YouSaid · the spoken record

Pickering

lines on the record

107

first

1992-01-06

most recent

1992-04-04

sittings or episodes

17

sources

un-security-council

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1. “This point is, of course, in no way contradicted, but is indeed reinforced, by General Assembly resolution 43/177. We believe in listening to all points of view, but not in a manner that requires violations of our rules of procedure. In particular, the United States does not agree with the practice of the Security Council that recently appears selectively to try to enhance the prestige of those who wish to speak in the Council through a departure from our rules of procedure. We consider this practice to be without legal foundation and to constitute, indeed, an abuse of our rules. For all these reasons, the United States requests that the terms of the proposed invitation be put to the vote. Of course, the United States will vote against this proposal.”

   1992-04-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3065 (1992) · source

2. “The United States has consistently taken the position that under the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council the only legal basis on which the Council may grant a hearing to persons speaking on behalf of non-governmental entities is rule 39. For four decades, the United States has Supported a generous interpretation of rule 39, and it would not have objected had this matter been appropriately raised under rule 39. We are, however, opposed to special and ad hoc departures from orderly procedure. The United States consequently opposes granting to the Palestine Liberation Organization the same rights to participate in the proceedings of the Security Council as if that organization were representing a Member State of the United Nations.”

   1992-04-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3065 (1992) · source

3. “My Government sees no justification for any departure from that practice, Further, there is nothing in resolutions adopted by the Assembly that would warrant a change in Security Council practice. It is also clear that the General Assembly resolutions are, of course, not binding upon the Security Council, General Assembly resolution 43/177, which purported to change the designation of the PLO Mission, did so "without prejudice to the observer status and functions of the Palestine Liberation Organization within the United Nations system, in conformity with relevant United Nations resolutions and practice", That resolution does not constitute recognition of any State of Palestine. Like many other Members of the United Nations, the United States does not recognize such a State.”

   1992-04-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3065 (1992) · source

4. “The United States, as it normally does when this question is considered, will request a vote on the proposal before the Security Council, and the United States will vote against it on two grounds. First, we believe that the Council does not have before it a valid request to speak. Secondly, the United States maintains that the representative of the Palestine Liberation Organization should be granted permission to speak only if the request complies with rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure. It is unwarranted and unwise for the Council to break with its own practice and rules in this regard. As all members of the Council are aware, it is a long-established practice that Observers do not have the right to speak in the Security Council upon their own request. Rather, a request must be made on the Observer's behalf by a Member State.”

   1992-04-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3065 (1992) · source

5. “That message is the surest guarantee that the United Nations Security Council, using its specific, unique powers under the Charter, will preserve the rule of law and ensure the peaceful resolution of threats to international peace and security, now and in the future. It is an important message. It is a message that we must all hope Libya will take quickly to heart by complying with resolution 731 (1992) and honouring its obligation to foreign nationals in Libya. If it does so now it will bring this chapter to an end quickly. The pause in the implementation of the sanctions until 15 April gives Libya the opportunity to do this. The choice is now clearly and unavoidably up to Libya.”

   1992-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3063 (1992) · source

6. “By severing Libya's air links, by imposing an embargo on military _ materiel, by requiring military advisers, technicians and specialists to be withdrawn, and by restricting Libyan diplomats and other officials around the world, who have so often abused their status, the international community is sending two clear signals: first, that it will not tolerate such threats to international peace and security; and, secondly, that it is prepared to take concerted political action against the continuing defiance of international obligations and norms of behaviour represented by Libya's State-supported terrorism.”

   1992-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3063 (1992) · source

7. “They are the response prescribed in the Charter as the appropriate next step for dealing with a threat to international peace and security. They are tailored to Fit the offence - Libya's wanton and criminal destruction of civilian aviation - and designed to penalize the Government of Libya, not its neighbours or any other State.”

   1992-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3063 (1992) · source

8. “As we sadly know, all efforts by the Secretary-General, the League of Arab States and indeed many others to bring about Libya's compliance have been blocked by Libya's continuing refusal to cooperate with the specific requests made in resolution 731 (1992). The Security Council has now acted upon the sanctions resolution before us. The action we have taken is indeed most Significant. At issue here is whether the international community is prepared to back up its own words with action and to demonstrate that it will protect itself against a State that engages in terrorism. The means chosen in this resolution are appropriate; these sanctions are measured, precise and limited. They are a multilateral, non-violent and peaceful response to violent and brutal acts.”

   1992-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3063 (1992) · source

9. “We have called upon Libya to comply with the four requests included in resolution 731 (1992): turn over the two suspects in the bombing of Pan Am 103 for trial in either the United States or the United Kingdom and meet the demands of French justice; disclose all it knows about the bombings of Pan Am 103 and UTA flight 772; take concrete steps to cease its support for terrorism; and pay appropriate compensation. Over two months ago this Councii, acting on behalf of the international community, unanimously urged the Libyan Government to provide a full and effective response to the four demands. This resolution also makes clear the Council's decision that Libya should comply with those demands.”

   1992-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3063 (1992) · source

10. “Over four months ago my Government, along with those of France and of the United Kingdom, provided the Security Council with evidence implicating the Government of Libya in the wanton destruction of two civilian airliners. This act resulted in the cold-blooded murder of 441 innocent civilians from over 30 countries. For Libya this act was no anomaly, but unfortunately part of a long, well-known history of support for terrorism and efforts to destabilize other Governments. The evidence revealing Libya's involvement in these acts of terrorism indicates a serious breach of international peace and security. It fully justifies the adoption by this Council of measures pursuant to Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.”

    1992-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3063 (1992) · source

11. “My Government and the Council will be watching closely Iraqi actions in the future. By disdaining and failing to comply with the Council's resolutions, Iraq risks making, as it has in the past, yet another tragic and fateful miscalculation, the full consequences of which the Government of Iraq will once again have to bear.”

    1992-03-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3059 (1992) · source

12. “As the President of the Council stated in his opening statement, the Council demands and expects Iraqi actions to comply with Council resolutions. Without full and unconditional compliance, the chances of lifting sanctions are nil. The Iraqi delegation now has the opportunity to provide authoritative answers to our questions and authoritative declarations of unconditional acceptance of resolutions 707 (1991) and 715 (1991) = indeed of all the resolutions. Even more important, Iraq now has the opportunity to show by its actions that it will carry out its obligations. We would welcome authoritative answers, declarations and, even more, actions. Once again, the Council stands at a critical juncture in its consideration of restoring and maintaining international peace and security in the Gulf region.”

    1992-03-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3059 (1992) · source

13. “Thus, the world is learning in detail of "Operation Anfal" - the forced relocations of thousands of Kurdish villagers in a deliberate Iraqi policy to erase 4,000 Kurdish villages from the face of the Earth. Already the Special Rapporteur has received more than 15,000 names of missing Kurds, which led him to conclude that it would be difficult to dismiss the Kurdish claim of some 182,000 disappeared persons. Grave diggers are giving evidence of the burying indiscriminately of executed persons in mass graves. This list of horrors goes on and on. Iraq's continuing repression of its civilian population led the Special Rapporteur to conclude that the threat to international peace and security in reference to resolution 688 (1991) continues. In conclusion, the Council has seen Iraqi promises of compliance over the past year.”

    1992-03-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3059 (1992) · source

14. “Shi'a religious colleges and universities have been closed; Shi'a publications are prohibited or strictly censored; Shi'a religious leaders are prevented from traveling freely. More generally, Iraq's human rights record is abysmal, . The Special Rapporteur's report of February 1992, a document circulated to members of the Council, as well as recent reports by private human rights organizations, catalogue a compendium of horrors. Much of the new evidence derives from the files, videotapes and documents of the Iraqi secret police and security forces themselves, which have in particular carefully recorded the regime's brutality against the Kurdish people.”

    1992-03-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3059 (1992) · source

15. “The Commission on Human Rights Special Rapporteur's report and the press have also documented repressive Iraqi Government practices against Shi'a religious and cultural institutions. The Government of Iraq apparently is waging a concerted attack against the Shi'a clergy by arresting them, "disappearing" them, imprisoning them and torturing them. Iraq has yet to reply to an inquiry from the Special Rapporteur about his November 1991 list of missing persons including Shi'a clergy. The Iraqis continue to keep the ill and aged Imam Khoie under house arrest and to deny him medical attention from outside specialists. In 1991 the shrine of Imam Hussain in Karbala was shelled, badly damaged and desecrated. The official Iraqi explanation that Shi'a "rebels" had defiled their holiest shrine defies credulity.”

    1992-03-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3059 (1992) · source

16. “It is ironic, and truly tragic, that the Government of Iraq should continue to issue distorted, fabricated and exaggerated claims about the alleged humanitarian impact of United Nations sanctions, sanctions which in no way restrict the flow of medicines, food and other essential humanitarian goods, while the Iraqi Government itself imposes an internal embargo consciously designed to deprive some selected Iraqi civilians of food, fuel, medicine and other essential supplies. The Iraqi Government continues to repress its predominantly Shi'a population in the south as well. As recently as December and January, the Iraqi military launched attacks on the "marsh Arabs", killing hundreds.”

    1992-03-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3059 (1992) · source

17. “Elements of the embargo include cutting off salary and pension payments to Iraqi civil servants in the north, curtailing rations to approximately half the level of what other Iraqi civilians receive, and reducing fuel deliveries to approximately 25 per cent of the pre-October 1991 level. Checkpoint guards on the roads leading to northern Iraq are reported to confiscate the smallest quantities of privately purchased food carried by civilians arriving at the checkpoints from the south.”

    1992-03-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3059 (1992) · source

18. “The Commission on Human Rights Special Rapporteur's 18 February 1992 report, the press and non-governmental organizations have all documented the economic embargo instituted by the Government of Iraq in October 1991 - and I am sorry to say still continuing to this day - on shipments of food, fuel and other essential humanitarian supplies to northern Iraq. This embargo, enforced by the Iraqi military, is both impeding United.Nations relief operations and inflicting severe hardship on Iraqi civilians, as well as impeding their right to enter and leave the area. In addition, Iraqi citizens formerly resident in the Kirkuk area are not allowed to return to their homes and businesses.”

    1992-03-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3059 (1992) · source

19. “Grave international concern at Baghdad's brutal repression of its own civilian population led to the adoption of resolution 688 (1991) on 5 April 1991. This resolution condemned the repression and demanded its immediate end. Members of the Council will recall that indiscriminate Iraqi shelling of civilian populations and other military pressures on civilians had led to a massive exodus from northern Iraq to Turkey and Iran, threatening the international peace and security of the region. Resolution 688 (1991) also insisted that Iraq allow immediate access by international humanitarian organizations to all those in need of assistance in all parts of Iraq and to make available all necessary facilities for their operations.”

    1992-03-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3059 (1992) · source

20. “Iraq has repeatedly criticized the Council for causing shortages of food, medicines and other essential civilian needs in Iraq, even though resolutions 706 (1991) and 712 (1991) provide the means for Iraq to assure the provision and equitable distribution of such goods to all the Iraqi civilian population. Paragraph 7 of resolution 706 (1991) also required Iraq to submit monthly statements of its gold and foreign currency holdings. Iraq has yet to submit its first report. Not only has Irag not taken advantage of the mechanism of resolutions 706 (1991) and 712 (1991) to improve the welfare of the Iraqi population, but Baghdad persists in actions of repression against its civilian population, particularly in the predominantly Kurdish-inhabited areas of the north and in the predominantly Shi'a-inhabited areas of the south.”

    1992-03-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3059 (1992) · source

21. “The latest series of such promises was made in a February 1992 letter to the Secretary-General, which declares that Iraq is prepared to talk to the ICRC representative in Baghdad about ICRC access to prisons and about publication , of names of the missing. To add insult to injury, this Iraqi letter asserts | that Iraq is now in compliance with paragraph 30 of resolution 687 (1991) as a result of those promises. Once again, Iraq has deliberately delayed any meaningful cooperation on this issue, displaying a totally callous and uncooperative attitude towards the plight of the missing and the suffering of their relatives.”

    1992-03-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3059 (1992) · source

22. “Ata meeting in Riyadh in March 1991 of representatives from Iraq, Kuwait, France, Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom and the United States, all the parties to that meeting, including Iraq, agreed to grant the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) all facilities necessary to enable the ICRC to gather information on the whereabouts of missing persons. One full year later, Iraq has yet to agree to ICRC access to Iraqi prisons and places of detention. Nor has Iraq yet followed through on its agreement to publish in its media lists of missing persons or reported effectively on what tracing steps it is taking on individual inquiry files. Iraq's response has been a series of unfulfilled promises.”

    1992-03-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3059 (1992) · source

23. “Also related to the border is the issue of five Iraqi border police posts located on the Kuwaiti side of the boundary line on the map used by the United Nations Irag-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM), which UNIKOM has repeatedly asked Iraq to remove to its side of the border - and, indeed, 1,000 metres away from the line on the UNIKOM map - as previously agreed, which Iraq stil refuses to do. On the return of property, although progress has been made in returning Kuwaiti property, much remains to be done, including the return of aircraft and surface-to-air missile systems taken from Kuwait by Iraq. On the repatriation of Kuwaiti, Saudi and other third-country nationals, Iraq refuses to take action on investigating lists of missing detainees submitted by Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.”

    1992-03-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3059 (1992) · source

24. “The Council insists on the necessity of assuring the international community that Iraq will not reacquire these destabilizing weapons. There is no alternative to Iraqi acceptance and implementation of resolutions 707 (1991) and 715 (1991). Allow me now to turn to Iraq's other obligations under resolution 687 (1991). On border issues, in August 1991 the Iraqi representative to the boundary Commission stated that Iraq rejected the work of the Commission. Iraq has nevertheless participated reluctantly in the work of the Commission. Iraq is obligated to accept the work of the Commission. Any statements by Iraq to the contrary are breaches of Iraq's obligations under resolution 687 (1991).”

    1992-03-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3059 (1992) · source

25. “The critical point here is not whether facilities are capable of producing material for civilian use, but whether they are capable of being used for prohibited purposes. The Council continues to support the proposition that the Special Commission, and not Iraq itself, must and will determine which facilities are required under Security Council resolutions to be destroyed. This is not a matter for negotiations or haggling, but for a final determination by the Special Commission, which must be observed by Iraq. Regarding Iraq's obligations under resolutions 707 (1991) and 715 (1991) to agree unconditionally to implement the ongoing monitoring and verification plans, the Special Commission Chairman reported in February that Iraq had not provided such an agreement.”

    1992-03-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3059 (1992) · source

26. “Irag has refused to destroy materiel and ballistic missile production and repair facilities designated by the Special Commission in February. Iraq has argued that these missile production items can be used for other purposes, including, interestingly enough, the production of military missiles of ranges of less than 150 kilometres. Iraq has claimed that it can render these and similar facilities for producing weapons of mass destruction harmless by converting them to civilian use. Given Iraq's clear record of non-compliance with United Nations efforts to identify Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, however, Iraq must not be allowed the option to return these facilities to use for production of these awful weapons. Therefore, these facilities should be destroyed rather than merely converted.”

    1992-03-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3059 (1992) · source

27. “More precisely, in the absence of full disclosure we shall all have to conclude that the destruction certainly cannot categorically be proved to be complete. United Nations resolutions also call for the destruction, removal or rendering harmless of Iraq's production facilities for these weapons of mass destruction. The clearest example of Iraq's nuclear facilities is the Al-Atheer facility. United Nations inspection teams have found that Al-Atheer is a state-of-the-art facility expressly designed for producing nuclear weapons. Iraq's own progress report on Al-Atheer - seized by a United Nations inspection team in September 1991 - links Al-Atheer directly with Iraq's nuclear weapons programme. Al-Atheer can in no way be considered to have any purpose other than weapons making, and therefore should be immediately and completely destroyed.”

    1992-03-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3059 (1992) · source

28. “In those February 1992 discussions with the Special Commission, Iraq stated it had already provided "all the necessary information" under resolution 687 (1991). Iraq's previous actions to the contrary make it impossible for us to believe now that such is true. The Special Commission Chairman could not but conclude that Iraq has given "no undertaking to provide such a full, final and complete disclosure". Even in the face of its unsatisfactory disclosure of information on its weapons of mass destruction programmes, destruction of some of these weapons has proceeded. Without full, final and complete disclosure, however, the inspectors will never know if all such weapons have been located and destroyed.”

    1992-03-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3059 (1992) · source

29. “As but one in a long list of examples I could give the Council today, Iraq's original declaration did not include five types of ballistic missiles covered by resolution 687 (1991). This pattern of concealment has continued, I am afraid to say, right down to the present day. For this I draw the Council's attention to the report of Executive Chairman Ekeus on his special mission to Baghdad of 21 to 23 February 1992, in which he notes that at the very moment he was being assured that Iraq had make all the required declarations and fulfilled its obligations, a ballistic missile inspection team found at two sites prohibited items that had not previously been declared. Iraq continues to try to deceive and evade.”

    1992-03-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3059 (1992) · source

30. “Lastly, although Iraq then claimed that its biological weapons research programme, which it said had begun in 1986, had ended in 1990, a Special Commission biological weapons inspection team found clear evidence, again at Salman Pak, of the capability to produce what it characterized as "vast quantities of biological agents." In the area of ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres, Iraq initially declared 62 Scud missiles and Scud variants and five sites for production, maintenance, Storage and deployment. Subsequent inspections revealed, however, that Irag had misrepresented its inventory of ballistic missiles, components and facilities and had attempted to deceive inspectors and conceal missiles and related components from inspection teams.”

    1992-03-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3059 (1992) · source

31. “To turn to biological weapons programme, Iraq unquestionably violated its obligations to hand over to the Special Commission all its biological-weapons-related items when, contrary to Security Council resolution 687 (1991), it destroyed buildings at its Salman Pak biological weapon research centre immediately prior to the first Commission inspection there, Moreover, after first maintaining that it had no biological weapons and that it had carried out no related activities, Iraq then acknowledged to inspectors that it had undertaken research which could have had offensive military applications.”

    1992-03-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3059 (1992) · source

32. “More importantly, Iraq has failed to respond satisfactorily to requests for information on Iraq's past chemical weapons programme, particularly as regards foreign suppliers of munitions, equipment, and precursor chemicals. Instead, Iraq has insisted that its chemical weapons production did not start until 1986 and has claimed that all its chemical weapons were produced indigenously. However, the whole world knows - and this is attested to by the United Nations itself - that Iraq used chemical weapons against Iran as early as 1983.”

    1992-03-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3059 (1992) · source

33. “In another instance, frag, in its declarations, consistently denied any nuclear "weaponization" programmes until the sixth nuclear weapons inspection team, in September 1991, found extensive and detailed documentation for such programmes. Belatedly, Iraq provided the seventh weapons inspection team formal, but still incomplete, written acknowledgement of its nuclear weapons programme. Yet another damning example was Iraq's denial until 6 August 1991, when inspectors found evidence of it, that Iraq had produced unsafeguarded plutonium. In the area of chemical weapons, Iraq offered contradictory statements regarding the making of chemical munitions.”

    1992-03-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3059 (1992) · source

34. “Indeed, an unfortunate pattern has developed: Iraq makes declarations of minimal content, declarations which are clearly meant to misinform and misdirect, and to conceal. Iraq repeatedly divulges information related to its weapons programmes only after being presented incontrovertible proof uncovered by the Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in their inspections. This is not compliance, but hide and seek, cat and mouse, cheat and retreat. For example, in the nuclear field Iraq concealed evidence of its electromagnetic isotope separation programme for enriching uranium, to the extent of pouring concrete over tell-tale structures and covering the concrete with rubble.”

    1992-03-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3059 (1992) · source

35. “Resolution 687 (1991) led to a number of other resolutions to implement its specific parts, including 689 (1991), 692 (1991), 699 (1991), 700 (1991), 705 (1991), 706 (1991), 707 (1991), 712 (1991) and 715 (1991). This is a long list indeed of detailed resolutions spelling out Iraq's obligations. Unfortunately, from the first Iraq has tried to obfuscate and evade its obligations. The Council agreed in resolution 687 (1991) that if the Gulf region is to enjoy peace and security Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles must be permanently eliminated. This requires Iraq's cooperation, including the full and complete disclosure of its weapons programmes. The record of Iraq's failure in this regard is unescapable, clear and serious.”

    1992-03-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3059 (1992) · source

36. “Nearly one year ago, on 3 April 1991, the Council adopted resolution 687 (1991). Thie comprehensive and unprecedented resolution established a detailed framework for restoring and maintaining international peace and security in the Gulf region. Adoption of this resolution was one of the most important actions ever taken by this Council, responding to the hope of mankind to make the United Nations an instrument of peace and stability. Resolution 687 (1991) required Iraq to take precise steps on many issues. Iraq formally notified the Secretary-General and the Security Council by letter on 4 April 1991, followed by an Iragi letter of il April 1991 from its National Assembly, of its acceptance of the resolution. Thus, a formal cease-fire to the Gulf conflict came into effect on 11 April 1991.”

    1992-03-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3059 (1992) · source

37. “Mr, PICKERING (United States of America): First, let me congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council, and thank you and others for their kind words addressed to me. During the course of the past year no subject has preoccupied the Security Council more than its efforts to restore international peace and security in the Gulf in the aftermath of Iraq's aggression against Kuwait. We are here today because the requirements of the Council have not been met. We are here also because Iraq has asked to send an authoritative senior official to answer "all the questions". I can assure him that there continue to be many questions which must be answered; pre-eminent among them is why Iraq will not comply fully and completely with the resolutions of this Council.”

    1992-03-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3059 (1992) · source

38. “The members of the Council emphasize that Iraq must be aware of the serious consequences of continued material breaches of resolution 687 (1991). "The members of the Council note that an Iraqi delegation is prepared to come to New York as soon as it is invited to do so. The members of the Council have asked its President to extend such an invitation to the delegation to come to New York without further delay. The members of the Council intend in any event to continue their consideration of this question no later than the week beginning 9 March 1992." The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on the agenda. The Security Council will remain seized of the matter. The meeting rose at 7 p.m.”

    1992-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3058 (1992) · source

39. “Irag's refusal to implement the determinations of the Special Commission constitutes a further material breach of the relevant provisions of resolution 687 (1991). "The members of the Council demand that Iraq immediately implement ali its obligations under Council resolution 687 (1991) and subsequent resolutions on Iraq. 'The members of the Council require the Government of Iraq to communicate directly to the Council without further delay an authoritative and unconditional acknowledgement of its agreement to accept and implement the above-noted obligations, including specifically to comply with the determination of the Special Commission requiring the destruction of pallistic-missile-related equipment.”

    1992-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3058 (1992) · source

40. “In the statement made on 19 February 1992 (S/23609) prior to the dispatch of the special mission to Iraq, the Council noted that Iraq's behaviour constituted a material breach of resolution 687 (1991), Regrettably, this continues to be the case. "Furthermore, the members of the Council equally deplore and condemn Iraq's failure, within the time prescribed by the Special Commission at the request of Irag, to commence destruction of ballistic-missile-related equipment designated by the Special Commission for destruction. The members of the Council reaffirm that it is for the Special Commission alone to determine which items must be destroyed under paragraph 9 of resolution 687 (1991), Therefore, the Government of Iraq's letter of 28 February 1992 to the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission is unacceptable.”

    1992-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3058 (1992) · source

41. “"The members of the Council deplore and condemn the failure of the Government of Iraq to provide the special mission with full, final and complete disclosure, as required by resolution 707 (1991), of all aspects of its programmes to develop weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres, including launchers, and of all holdings of such weapons, their components and production facilities and locations, as well as all other nuclear programmes; and the failure of Iraq to comply with the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification (S/22871/Rev.1 and §/22872/Rev.1 and Corr.1) approved by resolution 715 (1991).”

    1992-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3058 (1992) · source

42. “The members of the Council approve in full the conclusions of the special mission as contained in the report, and in particular its finding that Iraq is not prepared to give its unconditional agreement to implement all of its obligations under resolutions 687 (1991), 707 (1991) and 715 (1991).”

    1992-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3058 (1992) · source

43. “The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Security Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations. Members of the Council have before them document S/23643, containing the text of a note by the Secretary--General dated 26 February 1992. Foliowing consultations among members of the Security Council, I have been authorized to make the following statement on behalf of the Council: "The members of the Security Council express their gratitude to the Secretary-General for the report submitted to the Council on 27 February 1992 (S/23643), transmitting the results of the special mission dispatched to Iraq by the Secretary--General pursuant to the statement of the President of the Council of 19 February 1992 (S/23609).”

    1992-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3058 (1992) · source

44. “Our experience in Cambodia will likely help shape for years to come perceptions of the United Nations as an effective instrument for addressing regional conflict and of the viability of its principle of collective security. We do not underestimate this challenge, but instead resolve to meet it with determination and imagination. I now resume my functions as President of the Council. fhere are no further speakers on my list. The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on its agenda. m ing x 12 m.”

    1992-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3057 (1992) · source

45. “We are convinced that increasing the efficiency of UNTAC, and thereby reducing its cost, will benefit both the operation and the Organization. The United States has watched with deep satisfaction the increasing development of global cooperation, which in turn has given rise to expectations that the United Nations will at last assume responsibilities commensurate with the vision of its founders. Nowhere is the full scope and import of that vision more evident than in the mandate approved today for a United Nations presence in Cambodia. The United Nations is now poised to begin an enterprise of extraordinary size, scope and expense.”

    1992-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3057 (1992) · source

46. “We wholeheartedly welcome the Secretary-General's intention continually to review and refine UNTAC's operation in the light of actual experience and new information, with a view to maximum effectiveness and the most efficient use of resources. We welcome the announcement of his intended visit to Cambodia, particularly in that regard. I believe that the United States can make a significant contribution to this effort, which is essential in view of the immense cost and scale of the operation. The United States pledges to work closely with the Secretary-General and his staff, as well as with other Security Council members and interested countries, over the coming weeks and throughout the course of the operation.”

    1992-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3057 (1992) · source

47. “Essential also to the settlement, as well as to the implementation of the United Nations plan, is the spirit of cooperation among the Cambodians, made possible by the leadership of His Royal Highness Prince Norodom Sihanouk. His steadfast support and the active cooperation of the Cambodian leaders and people, who have placed their trust in the United Nations, are vital to the success of UNTAC's mission. The path ahead will not be easy; much urgent and difficult work remains to be done. It is clear that the generous support and constant attention of the international community will be required in order to fulfil the objectives of the settlement.”

    1992-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3057 (1992) · source

48. “We hope that the deployment of UNTAC can now proceed rapidly in order to preserve the settlement and to ensure that the operation will achieve the prompt administration of free and fair elections within the timeframe indicated in your report. The Cambodia settlement, I believe, is a success which legitimately can be said to have many fathers. I will not attempt to recount the contributions of those from many countries who can rightfully claim parentage, but I would like to extend a word of sincere gratitude for the leadership of former Secretary~General, Javier Perez de Cuellar, for the tireless efforts of Under-Secretary-General Rafeeuddin Ahmed, and for the contributions of many talented and dedicated members of the United Nations Secretariat.”

    1992-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3057 (1992) · source

49. “The Agreements on a comprehensive political settlement to the Cambodian conflict, signed on 23 October in Paris, reserved for the United Nations a central role in helping to secure these and the other objectives of the settlement, and they form the basis for the Council's action today. I would like to commend you, Mr. Secretary-General, for the strong personal interest you have taken in the elaboration of the plan by which the United Nations will discharge its responsibilities. Your plan is faithful to the spirit and the letter of the Paris Agreements. My Government also welcomes the appointment of an experienced and capable individual, Mr. Yasushi Akashi, to serve as your Special Representative for Cambodia and as head of UNTAC.”

    1992-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3057 (1992) · source

50. “I shall now make a statement in my capacity as representative of the United States. The United States welcomes the unanimous adoption of resolution 745 (1992) establishing the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). We also welcome the statement the Secretary-General made here this morning. This long-awaited step constitutes a landmark in the arduous effort over the course of many years to secure a comprehensive political settlement to the Cambodian conflict. The United States and Cambodia's many other friends have held as our paramount objectives the achievement of a just and durable peace, offering the Cambodian people the right to choose their own leaders through free and fair elections, and the safeguarding of human rights in a country where those rights have been so tragically abused.”

    1992-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3057 (1992) · source