YouSaid · the spoken record

Perricos

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26
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2007-06-29
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2007-06-29
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un-security-council

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  1. “Through their professionalism, they made Iraq a success story in international verification, and I hope that that expertise will not be dispersed and lost to the United Nations in the future.”

    2007-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5710 (2007) · source

  2. “I also take this opportunity to thank successive members of the Council for the guidance and support that they offered me and UNMOVIC, and especially for the patience that they have shown in listening to my statements every three months since September 2003. I wish to conclude by expressing my thanks and gratitude to the inspectors and the support staff of UNMOVIC and its predecessor, UNSCOM, and the staff of the IAEA involved in Iraq, for their dedicated work, diligence, courage and devotion to their mission of serving the United Nations and the Security Council and for using their knowledge, experience and expertise in unravelling a very complicated picture related to Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programmes.”

    2007-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5710 (2007) · source

  3. “Of particular interest for the future - not only for Iraq, but also for exporting States- is resolution 1051 (1996) and the export/import mechanism that it established to monitor the trade in dual-use items, equipment and material. I have had the opportunity to thank UNMOVIC's College of Commissioners for the support and advice that they provided to me. I would also like to thank the members of the Council secretariat for their full cooperation since the creation of UNMOVIC. My thanks go also to the Chairmen of UNSCOM, Ambassadors Ekeus and Butler. In particular, I wish to thank Mr. Hans Blix for the professional and independent manner in which he guided UNMOVIC during a very critical operational period.”

    2007-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5710 (2007) · source

  4. “That draft resolution also brings to mind paragraph 14 of resolution 687 (1991), in that fulfilment of the Iraqi obligations under the resolutions represents steps towards the goal of establishing in the Middle East a zone free of weapons of mass destruction and all missiles for their delivery and the objective of a global ban on chemical weapons. I sincerely hope that that goal will not be overlooked, but that it will be realized in the not-too-distant future. It also raises another question, regarding, the future of the obligations that were imposed on Iraq by various Council resolutions and that are still valid.”

    2007-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5710 (2007) · source

  5. “It created the mandate for the United Nations Special Commission established pursuant to Security Council resolution 687 (1991) (UNSCOM), the predecessor of UNMOVIC, and for the IAEA relating to Iraq. The draft resolution on which the Council will take action today, terminating that mandate, closes a cycle of many years of verification, during which the United Nations showed that it can successfully carry out the activities demanded by the international community despite difficulties and, frequently, a lack of cooperation from the inspected party.”

    2007-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5710 (2007) · source

  6. “As I reported to the Council, it is nearly a year since we provided extensive information intended to assist Iraq in submitting to the OPCW an initial inventory of its chemical-warfare programmes, as required by the CWC. It is, of course, up to the Council, exercising its judgement, to determine whether it will accept the residue of uncertainty when taking a decision to close the Iraq WMD disarmament file. This is my last briefing to the Security Council as Acting Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC. It coincides with my last working day in the Organization. Sixteen years ago, in April 1991, I had the opportunity as an IAEA official to be present in the Council Chamber when the Council adopted resolution 687 (1991), which is considered the mother of all resolutions related to weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.”

    2007-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5710 (2007) · source

  7. “However, the Council foresaw in 1991 that disarmament would need to be followed by an undetermined period of ongoing United Nations monitoring, which would minimize any continuing uncertainty regarding the closing of the disarmament file. Under the present circumstances, the remaining outstanding issues cannot be resolved and therefore contribute to the residue of uncertainty. If Iraq had already acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and were under the inspection regime of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the uncertainty with regard to its chemical weapons programme would be reduced. That is important, given that any industrial developments in Iraq would result in substantial increases in the size and extent of the chemical industry in the future.”

    2007-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5710 (2007) · source

  8. “and Iraq, which required steps by the Government of Iraq to ensure the integrity of the buildings containing potentially lethal toxic agents. It is widely accepted that there can be no complete certainty that disarmament has been fully achieved in a country. On a number of occasions, I personally and Mr. Blix before me referred to the unavoidable residue of uncertainty that will remain in that regard. A number of the still-open issues in the chemical, biological and missile areas could have been clarified with some additional activities such as sampling, interviews, the checking of documents in the possession of the ISG or even information from the coalition authorities. Some issues would not have been resolved even with such measures.”

    2007-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5710 (2007) · source

  9. “That could represent a reservoir from which this strain of anthrax could be isolated and cultured in the future. Another example relates to the status, as of 2004, of the Muthanna facility, which was the main chemical-weapons production site in Iraq. It was stated that all structures and bunkers at the site that had been sealed under the observation of the United Nations inspectors in 1994 had been breached and some equipment and materials removed. The ISG reported that chemical munitions were still being stored in the bunkers and that the bunkers tested positive for the presence of chemical- weapon agents. UNMOVIC therefore no longer knows the current status of the items and materials that were contained in the bunkers when a handover protocol was signed in 1994 between UNSCOM.”

    2007-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5710 (2007) · source

  10. “The use of this know-how and of relevant capabilities was expected to be monitored by the United Nations under the monitoring mechanism created by the Council as long as the Council reaffirmed Iraq's disarmament obligations under its relevant resolutions, not through self- monitoring by Iraq's national institutions. It should also be noted that a number of UNMOVIC's present concerns about unresolved issues actually follow from the ISG's findings. For example, the report of the Iraq Survey Group provided information related to the disposal by Iraqi personnel of bulk quantities of liquid anthrax in an area in Baghdad in 1991, but it was not clarified whether those quantities of agent were deactivated before being dumped into the ground.”

    2007-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5710 (2007) · source

  11. “UNMOVIC had arrived at similar conclusions regarding the production capability of Iraq's chemical industry after it had inspected all key facilities potentially capable of involvement in a chemical weapons programme, and determined that a number of them could be adapted for such a purpose after reconfiguration of the equipment. Know-how, at least the part of it necessary to develop proscribed activities, lies in the memory of each of those who already participated in those activities. But it may also be available in documents or records describing fabrication processes, sometimes referred to as "cookbooks", including blueprints and test results. UNMOVIC cannot provide assurances that all such documents and blueprints are in its possession or have been destroyed and that none remain in the hands of Iraqi individuals.”

    2007-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5710 (2007) · source

  12. “They also include a large number of dual-use equipment - more than 7,900 items that we knew were in certain sites in Iraq as of March 2003, but of whose present whereabouts we have no knowledge, except for the few found outside Iraq. The ISG report states that Iraq's chemical industry had the capability to restore chemical weapons production as a result of improvements in the chemical infrastructure achieved during the latter half of the 1990s. It further states that large and important projects for the indigenous production of chemicals were initiated to improve Iraq's self-sufficiency in their availability. At the same time, it recognizes that Iraq's industry was still struggling with serious shortages in many areas.”

    2007-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5710 (2007) · source

  13. “For example, what would be the current potential viability of a chemical or biological agent or the usability of a missile? A number of those issues - for instance, the 25 known Al Samoud 2 missiles that had not been destroyed by the middle of March 2003 and the 326 SA2 missile engines that are unaccounted for - have been reported by me to the Council during my presentation of various UNMOVIC quarterly reports. When reviewing the unresolved issues to determine whether they were still relevant, UNMOVIC has also identified capabilities that may still remain in Iraq. Capabilities include scientists and technicians involved in proscribed programmes, where they gained experience and know-how.”

    2007-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5710 (2007) · source

  14. “The main finding in the ISG's comprehensive report - the absence of any stockpiles of WMD or evidence of a revival of WMD-related programmes proscribed under the Security Council's resolutions - corresponds to UNMOVIC's conclusions reported to the Council in June 2003 with our thirteenth quarterly report, in light of our own verification experience in Iraq. The outstanding disarmament issues that we believe are of certain concern are of a technical nature and I shall therefore not detail them here. They cover all the weapons disciplines - chemical, biological, missiles and other means of delivery. While assessing the current relevance of a disarmament issue, UNMOVIC also considered whether it still represents a threat.”

    2007-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5710 (2007) · source

  15. “Such information includes any finding of an unaccounted-for item or evidence of its destruction, such as in testimony or documents, as well as assessments from the analysis of the latest pre-war Iraqi declarations and explanations, results of satellite imagery analysis and open-source information, such as the 2004 comprehensive report of the United States-led Iraq Survey Group (ISG) and its 2005 addendum. It should be noted that UNMOVIC did not have access to any of the supporting documentation, interview testimony or details of site inspections carried out by the ISG.”

    2007-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5710 (2007) · source

  16. “The latter revealed that Iraq had deliberately concealed at that time significant parts of its proscribed programmes, in particular in the chemical area, thus triggering considerable doubt about the sincerity of its intention to disarm. That led to UNSCOM's and then UNMOVIC's increased and sustained attention to any disarmament issue that remained unresolved. When assessing if a disarmament issue is still relevant, it has been necessary to consider whether any information made available since the draft UNMOVIC work plan was submitted to the Security Council in March 2003 could contribute to its solution.”

    2007-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5710 (2007) · source

  17. “During that early period of inspections, the United Nations inspectors uncovered key elements of the proscribed programmes, including that of undeclared biological warfare agents production and weaponization that had been concealed by Iraq until 1995. The inspectors also uncovered advanced capabilities in chemical weapons development, including the nerve agent VX, as well as indigenous developments on long-range missiles. Furthermore, the inspectors supervised the destruction of large quantities of proscribed items, material, munitions, missiles and equipment. In addition to those findings, various declarations and documents of Iraq - including those from the Haidar or so-called Chicken Farm - were consulted.”

    2007-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5710 (2007) · source

  18. “We understood that resolution 1284 (1999), under which UNMOVIC was created, required us to update our assessment of what are the remaining disarmament issues regarding items, materials and capabilities with respect to Iraq. I outlined to the College of Commissioners at its last 3 meeting in May our present assessment of these outstanding issues. The list of unresolved disarmament issues had been established on the basis of various sources, such as the report of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) (S/1999/94) and the Amorim report (S/1999/356) on the matter, as well as UNSCOM inspection reports and findings since 1991.”

    2007-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5710 (2007) · source

  19. “Paragraph 19 of the same quarterly report clarifies that, during the inspections, "a thorough assessment was made of both dual-use capabilities and the amount of time that would be needed to reconfigure specific installations to perform proscribed activities" (ibid) But neither the inspections nor the declarations and documents submitted by Iraq to UNMOVIC have resulted in eliminating the existing unresolved disarmament issues. A list of key remaining disarmament tasks selected from unresolved disarmament issues was presented to the Council on 19 March 2003. In the light of changes in Iraq in the aftermath of the war in 2003, we have revisited the unresolved disarmament issues.”

    2007-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5710 (2007) · source

  20. “The inspection findings were summarized in paragraphs 8, 9 and 19 of the thirteenth quarterly report to the Council of 30 May 2003. In paragraph 8, it was noted that "In the period during which it performed inspection and monitoring in Iraq, UNMOVIC did not find evidence of the continuation or resumption of programmes of weapons of mass destruction or significant quantities of proscribed items from before the adoption of resolution 687 (1991)"; and in paragraph 9 it was reported that "Inspections uncovered a small number of undeclared empty chemical warheads which appear to have been produced prior to 1990. Those and a few other proscribed items were destroyed" (ibid) Such destruction activities also included two thirds of the Al Samoud 2 missiles, which exceeded the 150- kilometre range limit set by the Council.”

    2007-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5710 (2007) · source

  21. “I have also drawn the attention of the Council in the past to the fact that, unless the Council decides otherwise, it would be assumed by UNMOVIC that the relevant disarmament obligations on Iraq in section C of resolution 687 (1991) and the disarmament undertakings in the letter of 8 May 2003 from the Permanent Representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States to the President of the Council, and noted by the Council in its resolution 1483 (2003), constitute the standards for determining the disarmament of Iraq. 07-40467 During the period from 27 November 2002 to 17 March 2003 - when United Nations inspectors were withdrawn - UNMOVIC conducted 731 inspections covering 411 sites, 88 of which had not been inspected before.”

    2007-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5710 (2007) · source

  22. “The training course in Qatar was the last training course provided by UNMOVIC for its roster of 380 experts. The other 38 courses, from UNMOVIC's inception, were possible due to the generosity and support of the Governments of Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Canada, China, Finland, France, Germany, Romania, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States. I take this opportunity to again thank those Governments which have been consistently supporting our training activities. Members will recall that on many occasions over the past years I have been asking that the Council find the opportunity to revisit UNMOVIC's mandate, including the activities and the process that could eventually lead to the closing of the disarmament file for Iraq and any other follow-up actions required.”

    2007-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5710 (2007) · source

  23. “The publication of the compendium provides a detailed and comprehensive United Nations account of the former Iraqi regime's extensive WMD programmes. For the first time it provides lessons learnt over many years of United Nations inspections and monitoring, which could be useful in any future multilateral verification undertaking. With your encouragement, Mr. President, we have actively pursued our training programme for inspectors on our roster. A multidisciplinary training course related to petrochemical technologies took place from 9 to 22 June in Doha, Qatar. It is noteworthy that this is the first training course to be conducted by UNMOVIC in the Middle East region. The course had long been planned and I am grateful to the Government of Qatar for the support it provided.”

    2007-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5710 (2007) · source

  24. “The Council had been informed in the past of our intention to place the full compendium document on the UNMOVIC website, www.unmovic.org, after sensitive information had been eliminated. That, I am pleased to say, took place on 27 June. The material has been redacted on the basis of two principles known to the Council. The first is information related to technology, research and production that may assist in the development of 07-40467 weapons of mass destruction and means of delivery. The second principle concerns the confidentiality of certain information, which includes names of foreign companies, institutions and banks, names of countries and names of individuals. The same principles will apply in the classification of UNMOVIC's archives.”

    2007-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5710 (2007) · source

  25. “One recent example is the reported use by insurgents in Iraq of toxic industrial chemicals previously under United Nations monitoring, such as chlorine, combined with explosives for dispersal. The possibility of non-State actors getting their hands on other, more toxic, agents is real. In view of those events in Iraq and the interest generated by them, we have, in the annex to our twenty-ninth quarterly report, further elaborated our study on the issue of small quantities in both the chemical and biological areas. UNMOVIC's activities over the past several years have been detailed in its quarterly reports to the Council and the various technical annexes thereto. We have already provided the Council with a summary of our compendium of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programmes, which was issued as document 8/2006/420 in June 2006.”

    2007-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5710 (2007) · source

  26. “Mr. Perricos: I welcome this opportunity to brief the Council on our activities. The twenty-ninth quarterly report to the Council, covering the period 1 March to 31 May, is in document S/2007/3l4. This is the last quarterly report of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), in view of the imminent decision by the Council to terminate the mandate of UNMOVIC and that of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) under the relevant Security Council resolutions relating to Iraq. In the present security environment of Iraq, the possibility should not be discounted that non-State actors may seek to acquire toxic agents or chemical precursors in small quantities.”

    2007-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5710 (2007) · source