YouSaid · the spoken record
Polyanskiy/Mr. Kirpichenko
- lines on the record
- 27
- first
- 2022-02-15
- most recent
- 2022-02-28
- sittings or episodes
- 3
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- un-security-council
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“There are no more names inscribed on the list of speakers. I will now adjourn the meeting so that the Council can continue its discussion on the subject in closed consultations. The meeting rose at 12.10 p.m.”
2022-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8982 (2022) · source
“Arias could provide some clarification, but it seems he prefers not to come to the Security Council, thereby running the risk of undermining not only his own reputation but the authority of the OPCW itself, one of the most important pillars of the weapons of mass destruction non-proliferation regime. In conclusion, I would also like to note the need to reduce the number of meetings that the Security Council holds on Syria. We hope that we will soon be able to return to that issue. I resume my functions as President of the Council. I now give the floor to the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic.”
2022-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8982 (2022) · source
“However, the policy of double standards at the Technical Secretariat is also manifest in the closure of the remaining issues related to Syria’s initial declaration. Damascus has fulfilled, in good faith, all of its obligations by acceding to the CWC in extremely difficult circumstances due to military and political instability and an externally-fuelled terrorist threat. Nevertheless, it is subject to unjustifiably harsh requirements and there has been an artificial frenzy stoked around that subject. We have no other explanation for the repetition in the latest report of the Director General of the OPCW (S/2022/76, annex) on the implementation of resolution 2118 (2013) of the same elements that we have seen before and that still do not hold water. Perhaps Mr.”
2022-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8982 (2022) · source
“We also believe that the goal of the IIT’s work is not to establish a true picture of events but to bend its content to fit the conclusion that Damascus is guilty — that is, to fulfil a political agenda. Therefore, we dismiss its findings — those in existing IIT reports and in its future products. The biased findings of the IIT were the basis for the punitive decision to strip Syria of its rights on fictitious grounds. That is the first time that such a step was taken concerning a sovereign State that believed it was in compliance with the Convention. The decision, made by the Conference of the States Parties, was forced through by Western delegations, in violation of CWC standards and the principle of consensus. Nevertheless, the Syrian Government has not refused to engage in dialogue with the OPCW.”
2022-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8982 (2022) · source
“In the same vein, we highlight the work of the Investigation and Identification Team (IIT), whose establishment was railroaded through the OPCW Executive Council, in violation of the principle of consensus and article XV of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Its products and outcomes are baseless. It is technically illiterate, not to mention factually unverified and politically biased. IIT methodology, as with that of the Fact-Finding Mission, violates the Convention and the principles for conducting investigations, primarily with regard to ensuring the chain of custody. Investigations conducted much later, by definition, cannot be accurate. It is very difficult to establish a chain of events several years later. Furthermore, it is practically impossible to conduct investigations remotely based on testimonies from vague sources.”
2022-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8982 (2022) · source
“We need only to think of the infamous report of the Fact-Finding Mission on alleged chemical weapons’ use in Syria, which recounts the incident that took place in Douma in 2018. Its conclusions were edited with an anti-Syrian bias, as compared with the initial version, following pressure from some. That was confirmed by various sources, including former OPCW inspectors who were part of the investigation team. It was quite simply a sham. However, despite calls from States Members of the United Nations and the broader international community, addressing those issues is not on the agenda of the Technical Secretariat.”
2022-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8982 (2022) · source
“The Technical Secretariat has been in possession of that information since September 2021, but no mention of it was made in the note I mentioned or during the meeting of the governing body of the organization. That information was not provided to Member States. Yet the threat of the use of chemical weapons by terrorists continues. As recently as 26 February, the Russian Ministry of Defence announced that fighters from Jabhat Al-Nusra in Idlib were to receive containers containing toxins, in all likelihood chlorine. Due to careless handling during their transport, one of the cylinders was badly damaged. As a result, approximately 10 terrorists received chemical burns on their skin and respiratory tracts. The OPCW Technical Secretariat has little hope.”
2022-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8982 (2022) · source
“We also realized that the note distributed on the day before the event on the contribution of the OPCW to the global counter-terrorism efforts, under his authorship, once again, for some reason, made no mention of the fact that the Islamic State in Iraq and the Sham (ISIS) has a full-fledged chemical weapons programme, according to the conclusions of the seventh report of the Special Adviser and Head of the United Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da’esh/Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (see S/2021/974). It is quite difficult for us to understand why, time and again, such an important aspect is not the focus of the OPCW’s attention.”
2022-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8982 (2022) · source
“This is the second time that that has happened. The same occurred in May last year. At the same time, what is most surprising is that, when it pertains to statements on other platforms and various forums, Mr. Arias can find the time to attend. For example, on 22 February, he participated in a seminar organized by the Arms Control Association in Washington, D.C., during which he saw fit to deliver an openly politicized assessment. However, he preferred not to answer our comprehensive questions. Mr. Arias also opened a meeting of the Open-Ended Working Group on Terrorism on 22 February, as part of the ninety-ninth session of the Executive Council of the OPCW.”
2022-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8982 (2022) · source
“I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of the Russian Federation. We would like to thank Mrs. Izumi Nakamitsu for her briefing. We were eager to see the report from the Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), Mr. Fernando Arias, during today’s meeting. Since his previous briefing to the Security Council (see S/PV.8785), approximately eight months ago, Mr. Arias was re-elected for a second term. We expected to hear his plans to address the dire situation at the OPCW caused by the politicization of its work. We extended an invitation to him, but Mr. Arias declined to participate in today’s meeting as he was too busy. We very much regret the fact that the OPCW Director- General was unable to find time in his schedule for a briefing to the Council.”
2022-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8982 (2022) · source
“I thank Mrs. Nakamitsu for her briefing. I shall now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements.”
2022-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8982 (2022) · source
“In accordance with rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representatives of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Syrian Arab Republic and Turkey to participate in this meeting. In accordance with rule 39 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite Mrs. Izumi Nakamitsu, High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, to participate in this meeting. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. I wish to draw the attention of Council members to document S/2022/76, which contains the text of a letter dated 31 January 2022 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council. I now give the floor to Mrs. Nakamitsu.”
2022-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8982 (2022) · source
“There are no more names inscribed on the list of speakers. I will now adjourn the meeting so that the Council can continue its discussion on the subject in closed consultations. The meeting rose at 11.25 a.m.”
2022-02-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8969 (2022) · source
“Port-au-Prince needs responsible international assistance in order to prevent further divisions within Haitian society and allowing the situation to spiral into a regional humanitarian crisis. Russia, together with its colleagues in the Security Council, will continue to work to ensure that international assistance provided through the United Nations results in a genuine normalization of the situation in Haiti, strengthening the country’s sovereignty and self-sufficiency. I resume my functions as President of the Council. I now give the floor to the representative of Haiti.”
2022-02-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8969 (2022) · source
“The complex of problems that have accumulated in Haiti must be resolved urgently, starting with the principal issue, namely, political stabilization. That can be achieved only through dialogue based on existing legislation, which must lead to elections and increased trust and support from the general public. If that is does not occur, the country will run the risk of falling into an abyss, and reconstruction and development will be delayed for many years. We encourage Haitians to swiftly engage in an internal dialogue to find a solution to the crisis. The United Nations mission must not only assist in that regard, but also make such a dialogue an absolute priority.”
2022-02-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8969 (2022) · source
“Against that backdrop, we are also seeing alarming reports that Haiti is being flooded with small arms, which, as we know, are not manufactured in the country. The only possible way for those small arms to enter the country is through seaports, over which the Government must regain full control. Otherwise, the issue of rampant gang activity will transform from one of a range of security threats into a political factor, which will be impossible to ignore. We note with regret the lack of significant progress in the investigation into the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in July last year. There are also concerning reports of possible foreign involvement in that crime, which the United Nations Secretary-General rightly referred to as an attack on democracy. Those responsible must be duly punished.”
2022-02-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8969 (2022) · source
“As a result, criminal elements have become increasingly active, and the situation as a whole has been compounded by the coronavirus disease pandemic. Today, Haiti is in a state of profound crisis, marked by rising political instability, criminal gang activity, civil unrest and sever economic, energy, migration and humanitarian problems. There is a power vacuum at all levels, with Government structures that lack authority, a paralysed judicial system and ineffective law enforcement agencies. We are witnessing the efforts of Prime Minister Ariel Henry’s Government to try to reach a compromise between the various social forces to stabilize the situation in the country and launch reform processes. However, it is premature to talk about progress.”
2022-02-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8969 (2022) · source
“I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of the Russian Federation. We thank the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Ms. Helen La Lime, for her briefing on the situation in the country and the work of the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti. Over many months, tensions in Haiti have escalated and are a source of grave concern. We are convinced that the root cause of such tensions is the lack of progress in the internal dialogue between political forces and society, which has led to the de facto paralysis of the legislative branch. That, in turn, has affected the State’s ability to effectively address urgent day-to-day tasks, above all guaranteeing the safety of the population.”
2022-02-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8969 (2022) · source
“In accordance with rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representative of Haiti to participate in this meeting. In accordance with rule 39 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite Ms. Helen La Lime, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Haiti and Head of the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti, to participate in this meeting. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. I wish to draw the attention of Council members to document S/2022/117, which contains the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti. I now give the floor to Ms. La Lime.”
2022-02-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8969 (2022) · source
“There are no more names inscribed on the list of speakers. I will now adjourn the meeting so that the Council can continue its discussion on the subject in closed consultations. The meeting rose at 4.50 p.m.”
2022-02-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8966 (2022) · source
“In that regard, we once again remind all parties to the conflict of the need to ensure unimpeded humanitarian access to all those in need; to lift the land, air and sea blockades on the country; and rescind all restrictions on deliveries of foodstuffs, medicines and other basic goods to all areas of Yemen without exception. In conclusion, we stress that the conflict in Yemen has a regionwide impact, given that it affects, inter alia, the safety of navigation. We also recall resolution 598 (1987) and other initiatives, including the Russian concept of collective security, designed to stabilize the situation in the Persian Gulf region. I now resume my functions as President of the Council. I give the floor to the representative of Yemen.”
2022-02-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8966 (2022) · source
“That settlement should be inclusive in nature and based on the principles of taking into account the opinions of all elements of Yemeni society, including representatives of all creeds, political forces and regions of the country. To that end, we support his plans to conduct consultations with all Yemeni stakeholders regarding the settlement’s new framework parameters. Against the backdrop of an impasse in the political process, we are particularly concerned by the dire socioeconomic and humanitarian situations in Yemen, which have long been teetering on the brink of disaster. As we heard today, that applies to the entire territory of Yemen, regardless of who is in control. Not a single area of Yemen can be called a safe place in terms of sustainable food and medical supplies.”
2022-02-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8966 (2022) · source
“On our part, we intend to continue to actively urge the official Yemeni authorities and the leadership of Ansar Allah to display a constructive approach and readiness to compromise when addressing their differences. We believe that our common goal is to ensure a comprehensive and lasting resolution of Yemen’s numerous problems, which are also affecting neighbouring States. Traditionally, the central role in that process is assigned to the United Nations and the Special Envoy for Yemen, Mr. Grundberg, who was hosted by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 26 November 2021. We support the Special Envoy’s activities as a mediator and trust that he will soon come up with specific modalities of a road map for a settlement.”
2022-02-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8966 (2022) · source
“We are convinced that such attempts to shift hostilities from Yemen to the territory of neighbouring States have the potential for a further escalation of violence. At the same time, we must acknowledge that the return of strikes and related violations of international humanitarian law are a direct consequence of an acute military and political crisis that has lasted for almost seven years. The new spiral of escalation poses a genuine threat to regional security. In that regard, we urge the warring parties to strictly abide by international humanitarian law and to fully and immediately reject all operations that result in the destruction of civilian infrastructure and civilian casualties. We are extremely concerned by the growing number of such incidents that occurred recently.”
2022-02-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8966 (2022) · source
“I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of the Russian Federation. We wish to thank the Special Envoy of the Secretary- General, Mr. Grundberg, and the Under-Secretary- General for Humanitarian Affairs, Mr. Griffiths, for providing an overview of the political and humanitarian situations in Yemen. We continue to closely monitor the escalation of hostilities in Yemen, including in Ma’rib and Shabwah governorates, which are becoming increasingly ferocious and resulting in a growing number of casualties among civilians, as well as refugees and internally displaced persons. We are seriously concerned by the continuing attacks on civilian infrastructure, both in Yemen and beyond its borders in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.”
2022-02-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8966 (2022) · source
“Griffiths and Ambassador Ferit Hoxha, Permanent Representative of Albania, in his capacity as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014). I now give the floor to Mr. Grundberg.”
2022-02-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8966 (2022) · source
“In accordance with rule 37 of the Security Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representative of Yemen to participate in this meeting. In accordance with rule 39 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite the following briefers to participate in this meeting: Mr. Hans Grundberg, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen, and Mr. Martin Griffiths, Under-Secretary- General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. I wish to draw the attention of Council members to document S/2022/50, which contains the text of a letter dated 25 January 2022 from the Panel of Experts on Yemen addressed to the President of the Security Council. At this meeting, the Security Council will hear briefings by Mr. Grundberg, Mr.”
2022-02-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8966 (2022) · source