattern has developed. Iraq makes declarations of minimal content, declarations which are Clearly meant to misinform, misdirect and conceal.”

    1992-11-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3139 (1992) · source

44. “We must know when Iraq will comply fully and completely with all the relevant resolutions of the Council. The Council should hold this delegation today to the strictest standards of accountability. We should not hesitate to pose further questions to the Iraqi delegation after the presentation of its initial statement. On 3 April 1991 the Council adopted resolution 687 (1991). This resolution waa one of the most important actions ever taken by the Council, responding to the hope of mankind to make the United Nations an instrument of peace and security. Resolution 687 (1991) required Irag to take precise steps on many issues. Iraq formally notified the Security Counci] by letter on 6 April 1991 (8/22456) of its acceptance of the resolution, Subsequently, a series of resolutions spelled out Iraq's obligations in Getail.”

    1992-11-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3139 (1992) · source

45. “As the previous speaker noted, your recitation, Mr. President, was complete indeed. Irag's invasion of Kuwait on Z August 1990 launched this Council's unprecedented effort to restore international peace and security in the Gulf. My Government notes that due to Iraqi intransigence the Council's efforts must continue undiminished. More than two years after Iraq's unprovoked aggression against Kuwait, and despite the concerted will of the world community, the Council still sees its requirements honoured only partially. We have before us today a senior Iraqi delegation. Its members understand full well the events that have brought ur to our meeting. On 11 and 12 March the Council received a similar delegation. In March we were not provided with authoritative, credible and respoasible answers. Today we expect such answers.”

    1992-11-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3139 (1992) · source

46. “We owe ECOWAS our full support as it considers means for pressuring the Liberian warring factions to implement the peace plan calling for encampment, disarmament and free and fair elections.”

    1992-11-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3138 (1992) · source

47. “it is imperative that the regional peace-keeping effort in Liberia succeed. Abandonment of the regional peace process could lead to resumption of warfare and probable humanitarian catastrophe. A bloody takeover by force would deal a setback to democratic aspirations throughout Africa and would lead to the conclusion that might makes right. Dissidents throughout the region, many of whom maintain connections to Charles Taylor, would be encouraged to take their battle into the streets rather than working through the political process. If the united ECOWAS effort fails in Liberia, the regional organisation is unlikely to venture into the difficult realm of peace-keeping and conflict resolution in the future, and pressure will build rapidly for direct United States or United Nations intervention.”

    1992-11-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3138 (1992) · source

48. “Their effort has been endorsed by the Organization of African Unity and the United Eations, but ECOWAS countries have borne the vast majority of the expense of 'fielding the peace-keeping force in Liberia. In addition to providing material support zer ECOWAS and humanitarian support tor Liberians, tha United States stands ready to help support demobilization of al1 Liberian factions and to help ensure that the proposed elections sre genuinely free and fair. To ensure real progress, hovever, comprehensive disarmament is necessary. Our experience in Angola, Cambodia and elsewnere amply Gemonstrates that peace without disarmanent is tenuous at best. This is especially true in Liberia, where proliferation of guns is accompanied by indisciplins, drugs and widespread human-rights abuses.”

    1992-11-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3138 (1992) · source

49. “ECOMOG remeina virtually the only force in Liberia unblemished by serious human-rights abuses, and is the one military force not motivated by personal aggrandizemant. Clearly, the ECOMOG troops would like to return to their home countries, but ECOMOG remains critical to peace, free elections and regional stability. Although the dispatch of peace-keeping forces to Liberia was a decision taken by the ECOWAS Governments on their own initiative, we have supported this effort from its inception. In addition to more than $200 million in humanitarian assistance to victims of the Liberian conflict, we have provided a@ totai of $8.6 million in assistance to ECOWAS directly, and $18.75 million in bilateral military grants to ECOWAS member States to support ECOMOG.”

    1992-11-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3138 (1992) · source

50. “Much of the progress of the past year in reaching a political settlement hes bean undone, but we must not lose sight of <<hat ECOWAS has accomplished through intervention and negotiation. The dispatch of a six-notion West African peace-keeping force in August 1990 demonatrated unprecedented African determination to take the lead in regional confiict zesolution. ECOMOG ended the killing, separated the warring factions, allowed relief assistance to flow to avert starvation ard established a cease-fire end framework for peaceful negotiations. In a country where ansrchy reigned, ECOMOG provided order and a bastion of security iu Monrovia, and hundreds of thousands of Liberians flocked to the relative safety of the city. ECOMOG troops won the support of the populace and acted with restraint and professionalism during the 21-month cease-fire.”

    1992-11-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3138 (1992) · source